The time of consciousness and vice versa

The temporal granularity of consciousness may be far less fine than the real-time information processing mechanisms that underlie our sensitivity to small temporal differences. It is suggested that conscious time perception, like space perception, is subject to errors that belie a unitary underlying representation. E. R. Clay's (The Alternative: A Study in Psychology, 1882) concept of the "specious present," an extended moment represented in consciousness, is suggested as an alternative to the more common notion of instantaneous experience that underlies much reasoning based on the "time of arrival" in consciousness.     

Sorting out theory from method and vice versa

This paper takes up the question of free will in behaviour, what it can mean, and how it might be said to occur. The case is made that, thanks to psychology's commitment to a 17th century conception of natural science, it has been effectively insulated from putting teleology to a proper empirical test. After presenting a justification and definition of free will in terms of the human being's telosponsive capacities, the paper closes by surveying aspects of the psychological literature which have gathered data relating to telic behaviour only to explain them away via traditional nontelic “scientific” theories.     

Developmental cognitive genetics: How psychology can inform genetics and vice versa

Developmental neuropsychology is concerned with uncovering the underlying basis of developmental disorders such as specific language impairment (SLI), developmental dyslexia, and autistic disorder. Twin and family studies indicate that genetic influences play an important part in the aetiology of all of these disorders, yet progress in identifying genes has been slow. One way forward is to cut loose from conventional clinical criteria for diagnosing disorders and to focus instead on measures of underlying cognitive mechanisms. Psychology can inform genetics by clarifying what the key dimensions are for heritable phenotypes. However, it is not a one-way street. By using genetically informative designs, one can gain insights about causal relationships between different cognitive deficits. For instance, it has been suggested that low-level auditory deficits cause phonological problems in SLI. However, a twin study showed that, although both types of deficit occur in SLI, they have quite different origins, with environmental factors more important for auditory deficit, and genes more important for deficient phonological short-term memory. Another study found that morphosyntactic deficits in SLI are also highly heritable, but have different genetic origins from impairments of phonological short-term memory. A genetic perspective shows that a search for the underlying cause of developmental disorders may be misguided, because they are complex and heterogeneous and are associated with multiple risk factors that only cause serious disability when they occur in combination.     

Developmental cognitive genetics: how psychology can inform genetics and vice versa

Developmental neuropsychology is concerned with uncovering the underlying basis of developmental disorders such as specific language impairment (SLI), developmental dyslexia, and autistic disorder. Twin and family studies indicate that genetic influences play an important part in the aetiology of all of these disorders, yet progress in identifying genes has been slow. One way forward is to cut loose from conventional clinical criteria for diagnosing disorders and to focus instead on measures of underlying cognitive mechanisms. Psychology can inform genetics by clarifying what the key dimensions are for heritable phenotypes. However, it is not a one-way street. By using genetically informative designs, one can gain insights about causal relationships between different cognitive deficits. For instance, it has been suggested that low-level auditory deficits cause phonological problems in SLI. However, a twin study showed that, although both types of deficit occur in SLI, they have quite different origins, with environmental factors more important for auditory deficit, and genes more important for deficient phonological short-term memory. Another study found that morphosyntactic deficits in SLI are also highly heritable, but have different genetic origins from impairments of phonological short-term memory. A genetic perspective shows that a search for the underlying cause of developmental disorders may be misguided, because they are complex and heterogeneous and are associated with multiple risk factors that only cause serious disability when they occur in combination.     

Social neuroscience: understanding the pieces fosters understanding the whole and vice versa

Social science and neuroscience perspectives represent two ends of a continuum of levels of organization studied in psychology. Human behavior as a whole unfolds at social levels of organization, whereas much of the research in psychology has focused on cognitive and biological pieces of this whole. Recent evidence underscores the complementary nature of social, cognitive, and biological levels of analysis and how research integrating these levels can foster more comprehensive theories of the mechanisms underlying complex behavior and the mind. This research underscores the unity of psychology and the importance of retaining multilevel integrative research that spans molar and molecular levels of analysis.     

This time with motivation: The implications of social neuroscience for research on motivated self- and other-perception (and vice versa)

Early neural research on self-evaluation began testing whether self-evaluation was somehow neurally different than evaluations of other people and inanimate objects. Self-evaluation was lauded as potentially unique partially because of motivational and affective influences. Despite the acknowledgement that motivation influences social cognition such as self-perception, neural models of self-perception have been conspicuously silent on how motivational states affect the neural level of analysis. What can be learned by examining motivational influences on the neural systems underlying social cognition including self-perception? An emerging body of neural research on self-enhancement motivation (i.e., the motivation to see one’s self in a positive light) is described and its implications for longstanding psychological questions about self-enhancement are discussed. Finally, several additional avenues for using the neural level of analysis to test questions about motivational influences on social cognition are discussed.     

Illusions in quantified reasoning: How to make the impossible seem possible, and vice versa

The mental model theory postulates that reasoners build models of the situations described in premises, and that these models normally represent only what is true. The theory has an unexpected consequence. It predicts the existence of illusions in inferences. Certain inferences should have compelling but erroneous conclusions. Two experiments corroborated the occurrence of such illusions in inferences about what is possible from disjunctions of quantified assertions, such as, "at least some of the plastic beads are not red." Experiment 1 showed that participants erroneously inferred that impossible situations were possible, and that possible situations were impossible, but that they performed well with control problems based on the same premises. Experiment 2 corroborated these findings in inferences from assertions based on dyadic relations, such as, "all the boys played with the girls."     

