"If I had said it I would have remembered it": reducing false memories with a distinctiveness heuristic

We examined the contributions of decision processes to the rejection of false memories. In two experiments, people studied lists of semantically related words and then completed a recognition test containing studied words, unrelated lure words, and related lure words. People who said words aloud at study were less likely to falsely recognize related lures on the test than were those who heard words at study. We suggest that people who said words at study employed a distinctiveness heuristic during the test whereby they demanded access to distinctive say information in order to judge an item as old. Even when retrieving say information is not perfectly diagnostic of prior study, as in Experiment 2, in which participants both said and heard words at study, people persist in using the distinctiveness heuristic to reduce false memories.     

The distinctiveness heuristic in false recognition and false recall

The effects of generative processing on false recognition and recall were examined in four experiments using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott false memory paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In each experiment, a Generate condition in which subjects generated studied words from audio anagrams was compared to a Control condition in which subjects simply listened to studied words presented normally. Rates of false recognition and false recall were lower for critical lures associated with generated lists, than for critical lures associated with control lists, but only in between-subjects designs. False recall and recognition did not differ when generate and control conditions were manipulated within-subjects. This pattern of results is consistent with the distinctiveness heuristic (Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999), a metamemorial decision-based strategy whereby global changes in decision criteria lead to reductions of false memories. This retrieval-based monitoring mechanism appears to operate in a similar fashion in reducing false recognition and false recall.     

The distinctiveness heuristic in false recognition and false recall

The effects of generative processing on false recognition and recall were examined in four experiments using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott false memory paradigm (Deese, 1959 Deese, J. 1959. On the prediction of occurrence of particular verbal intrusions in immediate recall. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58: 17–22. [Crossref], [PubMed] , [Google Scholar]; Roediger & McDermott, 1995 Roediger, H. L. and McDermott, K. B. 1995. Creating false memories: Remembering words not presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21: 803–814. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). In each experiment, a Generate condition in which subjects generated studied words from audio anagrams was compared to a Control condition in which subjects simply listened to studied words presented normally. Rates of false recognition and false recall were lower for critical lures associated with generated lists, than for critical lures associated with control lists, but only in between-subjects designs. False recall and recognition did not differ when generate and control conditions were manipulated within-subjects. This pattern of results is consistent with the distinctiveness heuristic (Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999 Schacter, D. L., Israel, L. and Racine, C. 1999. Suppressing false recognition in younger and older adults: The distinctiveness heuristic. Journal of Memory and Language, 40: 1–24. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), a metamemorial decision-based strategy whereby global changes in decision criteria lead to reductions of false memories. This retrieval-based monitoring mechanism appears to operate in a similar fashion in reducing false recognition and false recall.     

Why distinctive information reduces false memories: evidence for both impoverished relational-encoding and distinctiveness heuristic accounts

Two accounts explain why studying pictures reduces false memories within the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm (J. Deese, 1959; H. L. Roediger & K. B. McDermott, 1995). The impoverished relational-encoding account suggests that studying pictures interferes with the encoding of relational information, which is the primary basis for false memories in this paradigm. Alternatively, the distinctiveness heuristic assumes that critical lures are actively withheld by the use of a retrieval strategy. When participants were given inclusion recall instructions to report studied items as well as related items, they still reported critical lures less often after picture encoding than they did after word encoding. As the impoverished relational-encoding account suggests, critical lures appear less likely to come to mind after picture encoding than they do after word encoding. However, the results from a postrecall recognition test provide evidence in favor of the distinctiveness heuristic.     

