元认知:态度与说服研究的新视角

态度元认知指个体对所持态度的主观判断(如态度是否正确、重要与否等),是态度强度的重要维度,并能在态度说服过程中发挥关键作用。首先介绍态度元认知的主要成分(态度确定性、重要性及矛盾性),然后重点阐述新近对态度说服元认知过程的解释模型:认知加工精细程度模型(ELM),内隐-外显双过程模型(APE)和元认知模型(MCM),并从来源属性(来源可信度)、受众属性(情绪及身体动作)、信息属性(信息与受众的匹配程度)和情景四个方面阐释了影响说服元认知过程的因素。未来可以在态度元认知成分及其影响、说服元认知过程的心理机制、态度元认知神经机制等方面展开进一步研究。     

Majority versus minority influence: the role of message processing in determining resistance to counter‐persuasion

Two experiments examined the extent to which attitudes changed following majority and minority influence are resistant to counter‐persuasion. In both experiments participants' attitudes were measured after being exposed to two messages, delayed in time, which argued opposite positions (initial message and counter‐message). In the first experiment, attitudes following minority endorsement of the initial message were more resistant to a second counter‐message only when the initial message contained strong versus weak arguments. Attitudes changed following majority influence did not resist the second counter‐message and returned to their pre‐test level. Experiment 2 varied whether memory was warned (i.e., message recipients expected to recall the message) or not, to manipulate message processing. When memory was warned, which should increase message processing, attitudes changed following both majority and minority influence resisted the second counter‐message. The results support the view that minority influence instigates systematic processing of its arguments, leading to attitudes that resist counter‐persuasion. Attitudes formed following majority influence yield to counter‐persuasion unless there is a secondary task that encourages message processing. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Resisting persuasion by the skin of one's teeth: the hidden success of resisted persuasive messages

Recent research has suggested that when people resist persuasion they can perceive this resistance and, under specifiable conditions, become more certain of their initial attitudes (e.g., Z. L. Tormala & R. E. Petty, 2002). Within the same metacognitive framework, the present research provides evidence for the opposite phenomenon--that is, when people resist persuasion, they sometimes become less certain of their initial attitudes. Four experiments demonstrate that when people perceive that they have done a poor job resisting persuasion (e.g., they believe they generated weak arguments against a persuasive message), they lose attitude certainty, show reduced attitude-behavioral intention correspondence, and become more vulnerable to subsequent persuasive attacks. These findings suggest that resisted persuasive attacks can sometimes have a hidden yet important success by reducing the strength of the target attitude.     

Attribution versus persuasion as a means for modifying behavior.

The present research compared the relative effectiveness of an attribution strategy with a persuasion strategy in changing behavior. Study 1 attempted to teach fifth graders not to litter and to clean up after others. An attribution group was repeatedly told that they were neat and tidy people, a persuasion group was repeatedly told that they should be neat and tidy, and a control group received no treatment. Attribution proved considerably more effective in modifying behavior. Study 2 tried to discover whether similar effects would hold for a more central aspect of school performance, math achievement and self-esteem, and whether an attribution of ability would be as effective as an attribution of motivation. Repeatedly attributing to second graders either the ability or the motivation to do well in math proved more effective than comparable persuasion or no-treatment control groups, although a group receiving straight reinforcement for math problem-solving behavior also did well. It is suggested that persuasion often suffers because it involves a negative attribution (a person should be what he is not), while attribution generally gains because it disguises persuasive intent.     

Thinking outside the box: a metacognitive / theory of mind perspective on concrete thinking

Concrete thinking, an extraordinarily difficult condition to treat, has been psychoanalytically theorized to result from failures of symbolization-problems forming, linking, or fathoming the meaning of symbols-and/or failures of differentiation, resulting in difficulties distinguishing symbols from the thing being symbolized, fantasy from reality, self from other. Though difficulties symbolizing and differentiating are clearly evident in patients whose thinking is concrete, these may be a manifestation of concrete thinking rather than a root cause. Childhood thinking is characteristically concrete, and a persistence of such thinking into adulthood can be adequately explained as a failure to develop a more sophisticated theory of mind. Given that patients who exhibit such thinking tend to respond poorly to classic psychoanalytic interpretations, alternative technical approaches have been proposed. One such approach, "metacognitive" in nature, draws on a mode of thought used by gifted individuals that helps them "think outside the box" by dispensing with a typical pattern-recognition search so that novel meanings might be discovered. Metacognition, thoughts about one's thoughts and thought processes, facilitates symbolic thinking by creating sufficient distance from one's thoughts to allow the consideration of alternative meanings.     

