社会交流中人际神经同步的认知机制

近年来,许多研究者开始关注社会交流中的人际神经同步机制,并将人际神经同步作为研究社会交流的一个神经指标,这对于揭示社会交流的本质和规律具有重要意义。本文从心理理论和镜像神经系统的角度,分析社会交流中神经同步的认知机制及其影响因素。未来的研究应关注这两套机制是否因交流目的、对象、形式或内容的不同,而在不同的脑区表现出神经同步,进而引发了不同认知机制的争议;以及这两套机制各自或协同工作适用的情景和任务。     

从动作模仿到社会认知：自我-他人控制的作用

在社会互动中, 人们具有自动模仿他人动作的倾向。尽管这种自动模仿有利于个体理解他人动作的感受, 但有时也会与自身的动作意图产生冲突。因此我们需要将自身动作意图与他人动作进行区分并调控二者之间的冲突。这种能力被称为自我-他人控制(self-other control, SOC)。与动作模仿控制相同, 心理理论、观点采择和共情等更高级的社会认知同样涉及对自我和他人信息的加工。很多证据表明, SOC可能是一种领域普遍的(domain-general)加工机制, 即在动作模仿控制和其他社会认知中, 大脑对自我和他人双方信息的区分和冲突调控共用同一套SOC系统。最近一些研究发现, 相比于抑制自身优势反应的抑制控制(inhibitory control), SOC是社会认知中一个更为关键的影响因素, 抑制控制对社会认知的作用受到SOC的调节。此外, SOC的领域普遍性提示我们, 未来可以通过简单的动作模仿控制训练, 来为社会认知受损个体(如孤独症和述情障碍者)进行康复训练。     

镜像神经元系统的研究回顾及展望

镜像神经元系统的发现使得研究者从一个较为统一的神经机制层面了解人类多个层次的社会认知活动。在猕猴大脑F5区发现的镜像神经元可以在抽象的层面上帮助猕猴理解他人行为的意图。利用脑成像技术,研究发现人类的镜像神经元系统能够匹配外界的知觉表征和内在的动作表征从而通过“居身模仿”这一过程来进行模仿、语言理解、理解他人的意图及情绪这些重要的社会认知活动。另外,镜像神经元系统在社会交往中也起着重要作用,最后,就镜像神经元系统在心理理论中的作用、了解自我-他人问题和镜像神经元系统的关系、动机、经验等因素对镜像神经元系统活动的调控等问题对未来的研究方向进行了展望     

Primate Culture and Social Learning

The human primate is a deeply cultural species, our cognition being shaped by culture, and cultural transmission amounting to an “epidemic of mental representations” (Sperber, 1996). The architecture of this aspect of human cognition has been shaped by our evolutionary past in ways that we can now begin to discern through comparative studies of other primates. Processes of social learning (learning from others) are important for cognitive science to understand because they are cognitively complex and take many interrelated forms; they shape traditions, cultures and nonsocial aspects of cognition; and in turn they may be shaped by their cultural context. The study of primate social learning and culture has in recent years enjoyed a renaissance, providing a wealth of new findings, key aspects of which are reviewed. The focus is on cognitive issues, including learning about the consequences, sequential structure and hierarchical organization of actions; relating stored knowledge to the assimilation of new social knowledge; feedback guiding the construction of imitations; conceptual grasp of imitation; and the reciprocal relationship between social learning and culture.     

镜像神经元是认知科学的“圣杯”吗?

镜像神经元作为近二十年来神经科学领域内最重要的发现之一,相关的一系列研究掀起了一场"理解社会行为的革命"。然而,通过系统考察镜像神经元最初的操作性定义、基本功能及其实验证据,发现许多研究者对于镜像神经元的定义存在误解,人类脑中是否存在镜像神经元及其功能依然是当前学术界的争议焦点。迄今仍然缺乏令人信服的证据表明镜像神经元(或系统)就是动作理解、动作模仿、共情以及读心的直接神经机制。因此,将镜像神经元视为"认知科学的圣杯"的主张是一种落后的模块论意识形态,只能催生新的"神经神话"。     

“Being‐Imitated” Strategy at Home‐Based Intervention for Young Children with Autism

Previous studies have consistently shown that simply imitating children with autism will help to promote amount of gaze and to decrease distance to others. However, whether the “being‐imitated” strategy also affects the development of social cognition has not been clarified. We conducted a 2‐month researcher‐guided and home‐based intervention. Mothers were randomly assigned to two groups: One group was coached to engage the child using imitation, and the other was coached simply to respond contingently to bids. Before and after the 2‐month intervention, imitation skills, understanding the intentions of others’ acts, and gaze toward mothers were measured. Two months of being‐imitated enables the children to raise the general amount of their gaze interaction. The imitation skills also were promoted. On the other hand, the development of understanding others’ intentions was not observed, irrespective of condition. The increase of attention to others, which is facilitated by the accumulation of the being‐imitated experiences, can be generalized to the nonimitating person and results in the imitation of others by the child. Alternatively, the developmental linkages between the being‐imitated strategy and understanding of others’ intentions should be an important research task. The present study also indicates that caretakers can play a significant role in the intervention for a child with autism.     