Retrieval conditions and false recognition: testing the distinctiveness heuristic

High levels of false recognition are observed after people study lists of semantic associates that all converge on a nonpresented lure word. In previous experiments, we have found that orienting participants to encode distinctive information about study list items by presenting them as pictures as opposed to words produces marked reductions in false recognition. We have suggested that these reductions reflect the operation of a distinctiveness heuristic: Participants demand access to detailed pictorial information in order to support a positive recognition decision. The present experiments provide additional evidence on this point and allow us to distinguish between the distinctiveness heuristic account and an alternative account based on the impoverished encoding of relational information that occurs when one is studying pictures. In Experiment 1, even when only half of the items in a study list were presented as pictures, a general suppression of false recognition was observed that could be attributable to impoverished encoding of relational information. Experiment 2 provided a critical test of the distinctiveness heuristic account: We manipulated test instructions and found that differences in false recognition rates between picture and word encoding were attenuated in a retrieval condition that did not encourage reliance on a distinctiveness heuristic.     

Escape from illusion: reducing false memories

Illusory memories are unsettling, but far from uncommon. Over the past several years, increasing experimental and theoretical attention has focused on misattribution errors that occur when some form of memory is present but attributed to an incorrect time, place or source. Demonstrations of errors and distortions in remembering raise a question with important theoretical and practical implications: how can memory misattributions be reduced or avoided? We consider evidence that documents the occurrence of illusory memories, particularly false recognition responses, and then review three ways in which memory distortion can be minimized.     

Inducing and reducing false memories: a Swedish version of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm

Participants tend to falsely remember a nonpresented critical word after having studied a list of the word's primary associates. We present here a Swedish version of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm, which provides a tractable method of experimentally inducing and investigating such illusory memories. In Experiment 1 it was demonstrated that the constructed stimulus material induced highly reliable false-recall and false-recognition effects, and, moreover, that veridical and false memories were associated with a similar phenomenological experience of remembering. The results from Experiment 2 indicated that the susceptibility to false recognition can be substantially reduced when participants are explicitly required to monitor the sources of their memories. These findings are consistent with predictions derived from the source-monitoring framework.     

Speeded retrieval abolishes the false-memory suppression effect: Evidence for the distinctiveness heuristic

We examined two different accounts of why studying distinctive information reduces false memories within the DRM paradigm. The impoverished relational encoding account predicts that less memorial information, such as overall familiarity, is elicited by the critical lure after distinctive encoding than after nondistinctive encoding. By contrast, the distinctiveness heuristic predicts that participants use a deliberate retrieval strategy to withhold responding to the critical lures. This retrieval strategy refers to a decision rule whereby the absence of memory for expected distinctive information is taken as evidence for an event’s nonoccurrence. We show that the typical false-recognition suppression effect only occurs when the recognition test is self paced. This suppression effect is abolished when participants make recognition decisions under time pressure, such as within 1 second of seeing the test item. These results are consistent with the distinctiveness heuristic that a time-consuming retrieval strategy is used to reduce false-recognition responses.     

Adaptive constructive processes: evidence from priming verbal reasoning with false memories

Previous research has demonstrated that false memories produced by the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm serve adaptive functions both in related memory tasks and in various cognitive processes. The present study investigated whether memory errors induced by associated words could influence performance on verbal reasoning tasks. Participants were asked to solve sentence-based verbal reasoning problems, half of which had been primed by the presentation of word lists where the critical lures were also the solutions to the problems. The results showed that when false memories were generated, problems were solved more often and significantly faster than those that were primed without false memories or those that were unprimed, and that there was no evidence that the effect of priming with false memories observed in experiments was due to testing effects. The findings extend false memory priming effects to verbal reasoning processes, providing evidence with adaptive constructive processes.     

Aging can spare recollection-based retrieval monitoring: the importance of event distinctiveness

The authors investigated two retrieval-monitoring processes. Subjects studied red words and pictures and then decided whether test words had been studied in red font (red word test) or as pictures (picture test). Memory confusions were lower on the picture test than on the red word test, implicating a distinctiveness heuristic. Memory confusions also were lower when study formats were mutually exclusive (the same item was never studied as both a red word and a picture), compared with a nonexclusive condition, implicating a recall-to-reject process. When the to-be-recollected events were pictures, older adults used each monitoring strategy as effectively as did younger adults.     

