A Model of Consciousness

Using a combination of reviewing the extensive relevant literature, the author's original scientific research, and exploring the boundaries of human experiences, this article develops a model for consciousness. As a consequence, consciousness is elevated in the scientific understanding of the structure of the Universe, possibly enabling easier interpretation of such concepts as the anthropic principle and quantum physics. The handling of information is a key, leading to a review of the Information Field theory, together with a preliminary attempt at striking the appropriate balance between mind and matter.     

The traumatic roots of containment: the evolution of Bion's metapsychology

W. R. Bion wrote repeatedly about his World War I experiences as a tank officer, thus engaging in historicizing a traumatic emotional experience. A close reading of the many layers in these writings suggests that the war experiences influenced the metapsychology he created. The author argues that haunting questions regarding the ability of the mind to survive trauma led Bion to elaborate on the process of containing emotional experience, and hence to address the lack of an intricate theory of thinking in psychoanalytic metapsychology and to offer a vision of a mind struggling to survive, culminating in the growth of a postmodern consciousness.     

Waves,streams, states,and self: An outline of an integral psychology 1

Abstract

Although far from unanimous, there seems to be a general consensus that neither mind nor brain can be reduced without remainder to the other. This essay argues that indeed both mind and brain need to be included in a nonreductionistic way in any genuinely integral theory of consciousness. In order to facilitate such integration, this essay presents the results of an extensive cross‐cultural literature search on the “mind” side of the equation, suggesting that the mental phenomena that need to be considered in any integral theory include developmental levels or waves of consciousness, developmental lines or streams of consciousness, states of consciousness, and the self (or self‐system). A “master template” of these various phenomena, culled from over one‐hundred psychological systems East and West, is presented. It is suggested that this master template represents a general summary of the “mind” side of the brain‐mind integration. The essay concludes with reflections on the “hard problem,” or how the mind‐side can be integrated with the brain‐side to generate a more integral theory of consciousness.     

Wishing to Be White: Begging to Be Black

With race in mind, in this response the author draws on her own experiences of exilic consciousness, racial melancholia, whiteness, dissociation, and self-censorship to dialogue with Yvette Esprey. The author explores the issue of voice and how this is affected by context. The notions of the normative unconscious, K (nots), and the anti-analytic third are differentiated from one another. The relative weight given in the literature to unconscious processes such dissociation as opposed to more conscious self-censorship is explored in theory and with reference to Esprey’s case studies.     

Psychic reality and the nature of consciousness

In this paper we make the case for a psychoanalytically informed reconsideration of the phenomena of consciousness. Classically, following Freud, who viewed consciousness as merely a reflection or perception of unconscious mental activity, psychoanalysts have tended to regard a focus on conscious experience as potentially reductionistic and at risk of overlooking the mind's deeper structures. We describe the case of Mr K, a patient who experienced disturbances of consciousness that forced us to consider the possibility that the capacity to experience ourselves as conscious, intentional agents in a coherent world of objects is not merely a modality of perception but rather a maturational and developmental achievement that to some degree depends on adequate experiences of caregiving and is vital in ensuring the possibility of human communication. As such, it is a capacity that is vulnerable to experiences of neglect and maltreatment. We suggest that as well as compromising the capacity to think about one's own and other people's feelings, such experiences may have the further adverse consequence of leading the individual to experience and risk becoming conscious of certain dangerously maladaptive, destructive states of mind which in normal development remain inaccessible to conscious experience. Phenomenologically, such states of mind are experienced as fragmentation and disturbances of consciousness. We discuss the clinical implications of these reflections and the limitations they place on psychoanalytic work in the context of their impact on the work with Mr K.     

The Field of Consciousness and Extended Cognition

Extended cognition theorists claim that the definition of cognition can be extended to include not only the brain, but also the body and environment. In a series of works, Mark Rowlands has envisioned a new science of mind that explores the externalism of consciousness and cognition. This paper connects Rowlands’ work with the phenomenology of Aron Gurwitsch. It shows how Gurwitsch’s field of consciousness, in particular his conception of the marginal halo, can provide a distinct, organized way of thinking about extended cognition. A key question considered is from where do cognitive processes project and disclose meanings? By thinking of location as locus—a projecting pathway of points of intentional opportunity—organization in extended cognition becomes organization in a field of consciousness. The marginal halo in the field of consciousness is articulated as this locus of intentionality, what Rowlands (The new science of the mind: from extended mind to embodied phenomenology, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2010) calls “the noneliminable intentional core”. Problems of cognitive bloat and personal character are addressed in light of the findings. In addition to situating Gurwitsch’s work within the extended mind movement for the first time, this study highlights the importance of the marginal halo, largely neglected in previous Gurwitsch scholarship.     

