Negations in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a heuristic–analytic conflict

Research indicates that cognitive age differences can be influenced by metacognitive factors. This research has generally focused on simple memory tasks. Age differences in working memory (WM) performance are pronounced, but are typically attributed to basic cognitive deficits rather than metacognitive factors. However, WM performance can be influenced by strategic behaviour that might be driven by metacognitive monitoring. In the current project, we attempted to connect these lines of research by examining age differences in metacognitive WM monitoring and strategies. In Experiment 1, younger and older adult participants completed a computerized operation span task in conditions that either required or did not require monitoring reports. Participants in the monitoring condition predicted and postdicted global performance for each block and rated their responses following each trial within a block. In Experiment 2, participants also reported their trial-level strategic approach. In contrast to the age equivalence typically found for simple memory monitoring, results demonstrated age differences in WM monitoring accuracy. Overall age differences in strategy use were not found, but using effective strategies benefited older adults' performance more than younger adults'. Furthermore, age-related differences in the WM task appear to be mediated by the accuracy of performance monitoring.     

Perceptual access reasoning: developmental stage or system 1 heuristic?

In contrast with the two dominant views in Theory of Mind development, the Perceptual Access Reasoning hypothesis of Fabricius and colleagues is that children don’t understand the mental state of belief until around 6 years of age. Evidence for this includes data that many children ages 4 and 5, who pass the standard 2-location false belief task, nonetheless fail the true belief task, and often fail a 3-location false belief task by choosing the irrelevant option. These findings can be explained by the PAR hypothesis but pose challenges for the two dominant views. I argue against an alternate hypothesis which is proposed by Anika Fiebich in a recent paper. According to Fiebich, PAR is not a distinct transitional stage in children’s theory of mind development, but is a fast and frugal System 1 heuristic which fades once children become fluent in social reasoning. However, I point out a number of problems with Fiebich’s proposal and argue for the superiority of the PAR hypothesis. I also present five reasons to be skeptical about the findings of Perner and Horn which purportedly show that 4- and 5-year-olds can pass the 3-location false belief task when suitably modified. This is a further difficulty for Fiebich’s proposal, since she relies on these findings in her fluency theory. Finally, I sketch a dual systems theory of mind account based upon the PAR hypothesis which is different from Fiebich’s.     

Left–right coding of past and future in language: The mental timeline during sentence processing

The metaphoric mapping theory suggests that abstract concepts, like time, are represented in terms of concrete dimensions such as space. This theory receives support from several lines of research ranging from psychophysics to linguistics and cultural studies; especially strong support comes from recent response time studies. These studies have reported congruency effects between the dimensions of time and space indicating that time evokes spatial representations that may facilitate or impede responses to words with a temporal connotation. The present paper reports the results of three linguistic experiments that examined this congruency effect when participants processed past- and future-related sentences. Response time was shorter when past-related sentences required a left-hand response and future-related sentences a right-hand response than when this mapping of time onto response hand was reversed (Experiment 1). This result suggests that participants can form time–space associations during the processing of sentences and thus this result is consistent with the view that time is mentally represented from left to right. The activation of these time–space associations, however, appears to be non-automatic as shown by the results of Experiments 2 and 3 when participants were asked to perform a non-temporal meaning discrimination task.     

In conflict with ourselves? An investigation of heuristic and analytic processes in decision making

Many theorists propose two types of processing: heuristic and analytic. In conflict tasks, in which these processing types lead to opposing responses, giving the analytic response may require bothdetection andresolution of the conflict. The ratio bias task, in which people tend to treat larger numbered ratios (e.g., 20/100) as indicating a higher likelihood of winning than do equivalent smaller numbered ratios (e.g., 2/10), is considered to induce such a conflict. Experiment 1 showed response time differences associated with conflict detection, resolution, and the amount of conflict induced. The conflict detection and resolution effects were replicated in Experiment 2 and were not affected by decreasing the influence of the heuristic response or decreasing the capacity to make the analytic response. The results are consistent with dual-process accounts, but a single-process account in which quantitative, rather than qualitative, differences in processing are assumed fares equally well in explaining the data.     

Automatic influence of arousal information on evaluative processing: Valence–arousal interactions in an affective Simon task

Previous research showed that evaluation speed is faster for negative stimuli that are high in arousal and for positive stimuli that are low in arousal. The present study investigated whether arousal and valence analogously interact in automatic stimulus evaluations, i.e., if stimulus valence is irrelevant for the task. One sample of participants switched randomly between an evaluation task and an affective Simon task that assessed stimulus evaluations indirectly. Another sample completed a pure Simon task. In all conditions, the influence of affective stimuli on task performance was enhanced when valence and arousal were congruent (i.e., high-arousing negative and low-arousing positive stimuli) than when both stimulus dimensions were incongruent (i.e., low-arousing negative and high-arousing positive stimuli). These findings suggest that evaluative implications of stimulus arousal and valence are automatically inferred even when stimulus evaluation is irrelevant for the task at hand.     

