Disgusting bodies, disgusting religion: the biology of Tantra

Hard-core Tantric practice is disgusting, a point several scholars make. Scholarly interpretations of Tantric disgustingness, however, tend to follow the lead of Mary Douglas in suggesting that what disgusts is ultimately a reflection of social–historical concerns with borders and boundaries. Such interpretations fail to take seriously the Tantric consumption of feces, menstrual blood, urine, semen, and phlegm. Likewise, they fail to take seriously the particular sexual act involved, that is, intercourse with a menstruating, riding-astride, out-of-caste, mother-substitute. Consulting contemporary disgust research, I suggest that hard-core Tantra is literally disgusting because it is literally maladaptive. Disgust was naturally selected to deter the ingestion of bio-toxic pathogens as well as the practice of suboptimal sexual intercourse. Disgust maintains the species' viability. Tantra confounds disgust and thus disgusts. Tantra engages antibiological behaviors in its characteristically religious war against the body. As a disgusting religion, Tantra may be a perfected religion.     

厌恶情绪影响道德判断的发展研究

厌恶情绪的产生是为了回避潜在的病菌的威胁。研究发现,相比中性情绪状态下,厌恶情绪让人们更反对违背道德的行为,认为这些行为更错。目前,对于厌恶情绪对道德判断影响的发展还没有相关的研究。本实验以小学一年级,四年级及成人为研究对象来考察厌恶情绪对道德判断影响的发展。实验中被试被随机分入厌恶启动组和控制组,完成厌恶情绪任务和行为的道德判断任务。研究结果显示,在启动厌恶情绪之后,四年级和成人被试对道德违背行为的错误程度判断更为严格,同时四年级被试对行为的回避程度更高。一年级被试在厌恶情绪和控制条件下道德判断差异不显著。研究结果说明厌恶情绪对道德判断的影响是从无到有逐渐发展的。     

Imagine no religion: Heretical disgust,anger and the symbolic purity of mind

Immoral actions, including physical/sexual (e.g., incest) and social (e.g., unfairness) taboos, are often described as disgusting. But what about immoral thoughts, more specifically, thoughts that violate religious beliefs? Do heretical thoughts taint the purity of mind? The present research examined heretical disgust using self-report measures and facial electromyography. Religious thought violations consistently elicited both self-reported disgust and anger. Feelings of disgust also predicted harsh moral judgement, independent of anger, and were mediated by feelings of “contamination”. However, religious thought violations were not associated with a disgust facial expression (i.e., levator labii muscle activity) that was elicited by physically disgusting stimuli. We conclude that people (especially more religious people) do feel disgust in response to heretical thoughts that is meaningfully distinct from anger as a moral emotion. However, heretical disgust is not embodied in a physical disgust response. Rather, disgust has a symbolic moral value that marks heretical thoughts as harmful and aversive.     

Naturalism, Reduction and Normativity: Pressing from Below

David Papineau's model of scientific reduction, contrary to his intent, appears to enable a naturalist realist account of the primitive normativity involved in a biological adaptation's being "for" this or that (say the eye's being for seeing). By disabling the crucial anti-naturalist arguments against any such reduction, his model would support a cogni-tivist semantics for normative claims like "The heart is for pumping blood, and defective if it doesn't." No moral claim would follow, certainly. Nonetheless, by thus "pressing from below" we may learn something about moral normativity. For instance, suppose non-cognitivists like Mackie are right that the semantics of normative claims should be "unified": if the semantics of moral claims is non-cognitivist, so too is that of all normative claims. Then, assuming that a naturalist reduction does yield a sound cognitivist account of the primitive normativity, it would follow that our semantics of moral claims is cognitivist as well.     

Disgust as embodied moral judgment

How, and for whom, does disgust influence moral judgment? In four experiments participants made moral judgments while experiencing extraneous feelings of disgust. Disgust was induced in Experiment 1 by exposure to a bad smell, in Experiment 2 by working in a disgusting room, in Experiment 3 by recalling a physically disgusting experience, and in Experiment 4 through a video induction. In each case, the results showed that disgust can increase the severity of moral judgments relative to controls. Experiment 4 found that disgust had a different effect on moral judgment than did sadness. In addition, Experiments 2-4 showed that the role of disgust in severity of moral judgments depends on participants' sensitivity to their own bodily sensations. Taken together, these data indicate the importance-and specificity-of gut feelings in moral judgments.     

How Transparent is Disgust?

According to the so‐called transparency thesis, what is disgusting in nature cannot but be disgusting in art. This paper critically discusses the arguments that have been put forward in favour of the transparency thesis, starting with Korsmeyer's ( 2011 ) sensory view of disgust. As an alternative, it offers an account of the relationship between disgust and representation that explains, at least in part, whatever truth there is in the transparency thesis. Such an account appeals to a distinction between object‐centric and situation‐centric emotions.     

