正义意味着什么

与自由、平等、法治和民主等观念相比，正义是一个非常难以把握的观念。正义观念之所以难以把握，乃因为它是形式的，没有固定的内容。因此，我们要想弄清楚“正义意味着什么”,就需要对它加以进一步追问。从历史上说，有三种关于正义的追问，即前现代的、现代的和后现代的。从逻辑上说，也有三种关于正义的追问，它们是“什么的正义”“什么是正义”和“谁的正义”。历史与逻辑的追问是对应的。也就是说，对正义的追问可以分为三种，它们分别是“前现代的追问：什么的正义”“现代的追问：什么是正义”以及“后现代的追问：谁的正义”。正义不仅是形式的，也是程序性的。正义的形式性和程序性表明，正义的实质性内容是由政治价值赋予的。     

谁来关怀弱者——也谈诺齐克与罗尔斯之争

何者为正义或者何种正义的问题是诺齐克和罗尔斯争论的焦点,其中,我们可以窥见二人在弱者问题上的不同观点.在什么样的人才是弱者、弱者存在的条件是什么、对弱者的关怀与社会正义的关系等方面有着态度和方法的不一致.通过对此问题的探究,我们可以发现二人分歧的一个侧面.     

论西方正义思想的内在张力

正义问题的讨论在西方伦理学中呈现出一种紧张、对抗、冲突的景象,充满了内在的思辨张力.这种内在的思辨张力突出表现在三个方面:正义究竟是立足于社会的维面还是个人的维面?正义究竟是落实于乌托邦还是现实界?正义究竟是诉之于德性的完美还是制度的完善?正是这种内在的张力推动着西方伦理学不断深化对正义问题的理解和把握.     

论复合平等

分配的正义是一个宽广的观念。它把整个物品(goods)的世界都置于哲学反思的领域之内。没有什么会被忽略;我们公共生活的每一个特征都会被考察到。人类社会就是一个进行分配的社群。人类社会不全是分配的社会,但却主要是一个分配的社会：我们在一起共有(share)、划分(divide)和交换(exchange)。我们同样在一起制造那些我们所共有、划分和交换的事物;而制造——也就是工作——是通过劳动的划分而在我们中间分配的。我在经济中的处境,我在政治秩序中的地位,我在同侪中的声誉,我的物质的所有物：所有这些都自他人而来,到我这里。说我是正确地还是错误地、正义地还是不正义地拥有我所拥有的事物是可能的;但是给定分配的范围和参与者的人数,要作出这样的判断决不是轻易的。     

普遍的正义如何可能——柏拉图正义论及发微

柏拉图试图解决正义是什么、正义如何可能和正义是何种价值这样一些根本问题 ,其提问题的方式、解决路径都是柏拉图式的。有借鉴意义的是正义植根于心灵深处的土壤以及社会供给正义的途径。实现正义是一个艰难且复杂的社会历史过程 ,推进民主进程、使正义理念扎根于民众的日常生活深处 ,相对正义的社会才会被建立起来 ,基于此种理念之上的用以保证、体现和实现正义的制度才会被设计出来。     

论莱纳·福斯特作为辩护的正义思想

莱纳·福斯特认为,人是辩护的动物,正义观念可以获得合理的辩护,而且指向唯一的根源——辩护的权利;我们应该在辩护权利的基础上理解社会政治正义,并相应地建立社会基本结构的原则。可以说,他主张一种作为辩护的正义。作为辩护的正义以辩护的权利为基础,同时以相互性和普遍性为原则对辩护关系本身进行批判。作为辩护的正义被怀疑是一种纯粹程序的理论,只能为建立正义关系制定程序,而不介入实质的正义讨论。福斯特对这一怀疑进行了反驳,并将作为辩护的正义观念扩展到全球领域。     

论税收正义

税收是一种重要的道德存在.在我国,无论是民间还是学界关于税收德性的认识,经常会自觉不自觉地陷入一种"税收幻觉"之中,即认为税收是善的.与之不同,西方民众和学者对税收德性的界定却是:即便税收不是一种纯粹之恶,最多也只能是一种必要之恶.二者争论的焦点不是"税本恶"还是"税本善"的问题,而是税收正义能否实现的问题.纯粹之恶论者认为,既然税收本身是不公正的,我们显然无法将一种"罪恶之税"修正为"正义之税",因而税收正义是根本不可能的.必要之恶论者虽然也认为税是一种恶,但坚持税收正义并不是不可能的,国家可以通过严格的制度设计来校正税收之恶,在不同程度上实现税收的公平与正义.     

论正义与慈善

人们普遍持有正义与慈善的四种区分:一是正义的义务是消极义务,而慈善的义务是积极义务;二是正义的义务是可以强制的,而慈善的义务是不可以强制的;三是正义的义务是完善的义务,而慈善的义务是不完善的义务;四是正义是一个权利问题,而慈善则不是.这四种区分实质上似是而非.要想完整地把握正义与慈善,我们就必须对道德生活有一种整体的设想.     