The source of dual-task limitations: Serial or parallel processing of multiple response selections?

Although it is generally recognized that the concurrent performance of two tasks incurs costs, the sources of these dual-task costs remain controversial. The serial bottleneck model suggests that serial postponement of task performance in dual-task conditions results from a central stage of response selection that can only process one task at a time. Cognitive-control models, by contrast, propose that multiple response selections can proceed in parallel, but that serial processing of task performance is predominantly adopted because its processing efficiency is higher than that of parallel processing. In the present study, we empirically tested this proposition by examining whether parallel processing would occur when it was more efficient and financially rewarded. The results indicated that even when parallel processing was more efficient and was incentivized by financial reward, participants still failed to process tasks in parallel. We conclude that central information processing is limited by a serial bottleneck.     

Do attentional capacities and processing speed mediate the effect of age on executive functioning?

The executive processes are well known to decline with age, and similar data also exists for attentional capacities and processing speed. Therefore, we investigated whether these two last nonexecutive variables would mediate the effect of age on executive functions (inhibition, shifting, updating, and dual-task coordination). We administered a large battery of executive, attentional and processing speed tasks to 104 young and 71 older people, and we performed mediation analyses with variables showing a significant age effect. All executive and processing speed measures showed age-related effects while only the visual scanning task performance (selective attention) was explained by age when controlled for gender and educational level. Regarding mediation analyses, visual scanning partially mediated the age effect on updating while processing speed partially mediated the age effect on shifting, updating and dual-task coordination. In a more exploratory way, inhibition was also found to partially mediate the effect of age on the three other executive functions. Attention did not greatly influence executive functioning in aging while, in agreement with the literature, processing speed seems to be a major mediator of the age effect on these processes. Interestingly, the global pattern of results seems also to indicate an influence of inhibition but further studies are needed to confirm the role of that variable as a mediator and its relative importance by comparison with processing speed.     

Effects of subclinical depression and aging on generative reasoning about linear orders: same or different processing limitations?

The performance of older adults and depressed people on linear order reasoning is hypothesized to be best explained by different theoretical models. Whereas depressed younger adults are found to be impaired in generative inference making, older adults are well capable of making such inferences but exhibit problems with working memory (Experiments 1 and 2). Restriction of the available study time impairs reasoning by nondepressed control participants and. as such, proves to be a good model of older adults' but not depressed participants' limitations (Experiment 3). These results are replicated comparing depressed and older participants with a control group in the same study, providing increased power and linking the results to additional control measures of processing speed and working memory (Experiment 4).     

Rationality,reasoning and rules: reflections on Broome’s rationality through reasoning

Philosophical Studies - The paper provides a critical discussion of some key aspects of John Broome’s theories of rationality, reasoning and the relations between them.     

Speaker–listener incompatibility: Joint and separate processing in risky choice framing

Framing effects are considered in a conversational framework using the well-known Asian Disease problem [Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211, 453–458]. Speakers’ preferred message framing is examined and its corresponding persuasiveness is assessed using listeners’ responses. The results show that speakers exhibit a marked and consistent preference for positive over negative framing (Experiment 1). Judged from listeners’ responses, this preference is effective for promoting riskless, but not risky options. The incompatibility between speakers and listeners may be resolved by noting that speakers can jointly (i.e., comparatively) assess the information and the persuasive qualities of alternative frames. In contrast, listeners are exposed only to one of these frames and, consequently, can only assess the information separately (i.e., non-comparatively). Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that no incompatibility exists when both speakers and listeners are either in separate, or in joint evaluation mode. Differences between risky choice and attribute framing [Levin, I.P., Schneider, S.L., & Gaeth, G.J. (1998). All frames are not created equal: a typology and critical analysis of framing effects. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 76, 149–188] are briefly discussed.     

Language processing,activation and reasoning: A reply to Espino,Santamaría,and García-Madruga (2000)

Espino, Santamaría, and García-Madruga (2000) report three results on the time taken to respond to a probe word occurring as end term in the premises of a syllogistic argument. They argue that these results can only be predicted by the theory of mental models. It is argued that two of these results, on differential reaction times to end-terms occurring in different premises and in different figures, are consistent with Chater and Oaksford's (1999) probability heuristics model (PHM). It is argued that the third finding, on different reaction times between figures, does not address the issue of processing difficulty where PHM predicts no differences between figures. It is concluded that Espino et al.'s results do not discriminate between theories of syllogistic reasoning as effectively as they propose.     