Giving cognition a helping hand: The effect of congruent gestures on object name retrieval

The gestures that accompany speech are more than just arbitrary hand movements or communicative devices. They are simulated actions that can both prime and facilitate speech and cognition. This study measured participants’ reaction times for naming degraded images of objects when simultaneously adopting a gesture that was either congruent with the target object, incongruent with it, and when not making any hand gesture. A within‐subjects design was used, with participants (N= 122) naming 10 objects under each condition. Participants named the objects significantly faster when adopting a congruent gesture than when not gesturing at all. Adopting an incongruent gesture resulted in significantly slower naming times. The findings are discussed in the context of the intrapersonal cognitive and facilitatory effects of gestures and underline the relatedness between language, action, and cognition.     

Keeping an “I” on PRIDE: Measuring Imitation in Parent-Child Interaction Therapy

In parent–child interaction therapy (PCIT), therapists encourage parents to imitate child behaviors in order to convey approval of the child’s actions and promote the development of linguistic and social–cognitive skills. However, the Dyadic Parent-Child Interaction Coding System (DPICS-IV), used to measure skills taught during PCIT, does not include guidelines for coding parent–child imitation, making it difficult to determine how PCIT affects it. The current study addresses this problem by developing guidelines for coding imitation, which were then used to code DPICS-IV segments from 58 Mexican American families that participated in a past clinical trial. Results suggest that these coding guidelines can be used to reliably measure parent and child imitation. A series of additional analyses supported the construct validity of the codes. Specifically, there was a trend for parent imitation, but not child imitation, to increase more from pre–post treatment in PCIT relative to treatment as usual. In addition, parents who imitate their children were found to have children who imitate them more in return. Finally, improvement in parent imitation, but not child imitation, was significantly related to a decrease in child behavior problems. Further study is needed to determine the optimal frequency of imitation, and findings suggest that additional attention to coaching imitation may be warranted.     

A kinematic examination of dual-route processing for action imitation

The dual-route model of imitation suggests that meaningful and meaningless actions are processed through either an indirect or a direct route, respectively. Evidence indicates that the direct route is more cognitively demanding since it relies on mapping visuospatial properties of the observed action on to a performed one. These cognitive demands might negatively influence reaction time and accuracy for actions performed following a meaningless action under time constraints. However, how meaningful and meaningless action imitation processing is reflected in movement kinematics is not yet clear. We wanted to confirm whether meaningless action performance incurs a reaction time cost, whether the cost is reflected in kinematics, and, more generally, to examine kinematic markers of emblematic meaningful and meaningless action imitation. We examined participants’ reaction time and wrist movements when they imitated emblematic meaningful or matched meaningless gestures in either blocks of the same action type or mixed blocks. Meaningless actions were associated with a greater correction period at the end of the movement, possibly reflecting a strategy designed to ensure accurate completion for less familiar actions under time constraints. Furthermore, in mixed blocks, trials following meaningless actions had a significantly increased reaction time, supporting previous claims that route selection for action imitation may be stimulus-driven. However, there was only convincing evidence for this effect with an interval of ~2,948ms, but not ~3,573ms or ~2,553ms, between movements. Future work motion-tracking the entire hand to assess imitation accuracy, and more closely examining the influence of duration between movements, may help to explain these effects.     

Individual differences in neonatal “imitation” fail to predict early social cognitive behaviour

The influential hypothesis that humans imitate from birth – and that this capacity is foundational to social cognition – is currently being challenged from several angles. Most prominently, the largest and most comprehensive longitudinal study of neonatal imitation to date failed to find evidence that neonates copied any of nine actions at any of four time points (Oostenbroek et al., [2016] Current Biology, 26, 1334–1338). The authors of an alternative and statistically liberal post‐hoc analysis of these same data (Meltzoff et al., [2017] Developmental Science, 21, e12609), however, concluded that the infants actually did imitate one of the nine actions: tongue protrusion. In line with the original intentions of this longitudinal study, we here report on whether individual differences in neonatal “imitation” predict later‐developing social cognitive behaviours. We measured a variety of social cognitive behaviours in a subset of the original sample of infants (N = 71) during the first 18 months: object‐directed imitation, joint attention, synchronous imitation and mirror self‐recognition. Results show that, even using the liberal operationalization, individual scores for neonatal “imitation” of tongue protrusion failed to predict any of the later‐developing social cognitive behaviours. The average Spearman correlation was close to zero, mean r_s = 0.027, 95% CI [?0.020, 0.075], with all Bonferroni adjusted p values > .999. These results run counter to Meltzoff et al.'s rebuttal, and to the existence of a “like me” mechanism in neonates that is foundational to human social cognition.     

