The Amenability of Pleasure and Pain to Aggregation

According to several prominent philosophers, pleasure and pain come in measurable quantities. This thesis is controversial, however, and many philosophers have presented or felt compelled to respond to arguments for the conclusion that it is false. One important class of these arguments concerns the problem of aggregation, which says that if pleasure and pain were measurable quantities, then, by definition, it would be possible to perform various mathematical and statistical operations on numbers representing amounts of them. It is sometimes argued that such operations cannot be sensibly applied to pleasure and pain, and that sentences expressing such operations must be false or meaningless. The purpose of this paper is to present, explain, and rebut several versions of this argument. In the first section, I present a generic version of the argument. In the second section, I present a defense of its key premise based on a case involving comparisons of relief from pain, and explain why I think it fails. In the third section, I present and rebut another defense, based on a pair of analogies with temperature. In the final section, I present a third defense, based on an analogy with spatial distances. I then present my reasons for rejecting it. Along the way, I explain my reasons for thinking that pleasure and pain are amenable to interval measurement.     

神经美学视角的审美愉悦加工机制

审美对象特有的刺激属性会唤起观赏者特定的情绪或情感反应。个体在欣赏自然、艺术品和其他人类作品时会产生审美愉悦体验。审美愉悦-兴趣模型(PIA)认为, 审美愉悦体验包含审美过程中自动化加工阶段的审美愉悦和控制加工阶段的审美兴趣。近年来, 神经美学研究表明, 负责愉悦和奖赏的眶额叶皮层在审美过程中广泛激活, 是自动化加工阶段初级审美愉悦奖赏的神经基础, 而审美过程中纹状体亚回路中不同的连接和功能作用与两个阶段中审美愉悦的产生都有关联; 上述结果支持了审美愉悦-兴趣模型。但审美高峰体验时默认模式网络(DMN)相关脑区的激活和负责控制与理性思维的外侧前额叶皮层等脑区的失活, 提示在PIA模型强调的自动化加工阶段审美愉悦和控制加工阶段审美兴趣之上, 还有整合升华阶段的审美沉浸愉悦, PIA模型需得到进一步的扩展。未来研究应进一步检验审美愉悦认知加工模型及神经机制, 探索审美对创造力的影响机制和神经基础, 探讨不同审美经验愉悦机制的异同。     

The content and structure of laypeople's concept of pleasure

Five studies were conducted to map the content and structure of laypeople's conceptions of pleasure. Instances of the pleasure concept collected in Study 1 consisted predominantly of objects, events or persons described as sources of pleasure. Content analysis suggested that the pleasure category, like emotional response categories, might be formed at an implicit level where various pleasure antecedents are grouped based on common phenomenological qualities of the affective experience. Studies 2 and 3a showed that the pleasure category possesses a graded structure and fuzzy boundaries. Results further revealed that, either when explicitly presented with labels (Study 3b) or left to their own implicit categories during a sorting task (Study 4), laypeople represented pleasure as a hierarchical concept in which differentiated pleasure types (i.e., intellectual, emotional, social and physical) were subsumed under a higher level unitary form of pleasure. In this structure, unitary and differentiated pleasures shared a set of common affective qualities but were also distinguishable by unique and distinctive affective characteristics (Study 5). Ties to prior theories of pleasure and implications for decision making and behavioural research are discussed.     

The Importance of Pleasure in the Moral for Kant's Ethics

I argue for a new reading of Kant's claim that respect is the moral incentive; this reading accommodates the central insights of the affectivist and intellectualist readings of respect, while avoiding shortcomings of each. I show that within Kant's ethical system, the feeling of respect should be understood as paradigmatic of a kind of pleasure, pleasure in the moral. The motivational power of respect arises from its nature as pleasurable feeling, but the feeling does not directly motivate individual dutiful actions. Rather, the feeling is motivational in the sense that, after an agent has acted in a morally good way, the pleasure that results from that action contributes to the cultivation of virtue in the agent and, consequently, morally good actions in the future. Understanding the feeling of respect to be moral pleasure not only gives us insight into how finite rational beings develop virtue, but also a new way of understanding respect as an incentive.     