Predicting school achievement: The role of inductive reasoning,sleep length and morningness–eveningness

Adolescents move to evening orientation just when school schedule becomes earlier. Whereas school achievement has been associated to morningness orientation during morning school schedule, some studies have indicated that evening people are more intelligent. In this study the relative contribution of Morningness–Eveningness (M–E) in the prediction of school achievement, after controlling for age, sex/gender, inductive reasoning and sleep length was analyzed. Participants were 887 adolescents (aged 12–16). School achievement was evaluated using Grade Point Average (GPA), inductive reasoning was evaluated by reasoning subtest of Primary Mental Abilities (PMA-R), sleep length was calculated from rise time and bedtime questions, and M–E was evaluated by Morningness–Eveningness Scale for Children (MESC). Evening adolescents scored higher on PMA-R and obtained lower GPA. Inductive reasoning, age, sex/gender, sleep length and M–E accounted for 19% variance percentage on GPA. M–E was a significant predictor of school achievement even after controlling for traditional predictors, albeit slightly.     

Visual–auditory interactions on explicit and implicit information processing

Cognitive Processing - Interactions among sensory information are important for generating a coherent percept of the external world. Facilitation and inhibition effects in cross-modal perception...     

On the nature of international sales and sales management research: a social network–analytic perspective

This research uses a combination of text mining, co-word analysis, and social network analysis (SNA) to review 132 international sales and sales management (ISSM) articles published between 1980 and 2017. The study provides a unique view of the past and future of ISSM research and provides three principal contributions. First, from a social network–analytic perspective, it offers a unique examination of the ways ISSM research topics are interconnected, as reflected by keyword network structure. Second, by conducting SNA across two periods (1980–1999 and 2000–2017) and examining the changes in network centrality measures, the study offers initial insights into the evolving nature of the ISSM literature. Third, the study reports keyword network disconnections (i.e., structural holes) to propose a fruitful agenda for future ISSM research. Taken together, this research offers a current perspective of the ISSM research domain's evolving nature.     

Updating an object’s orientation and location during nonvisual navigation: A comparison between two processing modes

In the present study, we compared the effects of two processing modes on the updating of the location and orientation of a previously viewed object in space during a guided walk without vision. In Experiment 1, in order to measure the error for initial perception of object’s orientation, 12 subjects rotated a miniature model until it matched the memorized orientation of its counterpart object in space. In Experiment 2, they attempted either to keep track of the object continuously (in the object-centered [OC] task) or to estimate the object’s perspective only at the terminal vantage point given the trajectory they walked (in the trajectory-centered [TC] task). Subjects indicated the location of the object by facing it, and then rotated the model in order to indicate its orientation from the new vantage point. Results showed that, with respect to the TC mode, the OC mode induced a slowdown of the subjects’ self-paced locomotion velocity for both linear and angular movements, and a decrease of the latencies as well as smaller absolute errors for the orientation-of-the-object response. Mean signed errors on object’s orientation were equivalent for both processing modes, suggesting that the latter induced different allocations of processing resources on a common representation of space updated by “path integration.”     

Cognitive control in cued task switching with transition cues: Cue processing,task processing,and cue–task transition congruency

We investigated the processes underlying performance during cued task switching with transition cues. To this end, transition cueing and explicit cueing were compared in a design controlling for sequential effects in the two preceding trials in order to further examine the contribution of cue processes, task processes, and cue–task transition congruency during transition cueing. The study confirmed that the task-switch cost in transition cueing is larger than the task-switch cost in explicit cueing and showed that this larger switch cost is mainly due to cue processing. We also successfully decomposed performance in transition cueing into cue processing, task processing, and cue–task transition congruency on both a theoretical (Experiment 1) and an empirical basis (Experiments 2–3). Our empirical dissociation also demonstrates that cue–task transition congruency affects performance during both cue processing and task processing. We discuss the importance of our findings in relation to the different theories on task switching.     

Understanding of and reasoning about object–object relationships in long-tailed macaques?

Diagnostic reasoning, defined as the ability to infer unobserved causes based on the observation of their effects, is a central cognitive competency of humans. Yet, little is known about diagnostic reasoning in non-human primates, and what we know is largely restricted to the Great Apes. To track the evolutionary history of these skills within primates, we investigated long-tailed macaques’ understanding of the significance of inclinations of covers of hidden food as diagnostic indicators for the presence of an object located underneath. Subjects were confronted with choices between different objects that might cover food items. Based on their physical characteristics, the shape and orientation of the covers did or did not reveal the location of a hidden reward. For instance, hiding the reward under a solid board led to its inclination, whereas a hollow cup remained unaltered. Thus, the type of cover and the occurrence or absence of a change in their appearance could potentially be used to reason diagnostically about the location of the reward. In several experiments, the macaques were confronted with a varying number of covers and their performance was dependent on the level of complexity and on the type of change of the covers’ orientation. The macaques could use a board’s inclination to detect the reward, but failed to do so if the lack of inclination was indicative of an alternative hiding place. We suggest that the monkeys’ performance is based on a rudimentary understanding of causality, but find no good evidence for sophisticated diagnostic reasoning in this particular domain.