Evidence that nonconscious processes are sufficient to produce false memories

Are nonconscious processes sufficient to cause false memories of a nonstudied event? To investigate this issue, we controlled and measured conscious processing in the DRM task, in which studying associates (e.g., bed, rest, awake...) causes false memories of nonstudied associates (e.g., sleep). During the study phase, subjects studied visually masked associates at extremely rapid rates, followed by immediate recall. After this initial phase, nonstudied test words were rapidly presented for perceptual identification, followed by recognition memory judgments. On the perceptual identification task, we found significant priming of nonstudied associates, relative to control words. We also found significant false recognition of these nonstudied associates, even when subjects did not recall this word at study or identify it at test, indicating that nonconscious processes can cause false recognition. These recognition effects were found immediately after studying each list of associates, but not on a delayed test that occurred after the presentation of several intervening lists. Nonconscious processes are sufficient to cause this memory illusion on immediate tests, but may be insufficient for more vivid and lasting false memories.     

ERP evidence for the control of emotional memories during strategic retrieval

Neural evidence for the strategic retrieval of task-relevant ‘target’ memories at the expense of less relevant ‘nontarget’ memories has been demonstrated across a wide variety of studies. In ERP studies, this evidence consists of the ERP correlate of recollection (i.e. the ‘left parietal old/new effect’) being evident for targets and attenuated for nontargets. It is not yet known, however, whether this degree of strategic control can be extended to emotionally valenced words, or whether these items instead reactivate associated memories. The present study used a paradigm previously employed to demonstrate the strategic retrieval of neutral words (Herron & Rugg, Psychonomic Bulletin and & Review, 10(3), 703-–710, 2003b) to assess the effects of stimulus valence on behavioural and event-related potential (ERP) measures of strategic retrieval. While response accuracy and reaction times associated with targets were unaffected by valence, negative nontargets and new items were both associated with an elevated false alarm rate and longer RTs than their neutral equivalents. Both neutral and negative targets and nontargets elicited early old/new effects between 300 and 500 ms. Critically, whereas neutral and negative targets elicited robust and statistically equivalent left parietal old/new effects between 500 and 800 ms, these were absent for neutral and negative nontargets. A right frontal positivity associated with postretrieval monitoring was evident for neutral targets versus nontargets, for negative versus neutral nontargets, and for targets versus new items. It can therefore be concluded that the recollection of negatively valenced words is subject to strategic control during retrieval, and that postretrieval monitoring processes are influenced by emotional valence.     

Sensitivity reductions in false recognition: a measure of false memories with stronger theoretical implications

Signal detection analyses of recognition memory indicate that a bias to respond "old" is large for critical words that are centrally related with previously encoded word lists, is small for words that are less related, and is not observed for unrelated words. Also, recognition sensitivity has not been previously shown to differ between those conditions, which has focused debate over how to explain false recognition on the bias differences. In 3 experiments, critical-word sensitivity was lower than sensitivity for other word types, but related-word sensitivity was not lower than sensitivity for unrelated words. Extant models that predict reduced critical-word sensitivity also predict lower sensitivity for related words than for unrelated words. These results provide crucial new constraints on theoretical explanations of false memories.     

The development of automatic associative processes and children’s false memories

We investigated children’s ability to generate associations and how automaticity of associative activation unfolds developmentally. Children generated associative responses using a single associate paradigm (Experiment 1) or a Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM)-like multiple associates paradigm (Experiment 2). The results indicated that children’s ability to generate meaningful word associates, and the automaticity with which they were generated, increased between 5, 7, and 11 years of age. These findings suggest that children’s domain-specific knowledge base and the associative connections among related concepts are present and continue to develop from a very early age. Moreover, there is an increase in how these concepts are automatically activated with age, something that results from domain-general developments in speed of processing. These changes are consistent with the neurodevelopmental literature and together may provide a more complete explanation of the development of memory illusions.     

