Can false memories spontaneously recover?

Can false memories that were suppressed at one time spontaneously recover at a later time? Fuzzy trace theory and activation-monitoring theory predict that false memories in the Deese, Roediger, and McDermott (DRM) procedure become substantially reduced as list learning progresses because participants employ a memory-editing process. It follows that if the editing process is rendered less effective, false memories should spontaneously recover. We found that after DRM lists were well learned and false recognition to critical words was substantially reduced by multiple study–test trials, those false memories spontaneously recovered when participants were either rushed or delayed on a retest. We attributed the reduction in false recognition over trials to a memory-editing process that suppresses false recognition as participants gradually learn which words were in the lists and which words, though similar, were not. Rushing or delaying the participants on a retest made it more difficult for them to edit their memory, and false memories spontaneously returned.     

Can false memories spontaneously recover?

Can false memories that were suppressed at one time spontaneously recover at a later time? Fuzzy trace theory and activation-monitoring theory predict that false memories in the Deese, Roediger, and McDermott (DRM) procedure become substantially reduced as list learning progresses because participants employ a memory-editing process. It follows that if the editing process is rendered less effective, false memories should spontaneously recover. We found that after DRM lists were well learned and false recognition to critical words was substantially reduced by multiple study-test trials, those false memories spontaneously recovered when participants were either rushed or delayed on a retest. We attributed the reduction in false recognition over trials to a memory-editing process that suppresses false recognition as participants gradually learn which words were in the lists and which words, though similar, were not. Rushing or delaying the participants on a retest made it more difficult for them to edit their memory, and false memories spontaneously returned.     

Does collaborative remembering reduce false memories?

Collaborative remembering refers to recall by groups rather than by an individual. Three experiments investigated whether, relative to individual remembering, collaborative remembering decreased correct recall and false recall using the Deese‐Roediger‐McDermott paradigm. Participants were first asked to study and recall five lists of 15 words that were each semantically associated with a critical non‐presented word. Half the participants recalled the words by themselves, while the remaining half were assigned to pairs and collaboratively recalled the words. In Experiment 1, pairs produced the same number of false or correct words as individuals who were tested alone. In Experiment 2, the interpersonal closeness of the groups was also manipulated: friends and pairs who were not friends were assigned to the collaborative groups. Both friends and non‐friends produced fewer false or correct words than individuals. Experiment 3, in which the performance of the individuals and non‐friend pairs were compared using a recall test of the same 75 words as the previous experiments, replicated the results of Experiment 2. These results are discussed in terms of the retrieval‐strategy disruption.     

Can false memories prime problem solutions?

Previous research has suggested that false memories can prime performance on related implicit and explicit memory tasks. The present research examined whether false memories can also be used to prime higher order cognitive processes, namely, insight-based problem solving. Participants were asked to solve a number of compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems, half of which had been primed by the presentation of Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) lists whose critical lure was also the solution to the problem. The results showed that when the critical lure: (a) was falsely recalled, CRAT problems were solved more often and significantly faster than problems that were not primed by a DRM list and (b) was not falsely recalled, CRAT problem solution rates and times were no different than when there was no DRM priming. A second experiment demonstrated that these outcomes were not a simple artifact of the inclusion of a recall test prior to the problem solving task. The implications of these results are discussed with regard to the previous literature on priming and the adaptive function of false memories.     

Emotions and false memories: valence or arousal?

The effects of mood on false memories have not been studied systematically until recently. Some results seem to indicate that negative mood may reduce false recall and thus suggest an influence of emotional valence on false memory. The present research tested the effects of both valence and arousal on recall and recognition and indicates that the effect is actually due to arousal. In fact, whether participants' mood is positive, negative, or neutral, false memories are significantly more frequent under conditions of high arousal than under conditions of low arousal.     

Are nonconscious processes sufficient to produce false memories?

Seamon, Luo, and Gallo (1998) reported evidence that nonconscious processes could produce false recognition in a converging-associates task, whereby subjects falsely remember a nonstudied lure (e.g., sleep) after studying a list of related words (bed, rest, awake...). Zeelenberg, Plomp, and Raaijmakers (2003) failed to observe this false recognition effect when list word recognition was at chance. We critically evaluate the evidence for nonsconscious processing and report the results of a new experiment designed to overcome previous methodological limitations. Consistent with Seamon et al., we found that conscious activation of a related lure during study was not necessary for its subsequent recognition; consistent with Zeelenberg et al., we found no evidence for recognition of related lures under conditions where there was no memory for studied words. It is currently unknown whether conscious recollection of the studied items is necessary for false recognition or if nonconscious activation of the lure is sufficient.     

