In Defence of the Open Question Argument

The purpose of this paper is to defend G. E. Moore's open question argument, understood as an argument directed against analytic reductionism, the view that moral properties are analytically reducible to non-moral properties. In the first section I revise Moore's argument in order to make it as plausible and resistant against objections as possible. In the following two sections I develop the argument further and defend it against the most prominent objections raised against it. The conclusion of my line of reasoning is that the open question argument offers the best explanation of our responses to the questions put in the argument, namely that analytic reductionism is mistaken. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons

Several proponents of the ‘buck-passing’ account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons.     

G.E. Moore and the relation between intrinsic value and human activity

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

No Other Life: death and Catholicism in the novels of Brian Moore

There is a critical consensus (Dahlie, 1969, 1981; Flood, 1974; O'Donoghue, 1990; Sullivan, 1996) that one theme predominates in Brian Moore's fiction: the literary portrayal of Roman Catholicism. Yet over the past five decades, Moore's attitude to Catholicism, now more ambivalent than openly antagonistic, has changed and developed just as Roman Catholicism, especially post‐Vatican II, has changed and developed. Refining such a literary consensus, this article argues that the literary examination of a metaphysics and theology of death has been central to Moore's portrayal of Catholicism. A critical examination will be provided here of the portrayal of death in a representative sample of Brian Moore's novels before a more detailed focus upon the novel from which this article takes its main title, No Other Life (1993). By way of open conclusion, literary case study will be highlighted as a means of engaging in that interdisciplinary realm where literature and theology examine similar themes. In particular, such interdisciplinary research will be contextualised as part of an international literary‐theological programme from which one volume has arisen and which the present author is currently editing (Gearon, forthcoming).     

The Question of Survival: The Death of Desire and the Weight of Life

This article aims to document the psychic injuries of torture. Psychic deadness, erasure of intersubjectivity, refusal of meaning-making, perversion of agency, and an inability to bear desire constitute the core features of the post-traumatic landscape of torture. The existential challenges in traumatized lives is examined, and questions are also raised about the ethics and unconscious defensive functions of the term "survival." Clinical materials with various torture patients are reported to explore the process of working through the losses and paradoxes of trauma. The role of unmourned loss and the defense of fetishizing the trauma are highlighted as the motivating force and the problem in the current preoccupation with trauma in modern Western culture.     

Wittgenstein as a Philosopher of Technology: Tool Use,Forms of Life,Technique, and a Transcendental Argument

The work of Ludwig Wittgenstein is seldom used by philosophers of technology, let alone in a systematic way, and in general there has been little discussion about the role of language in relation to technology. Conversely, Wittgenstein scholars have paid little attention to technology in the work of Wittgenstein. In this paper we read the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty in order to explore the relation between language use and technology use, and take some significant steps towards constructing a framework for a Wittgensteinian philosophy of technology. This framework takes on board, and is in line with, insights from postphenomenological and hermeneutic approaches, but moves beyond those approaches by benefiting from Wittgenstein’s insights into the use of tools, technique, and performance, and by offering a transcendental interpretation of games, forms of life, and grammar. Focusing on Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language in the Investigations, we first discuss the relation between language use and technology use, understood as tool use, by drawing on his analogy between language and tools. This suggests a more general theory of technology use, understood as performance. Then we turn to his epistemology and argue that Wittgenstein’s understanding of language use can be embedded within a more general theory about technology use understood as tool use and technique, since language-in-use is always already a skilled and embodied technological practice. Finally, we propose a transcendental interpretation of games, forms of life, and grammar, which also gives us a transcendental way of looking at technique, technological practice, and performance. With this analysis and interpretation, further supported by comments on robotics and music, we contribute to using and integrating Wittgenstein in a more systematic way within philosophy of technology and engage with perennial questions from the philosophical tradition.