Manic temporality

Time-consciousness has long been a focus of research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychology. We advance and extend this tradition of research by focusing on the character of temporal experience under conditions of mania. Symptom scales and diagnostic criteria for mania are peppered with temporally inflected language: increased rate of speech, racing thoughts, flight-of-ideas, hyperactivity. But what is the underlying structure of temporal experience in manic episodes? We tackle this question using a strategically hybrid approach. We recover and reconstruct three hypotheses regarding manic temporality that were advanced and modeled by two pioneers of clinical phenomenology: Eugène Minkowski (1885–1972) and Ludwig Binswanger (1881–1966). We then test, critique, and refine these hypotheses using heterophenomenological methods in an interview-based study of persons with a history of bipolar and a current diagnosis of acute mania. Our conclusions support a central hypothesis due to Minkowski and Binswanger, namely, that disturbance in the formal structure of temporal experience is a core feature of mania. We argue that a suitably refined variant of Binswanger’s model of disturbance in manic protention helps to explain a striking pattern of impaired insight and impaired reasoning in manic episodes.     

A second case report of lleuprolide acetate for depot suspension-induced mania

This is the second published case report of Lleuprolide acetate for depot suspension (LD)-induced mania. Both reports detail a patient with a prior psychiatric history of both depressive and hypomanic episodes. While depression is a predictable and documented side effect of LD and menopause (especially in those with a previoushistory of symptoms), manic reactions are rare and unexplained. Possible causative mechanismsbehind the LD-induced manic episodes are discussed, and we suggest that patients with a single previous hypomanic episode are at risk for LD-induced mania.     

Athanasios Koukopoulos (1931–2013)

With the death of Athanasios Koukopoulos last year, psychiatry lost one of its most stimulating and scientifically influential representatives has been lost. His main scientific contributions are in the course of manic depressive illnesses and mixed affective states. Perhaps his most important contribution to modern psychiatry are his studies on the use of antidepressants in bipolar disorder. He was able to show that antidepressants attenuate the beneficial effects of lithium, can trigger mania, and can lead to cycle acceleration and rapid cycling.     

Temporality and psychopathology

The paper first introduces the concept of implicit and explicit temporality, referring to time as pre-reflectively lived vs. consciously experienced. Implicit time is based on the constitutive synthesis of inner time consciousness on the one hand, and on the conative–affective dynamics of life on the other hand. Explicit time results from an interruption or negation of implicit time and unfolds itself in the dimensions of present, past and future. It is further shown that temporality, embodiment and intersubjectivity are closely connected: While implicit temporality is characterised by tacit bodily functioning and by synchronisation with others, explicit temporality arises with states of desynchronisation, that is, of a retardation or acceleration of inner time in relation to external or social processes. These states often bring the body to awareness as an obstacle as well. On this basis, schizophrenia and melancholic depression are investigated as paradigm cases for a psychopathology of temporality. Major symptoms of schizophrenia such as thought disorder, thought insertion, hallucinations or passivity experiences may be regarded as manifesting a disturbance of the constitutive synthesis of time consciousness, closely connected with a weakening of the underlying pre-reflective self-awareness or ipseity. This results in a fragmentation of the intentional arc, a loss of self-coherence and the appearance of major self-disturbances. Depression, on the other hand, is mostly triggered by a desynchronisation from the social environment and further develops into an inhibition of the conative–affective dynamics of life. As will be shown, both mental illnesses bear witness of the close connection of temporality, embodiment and intersubjectivity.     

Beyond logic – entering the realm of mystery: hermeneutic phenomenology as a tool for reflecting on children’s spirituality

This paper suggests hermeneutic phenomenology as a theoretical framework for reflecting, interpreting and gaining insight into children’s spirituality. It describes an episode that took place in a Year 5 classroom involving a 10‐year‐old child and his response to an Australian Aboriginal Dreamtime story. The possibilities this observed incident opens for hermeneutic phenomenology are then explored using van Manen’s notion of lifeworld existentials as guides to reflection upon the life expression of this child. The four lifeworld existentials are lived space (spatiality), lived body (corporeality), lived time (temporality) and lived human relation (relationality). In using these as a means by which to interpret the life expression of this child, it is argued that some insights into his or her spirituality can be gleaned.     