Can false memories be created through nonconscious processes?

Presentation times of study words presented in the Deese/Roediger and McDermott (DRM) paradigm varied from 20 to 2000 ms per word in an attempt to replicate the false memory effect following extremely short presentations reported by. Both in a within-subjects design (Experiment 1) and in a between-subjects design (Experiment 2) subjects showed memory for studied words as well as a false memory effect for related critical lures in the 2000-ms condition. However, in the conditions with shorter presentation times (20 ms in Experiment 1; 20 and 40 ms in Experiment 2) no memory for studied words, nor a false memory effect was found. We argue that there is at present no strong evidence supporting the claim for a nonconscious basis of the false memory effect.     

Testing emotional memories: does negative emotional significance influence the benefit received from testing?

A large body of research shows that emotionally significant stimuli are better stored in memory. One question that has received much less attention is how emotional memories are influenced by factors that influence memories after the initial encoding of stimuli. Intriguingly, several recent studies suggest that post-encoding factors do not differ in their effects on emotional and neutral memories. However, to date, only detrimental factors have been addressed. In the present study, we examined whether emotionally negative memories are differentially influenced by a well-known beneficial factor: the testing of memories. We employed a standard cued recall testing-effect paradigm where participants studied cue-target pairs for negative and neutral target pictures. In a subsequent post-encoding phase, one third of the cue-target pairs were tested and one third restudied; the remaining third served as control pairs. After one week, memory for all cue-target pairs was tested. While replicating both the testing effect and the emotional enhancement effect, no differences between negative and neutral memories in the benefits received from testing and restudying were observed. Thus, it seems to be true that post-encoding factors do not influence emotional memories in any other way than neutral memories, even when they are beneficial.     

Can false memories prime alternative solutions to ambiguous problems?

Research has demonstrated that false memories are capable of priming and facilitating insight-based problem-solving tasks by increasing solution rates and decreasing solution times. The present research extended this finding by investigating whether false memories could be used to bias ambiguous insight-based problem-solving tasks in a similar manner. Compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems with two possible correct answers, a dominant and a non-dominant solution, were created and normed (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, participants were asked to solve these CRAT problems after they were given Deese/Roediger-McDermott lists whose critical lures were also the non-dominant solution to half of the corresponding CRATs. As predicted, when false memories served as primes, solution rates were higher and solution times were faster for non-dominant than dominant CRAT solutions. This biasing effect was only found when participants falsely recalled the critical lure, and was not found when participants did not falsely recall the critical lure, or when they were not primed. Results are discussed with regard to spreading activation models of solution competition in problem-solving tasks and current theories of false memory priming effects.     

How are false memories distinguishable from true memories in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm? A review of the findings

This article reviewed the literature comparing true and false memories. Although false memory experience is typically characterized as compellingly similar to true memory experience, research also indicates many distinctions between these two types of memory. The primary focus of this article was on comparing these two types of memory in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm on a number of independent and dependent measures. Studies that compared true and false memories in recall and recognition rates over retention intervals, as a function of list word presentation duration, list presentation repetition, in recall and recognition latencies, output serial position, phenomenological experiences (conscious and unconscious discrimination between these two types of memories), and neurophysiological processes were reviewed. The conclusion is that the degree to which false memory is experienced and observed as similar to or the same as true memory is a function of a number of variables in the process of acquiring and measuring the memory.     

How does imagery in interactive consumption lead to false memory? A reconstructive memory perspective

Consumers are often exposed to information that may contradict their consumption experience, leading to “false memory” for aspects of the consumption. We develop a theory suggesting why false memory may be heightened due to imagery processing. We subject this theory to a rigorous test in three experiments. We find that post-consumption imagery makes it more difficult to discern between consumption and misleading information thereby boosting false recall. Yet, imagery that is more consumption-based helps reduce consumers' susceptibility to false memory. Consistent with this notion, we explicate the role that attention plays at different stages of consumption in affecting false memory.     

