Cognitive Pathways to Belief in Karma and Belief in God

Supernatural beliefs are ubiquitous around the world, and mounting evidence indicates that these beliefs partly rely on intuitive, cross-culturally recurrent cognitive processes. Specifically, past research has focused on humans' intuitive tendency to perceive minds as part of the cognitive foundations of belief in a personified God—an agentic, morally concerned supernatural entity. However, much less is known about belief in karma—another culturally widespread but ostensibly non-agentic supernatural entity reflecting ethical causation across reincarnations. In two studies and four high-powered samples, including mostly Christian Canadians and mostly Hindu Indians (Study 1, N = 2,006) and mostly Christian Americans and Singaporean Buddhists (Study 2, N = 1,752), we provide the first systematic empirical investigation of the cognitive intuitions underlying various forms of belief in karma. We used path analyses to (a) replicate tests of the previously documented cognitive predictors of belief in God, (b) test whether this same network of variables predicts belief in karma, and (c) examine the relative contributions of cognitive and cultural variables to both sets of beliefs. We found that cognitive tendencies toward intuitive thinking, mentalizing, dualism, and teleological thinking predicted a variety of beliefs about karma—including morally laden, non-agentic, and agentic conceptualizations—above and beyond the variability explained by cultural learning about karma across cultures. These results provide further evidence for an independent role for both culture and cognition in supporting diverse types of supernatural beliefs in distinct cultural contexts.     

Belief in God: A game-theoretic paradox

Conclusions The Belief Game is a two-person, nonzero-sum game in which both players can do well [e.g., at (3, 4)] or badly [e.g., at (1,1)] simultaneously. The problem that occurs in the play of this game is that its rational outcome of (2, 3) is not only unappealing to both players, especially God, but also, paradoxically, there is an outcome, (3, 4), preferred by both players that is unattainable. Moreover, because God has a dominant strategy, His omniscience does not remedy the situation, though - less plausibly - if man possessed this quality, and God were aware of it, (3, 4) would be attainable.How reasonable is it to use the device of a simple game to argue that nonrevelation by God, and nonbelief by man, are rational strategies? Like any model of a complex reality, the Belief Game abstracts a great deal from the problem that confronts the thoughtful agnostic asking the most profound of existential questions. Yet, to the degree that belief in God is seen as a personal question, conceptualized in terms of a possible relationship one might have with one's Creator, it seems appropriate to try to model this relationship as a game. The most difficult question to answer, I suppose, is, if God exists, what are His preferences in such a game?I have argued that He would first like to be believed, but at the same time not reveal Himself. These goals, in my opinion, are consistent with the role He assumes in many biblical stories, although this is not to say that the Bible offers the final word on philosophical and theological matters in the modern world. Nevertheless, it seems to me to be a logical place from which to start, and the clues it offers on God's preferences seem not contradicted by contemporary events.Of course, the Belief Game supposes that God not only has preferences but makes choices as well. To many people today - myself included - these choices are not apparent. But if He does make them, and in particular chooses not to reveal Himself, I think the Belief Game helps us to understand why nonrevelation is rational. Furthermore, it gives us insight into why, given this choice by God, our own reasons for believing in Him - in a game-theoretic context - may be rendered tenuous.     

Attachment, Working Models of Self and Others, and God Concept in Kindergarten

An attachment theoretical model of individual differences in God concepts among kindergarteners was tested. Subjects were 72 kindergarteners (mean age 63 months) from two elementary schools. Children's concepts of self, other, and God were measured using structured questionnaires. A questionnaire and an incomplete doll story procedure were used to tap the quality of the teacher-child and mother-child relationship. The model was partly supported. Contrary to our expectations, a punishing concept of God was not related to any of the independent variables. However, in line with the model, harmony and closeness in the teacher-child relationship predicted a loving God concept and this association was explained by children's working models of self. Working models of others predicted a loving God concept. Although the child's representation of the mother-child attachment relationship was significantly connected to the teacher-child relationship, it was not predictive of the concept of God.     