MMPI predictors of mania among psychiatric inpatients

MMPI data from 64 patients with a diagnosis of manic-depressive illness, manic type, were compared with MMPI data from patients in two comparison groups--64 patients with a psychotic diagnosis other than manic-depressive illness, and 64 patients with a variety of psychiatric diagnoses. Manic patients had higher Ma scale scores for MMPI scales that assess personal distress and interpersonal difficulties (e.g., D and Si). Discriminant analysis, with the Ma, D, and Si scales as predictors, correctly classified as manic or not manic 82.5% of the patients in the derivation sample and 74.2% of the patients in the cross-validation sample. Two high-point pairs, Sc-Ma/Ma-Sc and Pa-Ma/Ma-Pa, occurred in the MMPI profiles of almost half of the manic patients but were rarely found among the profiles of other patients. The results of this study support the use of the MMPI in identifying manic patients, particularly when discriminating between mania and other types of psychosis.     

Gender as Lived Time: Reading The Second Sex for a Feminist Phenomenology of Temporality

This article suggests that Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex offers an important contribution to a feminist phenomenology of temporality. In contrast to readings of The Second Sex that focus on the notion of “becoming” as the main claim about the relation between “woman” and time, this article suggests that Beauvoir's discussion of temporality in volume II of The Second Sex shows that Beauvoir understands the temporality of waiting, or a passive present, to be an underlying structure of women's existence and subordination. Accordingly, I argue that Beauvoir does not see “woman” as a mere becoming, as that which unfolds in time, but instead understands becoming a woman to be realized as lived time. As such, Beauvoir's account shows that gender and temporality are deeply entangled, and thus she challenges the classic phenomenological account of temporality as a general, given structure of human existence. More specifically, I argue that her account shows how a particular experience of time is an underlying structure of sexual objectification, a claim that expands on the feminist phenomenological claim that a particular relation to space becomes a way in which women take up and negotiate their own subordination and objectification.     

Autopoietic Enactivism,Phenomenology, and the Problem of Naturalism: A Neutral Monist Proposal

In this paper, I compare the original version of the enactive view—autopoietic enactivism—with Husserl’s phenomenology, regarding the issue of the relationship between consciousness and nature. I refer to this issue as the “problem of naturalism.” I show how the idea of the co-determination of subject and object of cognition, which is at the heart of autopoietic enactivism, is close to the phenomenological form of correlationism. However, I argue that there is a tension between an epistemological reading of the subject-object correlation that renounces to search for its metaphysical ground, and the enactivist focus on the biological basis of cognition, which seems to imply a view of nature as the metaphysical ground of the conscious mind. A similar problem arises in Husserl’s phenomenology in the contrast between the idea of the fundamental subject-object correlation, the concept of nature as a correlate of transcendental constitution, and the investigation of the corporeal and material grounding of consciousness. I find a way out of this problem by drawing on the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology. I argue that the investigation of the temporality of experience in genetic phenomenology leads us to investigate the metaphysical ground of the subject-object correlation, understood dynamically as co-constitution and co-origination. Then I propose to complement phenomenology and enactivism with a form of neutral monism, which conceives of the co-constitution of subject and object as grounded in a flow of fundamental, pre-phenomenal qualities.

     

KIERKEGAARD ON PATIENCE AND THE TEMPORALITY OF THE SELF: The Virtues of a Being in Time

This paper examines Kierkegaard's discussion of patience in some of his Upbuilding Discourses , and its connection with his understanding of the nature of selfhood as it appears both in the Discourses and in The Sickness unto Death . That understanding stresses that selfhood is not simply given, but is a task to be achieved—although a task that can only be achieved by the self that is formed in the process of undertaking it. For Kierkegaard, an account of the self that recognizes its essential temporality must give a crucial role to patience as a virtue necessary for the formation and maintenance of personal identity. However, although the self is essentially temporal for Kierkegaard, it is also essentially such as to participate in eternity, and this complexity and tension in his concept of the self gives his understanding of patience a particular character—one that presents an important challenge to some of the dominant assumptions of recent and contemporary philosophy in both the analytic and the continental traditions.     

