A computational unification of cognitive behavior and emotion

Existing models that integrate emotion and cognition generally do not fully specify why cognition needs emotion and conversely why emotion needs cognition. In this paper, we present a unified computational model that combines an abstract cognitive theory of behavior control (PEACTIDM) and a detailed theory of emotion (based on an appraisal theory), integrated in a theory of cognitive architecture (Soar). The theory of cognitive control specifies a set of required computational functions and their abstract inputs and outputs, while the appraisal theory specifies in more detail the nature of these inputs and outputs and an ontology for their representation. We argue that there is a surprising functional symbiosis between these two independently motivated theories that leads to a deeper theoretical integration than has been previously obtained in other computational treatments of cognition and emotion. We use an implemented model in Soar to test the feasibility of the resulting integrated theory, and explore its implications and predictive power in several task domains.     

A multiple‐method analysis of appraisal–emotion relationships: The case of the prosocial intergroup emotions

Despite its status as a prominent set of theories for explaining the elicitation and differentiation of emotions, much appraisal theory and research offer little indication of the nature of the relationship expected between appraisals and emotions. Here, we present a three‐study, multiple‐method analysis in which we examine numerous ways of testing appraisal–emotion relationships using the “prosocial” intergroup emotions—sympathy, anger, and guilt—as an example. Results show that the set of appraisal dimensions that appears strongly characteristic of an emotion varies depending on the kind of appraisal—emotion relationship hypothesised and the experimental methodology/statistical analysis used. These findings demonstrate the utility of explicit theorising about the nature of the relationship between emotions and appraisals, and show how the hypothesised appraisal–emotion relationship and choice of methodology can affect the structure of appraisal theories. We recommend an analysis across multiple methods to provide a more complete picture of a given set of appraisal–emotion relationships.     

Appraisal,computational models,and scherer's expert system

Abstract

This paper discusses computational models of the mechanism of emotion elicitation according to appraisal theories of emotion. Following a brief review of earlier models, the general affordances of computational models are discussed. Scherer's (1993) recent “expert system” for predicting emotions is then examined in some detail, followed by an exploration of several alternative algorithms for computing an elicited emotion based on an appraisal specification.     

Appraisal of Emotions in Media Use: Toward a Process Model of Meta-Emotion and Emotion Regulation

Over the past 20 years, research on meta-emotion and related concepts such as meta-mood and need for affect has become fruitful and prominent across a variety of disciplines, including media psychology. This paper reviews the literature on meta-emotion and considers problems regarding the definition and operationalization of this construct. We propose a process model of meta-emotion and emotion regulation to integrate and extend existing work. Drawing on appraisal theories of emotion, we understand meta-emotion as a process that monitors and appraises emotions and recruits affective responses toward them, which results in a motivation to maintain and approach emotions, or to control and avoid them. This meta-emotion process plays an important role in media users' selection or rejection of specific media offerings and their invitation to experience emotion. We discuss how this framework may integrate previously unrelated findings on the role of emotions in guiding selective media use and conclude with directions for further research.     

EMA: A process model of appraisal dynamics

A computational model of emotion must explain both the rapid dynamics of some emotional reactions as well as the slower responses that follow deliberation. This is often addressed by positing multiple levels of appraisal processes such as fast pattern directed vs. slower deliberative appraisals. In our view, this confuses appraisal with inference. Rather, we argue for a single and automatic appraisal process that operates over a person’s interpretation of their relationship to the environment. Dynamics arise from perceptual and inferential processes operating on this interpretation (including deliberative and reactive processes). This article discusses current developments in a computational model of emotion processes and illustrates how a single-level model of appraisal obviates a multi-level approach within the context of modeling a naturalistic emotional situation.     

Intention,Emotion, and Action: A Neural Theory Based on Semantic Pointers

We propose a unified theory of intentions as neural processes that integrate representations of states of affairs, actions, and emotional evaluation. We show how this theory provides answers to philosophical questions about the concept of intention, psychological questions about human behavior, computational questions about the relations between belief and action, and neuroscientific questions about how the brain produces actions. Our theory of intention ties together biologically plausible mechanisms for belief, planning, and motor control. The computational feasibility of these mechanisms is shown by a model that simulates psychologically important cases of intention.     

Exploring the dynamics of the appraisal–emotion relationship: A constraint satisfaction model of the appraisal process

This paper presents a computational model of emotions that is based in an appraisal theoretical framework. The model explores the dynamics of the appraisal–emotion relationship using parallel constraint satisfaction. It proposes belief coherence, desire coherence and belief–desire coherence as basic principles and specifies how these principles can be realised in a parallel constraint satisfaction system. The model shows that the very same mechanisms that account for the formation of coherence or consistency are also pivotal for the emergence and alteration of emotional states and for the dynamics of the cognition–emotion relationship. Concrete simulation examples show how discrete emotions such as anger, pride, sadness, shame, surprise, relief and disappointment emerge out of these principles.     