Self and society: between God and brain

Cognitive Neuroscience and Divine Action, 21-27 June 1998, Paserbiec, Poland.     

Jerome I. Gellman,Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Belief

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Mother, Father, and Self: Sources of Young Adults' God Concepts

Following developmental attachment theory, we predicted a path in which nurturing parents affect young adults' self-concepts and self-esteem, which in turn predicts the image of a nurturing God. To ascertain how images of parents and images of self predict God images, 132 young adults aged 18–22 (M = 19) completed the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale, and a six-item measure of God's perceived involvement in their lives (religiosity scale). In a follow-up interview, they rated their parents, God, and selves on scales of closeness, nurturing, power, and punishing/judging. For men, mothers were responsible, more than fathers, for creating a climate for sons' self-esteem through nurturance and discipline, which in turn contributed to seeing God as nurturing, feeling close to God, and being more religious. For women, mothers and fathers created a model of nurturance and power, which contributed to seeing God as nurturing and powerful. Punishing/judging parents directly affected punishing/judging God images in these young adults. Men perceived God to be more punishing/judging than did women, while women perceived God to be more nurturing. Even in adulthood, parents, especially mothers, continue to exert influences on young adults' faith and images of God.     

Hegel: Death of God and Recognition of the Self

Abstract

This paper covers the theme of the death of God considered from a Hegelian standpoint. For Aristotle, the image of God as ‘thought thinking itself’ was an image of the knowledge aspired to in philosophy. With the notion of God becoming man and his insistence on the icon of the Cross, Hegel challenged the Aristotelian goal of philosophy as immutable knowledge of an ‘ultimate’ reality. Hegel viewed the crisis of normativity (the death of the Cartesian divine guarantor) as strictly linked to the conception of the self. It is Nietzsche who is best known for alluding to the full significance of this image for modern life, but Hegel’s thought on the complex relations of philosophy and religion in the modern world can be regarded as an attempt to think through this same historical phenomenon. In this paper, I focus on the philosophical relevance of Hegel’s notion of the death of God. I argue that unpacking the significance of the ‘truths’ presented symbolically in modern Christianity is crucial in understanding the requirements that an idealistic philosophy must meet.     

Self Psychology, Dreams and Group Psychotherapy: Working in the Playspace

This paper presents one leadership style within a self-psychological approach to working with dreams in group psychotherapy. It stresses an empathic attunement, the creation of safety, and an experience-near playful relationship. Playful is not used lightly here. It is used in the spirit of Winnicott's intermediate space where a mother suspends questions of what is real or not real and what is me and not me. Freud's analogy to a playspace forms a metaphor for the creation of a special atmosphere in a group, or for that matter in individual work as well, that encourages exploration, risk taking, and vulnerability. Working with dreams in this playspace deepens the curative process, not only for the dreamer, but for the entire group.     

Explaining Support for Violating Out‐Group Human Rights in Conflict: Attitudes Toward Principles of Human Rights,Trust in the Out‐Group,and Intergroup Contact1

A public atmosphere that supports violating the human rights of out‐group members can enable or even encourage enacting such violations. We present a model that explains such support in terms of 2 underlying components: (a) support for violating general principles of human rights (SVHRG); and (b) lack of trust toward the specific out‐group. This model was successful (R² = .47) in predicting Jewish‐Israeli support for violating human rights of Palestinians (SVHRP). Structural equation modeling indicated that, consistent with our hypotheses, SVHRG and distrust of Palestinians each significantly contributed to predicting SVHRP; and contact with Palestinians and religiosity each significantly contributed to predicting trust in Palestinians, with more contact predicting higher trust and more religiosity predicting lower trust.     

Self Torture and Group Beneficence

Moral puzzles about actions which bring about very small or what are said to be imperceptible harms or benefits for each of a large number of people are well known. Less well known is an argument by Warren Quinn that standard theories of rationality can lead an agent to end up torturing himself or herself in a completely foreseeable way, and that this shows that standard theories of rationality need to be revised. We show where Quinn's argument goes wrong, and apply this to the moral puzzles.