Blackout of my nights: Contentless,timeless and selfless report from the night in patients with central hypersomnias

At the extreme spectrum of consciousness during sleep, some patients with rare hypersomnias reported experiencing a specific night ‘blackout’ when sleeping, i.e., an absence of experiences or recall of them from sleep onset to offset. Thus, we explored through questionnaires the conscious experiences (dreaming experience, mind, self) during the night in 133 patients with idiopathic hypersomnia, 108 patients with narcolepsy, and 128 healthy controls. The night blackout was more frequent in idiopathic hypersomnia than in narcolepsy and control groups. Patients with idiopathic hypersomnia and frequent night amnesia had lower dream recall frequencies, and felt more often sleep as deep and mind as blank during the night. They had a higher proportion of slow wave sleep on their (retrospectively collected) sleep recordings than those without night blackout. This night blackout provides a new model for studying loss of consciousness during sleep, here as a contentless, selfless and timeless feeling upon awakening.     

Re-representing consciousness: dissociations between experience and meta-consciousness

A distinction is drawn between non-conscious (unexperienced), conscious (experienced), and meta-conscious (re-represented) mental processes. There is evidence for two types of dissociations between consciousness and meta-consciousness, the latter being defined as the intermittent explicit re-representation of the contents of consciousness. Temporal dissociations occur when an individual, who previously lacked meta-consciousness about the contents of consciousness, directs meta-consciousness towards those contents; for example, catching one's mind wandering during reading. Once meta-consciousness is triggered, translation dissociations can occur if the re-representation process misrepresents the original experience, such as when one verbally reflects on non-verbal experiences or takes stock of subtle or ambiguous experiences.     

Hylomorphism and the Construct of Consciousness

Topoi - The hard problem of consciousness has held center stage in the philosophy of mind for the past two decades. It claims that the phenomenal character of conscious experiences—what...     

简论里贝特的意识理论

里贝特是人类意识和自由意志的实验研究领域的一个卓越的、先驱性的神经科学家。里贝特的意识研究工作涉及如下四个方面：（1）关于意识研究的认识论原则;（2）对意识现象本性的界定;（3）意识机制的时控理论;（4）对自由意志的阐释和有意识的心智场理论。里贝特的意识研究独树一帜,其时控理论具有坚实可信的实验证据,它从时间维度揭示了有意识的主观体验以及无意识的心智功能与神经活动之间的时间机制。     

Christian Mysticism and Science: The Phenomenological Dimension

Abstract

In this second of three papers, I identify three fundamental phenomenological themes that have informed Christian mystical theology and then explore how these themes might be given further understanding via natural science. The first theme, detachment, minimizes any association with the secular world in favor of humility and openness to God. Detachment is chosen in consciousness using a resonant global workspace linked through the hippocampus to reconstructions of both declarative and emotional memory. The second theme, infused contemplation, is concerned with God's top-down revelation to the recollected mind of the mystic. The resulting top-down resonance creates an appropriate theory of mind for infused contemplation, as the human mind is now more perfectly linked with the mind of God. The third theme is mystical union, which both theology and science claim occurs within consciousness. Starting in intentional consciousness, the mystic undergoes an unmediated surrender beyond cognition to non-intentional consciousness. Because God fills the center of our being, a resonating luminosity can thus occur arising from the union of God and self within pure consciousness.     

Chaos theory and the evolution of consciousness and mind: A thermodynamic-holographic resolution to the mind-body problem

This address describes Neurological Positivism's (NP) energetic evolution of consciousness, mind, and the brain-mind relationship within a model that integrates ideas and research from chaos theory, Pribram's holonomic brain theory, evolutionary theory, and the laws of thermodynamics (the energy laws The energetic evolution and encapsulation of space-time consciousness from chaotic-holographic environments is described. Consciousness is described as a natural evolutionary space-time template of continuously generated self-referential energy patterns (algorithms). The energetic evolution of mind is described as a natural self-referential exteriorization of the algorithmic organization of consciousness in the form of culturally shared mental models. It is proposed that the brain-mind energy relationship has historically undergone and continues to undergo change, and that this change is a natural thermodynamic arrow that constitutes the evolution of culture. That is, the evolution of culture proceeds in the direction of progressively more complete and efficient exteriorizations of the algorithmic organization of the brain-thus, for example, the recent evolution of brain-like computing systems and virtual reality systems. Accordingly, an uneven, but closing, central-energy-state identity (self-similarity) between brain and mind is described. It is concluded that NP's conception of mind helps us understand the evolutionary unfoldment of culture, and provides a sense of direction as to its future.     

