Where creativity resides: the generative power of unconscious thought

In three experiments, the relation between different modes of thought and the generation of "creative" and original ideas was investigated. Participants were asked to generate items according to a specific instruction (e.g., generate place names starting with an "A"). They either did so immediately after receiving the instruction, or after a few minutes of conscious thought, or after a few minutes of distraction during which "unconscious thought" was hypothesized to take place. Throughout the experiments, the items participants listed under "unconscious thought" conditions were more original. It was concluded that whereas conscious thought may be focused and convergent, unconscious thought may be more associative and divergent.     

Think different: the merits of unconscious thought in preference development and decision making

The role of unconscious and conscious thought in decision making was investigated in 5 experiments. Because of the low processing capacity of consciousness, conscious thought was hypothesized to be maladaptive when making complex decisions. Conversely, unconscious thought was expected to be highly effective. In Experiments 1-3, participants were presented with a complex decision problem in which they had to choose between various alternatives, each with multiple attributes. Some participants had to make a decision immediately after being presented with the options. In the conscious thought condition, participants could think about the decision for a few minutes. In the unconscious thought condition, participants were distracted for a few minutes and then indicated their decision. Throughout the experiments, unconscious thinkers made the best decisions. Additional evidence obtained in Experiments 4 and 5 suggests that unconscious thought leads to clearer, more polarized, and more integrated representations in memory.     

The tendency of unconscious thought toward global processing style

This study explored whether unconscious thought has a tendency to process information globally. In three experiments, a Navon task was used to activate global or local processing styles. Findings showed that in the unconscious-thought groups, those performing the local Navon task presented a poorer decision-making performance when compared to those performing the global Navon task (Experiment 1); participants reported that their judgments were made based on partial attributes (Experiment 2), and evaluated a target individual mainly based on information consistent with stereotypes (Experiment 3). These results showed that when presented with distracter tasks, conscious thought activates local processing, which impairs its ability to process information globally. However, this impairment would not happen if global processing were activated instead. This study provides support to the idea that unconscious thought has a tendency to process information globally.     

On the goal-dependency of unconscious thought

Recent research has shown that unconscious thought can improve the quality of complex decisions [Dijksterhuis, A. (2004). Think different: The merits of unconscious thought in preference development and decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 586–598; Dijksterhuis, A., Bos, M.W., Nordgren, L.F., & van Baaren, R. B. (2006). On Making the Right Choice: The deliberation-without-attention effect. Science, 311(5763), 1005–1007]. In the present research, we investigate whether unconscious thought is goal-dependent. In four experiments participants were given information pertaining to a decision problem or to an impression formation problem. Subsequently, they were either given time to think consciously about the information or they were distracted for some time, during which they could engage in unconscious thought. Of the participants that were distracted, however, some were given the goal to further process the information, whereas others were not given such a goal. Our experiments clearly show that unconscious thought is goal-dependent. Without a goal, people do not engage in unconscious thought.     

Nietzsche on conscious and unconscious thought

ABSTRACT

While much recent attention has been directed towards Nietzsche’s reflections on the mind, and on consciousness in particular, his often-suggestive comments about thinking have thus far avoided comparable scrutiny. Starting from Nietzsche’s claims that we ‘think constantly, but [do] not know it’, and that only our conscious thinking ‘takes place in words,’ I draw out the distinct strands that underpin such remarks. The opening half of the paper focuses upon Nietzsche’s understanding of unconscious thinking, and the role of affects therein. In what remains, I consider the difference (for Nietzsche) between conscious and unconscious thought, with a particular focus on two important readings. The first, put forward by Paul Katsafanas, claims that conscious states alone have conceptually-articulated content. The second, defended most prominently by Mattia Riccardi, argues that Nietzsche’s various claims evince a form of HOT (higher-order thought) theory. I argue that neither reading is quite right, and instead propose an alternative interpretation of conscious thinking ‘in words’, which draws on work on inner speech.     

Conscious and unconscious thought in artificial grammar learning

Unconscious Thought Theory posits that a period of distraction after information acquisition leads to unconscious processing which enhances decision making relative to conscious deliberation or immediate choice (Dijksterhuis, 2004). Support thus far has been mixed. In the present study, artificial grammar learning was used in order to produce measurable amounts of conscious and unconscious knowledge. Intermediate phases were introduced between training and testing. Participants engaged in conscious deliberation of grammar rules, were distracted for the same period of time, or progressed immediately from training to testing. No differences in accuracy were found between intermediate phase groups acting on decisions made with meta-cognitive awareness (either feeling-based intuitive responding or conscious rule- or recollection-based responding). However, the accuracy of guess responses was significantly higher after distraction relative to immediate progression or conscious deliberation. The results suggest any beneficial effects of 'unconscious thought' may not always transfer to conscious awareness.     