A bad taste in the mouth: gustatory disgust influences moral judgment

Can sweet-tasting substances trigger kind, favorable judgments about other people? What about substances that are disgusting and bitter? Various studies have linked physical disgust to moral disgust, but despite the rich and sometimes striking findings these studies have yielded, no research has explored morality in conjunction with taste, which can vary greatly and may differentially affect cognition. The research reported here tested the effects of taste perception on moral judgments. After consuming a sweet beverage, a bitter beverage, or water, participants rated a variety of moral transgressions. Results showed that taste perception significantly affected moral judgments, such that physical disgust (induced via a bitter taste) elicited feelings of moral disgust. Further, this effect was more pronounced in participants with politically conservative views than in participants with politically liberal views. Taken together, these differential findings suggest that embodied gustatory experiences may affect moral processing more than previously thought.     

NATURAL GOODNESS AND NATURAL EVIL

In Natural Goodness Philippa Foot gives an analysis of the concepts we use to describe the characteristics of living things. She suggests that we describe them in functional terms, and this allows us to judge organisms as good or defective depending on how well they perform their distinctive functions. Foot claims that we can judge intentional human actions in the same way: the virtues contribute in obvious ways to good human functioning, and this provides us with grounds for making moral judgements. This paper criticises Foot’s argument by challenging her notion of function. I argue that the type of judgement she makes about living things requires an evolutionary biological account of function. However, such an account would render her meta‐ethical claims implausible, since it is unlikely that human beings are adapted to be maximally virtuous. I conclude that Foot is wrong about the logical structure of our judgements of human action.     

Moral violations reduce oral consumption

Consumers frequently encounter moral violations in everyday life. They watch movies and television shows about crime and deception, hear news reports of corporate fraud and tax evasion, and hear gossip about cheaters and thieves. How does exposure to moral violations influence consumption? Because moral violations arouse disgust and because disgust is an evolutionarily important signal of contamination that should provoke a multi-modal response, we hypothesize that moral violations affect a key behavioral response to disgust: reduced oral consumption. In three experiments, compared with those in control conditions, people drank less water and chocolate milk while (a) watching a film portraying the moral violations of incest, (b) writing about moral violations of cheating or theft, and (c) listening to a report about fraud and manipulation. These findings imply that “moral disgust” influences consumption in ways similar to core disgust, and thus provide evidence for the associations between moral violations, emotions, and consumer behavior.     

What Is Wrong with External Reasons?

In this paper I argue that only a subset of the reason statementsWilliams defines as external must be rejected as false. `A has areason to ' is necessarily false when the ends and aimsconstitutive of A's good close off the deliberative route from her S to the conclusion she has reason to . But when less important ends are at stake, it seems that a person's needs generally provide reasons for action, contrary to Williams's internalist account. I suspect, however, that there may remain inexorable disagreementover these claims because people value things in two distinct ways. Tosupport my suspicion, I explain how people's valuation can take either an agency-prioritizing or an end-prioritizing form. I then argue thatresolving the disagreement over Williams's internalist account ofreasons depends on whether it can be established that the agency-prioritizingform is the rationally superior form of valuation.     

MORALIZATION AND BECOMING A VEGETARIAN:

Abstract —We describe a rather common process that we call moralization, in which objects or activities that were previously morally neutral acquire a moral component. Moralization converts preferences into values, and in doing so influences cross-generational transmission (because values are passed more effectively in families than are preferences), increases the likelihood of internalization, invokes greater emotional response, and mobilizes the support of governmental and other cultural institutions. In recent decades, we claim, cigarette smoking in America has become moralized. We support our claims about some of the consequences of moralization with an analysis of differences between health and moral vegetarians. Compared with health vegetarians, moral vegetarians find meat more disgusting, offer more reasons in support of their meat avoidance, and avoid a wider range of animal foods. However, contrary to our prediction, liking for meat is about the same in moral and health vegetarians.     

Selves and Moral Units

Derek Parfit claims that, at certain times and places, the metaphysical units he labels "selves" may be thought of as the morally significant units (i.e., the objects of moral concern) for such things as resource distribution, moral responsibility, commitments, etc. But his concept of the self is problematic in important respects, and it remains unclear just why and how this entity should count as a moral unit in the first place. In developing a view I call "Moderate Reductionism," I attempt to resolve these worries, first by offering a clearer, more consistent account of what the concept of "self" should involve, and second by arguing for why selves should indeed be viewed as moral (and prudential) units. I then defend this view in detail from both "conservative" and "extreme" objections.     