Social cognition and the manic defense: attributions, selective attention, and self-schema in bipolar affective disorder.

Manic patients, depressed bipolar patients, and normal controls were compared on measures of social cognition. Manic patients showed a normal self-serving bias on the Attributional Style Questionnaire, but depressed patients attributed negative events more than positive events to self. On an implicit test of attributional style, both patient groups attributed negative events more than positive events to self. Both patient groups showed slowed color naming for depression-related but not euphoria-related words. Manic patients, like normal controls, endorsed mainly positive words as true of self but, like the depressed patients, recalled mainly negative words. Findings from the implicit tests indicate a common form of psychological organization in manic and depressed patients, whereas the contrasts between the scores on the implicit and explicit measures are consistent with the hypothesis of a manic defense.     

A model of the synchronic self

The phenomenology of the self includes the sense of control over one's body and mind, of being bounded in body and mind, of having perspective from within one's body and mind and of being extended in time. I argue that this phenomenology is to be accounted for by a set of five dissociable cognitive capacities that compose the self. The focus of this paper is on the four capacities that compose the synchronic self: the agentive(B) self, which underlies the sense of control over one's body; the boundary(B) self, which underlies the sense of being bounded within one's body; the agentive(M) self which underlies the sense of control over one's thoughts; and the boundary(M) self which underlies the sense of being bounded within one's mind. I model the agentive(B) and agentive(M) selves as parts of the motor control system and the boundary(B) self as the capacity to form and integrated map of the body. I point to the delusion of thought broadcast as a possible source of evidence for future research on the boundary(M) self.     

Time and Matter: Historicity,Facticity and the Question of Phenomenological Realism

This paper deals with the question of historical facticity in the phenomenological tradition. I argue that taking historicity into consideration in its factical constitution means transgressing the realm of the primordial or existential temporality. Following Ricoeur’s discussion of the idea of the “referential status of the past,” the question of the material foundation of historical meaning-formation, i.e., relation between temporality and materiality will be brought into the forefront of phenomenological investigations. It is with this context in mind that I argue that exploring the conditions of historicity with regard to its factical and material determinations should assume a realist position in phenomenology.     

The Temporal Foundation of the Self and the Other: A Phenomenological Reading of Narcissism

Rethinking the manner in which psychoanalysis articulates the self’s relation to the other, this paper returns to the primordial stage of narcissism. The paper traces the consequences of the Freudian and Lacanian notions of narcissism and offers a new, alternative picture of the narcissistic stage by suggesting, in light of Heidegger and Loewald, that temporality must be recognized as a constitutive dimension of the self’s openness to the Other.     

Fenomenologia,coscienza del tempo e analisi musicale

This paper explores the relationships between American phenomenology of music and conventional studies of musical analysis. The temporality of experience is a central topic in the phenomenology of music: recent research in USA has focused on musical time-consciousness (Schutz and Smith) or on analytical applications (Clifton, Lochhead, Ferrara). Many methods of musical analysis, like phenomenological methods, are concerned to study subjective temporal structures: Schenkerian and post-Schenkerian scholars (Salzer, Meyer, Narmour, Lewin) have elaborated specific systems for the explanation of musical form on a experiential basis. Apart from any comparison with the different approaches, phenomenological analysis appears to be fundamental for the analytical interpretation of music.     

Measurement as transcendental–empirical <Emphasis Type="Italic">écart</Emphasis>: Merleau-Ponty on deep temporality

Merleau-Ponty’s radical reflection conceptualizes the transcendental and the empirical as intertwined, emerging only via an écart. I advance this concept of transcendental empirical écart by studying the problem of measurement in science, in both general and quantum mechanical contexts. Section one analyses scientific problems of measurement, focusing on issues of temporality, to show how measurement entails a transcendental that diverges with the empirical. Section two briefly interprets this result via Merleau-Ponty’s concept of depth, to indicate how measurement reveals a temporality that is not an already given ground that would guarantee the transcendental in advance: temporality is instead ‘deep,’ itself engendering a divergence of transcendental and empirical operations that first allows for measurement and sense.     