Husserl on Minimal Mind and the Origins of Consciousness in the Natural World

Husserl Studies - The main aim of this article is to offer a systematic reconstruction of Husserl’s theory of minimal mind and his ideas pertaining to the lowest level of consciousness in...     

Near-Death Experience,Consciousness, and the Brain: A New Concept about the Continuity of Our Consciousness Based on Recent Scientific Research on Near-Death Experience in Survivors of Cardiac Arrest

In this article first some general aspects of near-death experience will be discussed, followed by questions about consciousness and its relation to brain function. Details will be described from our prospective study on near-death experience in survivors of cardiac arrest in the Netherlands, which was published in the Lancet in 2001. In this study it could not be shown that physiological, psychological, or pharmacological factors caused these experiences after cardiac arrest. Neurophysiology in cardiac arrest and in a normal functioning brain will be explained. Finally, implications for consciousness studies will be discussed, and how it could be possible to explain the continuity of our consciousness. Scientific study of NDE pushes us to the limits of our medical and neurophysiologic ideas about the range of human consciousness and mind–brain relation.     

The frontal lobes and theory of mind: developmental concepts from adult focal lesion research

The primary objective in this paper is to present a framework to understand the structure of consciousness. We argue that consciousness has been difficult to define because there are different kinds of consciousness, hierarchically organized, which need to be differentiated. Our framework is based on evidence from adult focal lesion research. The different types of consciousness are associated with distinct brain regions, with the higher levels of consciousness related to self-awareness and theory of mind (both facets of consciousness), with an emphasis on the role of the frontal lobes. The secondary objective is to use this structure to suggest hypotheses about the potential effect of frontal dysfunction at various developmental stages, and including both congenital and acquired brain injury.     

Ritual Body Postures: Empirical Study of a Neurophysiological Unique Altered State of Consciousness

This study examines ritual body postures (RBPs), a technique for the induction of a unique altered state of consciousness (ASC) characterized by the paradoxical arousal of a combined trophotropic and ergotropic trance. The objectives were (a) to test the specificity of RBPs, (b) to describe effects on daily life, and (c) to analyze experts and novices regarding the aforementioned objectives. The study was conducted over a ten-month period with 19 participants. Participant observation and open-ended interviews were conducted, and previous experiences with RBPs and ASCs were assessed. Experience-focused interviews were conducted with four novices and four experts. (a) No specificity of the RBPs was noted; (b) effects on daily life included higher awareness of the body, mind, and social interactions, above all a better understanding of the participant's biography, increased self-care and self-assertion, and higher levels of tolerance and acceptance; (c) novices described more tactile and nociceptive experiences, experts more visionary experiences. Considering effects on daily life, no differences were detected between novices and experts. ASC experiences while in RBPs serve the satisfaction of basic needs that are central to counseling and psychotherapy. Due to their unique paradoxical arousal, RBPs open up an independent research field for future studies on ASCs.     

Colour Discrimination And Monitoring Theories of Consciousness

According to the monitoring theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious in virtue of being represented in the right way by a monitoring state. David Rosenthal, William Lycan, and Uriah Kriegel have developed three different influential versions of this theory. In order to explain colour experiences, each of these authors combines his version of the monitoring theory of consciousness with a specific account of colour representation. Even though Rosenthal, Lycan, and Kriegel disagree on the specifics, they all hold that colours are represented by a single type of mental state. The main goal of this paper is to show that a more complex account of colour representation is needed for the monitoring theory of consciousness to do justice to the phenomenology of colour experiences. In particular, I will argue that the fine-grained character of colour experience—that is, the fact that perceivers can become conscious of small differences between colours—requires that colour representation be construed in terms of two different types of mental states, namely sensory states that represent appearance properties and colour representations that represent physical colours.