Hungry for money: the desire for caloric resources increases the desire for financial resources and vice versa

This report attempts to provide an evolutionary explanation for humans' motivation to strive for money in present-day societies. We propose that people's desire for money is a modern derivate of their desire for food. In three studies, we show the reciprocal association between the incentive value of food and of money. In Study 1, hungry participants were less likely than satiated participants to donate to charity. In Study 2, participants in a room with an olfactory food cue, known to increase the desire to eat, offered less money in a give-some game compared with participants in a room free of scent. In Study 3, participants' desire for money affected the amount of M&M's they ate in a subsequent taste test, but only among participants who were not restricting their food intake in order to manage their weight.     

From majority to minority and vice versa: the asymmetrical effects of losing and gaining majority position within a group

Two studies examined the effects of stable, partially changed, and completely changed majority and minority positions within a group on perception and evaluation of the group. It was hypothesized that loss of majority position (majority-to-minority change) would have stronger effects than gain of majority position (minority-to-majority change). The hypothesized asymmetrical effect was demonstrated in that loss of majority position decreased perception of group-self similarity, group attraction, and expectations for positive interactions with the group, whereas a corresponding gain of position did not increase them. Thus immediately following changes, the group is especially fragile because disintegrative forces created by the loss of majority position are stronger than integrative forces created by the gain of majority position.     

It doesn't matter whether onset and rime predicts reading better than phoneme awareness does or vice versa

Hulme et al. argue against our hypothesis that there are two routes from onset and rime awareness to reading: an indirect route whereby onset-rime awareness feeds into the development of phoneme awareness which in turn affects children's reading, and a direct route by which onset-rime awareness makes an independent contribution to children's reading. The evidence that Hulme et al. present against this hypothesis is not convincing, partly because our hypothesis actually predicts most of their results and partly because of weaknesses in the design of Hulme et al.'s study and in the unusual procedures that they employed.     

In favor of (plain) phenomenology

Plain phenomenology explains theoretically salient mental or psychological distinctions with an appeal to their first-person applications. But it does not assume (as does heterophenomenology) that warrant for such first-person judgment is derived from an explanatory theory constructed from the third-person perspective. Discussions in historical phenomenology can be treated as plain phenomenology. This is illustrated by a critical consideration of Brentano’s account of consciousness, drawing on some ideas in early Husserl. Dennett’s advocacy of heterophenomenology on the grounds of its supposed “neutrality” does not show it is preferable to plain phenomenology. In fact the latter is more neutral in ways we ought to want, and permits a desirable (and desirably critical) use of first-person reflection that finds no place in the former.     

How to turn a hawk into a dove and vice versa: Interactions between emotions and goals in a give-some dilemma game

The present study investigated emotional influences on behavior in a one-shot, simultaneous, give-some dilemma game. In accordance with functional perspectives on the role of discrete emotions, we found fear to reduce, and guilt to increase levels of cooperation. Moreover, we showed individual differences in the effect of induced emotional states. Specifically, results indicated that inducing fear reduced cooperation only for individuals with a pro-social value orientation, and that guilt induction increased cooperation only for individuals with a pro-self value orientation. We also established that both social value orientations could be adequately described in terms of differences in chronically accessible goals (as assessed by value-importance ratings). These results, therefore, seem to support our hypothesis that individual differences in the behavioral consequences of induced emotional states are related to variation in chronic accessibility of general goals associated with a particular emotional state.     

Make applied phenomenology what it needs to be: an interdisciplinary research program

Continental Philosophy Review - Once a marginal affair, applied phenomenology is now a vast and vibrant movement. With great success, however, comes great criticism, and critics have been harsh,...     

The how and why of what went where in apparent motion: modeling solutions to the motion correspondence problem

A model that is capable of maintaining the identities of individuated elements as they move is described. It solves a particular problem of underdetermination, the motion correspondence problem, by simultaneously applying 3 constraints: the nearest neighbor principle, the relative velocity principle, and the element integrity principle. The model generates the same correspondence solutions as does the human visual system for a variety of displays, and many of its properties are consistent with what is known about the physiological mechanisms underlying human motion perception. The model can also be viewed as a proposal of how the identities of attentional tags are maintained by visual cognition, and thus it can be differentiated from a system that serves merely to detect movement.     

Overconfidence and underconfidence: When and why people underestimate (and overestimate) the competition

It is commonly held that people believe themselves to be better than others, especially for outcomes under their control. However, such overconfidence is not universal. This paper presents evidence showing that people believe that they are below average on skill-based tasks that are difficult. A simple Bayesian explanation can account for these effects and for their robustness: On skill-based tasks, people generally have better information about themselves than about others, so their beliefs about others’ performances tend to be more regressive (thus less extreme) than their beliefs about their own performances. This explanation is tested in two experiments that examine these effects’ robustness to experience, feedback, and market forces. The discussion explores the implications for strategic planning in general and entrepreneurial entry in particular.