The authority of pleasure

The aim of the paper is to reassess the prospects of a widely neglected affective conception of the aesthetic evaluation and appreciation of art. On the proposed picture, the aesthetic evaluation and appreciation of art are non‐contingently constituted by a particular kind of pleasure. Artworks that are valuable qua artworks merit, deserve, and call for a certain pleasure, the same pleasure that reveals (or at least purports to reveal) them to be valuable in the way that they are, and constitutes their aesthetic evaluation and appreciation. This is why and how art is non‐contingently related to pleasure. Call this, the Affective View. While I don't advance conclusive arguments for the affective view in this paper, I aim to reassess its prospects by (1) undermining central objections against it, (2) dissociating it from hedonism about the value of artworks (the view that this value is grounded in, and explained by, its possessors’ power to please), and (3) introducing some observations on the practice of art in support of it. Given that the objections I discuss miss their target, and given the observations in support of it, I conclude that the affective view is worth serious reconsideration.     

Intuitive Hedonism

The hoary philosophical tradition of hedonism – the view that pleasure is the basic ethical or normative value – suggests that it is at least reasonably and roughly intuitive. But philosophers no longer treat hedonism that way. For the most part, they think that they know it to be obviously false on intuitive grounds, much more obviously false on such grounds than familiar competitors. I argue that this consensus is wrong. I defend the intuitive cogency of hedonism relative to the dominant desire-based and objectivist conceptions of well-being and the good. I argue that hedonism is still a contender, and indeed that our current understanding of commonsense intuition on balance supports it. An erratum to this article is available at .     

忧乐圆融：儒家忧乐思想的核心特质

儒家肯定感性忧乐的自然合理性,但是认为感性忧乐有待于外,陷溺于感性忧乐,容易使人流于以物役心的异化状态。儒家忧乐思想的根本形态是德性忧乐,德性忧乐的根据是本心自足之德性。儒家以德性之忧作为德行修养的内在心理动力,德性之乐是在德性彰明过程中本心情感的自然涌现,可以统摄和超越感性忧乐,实现忧乐圆融。     

Emotional autonomy and adjustment among emerging adults: The moderating role of family relationships

Emerging adults build their personal maturity within the family context; however, few studies focus on the role of emotional autonomy during this stage. The aim of this study was to analyze the relationship between emotional autonomy and adjustment during emerging adulthood, bearing in mind the possible moderating role of parental support in this relationship. Data were collected from 1,502 Spanish undergraduate students (903 women) aged between 18 and 29. Participants completed measures of emotional autonomy (EAS, Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986), family social support (MSPSS; Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet & Farley, 1988), psychological well-being (PWBS; Ryff, Lee, Essex & Schmutte, 1995) and psychological distress (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The results indicate that emotional autonomy correlates negatively with family support and psychological well-being and positively with psychological distress. However, only when young people perceive a family context with low social support is gaining emotional distance from their parents associated with an increase in their psychological well-being. Our findings highlight the crucial role that the family environment plays in well-being during young adulthood, and reveal that the effect of emotional distancing from parents on adjustment depends on the quality of the family climate. Future research should seek to gain greater insight into emotional autonomy during emerging adulthood, taking into account cross-cultural diversity.     

The Activities of The Scandinavian Societies

Freud's concept of the death instinct has given rise to many different interpretations which have often been contradictory. It is in fact already possible to discern two diametrically opposite meanings of this concept in Freud's work from 1920—Beyond the Pleasure Principle—in which he first introduced the concept of the death instinct. In this paper, it is argued that both these meanings are relevant in describing psychical life, although only one of these meanings actually qualifies for the concept “death instinct”. Beyond the Pleasure Principle was written in order to try to understand some everyday, as well as clinical phenomena which could not be explained by the so-called pleasure principle. Freud postulated something beyond the pleasure principle, which initially seemed to have to do with binding energy. I will preserve this idea and attempt to develop it within the context of a phenomenological analysis of time. The temporalization of the subject involves a very basic affirmation of existence, in that the subject experiences something constant, something that can be said to possess the quality of a gestalt. I propose that that which is beyond the pleasure principle—this binding of energy—should be understood as the opposite of the idea of a primordial death instinct striving towards death. In this case, that which is beyond the pleasure principle reflects an original affirmation of existence, which could be said to correspond to Freud's first meaning of the death instinct. The second meaning—for which the name “death instinct” seems to be applicable—concerns the discharge of energy, which from a temporal point of view shows itself as a tendency to dissolution. The concept of the death instinct in its various meanings is discussed in connection with phenomenological reflections on time, which is a different approach from Freud's attempt to ground the death instinct in biology.     