Winnicott on Jung: destruction, creativity and the unrepressed unconscious

This paper considers Winnicott's critique of Jung, principally expressed in his review of Memories, Dreams, Reflections, which asserts that Jung's creative contribution to analysis was constrained by his failure to integrate his 'primitive destructive impulses', subsequent to inadequate early containment. It is argued that although Winnicott's diagnosis illuminates Jung's shadow, particularly his constraints vis-à-vis the repressed Freudian unconscious, it fails to appreciate the efficacy of the compensatory containment Jung found in the collective unconscious. This enigmatic relationship between destruction and creativity-so central to late Winnicott-is illuminated by Matte Blanco's bi-logic, and further explored in relation to William Blake. Winnicott's personal resolution through his Jung-inspired 'splitting headache' dream of destruction-previously considered in this Journal by Morey (2005) and Sedgwick (2008)-is given particular attention.     

A process-dissociation examination of the cognitive processes underlying unconscious thought

Conscious and unconscious thought have been previously found to differentially impact decision-making quality. However, little research has directly measured the processes underlying these modes of thinking. We propose that both thinking modes are characterized by rule-based and intuitive processing. In two experiments, we used the Process Dissociation Procedure to independently measure these cognitive processes. We tested three competing hypotheses: (a) conscious thinking evokes both increased rule-based and decreased intuitive processing compared to unconscious thinking; (b) conscious and unconscious thinking evoke similar levels of intuitive processing but conscious thinking enhances rule-based processing; and (c) conscious and unconscious thinking evoke similar levels of rule-based processing but unconscious thinking enhances intuitive processing. Experiment 1 used base-rate and law-of-large-numbers decision-making problems, whereas Experiment 2 used decision-making problems similar to the “apartment” problem that is often used in unconscious thought studies. In both experiments we found support for hypothesis (b).     

The best of both worlds: Integrating conscious and unconscious thought best solves complex decisions

Two studies address the debate over whether conscious or unconscious mental processes best handle complex decisions. According to Unconscious Thought Theory (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006) both modes of thinking have particular advantages: conscious thought can follow strict rules, whereas unconscious thought is better suited for integrating numerous decision attributes. Because most complex decisions require both adherence to precise rules and the aggregation of information, we hypothesized that complex decisions can best be made by engaging in periods of both conscious and unconscious thought. In both studies we found that the sequential integration of conscious and unconscious thought solved complex choices better than conscious or unconscious thought alone. In Study 2 we examined whether the sequential order of the integration condition matters. In line with our prediction, we found that integration worked best when unconscious thought followed conscious thought.     

The unconscious

A discussion of the unconscious leads naturally to Freud and to a theory on subjectivity we may designate as de-centred. The unconscious reminds us that not only do we not know ourselves. In the core of our subjectivity, we have to acknowledge the notion of otherness. Re-reading Freud's text, The Unconscious, from 1915, the current author emphasises the character and function of the unconscious as radically different from what we know about conscious processes. This allows for the concept of the preconscious, which the author links to Winnicott's intermediary area and Green's tertiary processes. Taking as point of departure Freud's differentiation of word presentation and thing presentation, the author points to Freud's introduction of the term thing-cathexies of the object as designating the primal psychic representation. The Freudian perspective is broadened, encompassing the notion of otherness as discussed by Laplanche and Aulagnier. Concluding the paper, the author draws some implications for psychoanalytic technique, focusing especially on transference.     

Unifying theories of creativity: Metaphorical thought and the unification process

Theories of creativity collectively provide a rich but fragmented knowledge base for research. In order to better understand the nature of creativity, investigators must provide a more coherent theoretical foundation by integrating many theories from different disciplines. Unfortunately, interdisciplinary groups of theorists who attempt collaborative theoretic integration have trouble finding common conceptual ground for their unification efforts. The implicit influence of metaphor on thought causes some of these difficulties, but metaphor also holds potential for bridging the conceptual gaps between differing theoretical and philosophical positions. Interdisciplinary teams of theorists can engage in parallel processes of metaphorical exploration and nonmetaphorical verification to illuminate the barriers to integration, and to capitalize on the integrative potential of metaphoric thought.     

The motivational unconscious

Motives may be said to be unconscious in a variety of ways. They may be automatically and unconsciously elicited by consciously perceptible situational cues; they may be instigated by cues that are themselves excluded from conscious awareness, as expressions of implicit perception or memory; or the person may be consciously unaware of his or her actual motivational state. The paper reviews the evidence pertaining to all three aspects of unconscious motivation, with emphasis on conceptual and methodological questions that arise in the study of motives which are not accessible to phenomenal awareness or voluntary control but nonetheless influence the individual's experience, thought, and action.     

The social unconscious in clinical work

An analyst who is unaware of the constraints of social facts and forces will be insensitive to their unconscious recreation within therapeutic situations, and unable to provide space for patients to imagine how their identities have been formed at particular social and political junctures. The concepts of the social unconscious and of equivalence are defined and located within the traditions of Group Analysis and British Object Relations Theory. A model of maturity is outlined, the central element of which is the willingness and ability to take the role of citizen. These ideas are illustrated with clinical vignettes from psychoanalysis and group analysis.