The influence of delaying judgments of learning on metacognitive accuracy: a meta-analytic review

Many studies have examined the accuracy of predictions of future memory performance solicited through judgments of learning (JOLs). Among the most robust findings in this literature is that delaying predictions serves to substantially increase the relative accuracy of JOLs compared with soliciting JOLs immediately after study, a finding termed the delayed JOL effect. The meta-analyses reported in the current study examined the predominant theoretical accounts as well as potential moderators of the delayed JOL effect. The first meta-analysis examined the relative accuracy of delayed compared with immediate JOLs across 4,554 participants (112 effect sizes) through gamma correlations between JOLs and memory accuracy. Those data showed that delaying JOLs leads to robust benefits to relative accuracy (g = 0.93). The second meta-analysis examined memory performance for delayed compared with immediate JOLs across 3,807 participants (98 effect sizes). Those data showed that delayed JOLs result in a modest but reliable benefit for memory performance relative to immediate JOLs (g = 0.08). Findings from these meta-analyses are well accommodated by theories suggesting that delayed JOL accuracy reflects access to more diagnostic information from long-term memory rather than being a by-product of a retrieval opportunity. However, these data also suggest that theories proposing that the delayed JOL effect results from a memorial benefit or the match between the cues available for JOLs and those available at test may also provide viable explanatory mechanisms necessary for a comprehensive account.     

Social influence on metacognitive evaluations: The power of nonverbal cues

Metacognitive evaluations refer to the processes by which people assess their own cognitive operations with respect to their current goal. Little is known about whether this process is susceptible to social influence. Here we investigate whether nonverbal social signals spontaneously influence metacognitive evaluations. Participants performed a two-alternative forced-choice task, which was followed by a face randomly gazing towards or away from the response chosen by the participant. Participants then provided a metacognitive evaluation of their response by rating their confidence in their answer. In Experiment 1, the participants were told that the gaze direction was irrelevant to the task purpose and were advised to ignore it. The results revealed an effect of implicit social information on confidence ratings even though the gaze direction was random and therefore unreliable for task purposes. In addition, nonsocial cues (car) did not elicit this effect. In Experiment 2, the participants were led to believe that cue direction (face or car) reflected a previous participant's response to the same question—that is, the social information provided by the cue was made explicit, yet still objectively unreliable for the task. The results showed a similar social influence on confidence ratings, observed with both cues (car and face) but with an increased magnitude relative to Experiment 1. We additionally showed in Experiment 2 that social information impaired metacognitive accuracy. Together our results strongly suggest an involuntary susceptibility of metacognitive evaluations to nonverbal social information, even when it is implicit (Experiment 1) and unreliable (Experiments 1 and 2).     

Knowing minds: Linking early perspective taking and later metacognitive insight

Recent metacognitive research using a partial knowledge task indicates that a firm understanding of ‘knowing about knowing’ develops surprisingly late, at around 6 years of age. To reveal the mechanisms subserving this development, the partial knowledge task was used in a longitudinal study with 67 children (33 girls) as an outcome measure at 5;9 (years;months). In addition, first- and second-order false belief was assessed at 4;2, 5;0, and 5;9. At 2;6, perspective taking and executive abilities were evaluated. Metacognition at 5;9 was correlated with earlier theory of mind and perspective taking – even when verbal intelligence and executive abilities were partialled out. This highlights the importance of perspective taking for the development of an understanding of one’s own mind.     

Cognitive and affective matching effects in persuasion: an amplification perspective

Past research suggests that cognitive and affective attitudes are more open to change toward cognitive and affective (i.e., matched) persuasive attacks, respectively. The present research investigates how attitude certainty influences this openness. Although an extensive literature suggests that certainty generally reduces an attitude's openness to change, the authors explore the possibility that certainty might increase an attitude's openness to change in the context of affective or cognitive appeals. Based on the recently proposed amplification hypothesis, the authors posit that high (vs. low) attitude certainty will boost the resistance of attitudes to mismatched attacks (e.g., affective attitudes attacked by cognitive messages) but boost the openness of attitudes to matched attacks (e.g., affective attitudes attacked by affective messages). Two experiments provide support for this hypothesis. Implications for increasing the openness of attitudes to both matched and mismatched attacks are discussed.     

Studies in social influence III: Majority versus minority influence in a group

This experimental study was aimed at investigating the mechanisms of influence involved in the two functionally opposed phenomena of innovation and conformity. We have been concerned for several years with the former of these two phenomena because of its intrinsic importance and the limited amount of research devoted to it. In the present article we have attempted not only to analyse the position more thoroughly, but also to compare the effects of innovation with those of conformity. In particular, we have endeavoured to show that behavioural style acts as a general source of influence in the two phenomena under consideration, where manifest judgments are concerned. On the other hand, the latent effects of influence may be different in the two cases of innovation and conformity. To investigate these questions, we developed an experimental design consisting of three parts. The first part was intended to study manifest influence on a quasi-physical judgment based on a cultural truism. The second part was aimed at the study of latent modifications in the perceptual-cognitive code as a result of influence. The third, in the form of a postexperimental questionnaire, was intended to provide information about various aspects, including the perception of the agent of influence by subjects. The main function of the experimental manipulations was to vary the minority or majority relationship of the agent of influence within a group, and its behavioural style, consistent or inconsistent. Our main findings indicate that behavioural consistency is the main factor behind the influence exerted by both majority and minority. But whereas, in conformity, influence is limited to modifying manifest judgments, in innovation, it changes the perceptual-cognitive code underlying such judgments.     