正义的给予和正义的维护:两种不同的国家观——以罗尔斯和诺齐克为例

<正>一个国家(或政府)得以存在的基本理由是与对社会正义的追求分不开的。但是,国家应当是作为正义的维护者还是作为正义的给予者,对此在人类思想史上有着不同的认识,形成了两种不同的国家观。本文以罗尔斯与诺齐克为例,尝试对这两种国家观加以梳理。1.正义的给予:罗尔斯的正义观与国家观罗尔斯以对正义的考察和对社会制度的正义性考     

人的观念与全球正义

作为一种特定的人的观念,世界主义公民具有正义感和善观念这两种道德能力,拥有理智理性与合情理性的理念,是自由而平等的道德主体。这样一种人的观念也预制了全球正义的核心理念:全球正义是全球制度的首要美德;个人是全球正义的终极关怀单元;伦理普遍主义是全球正义的伦理基础;倡导平等主义的全球分配正义。作为世界主义公民的人的观念与全球正义理念是紧密相连、彼此印证和相互支撑的。     

The Influence of Perceived Injustice on the Endorsement of Political Leaders1

Recent public opinion polls have suggested that there is a striking lack of public support for national political leaders and institutions. The two studies discussed in this paper explore why public evaluations of political leaders and institutions are low. In particular, they examine the role of perceived injustice in creating dislike for and distrust of leaders and institutions. This focus upon justice is contrasted with the more traditional focus upon the level of outcomes received from the political system and upon congruence in citizen-leader policy preferences. The results strongly support a focus upon justice by showing that judgments of injustice exercise an influence upon leadership evaluations and in stitutional endorsements which is independent of beliefs about the level of outcomes the political system is providing to citizens or of public support for government policies. In fact, both studies suggest that judgments of justice or injustice have more influence upon the endorsement of political leaders and institutions than do outcome-related concerns.     

Global Inequality and International Institutions

This article considers the links between international institutions and global economic justice: how international institutions might be morally important; how they have changed; and at what those changes imply for justice. The institutional structure of international society has evolved in ways that help to undercut the arguments of those who take a restrictionist position towards global economic justice. There is now a denser and more integrated network of shared institutions and practices within which social expectations of global justice and injustice have become more securely established. But, at the same time, our major international social institutions continue to constitute a deformed political order. This combination of density and deformity shapes how we should think about international justice in general and has important implications for the scope, character, and modalities of global economic justice. Having laid out a view of normative development and where it leads, the article then examines why international distributive justice remains so marginal to current practice.     

Justice,authority, and the world order

This paper defends the pertinence of global justice in the contemporary world. It accepts, for the sake of argument, Nagel's view that matters of justice arise only when political authority is asserted or exercised and, connectedly, his rejection of the cosmopolitan thesis. However, it challenges his conclusion that considerations of justice do not apply beyond the state. It argues that on any plausible account of the relationship between authority and justice international institutions, such as the World Trade Organisation, are now authoritative in the right way to justify their evaluation from the point of view of justice.     

LOVE,JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL ESCHATOLOGY

In this paper, we explore the ontological and theological ground of political institutions in order to then reflect upon the eschatological calling of society. The paper builds on Tillich's ontological insight that love does not simply transcend justice, but that it permeates and drives justice, that justice gives form to love's reunion of the separated. This relation between love and justice is at play in political institutions: these unite human beings under forms of justice that must be transformed ever anew if they are not to lose touch with the dynamic power of love and freeze into increasingly unjust juridicalism. The modern history of Western civilisation bears witness to this ontological tension, and the phenomenon of globalisation is yet another instance of human society's mystical calling. Thus, love heads the dynamic movement that transforms political institutions ever anew. Yet society as a whole must become conscious of its ontology for humanity to truly reach its eschatological potential, and this will require both that theology recovers its ground and that political theory thinks theologically.     

TO INTERPRET,OR TO BE OMNISCIENT

Abstract

Susan Moller Okin has criticized Michael Sandel's view that the family is an example of an institution that is sometimes ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ justice, and for which justice is not, under the best conditions, a virtue. She argues that he both misses the point of justice as a virtue of social institutions and that he idealizes the family, and after undertaking this ‘ground-clearing’, goes on to argue that families should be just. This paper offers a qualified defense of Sandel. I argue, first, that Sandel has not missed the point of justice as a virtue of social institutions. But I go on to argue, more centrally, that if we distinguish between what I call ‘internal’ and ‘social’ justice of the family, and look carefully at the conclusions of Okin's own arguments, we see that she has really argued for the social justice of the family, and that this can be maintained alongside Sandel's vision of the family as an institution within which considerations of justice are neither central, nor necessarily appropriate. I try to carve out space both for Sandel's vision of the family, and for Okin's substantive feminist conclusions about family-based gender injustice.     