The role of sensorimotor experience in the development of mimicry in infancy

During social interactions we often have an automatic and unconscious tendency to copy or ‘mimic’ others’ actions. The dominant view on the neural basis of mimicry appeals to an automatic coupling between perception and action. It has been suggested that this coupling is formed through associative learning during correlated sensorimotor experience. Although studies with adult participants have provided support for this hypothesis, little is known about the role of sensorimotor experience in supporting the development of perceptual‐motor couplings, and consequently mimicry behaviour, in infancy. Here we investigated whether the extent to which an observed action elicits mimicry depends on the opportunity an infant has had to develop perceptual‐motor couplings for this action through correlated sensorimotor experience. We found that mothers’ tendency to imitate their 4‐month‐olds’ facial expressions during a parent‐child interaction session was related to infants’ facial mimicry as measured by electromyography. Maternal facial imitation was not related to infants’ mimicry of hand actions, and instead we found preliminary evidence that infants’ tendency to look at their own hands may be related to their tendency to mimic hand actions. These results are consistent with the idea that mimicry is supported by perceptual‐motor couplings that are formed through correlated sensorimotor experience obtained by observing one's own actions and imitative social partners.     

The Developmental Origin of Metacognition

We explain metacognition as a management of cognitive resources that does not necessitate algorithmic strategies or metarepresentation. When pragmatic, world‐directed actions cannot reduce the distance to the goal, agents engage in epistemic action directed at cognition. Such actions often are physical and involve other people, and so are open to observation. Taking a dynamic systems approach to development, we suggest that implicit and perceptual metacognition emerges from dyadic reciprocal interaction. Early intersubjectivity allows infants to internalize and construct rudimentary strategies for monitoring and control of their own and others' cognitions by emotion and attention. The functions of initiating, maintaining, and achieving turns make proto‐conversation a productive platform for developing metacognition. It enables caregiver and infant to create shared routines for epistemic actions that permit training of metacognitive skills. The adult is of double epistemic use to the infant—as a teacher that comments on and corrects the infant's efforts, and as the infant's cognitive resource in its own right. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Weaving the fabric of social interaction: Articulating developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience in the domain of motor cognition

In this article, we bring together recent findings from developmental science and cognitive neuroscience to argue that perception-action coupling constitutes the fundamental mechanism of motor cognition. A variety of empirical evidence suggests that observed and executed actions are coded in a common cognitive and neural framework, enabling individuals to construct shared representations of self and other actions. We review work to suggest that such shared representations support action anticipation, organization, and imitation. These processes, along with additional computational mechanisms for determining a sense of agency and behavioral regulation, form the fabric of social interaction. In addition, humans possess the capacity to move beyond these basic aspects of action analysis to interpret behavior at a deeper level, an ability that may be outside the scope of the mirror system. Understanding the nature of shared representations from the vantage point of developmental and cognitive science and neuroscience has the potential to inform a range of motor and social processes. This perspective also elucidates intriguing new directions and research questions and generates specific hypotheses regarding the impact of early disorders (e.g., developmental movement disorders) on subsequent action processing.     

Gestural sense-making: hand gestures as intersubjective linguistic enactments

The ubiquitous human practice of spontaneously gesturing while speaking demonstrates the embodiment, embeddedness, and sociality of cognition. The present essay takes gestural practice to be a paradigmatic example of a more general claim: human cognition is social insofar as our embedded, intelligent, and interacting bodies select and construct meaning in a way that is intersubjectively constrained and defeasible. Spontaneous co-speech gesture is markedly interesting because it at once confirms embodied aspects of linguistic meaning-making that formalist and linguistic turn-type philosophical approaches fail to appreciate, and it also forefronts intersubjectivity as an inherent and inherently normative dimension of communicative action. Co-speech hand gestures, as linguistically meaningful speech acts, demonstrate both sedimentation and spontaneity (in the sense of Maurice Merleau-Ponty??s dialectic of linguistic expression (2002)), or features of convention and nonconvention in a Gricean sense (1989). Yet neither pragmatic nor classic phenomenological approaches to communication can accommodate the practice of co-speech hand gesturing without some rehabilitation and reorientation. Pragmatic criteria of intersubjectivity, normativity, and rationality need to confront the non-propositional and nonverbal meaning-making of embodied encounters. Phenomenological treatments of expression and intersubjectivity must consider the normative nature of high-order social practices like language use. Reciprocally critical exchanges between these traditions and gesture studies yield an improved philosophy that treats language as a multi-modal medium for collaborative meaning achievement. The proper paradigm for these discussions is found in enactive approaches to social cognition. Co-speech hand gestures are first and foremost emergent elements of social interaction, not the external whirring of an isolated internal consciousness. In contrast to current literature that frequently presents gestures as uncontrollable bodily upsurge or infallible imagistic phenomenon that drives and dances with verbal or ??linguistic?? convention (McNeill 1992, 2005), I suggest that we study gestures as dynamic, embodied, and shared tools for collaborative sense-making.     