A general theoretical framework for the design of artificial emotion systems in Autonomous Agents

Autonomous Agents (AAs) capable of exhibiting emotional behaviors have contributed to the development of natural human-machine interactions in several application domains. In order to provide AAs with emotional mechanisms, their underlying architecture must implement an Artificial Emotion System (AES), a computational model that imitates specific facets of human emotions. Although several AES have been reported in related literature, their design is generally supported on several emotion theories, leading researchers to model and integrate isolated emotion components and mechanisms into the architectures of AES. This theoretical foundation of AES contributes to ambiguities in the analysis and comparison of their underlying architectures, which demands the definition of standards, design guidelines, and integrative frameworks. In this paper, we present a psychologically inspired theoretical framework designed to serve as a platform for the unification of AES' components, the comparison of AES, and the design and implementation of AES in AAs. We analyze common emotion-related requirements of AES, emotion components involved in the design of this type of computational model, and emotion theories that drive the design of most AES. The validation of this framework demonstrates its compatibility with current AES and its feasibility as a model for unifying multiple emotional theories.     

Studying the emotion-antecedent appraisal process: An expert system approach

Abstract

The surprising convergence between independently developed appraisal theories of emotion elicitation and differentiation is briefly reviewed. It is argued that three problems are responsible for the lack of more widespread acceptance of such theories: (1) the criticism of excessive cognitivism raised by psychologists working on affective phenomena; (2) the lack of process orientation in linking appraisal to the complex unfolding of emotion episodes over time; and (3) the lack of consensus on the number and types of appraisal criteria between theorists in this domain. Although readers are referred to recent theoretical discussions and evidence from the neurosciences with respect to the first two issues, an empirical study using computerised experimentation is reported with respect to the third issue. Data obtained with an expert system based on Scherer's (1984a) “stimulus evaluation check” predictions show the feasibility of this approach in determining the number and types of appraisal criteria needed to explain emotion differentiation. It is suggested to use computer modelling and experimentation as a powerful tool to further theoretical development and collect pertinent data on the emotion-antecedent appraisal process.     

Integrating analogical mapping and general problem solving: the path-mapping theory

This article describes the path-mapping theory of how humans integrate analogical mapping and general problem solving. The theory posits that humans represent analogs with declarative roles, map analogs by lower-level retrieval of analogous role paths, and coordinate mappings with higher-level organizational knowledge. Implemented in the ACT-R cognitive architecture, the path-mapping theory enables models of analogical mapping behavior to incorporate and interface with other problem-solving knowledge. Path-mapping models thus can include task-specific skills such as encoding analogs or generating responses, and can make behavioral predictions at the level of real-world metrics such as latency or correctness. We show that the path-mapping theory can successfully account for the major phenomena addressed by previous theories of analogy. We also describe a path-mapping model that can account for subjects' incremental eye-movement and typing behavior in a story-mapping task. We discuss extensions and implications of this work to other areas of analogy and problem-solving research.     

Integration of Two Skeptical Emotion Theories: Dimensional Appraisal Theory and Russell's Psychological Construction Theory

This inquiry attempts to integrate two skeptical emotion theories: dimensional appraisal theory and Russell's (2003) psychological construction theory. To bring out the skeptical elements of these theories, I compare them first with two classic theories: affect program theory and discrete appraisal theory. The skeptical theories are similar to each other in that they replace the concept of emotion with the concept of emotional episode, and that they organize the variety within the set of emotional episodes according to dimensions instead of vernacular emotion subsets. Their differences concern the strength of the relations among the components in emotional episodes and the scientific status of the set of emotional episodes. To make an informed decision about the elements to keep and to revise from both theories, I engage in a separate analysis of the behavior-related components and the experience component, guided by insights from general behavior theories and general theories of consciousness. The analysis of the behavior-related components suggests the relatively uncharted idea that the so-called emotional aspect of behavior can be caused by a goal-directed mechanism. The analysis of the experience component reveals that different theories have emphasized different aspects of experience and hence different paths toward experience. The inquiry ends with an integrated theory that rejects the scientific status of emotions or emotional episodes, but accepts the scientific status of the components and sees strong causal relations among them.     

Two Models of Moral Judgment

This paper compares two theories and their two corresponding computational models of human moral judgment. In order to better address psychological realism and generality of theories of moral judgment, more detailed and more psychologically nuanced models are needed. In particular, a motivationally based theory of moral judgment (and its corresponding computational model) is developed in this paper that provides a more accurate account of human moral judgment than an existing emotion‐reason conflict theory. Simulations based on the theory capture and explain a range of relevant human data. They account not only for the original data that were used to support the emotion – reason conflict theory, but also for a wider range of data and phenomena.     