Freud, psychoanalysis and the psychosomatic problem

According to the author an unbroken hallucination of the pleasure principle is underlying the vision of mankind as in biotechnical medicine as well as in a concept of science that is reduced to technical progress. Psychosomatics is to overcome the false rationality of such thought.     

The Structure of Anxiety and Depression in a Normative Sample of Younger and Older Australian Adolescents

It has been reported that depression and anxiety have overlapping symptoms and are conceptually interrelated. One of the most prominent theoretical developments that explain this association is Clark and Watson’s tripartite model (Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100:316–336, 1991) that posits these two disorders and negative emotions share a latent component of negative affect (NA). The current study had two aims, (a) to compare a tripartite factor structure against competing models by Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) of the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales (DASS-21) (Lovibond and Lovibond 1995), and (b) explore the psychometric properties of the DASS-21. The DASS-21 was completed by a representative sample of 4039 young Australians, aged 12–18 years, as part of the South Australian Youth Mental Health Survey (SAYMHS), South Australia, Australia. The best fitting model for the data consisted of anhedonic depression, physiological hyperarousal, and general NA. The psychometric properties of the DASS-21 were excellent with a stable and interpretable factor structure and good internal consistency. The results of the current study suggest that the theoretical tripartite structure of depression and anxiety is robust and applicable among Australian youth. The diagnostic, clinical and theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.     

红色和蓝色对中国汉族大学生情绪的启动效应

通过3个实验探讨红色和蓝色对中国汉族大学生的情绪意义。实验1采用限制联想法考察红色和蓝色的情绪意义。实验2、实验3采用启动范式, 分别考察在知觉水平和概念水平上红色和蓝色对情绪的启动效应。结果发现：(1)知觉水平：在唤醒度和优势度上, 红色知觉引发了高唤醒、高优势情绪, 蓝色知觉引发了低唤醒、低优势情绪, 这与国外研究基本一致; 但在愉悦度上, 红色知觉既能引发高愉悦情绪, 也能引发低愉悦情绪, 而蓝色知觉只引发了高愉悦情绪, 这体现出本土化特点。(2)概念水平：在唤醒度和愉悦度上, 红色概念引发了高唤醒、高优势情绪, 蓝色概念引发了低唤醒、低优势情绪, 这与知觉水平基本一致; 但在愉悦度上, 红色概念只启动了高愉悦情绪, 而蓝色概念同时启动了高愉悦和低愉悦的情绪, 这与知觉水平不一致。本研究表明：(1)红色和蓝色对中国汉族大学生情绪引发的特点主要表现在愉悦度上; (2)颜色知觉和颜色概念对情绪的引发机制可能具有如下特点：颜色知觉对情绪的三维度具有直接的引发作用; 而颜色概念对情绪唤醒度和优势度的引发是以颜色知觉为中介, 对愉悦度的引发则是以社会文化为原因。本研究探讨了红色和蓝色对中国汉族大学生情绪的作用, 对红色和蓝色在中国社会环境中的应用具有一定的实际价值; 同时, 直接比较并剖析了颜色知觉与概念对情绪的引发特点, 对于揭示二者对情绪引发的内部机制具有一定的理论意义。     

Beyond Pregenital Determination of Femininity and Masculinity (Discussion)1

Abstract

The authors investigate the relationship between the concept of functional pleasure as defined by Fenichel and a number of other psychoanalytic concepts. Considered in the light of this concept, the pleasure–unpleasure principle as defined by Freud is to be distinguished in terms of a pleasure principle and a principle of avoiding unpleasure. These are then reunified in the sense of an unpleasure–functional pleasure principle, to which the substitutive formations of the repressed are subjected. It is argued that, in the realization of substitutive formations of repressed genital–sexual instinctual wishes, the intentional erogenous pleasure changes into a functional pleasure, in which a successful defence finds its experiential expression.     