Spoken language and arm gestures are controlled by the same motor control system

Arm movements can influence language comprehension much as semantics can influence arm movement planning. Arm movement itself can be used as a linguistic signal. We reviewed neurophysiological and behavioural evidence that manual gestures and vocal language share the same control system. Studies of primate premotor cortex and, in particular, of the so-called "mirror system", including humans, suggest the existence of a dual hand/mouth motor command system involved in ingestion activities. This may be the platform on which a combined manual and vocal communication system was constructed. In humans, speech is typically accompanied by manual gesture, speech production itself is influenced by executing or observing transitive hand actions, and manual actions play an important role in the development of speech, from the babbling stage onwards. Behavioural data also show reciprocal influence between word and symbolic gestures. Neuroimaging and repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) data suggest that the system governing both speech and gesture is located in Broca's area. In general, the presented data support the hypothesis that the hand motor-control system is involved in higher order cognition.     

Gestural imitation and limb apraxia in corticobasal degeneration

Limb apraxia is a common symptom of corticobasal degeneration (CBD). While previous research has shown that individuals with CBD have difficulty imitating transitive (tool-use actions) and intransitive non-representational gestures (nonsense actions), intransitive representational gestures (actions without a tool) have not been examined. In the current study, eight individuals with CBD and eight age-matched healthy adults performed transitive, intransitive representational and intransitive non-representational gestures to imitation. The results indicated that compared to controls, individuals with CBD were significantly less accurate in the imitation of transitive and intransitive non-representational gestures but showed no deficits for the imitation of intransitive representational gestures. This advantage for intransitive representational gestures was thought to be due to fewer demands being placed on the analysis of visual-gestural information or the translation of this information into movement when imitating these gestures. These findings speak to the importance of context and the representation of gestures in memory in gesture performance.     

Using imitation with congenitally deafblind adults: establishing meaningful communication partnerships

All congenitally deafblind people are potential communication partners. The key question for practitioners is how to help them achieve that potential. Imitation offers a particularly powerful means of doing so because it allows both partners to occupy a joint dyadic space, where the process of repairing the damaged communication partnerships that many deafblind people have been forced to function within throughout their lives can begin. I will first outline a brief history of deafblind education over the last 150 years in order to provide a general account of changes in practice and theory and corresponding impacts on interventions. I will then describe some of the difficulties that congenitally deafblind people face in making contact with and being understood by other people before drawing on both practical examples and theoretical accounts on neonatal imitation to examine four key functions that imitation plays in facilitating communicative exchanges between deafblind individuals and their partners: it attracts attention, it stimulates turn‐taking, it allows partners to recognize each other and it reveals the other as ‘just like me’. I will conclude that imitation is simply the starting place for a journey towards a ‘natural’ language for congenitally deafblind people, a language where meanings are jointly negotiated from the actions, gestures and vocalizations that develop between deafblind people and their communication partners. This starting place is the same for congenitally deafblind people as it is for all infants: a companion space where imitation acts a powerful and immediate source of feedback about your value as a fellow human being. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

从“变色龙效应”到“镜像神经元”再到“模仿过多症”—— 作为社会交流产物的人类无意识模仿

人类无意识模仿是指人们在社会交流时会相互无意识地模仿对方的一些动作、表情和行为方式。其在个体社会认知以及人际交流上扮演着重要的角色。通过回顾近十年来人类无意识模仿的各个领域内的研究进展, 以及分析无意识模仿的行为学效应, 脑神经机制以及病理学调控, 可以得出如下结论：所有神经层面以及行为层面的人类无意识模仿现象都是社会交流的产物。该观点在澄清无意识模仿神经机制以及促进幼儿社会认知发展方面具有一定启示意义, 而探索孤独症患者无意识模仿障碍的病理机制有望为该领域的未来研究开启新的方向。