Disorders of Temporality and The Subjective Experience of Time: Unresponsive Objects and the Vacuity of the Future

This paper explores how the personal sense of time—temporality—is organized and experienced in different clinical situations. It uses examples from infancy observations to draw links between caregivers’ response to infants’ capacities for motor activity and emotional communication and the development of the senses of personal security, vital intersubjectivity and temporality, that is, the feeling of a meaningful self and an open future. In illustrations from both early child–parent interaction and an extended case, it suggests how moment-to-moment interactions reflect and sustain these core, highly personal experiences of what it feels like to live in the world, that is, how an accretion of “micro” interactions can contribute to and help us understand the “macro” structures that analysts usually describe, such as intersubjectivity, the sense of self, and here, the senses of time.

With that in mind, the paper evokes a few specific “disorders of temporality.” One group of these involves the blurring of past and present, especially following trauma. Much of the paper, though, is concerned with a basic deficit in the sense of time that can be observed, when the patient presents without the hope that new experiences can emerge, however fitfully, with the feeling of a forward-moving future. In an imaginative move, the paper links this image with the experience of an infant with an unresponsive parent, one who does not afford that infant the most basic senses of personal agency that come from having her feelings and gestures recognized and responded to in a way that gives her the feeling that she is having some effect on her world. Clinical implications are drawn, often demonstrating how brief moments of analytic interaction reflect the macrocosms of the broader analytic relationship and the patient’s psychological organization.     

Beyond the twee: Thuy’s practical expression of living the Mercy Education Value of hospitality

This article utilises hermeneutic phenomenology as a theoretical framework for reflecting upon and interpreting the Mercy Education Value of hospitality. It describes an incident involving the author’s encounter with a member of staff upon his new appointment in a Catholic secondary college formed in the Mercy Tradition. Through this article, the possibilities opened by such an encounter for hermeneutic phenomenology are explored using van Manen’s lifeworld existentials as guides to reflection upon the described incident. The four lifeworld existentials are lived space (spatiality), lived body (corporeality), lived time (temporality) and lived other (relationality). In using these as guides to reflection, it is argued that some insights into the Mercy value of hospitality may be gleaned, namely that to be Mercy involves: (1) exceeding the carefully and socially programmed how are you – fine exchange; (2) an encounter with the other – the stranger – in whom is to be found the person of Jesus Christ, in which both participants are transformed; and (3) taking a risk – pushing boundaries so as to enter into relationship with the other.     

Body Dysmorphia and the Phenomenology of Embodiment

This paper explores the relationship between phenomenology and body dysmorphia. This is, to explain, a disorder in which the sufferer perceives, and is obsessed by, defects in appearance which are either non-existent or severely exaggerated. I will see how Husserl’s and Sartre’s analyses of embodiment can explain the radical uncertainty, and anxiety, about appearance that underscores this condition. Their accounts of the body-as-lived reveal first of all an essential intimacy between body and self that the “objective”, material, view of the body covers over. Second, however, their analyses show that there is always also an essential elusiveness of the body before our attempts to grasp or know it. Taken together, these points indicate how body dysmorphia arises. If there is an essential project of the self to know the body, but this is necessarily frustrated, then we can see how an obsession and anxiety surrounding bodily appearance can emerge.     

Phenomenology as the Original Science of Life in Heidegger’s Early Freiburg Lectures

The aim of this essay is to introduce an original and radical phenomenology of life into Heidegger’s earliest lectures at Freiburg University that stands independently from and in contrast to fundamental ontology. The motivation behind this aim lies in the exclusion of life from the existential analytic of Dasein despite Heidegger’s preoccupation with the question of life during this very early period. Principally, the essay demonstrates how Husserl’s phenomenological insight into the intentionality of life has the potential to be transformed into a living aporia. Although this demonstration is set within the general context of obtaining knowledge in and of life, it is achieved via a reciprocal critique of both the possibility of a philosophy of life and Husserlian phenomenology that reveals the congruence life philosophy has with the project of phenomenology. The essay ends by exposing Heidegger’s own latent and inexplicit formulation of phenomenology as the original science of life in terms of a radical correlation that holds aporetically between living and unliving experience.