POWER IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AS THE SUBJECT OF JUSTICE

Abstract: The paper suggests that the state is subject to assessment according to principles of social justice because state institutions or practices exercise forms of power over which no particular person has control. This rationale for assessment of social justice equally applies to legally optional or informal social practices. But it does not apply to individual conduct. Indeed, it follows that principles of social justice cannot provide a basis for the assessment and guidance of individual choice. The paper develops this practice‐based conception of the subject of justice by rejoining G. A. Cohen's influential critique of Rawls’ focus on the “basic structure” of society.     

Marriage,Morality, and Institutional Value

This paper develops a Kantian account of the moral assessment of institutions. The problem I address is this: while a deontological theory may find that some legal institutions are required by justice, it is not obvious how such a theory can assess institutions not strictly required (or prohibited) by justice. As a starting-point, I consider intuitions that in some cases it is desirable to attribute non-consequentialist moral value to institutions not required by justice. I will argue that neither consequentialist nor virtue-ethical accounts account for these intuitions, suggesting that a distinctive deontological account is needed. The account I give is drawn from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals; I distinguish it from Kantian views of institutions developed by Barbara Herman and Onora O’Neill. Throughout, I use marriage as an example.

Framing,Reciprocity and the Grounds of Egalitarian Justice

John Rawls famously claims that ‘justice is the first virtue of social institutions’. On one of its readings, this remark seems to suggest that social institutions are essential for obligations of justice to arise. The spirit of this interpretation has recently sparked a new debate about the grounds of justice. What are the conditions that generate principles of distributive justice? I am interested in a specific version of this question. What conditions generate egalitarian principles of distributive justice and give rise to equality as a demand of justice? My paper focuses on relationalist answers to this question. Advocates of relationalism assume that ‘principles of distributive justice have a relational basis’, in the sense that ‘practice mediated relations in which individuals stand condition the content, scope and justification of those principles’. To say that principles of justice are ‘based’ on and ‘conditioned’ by practice mediated relations is ambiguous. I will here be concerned with advocates of what I call the relationalist requirement, viz. positions which assume that ‘practice mediated relations’ constitute a necessary existence condition for principles of egalitarian distributive justice. Relationalists who endorse this view come in different varieties. My focus is on relationalists that view social and political institutions as the relevant ‘practice mediated relation’. The question at stake, then, is this: Are institutionally mediated relations a necessary condition for equality to arise as a demand of justice? Strong relationalists of the institutionalist cast, call them advocates of the institutionalist requirement, differ in important respects. They argue about what set of institutions is foundationally significant, and they disagree on why only that institutional relation gives rise to egalitarian obligations of justice. My paper engages two ways of arguing for the institutionalist requirement: Julius’s framing argument and Andrea Sangiovanni’s reciprocity argument. The issue at stake are the grounds of egalitarian justice and I will argue that the institutionalist requirement is mistaken. It is not the case that egalitarian obligations of distributive justice arise only between and solely in virtue of individuals sharing a common institution.     

群体健康与关系“正义”

生命伦理学具有广泛性和综合性,着眼于群体健康是当前生命伦理学发展的趋势。在群体水平的生命伦理学的研究中,有关“正义”的概念是核心的问题。涛慕思·W·博格提出了正义的“关系概念”,借以考察范围广泛的社会制度与健康结果的产生具有什么样的因果关系,进而强调社会制度的制定者和支持者对其产生的健康结果负有责任。通过对此“关系概念”进行分析,以期对中国国内健康领域问题的解决有所启示。     

Burdened Societies and Transitional Justice

Following John Rawls, nonideal theory is typically divided into: (1) “partial-compliance theory” and (2) “transitional theory." The former is concerned with those circumstances in which individuals and political regimes do not fully comply with the requirements of justice, such as when people break the law or some individuals do not do their fair share within a distributive scheme. The latter is concerned with circumstances in which background institutions may be unjust or may not exist at all. This paper focuses on issues arising in transitional theory. In particular, I am concerned with what Rawls’ has called “burdened societies," that is, those societies that find themselves in unfavorable conditions, such that their historical, social or economic circumstances make it difficult to establish just institutions. The paper investigates exactly how such burdened societies should proceed towards a more just condition in an acceptable fashion. Rawls himself tells us very little, except to suggest that societies in this condition should look for policies and courses of action that are morally permissible, politically possible and likely to be effective. In this paper I first try to anticipate what a Rawlsian might say about the best way for burdened societies to handle transitional problems and so move towards the ideal of justice. Next, I construct a model of transitional justice for burdened societies. Ultimately, I argue for a model of transitional justice that makes use of a nonideal version of Rawls’ notion of the worst-off representative person.