The Rawls–Harsanyi Dispute: A Moral Point of View

Central to the Rawls–Harsanyi dispute is the question of whether the core modeling device of Rawls' theory of justice, the original position, justifies Rawls' principles of justice, as Rawls suggests, or whether it justifies the average utility principle, as Harsanyi suggests. Many commentators agree with Harsanyi and consider this dispute to be primarily about the correct application of normative decision theory to Rawls' original position. I argue that, if adequately conceived, the Rawls–Harsanyi dispute is not primarily a dispute about the correct application of normative decision theory to Rawls' original position. Instead, Rawls and Harsanyi aim to model different moral ideals, and this difference in their moral assumptions leads them to significantly different conclusions about justice. There is no winner in the Rawls–Harsanyi dispute. Instead, the dispute merely clarifies the moral ideals and their formal representations that need to be assumed in order to justify either Rawls' contractualist principles of justice or the average utility principle. Thus understood, the Rawls–Harsanyi dispute offers a promising starting point for future research that can deepen and enrich our understanding of the demands of justice.     

"仁"——医德的元德

医德是医学道德的简称,具言之,它是指医务人员在医疗卫生服务的职业活动中应该具备的仁爱、救死扶伤等的品德,是道德德目在医务人员身上的内化,也是对医务人员必须具备的最起码的要求.我们评价一个医生,首先是直面他的医德,医德是医生形象的体现,没有医德的医生即使技艺再高超,也算不上一个完整意义上的医生,"无德不成医".事实上一个医德低下的医生,他的技艺也不会高超的.     

IS PERCEPTION A PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE?

It is widely agreed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e., that it has representational content. Many philosophers take this to mean that like belief, experience has propositional content, that it can be true or false. I accept that perceptual experience has intentionality; but I dispute the claim that it has propositional content. This claim does not follow from the fact that experience is intentional, nor does it follow from the fact that experiences are accurate or inaccurate. I end by considering the relationship between this question and the question of whether experience has non-conceptual content.     

The reduction of sensory pleasure to desire

One of the leading approaches to the nature of sensory pleasure reduces it to desire: roughly, a sensation qualifies as a sensation of pleasure just in case its subject wants to be feeling it. This approach is, in my view, correct, but it has never been formulated quite right; and it needs to defended against some compelling arguments. Thus the purpose of this paper is to discover the most defensible formulation of this rough idea, and to defend it against the most interesting objections.     

The affective costs of overconfidence

Positive illusions, though often beneficial (Taylor & Brown, 1988 ), can diminish the pleasure of outcomes. This prediction follows from decision affect theory. We investigated this prediction by measuring the confidence that recreational basketball players felt while making shots and the pleasure they felt with subsequent outcomes. Results showed that most players were overconfident. Those who were more overconfident tended to experience less enjoyment with their outcomes. Using individual parameter estimates from decision affect theory, we estimated how each player would have felt if their self assessments had been accurate. For the vast majority, better calibration would have led to greater pleasure. In a second study, we randomly assigned players to a debiasing treatment condition or a control condition. Relative to the control players, debiased players were better calibrated and derived greater average pleasure from the task. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Depression Anxiety Stress Scales: Factor structure and differential item functioning across women and men

This study examined the factor structure, and differential item functioning of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) across sex. The DASS was completed by 201 women and 165 men from the general community. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) indicated support for the original 3-factor oblique model (factors for depression, anxiety and stress). There was however more support for a bifactor model, with four orthogonal factors: a general factor on which all the depression, anxiety and stress items load, and specific independent factors for depression, anxiety and stress items. None of the DASS items showed DIF. The practical, theoretical, research and clinical implications of the findings are discussed.