How does context affect assessments of facial emotion? The role of culture and age

People from Asian cultures are more influenced by context in their visual processing than people from Western cultures. In this study, we examined how these cultural differences in context processing affect how people interpret facial emotions. We found that younger Koreans were more influenced than younger Americans by emotional background pictures when rating the emotion of a central face, especially those younger Koreans with low self-rated stress. In contrast, among older adults, neither Koreans nor Americans showed significant influences of context in their face emotion ratings. These findings suggest that cultural differences in reliance on context to interpret others' emotions depend on perceptual integration processes that decline with age, leading to fewer cultural differences in perception among older adults than among younger adults. Furthermore, when asked to recall the background pictures, younger participants recalled more negative pictures than positive pictures, whereas older participants recalled similar numbers of positive and negative pictures. These age differences in the valence of memory were consistent across culture.     

Can false memories be corrected by feedback in the DRM paradigm?

Normal processes of comprehension frequently yield false memories as an unwanted by-product. The simple paradigm now known as the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm takes advantage of this fact and has been used to reliably produce false memory for laboratory study. Among the findings from past research is the difficulty of preventing false memories in this paradigm. The purpose of the present experiments was to examine the effectiveness of feedback in correcting false memories. Two experiments were conducted, in which participants recalled DRM lists and either received feedback on their performance or did not. A subsequent recall test was administered to assess the effect of feedback. The results showed promising effects of feedback: Feedback enhanced both error correction and the propagation of correct recall. The data replicated other data of studies that have shown substantial error perseveration following feedback. These data also provide new information on the occurrence of errors following feedback. The results are discussed in terms of the activation-monitoring theory of false memory.     

How accurate are memories of traffic accidents? Increased false memory levels among motorcyclists when confronted with accident-related word lists

Previous studies have found that false memories increase when people receive stimuli which is related to their knowledge base. In the current set of four experiments, we examined how accident experience affected false memory production among motorcyclists using different types of false memory word lists. Specifically, Experiments 1, 2, and 3 were conducted involving motorcyclists with and without accident experience, whereas Study 4 was conducted on non-motorcyclists without accident experience. In all experiments, participants were given associatively-related word lists known to foster false memory creation. Different types of word lists were used consisting of accident-related words, emotionally-negative words, and neutral words. Levels of false memory were measured using recall and recognition tests. We found consistent results in Experiments 1, 2, and 3 in which among motorcyclists, accident-related words produced higher levels of false memory than emotionally-negative and neutral words. This pattern was not observed in Experiment 4 where non-motorcyclists were involved. Our results shed light on the role of previous experience on false memory formation. One implication could be that the police should be careful with reports of motorcyclists' experiences about their accidents as motorcyclists may spontaneously come up with false, but related details concerning these experiences.     

Does test-induced priming play a role in the creation of false memories?

We investigated the role of test-induced priming in creating false memories in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, in which subjects study lists of related words (bed, rest, awake) and then falsely recall or recognise a related word (sleep) on a later test. However, in experiments using three different procedures, we found that the number of related words tested prior to the critical word had surprisingly little impact on false recall and recognition. We manipulated the location of the critical item in tests of yes/no recognition, word-stem cued recall, and part-set cued recall. We consistently obtained high probabilities of false recall and recognition, but the probability was unaffected by the number of related items presented prior to the test of the critical item. Surprisingly, test-induced priming of the critical item does not seem to play a large role in this memory illusion.     

When do false memories cross language boundaries in English—Spanish bilinguals?

To determine whether false memories cross language boundaries, we presented English-Spanish bilinguals with conceptually related word lists for five study-test trials. Some lists were heard in English, some in Spanish, and they were then followed by a recognition memory test composed of studied words, conceptually related nonstudied critical words, and unrelated words presented in the same language used at study or in a different language. Even though participants were instructed to recognize only previously heard words, they falsely recognized both same-language and different-language critical words. With practice, participants increased their accurate recognition of list words and decreased their false recognition of critical words when the study-test language was the same, and they decreased their false recognition of list words and critical words when the language differed. False memories can cross language boundaries when participants rely on conceptual representations from the word lists, but these errors decrease over trials as participants increasingly rely on language-specific lexical representations.