KANTIAN VALUE REALISM

Why should we be interested in Kant's ethical theory? One reason is that we find his views about our moral responsibilities appealing. Anyone who thinks that we should treat other people with respect, that we should not use them as a mere means in ways to which they could not possibly consent, will be attracted by a Kantian style of ethical theory. But according to recent supporters of Kant, the most distinctive and important feature of his ethical theory is not his claims about the particular ethical duties that we owe to each other, but his views about the nature of value. They argue that Kant has an account of the relationship between practical reason and value, known as “Kantian constructivism” that is far superior to the traditional “value realist” theory, and that it is because of this that we should accept his theory. ¹ 1 Korsgaard (1996a, 1996b, 2003 ).
It is now standard for both supporters and critics to claim that Kant's moral theory stands or falls with Kantian constructivism. ² 2 Gaut (1997 ), Regan (2002 ).
But this is a mistake. In this paper, I sketch a rival Kantian theory of value, which I call Kantian value realism. I argue that there is textual evidence that Kant himself accepted value realism rather than constructivism. Whilst my aim in this paper is to set out the theory clearly rather than to defend it, I will try to show that Kantian value realism is preferable to Kantian constructivism and that it is worthy of further study.     

Is it disgusting to be reminded that you are an animal?

Six studies (Ns?=?65, 96, 120, 129, 40, 200) tested the hypothesis that being reminded of our animal nature makes us feel disgust. Participants from three cultural groups indicated the intensity of their disgust reactions to pleasant and unpleasant animal reminder stories and pictures as well as to a statement directly reminding them of their animal nature. Findings did not support the hypothesis: Pleasant animal reminders reminded respondents of their animal nature (even more powerfully than did unpleasant ones), but were not disgusting. The direct reminder of our animal nature was not disgusting. There was no significant correlation between disgust and being reminded of animal nature for disgusting (unpleasant) animal reminders. Thus, some disgusting events remind us of our animal nature, but they are not disgusting because they remind us of our animal nature. Animal reminders per se are not disgusting.     

Modesty as an excellence in moral perspective taking

I argue for an egalitarian conception of modesty. Modesty is a virtue because an apt expression of what is, and is not, morally salient in our attitudes toward persons and is important because we are prone to arrogance, self‐importance, and hero worship. To make my case, I consider 3 claims which have shaped recent discussions: first, that modesty is valuable because it obviates destructive social rankings; second, that modesty essentially involves an indifference to how others evaluate one's accomplishments; and third, the widespread but normatively fraught assumption that the modest person is deserving of credit. Although the first 2 features identify something significant about modesty, they fail to ground it. I argue that appeals to deserved credit bear a larger explanatory burden than has been supposed; they can smuggle in the illegitimate social hierarchies that modesty is supposed to counter. I make my case for modesty as an excellence in moral perspective by arguing that prominent, nonegalitarian, accounts of modesty allow for or promote illegitimate forms of social privilege. Modesty is valuable because it expresses a commitment to fair distribution of basic moral recognition and a skillful response to unjust social hierarchies at odds with this fair distribution.     

Will you touch a dirty diaper? Attitudes towards disgust and behaviour

Individuals differ in their willingness to engage with disgusting stimuli (e.g., dirty diapers). We propose that such differences are associated with attitudes towards disgust. Specifically, we predicted that people with less negative attitudes towards disgust (i.e., those who evaluate disgust less negatively) would be more willing to engage with disgusting stimuli. We asked participants to engage with disgusting stimuli in the laboratory and used two measures that assess behavioural and affective or cognitive components of attitudes towards disgust. As predicted, less negative attitudes towards disgust were associated with greater engagement with disgusting stimuli, above and beyond the current experience of disgust and the tendency to experience disgust. These findings stress the importance of attitudes towards emotions in understanding emotion-relevant behaviour.     

Pecunia olet: the role of incidental disgust in the ultimatum game

We address the role of the incidental emotion of disgust in the Ultimatum Game. Participants had to choose whether or not to accept a ? offer from a ?0 pot made by another participant; 120 were in a room where a disgusting smell was released and 120 were in a room with no particular smell. Acceptance rates were higher in the room with the disgusting smell. The effect was mainly carried by the male participants who also reported more disgust with the disgusting smell and judged the offer as less unfair than females. We propose a spontaneous discounting explanation. Acceptance rates were higher in the room with the disgusting smell because participants misattributed the disgust induced by the offer to the ambient disgusting smell.     

The Treatment of Oedipal Disgust: When One Person’s Sexual Delight Is Another’s Disgust

Sexual disgust has been conceptualized in terms of drive theory and preoedipal dynamics. Sexual disgust can also be conceptualized from a relational perspective that draws on oedipal psychodynamics as well as recent research on disgust as a form of embodied moral cognition. From a subjective viewpoint, sexual disgust is self-affirming, as it preserves the purity, sanctity, and desirability of the self in the face of polluting sexual contact. Yet from an other-centered viewpoint, sexual disgust precludes empathic recognition when it shames the object of sexual disgust and rationalizes its mistreatment. This dialectic of assertion (i.e., refusal to submit to something sexually disgusting) and recognition (i.e., affirmation as an object of sexual desire) plays out in adult romantic relationships when one partner’s sexual delight is the other partner’s sexual disgust.