Enacting musical emotions. sense-making,dynamic systems,and the embodied mind

The subject of musical emotions has emerged only recently as a major area of research. While much work in this area offers fascinating insights to musicological research, assumptions about the nature of emotional experience seem to remain committed to appraisal, representations, and a rule-based or information-processing model of cognition. Over the past three decades alternative ‘embodied’ and ‘enactive’ models of mind have challenged this approach by emphasising the self-organising aspects of cognition, often describing it as an ongoing process of dynamic interactivity between an organism and its environment. More recently, this perspective has been applied to the study of emotion in general, opening up interesting new possibilities for theory and research. This new approach, however, has received rather limited attention in musical contexts. With this in mind, we critically review the history of music and emotion studies, arguing that many existing theories offer only limited views of what musical-emotional experience entails. We then attempt to provide preliminary grounding for an alternative perspective on music and emotion based on the enactive/dynamic systems approach to the study of mind.     

Cognition and emotion: a plea for theory

ABSTRACT

Research on cognition and emotion during the past 30 years has made reasonable progress in theory, methods and empirical research. New theories of the cognition–emotion relation have been proposed, emotion research has become more interdisciplinary, and improved methods of emotion measurement have been developed. On the empirical side, the main achievement of the past 30 years is seen to consist in the reduction of the set of serious contenders for a theory of emotions. Still, several important issues are not fully resolved, including the computational implementation of appraisal processes, the nature of emotions, and the link between emotions and actions. Also, quantitative theories of the cognition–emotion relation need to be refined and tested, and improved theories of the link between emotions and bodily and facial expressions need to be developed. To counter the dangers of theoretical fragmentation and knowledge loss, more efforts should be devoted to the analysis, reconstruction, comparison and integration of important theories and hypotheses in the field of emotion, as well as to the systematization of arguments in favor and against these theories and hypotheses.     

Walton's Quasi‐Emotions Do Not Go Away

The debate about how to solve the paradox of fiction has largely been a debate between Kendall Walton and the so‐called thought theorists. In recent years, however, Jenefer Robinson has argued, based on her affective appraisal theory of emotion, for a noncognitivist solution to the paradox as an alternative to the thought theorists’ solution and especially to Walton's controversial solution. In this article, I argue that, despite appearances to the contrary, Robinson's affective appraisal theory is compatible with Walton's solution, at the core of which lies the thesis that there are quasi‐emotions. Moreover, since Robinson's theory is compatible with Walton's solution, I show how it can be used as a model to empirically test whether quasi‐emotions exist.     

Alternatives to the fixed-set model: A review of appraisal models of emotion

Over several decades, appraisal theory has emerged as a prominent theoretical framework explaining the elicitation and differentiation of emotions, and has stimulated a great deal of theorising and empirical research. Despite the large amount of research in this area, there are many aspects of appraisal theory and research that remain unclear or problematic. In this review, we identify a common assumption of many appraisal theories—the fixed appraisal set—and argue that this assumption, combined with a lack of explicit theorising about the predicted relationship between appraisals and emotions, leads to a lack of clarity in both appraisal models and the empirical testing of those models. We recommend that appraisal theorists move in a direction already taken by a small number of theorists, and adopt the starting assumption of a variable appraisal set. We further suggest that theories of concepts and categorisation may inform theorising about appraisal–emotion relationships.     

Put your money where your mouth is! Explaining collective action tendencies through group-based anger and group efficacy

Insights from appraisal theories of emotion are used to integrate elements of theories on collective action. Three experiments with disadvantaged groups systematically manipulated procedural fairness (Study 1), emotional social support (Study 2), and instrumental social support (Study 3) to examine their effects on collective action tendencies through group-based anger and group efficacy. Results of structural equation modeling showed that procedural fairness and emotional social support affected the group-based anger pathway (reflecting emotion-focused coping), whereas instrumental social support affected the group efficacy pathway (reflecting problem-focused coping), constituting 2 distinct pathways to collective action tendencies. Analyses of the means suggest that collective action tendencies become stronger the more fellow group members "put their money where their mouth is." The authors discuss how their dual pathway model integrates and extends elements of current approaches to collective action.     

Toward Computational Model of Emotion from Individual Difference in Perceiving Facial Expressions

We propose a computational model for identifying emotional state of a facial expression from appraisal scores given by human observers utilizing their differences in perception. The appraisal model of human emotion is adopted as the basis of this evaluation process with appraisal variables as output. We investigated the performance for both categorical and continuous representation of the variables appraised by human observers. Analysis of the data exhibits higher degree of agreement between estimated Indian ratings and the available reference when these are rated through continuous domain. We also observed that emotional state with negative valence are influential in the perception of hybrid emotional state like ‘Surprise’, only when appraisal variables are labeled through categories of emotions. Thus, the proposed method has implications in developing software to detect emotion using appraisal variables in continuous domain, perceived from facial expression of an agent (or human subject). Further, this model can be customized to include cultural variability in recognizing emotions.     

Theories and Ordinals in Proof Theory

Astract How do ordinals measure the strength and computational power of formal theories? This paper is concerned with the connection between ordinal representation systems and theories established in ordinal analyses. It focusses on results which explain the nature of this connection in terms of semantical and computational notions from model theory, set theory, and generalized recursion theory.