Adolescent sexual behavior in two ethnic minority groups: a multisystem perspective

Adolescents are at high risk for a number of negative health consequences associated with early and unsafe sexual activity, such as infection with HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, as well as unintended pregnancy. In the present study, a multisystem model was applied to one adolescent sexual behavior, penile-vaginal intercourse. Nine hundred seven Black and Hispanic adolescents (aged 14 to 17 years) and their mothers were interviewed. Factors from three systems (self, family, and extrafamilial) that are influential in the lives of adolescents were evaluated using four outcome measures. Factors from most or all systems emerged as predictors of each outcome measure. A cumulative risk index suggested a linear relationship between the number of systems identified as being at risk and indicators of adolescent sexual behavior. The implications for prevention are discussed.     

The influence of the minority on perception: A note on a possible alternative explanation

This research note raises some concerns about possible alternative explanations to studies using perceptual change as indicative of minority vs majority influence. Having failed to replicate the original study (S. Moscovici & B. Personnaz, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 1980, 16, 270–282), using the same and an alternate measuring procedure, inspection of additional data introduces the role of suspiciousness in explaining this and previous findings. An informal study adds further credence to this explanation.     

Majority influence,minority influence and conversion behavior: A replication

A recent experiment by Moscovici and Personnaz (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 1980, 16, 270–282) showed that whereas a majority produces merely compliance, or a change in the individual's verbal responses, a minority induces conversion, or a true change in one's subjective judgments. Because of the theoretical significance of these findings and because of their inconsistency with data from other experiments, an exact replication and extension of this experiment was performed. There was no evidence of compliance in any social influence condition. Instead, and in contrast to Moscovici and Personnaz, both a majority and a minority produced “conversion” behavior. Subjects' behavior is interpreted as the expression of an improved perception, resulting from a heightened level of attention to the object of judgment under social influence conditions.     

The pantomime of persuasion: Fit between nonverbal communication and influence strategies

How can we be more successful in persuading others and increase the odds of behavioral compliance? We argue that when a verbal influence strategy is embedded in a nonverbal style that fits its orientation, this boosts the strategy's effectiveness, whereas a misfit attenuates its impact. In field-experiment 1, agents tried to persuade participants in buying a candybox by using an approach-oriented strategy (Door-In-The-Face, DITF). An eager nonverbal style increased the impact of the DITF, whereas vigilant nonverbal cues rendered it ineffective. Conversely, field-experiment 2 showed that an avoidance-oriented strategy (Disrupt-Then-Reframe) benefited from being presented in a vigilant, rather than an eager nonverbal style, which similarly attenuated its impact. Hence, eager nonverbal cues promote the effectiveness of approach-oriented influence strategies whereas vigilant cues do the opposite and increase the impact of avoidance-oriented influence strategies.     

The effects of majority size on minority influence

Two experiments investigated the role of majority size (social pressure) in minority influence. Opposite predictions were derived from an attributional account and two social impact models. In Experiment 1 there was a tendency for minority influence to decrease with increasing majority size when the minority argued against gay rights. The results were stronger and clearer in Experiment 2. For pro-abortion minorities, the minority's impact clearly declined as the size of the opposing majority increased. As predicted by the social impact models, this decline occurred during the initial increase of the majority size. The limitations of the mathematical models are discussed.     

Judging a group by sampling members: how the subdivision of a minority affects its perceived size and influence

The authors used a frequency sampling paradigm to investigate how perceptions of a minority group's size and influence are affected by the manner in which the subgroup structure of the minority is presented. Participants in two experiments read sequentially sampled opinions that hypothetical members of a committee supposedly held about a controversial proposal. The minority members holding "against" opinions were described as belonging either to one homogenous group (the single-entity condition) or to one of three subgroups (the multiple-subgroups condition). Although the numbers of "for" and "against" opinions were held constant, predictable biases emerged in participants' frequency reports. Consistent with an information loss account, the minority was viewed as larger in the multiple-subgroups condition than in the single-entity condition. The manipulation also affected the perceived social influence of the minority on the committee's final decision about the proposal.     

Taking a fresh perspective: Vicarious restoration as a means of recovering self-control

In the realm of self-regulation, recent work shows that the state of ego depletion can be vicariously transmitted from a target to a perceiver simply by imagining the perspective of a depleted target (i.e., vicarious depletion; Ackerman et al., 2009). The present study asked whether such vicarious effects can extend to the domain of self-regulatory recovery. In Experiment 1, depleted participants who took the perspective of someone engaging in a restorative activity showed recovered self-control on a later task. Experiments 2 and 3 expanded upon this effect by illustrating that such vicarious self-regulatory processes only emerge if the target is similar to the participant. Taken together, the present studies offer a powerful method by which mental resources can be replenished, and identify one critical boundary condition of its effectiveness.