Aging and strategic retrieval in a cued-recall test: the role of executive functions and fluid intelligence

Cued-recall in episodic memory was investigated in relation to low and high cognitive support at retrieval, executive function level and fluid intelligence level in 81 healthy adults divided first into two age groups (young and elderly adults). The first analyses showed that age-related differences were greater when a low cognitive support was provided to recall the words. An individual index of loss of performance when the number of cues was decreased was then calculated. Hierarchical regression analysis revealed that the executive functions measure (perseverative errors on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test) was a better candidate than the fluid intelligence measure (Cattell's culture fair test) to account for the age-related variance of the size of performance loss. These findings suggest that age differences in implementing strategic retrieval may be mainly due to a decline in executive functions.     

Dissonance-induced false memories: Evidence from a free-choice paradigm

People often misremember the past as consistent with the present. Recent research using an induced-compliance paradigm has revealed that cognitive dissonance is one mechanism that can underlie this memory distortion. We sought to replicate and extend this finding using a free-choice paradigm: Participants made either an easy or a difficult choice between two smartphones and, either immediately or two days later, reported their memories for their decision experience. Participants who made a difficult decision produced the spread-of-alternatives effect expected by dissonance theory, and they were also more likely than those in the easy conditions to misremember their initial decision more favourably than they had initially rated it. Overall, our findings replicate the effect of dissonance on memory distortion and, further, show that the effect generalises to other dissonance-inducing situations.     

True photographs and false memories

Abstract— Some trauma-memory-oriented psychotherapists advise clients to review old family photo albums to cue suspected "repressed" memories of childhood sexual abuse. Old photos might cue long-forgotten memories, but when combined with other suggestive influences they might also contribute to false memories. We asked 45 undergraduates to work at remembering three school-related childhood events (two true events provided by parents and one pseudoevent). By random assignment, 23 subjects were also given their school classes' group photos from the years of the to-be-recalled events as memory cues. As predicted, the rate of false-memory reports was dramatically higher in the photo condition than in the no-photo condition. Indeed, the rate of false-memory reports in the photo condition was substantially higher than the rate in any previously published study.     

Elucidating the mental processes underlying the direct retrieval of autobiographical memories

The literature on autobiographical memory retrieval has directed much attention to the concepts of direct retrieval (fast, automatic retrieval) and generative retrieval (slower, deliberative/strategic retrieval). Among the many findings reported on these phenomena, their relative prevalence has stood out as a central feature in many studies, with most studies reporting the frequency of direct retrieval as equal to or exceeding generative retrieval. In this study, we used the retrieve-aloud procedure (a method where participants verbalize their thoughts while retrieving) to delve more deeply into the nature of reports of ubiquitous direct retrieval. We hypothesized that much of the direct retrieval reported in literature is not bona fide direct retrieval (i.e., seemingly automatic retrieval), but is a combination of other retrieval processes, including generative-like retrieval processes. Our results supported this view, showing that less than one-half of all of the observed direct retrievals were bona fide direct retrieval, while the rest were a form of generative retrieval, or fell somewhere in between direct and generative retrieval. We argue that the results suggest that the prevalence of direct retrieval may be overestimated in the literature, and we further propose an alternative classification schema for direct retrievals.     

True and false memory for colour names versus actual colours: Support for the visual distinctiveness heuristic in memory for colour information

In a colour variation of the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm, participants studied lists of words critically related to a nonstudied colour name (e.g., “blood, cherry, scarlet, rouge … ”); they later showed false memory for the critical colour name (e.g., “red”). Two additional experiments suggest that participants generate colour imagery in response to such colour-related DRM lists. First, participants claim to experience colour imagery more often following colour-related than standard non-colour-related DRM lists; they also rate their colour imagery as more vivid following colour-related lists. Second, participants exhibit facilitative priming for critical colours in a dot selection task that follows words in the colour-related DRM list, suggesting that colour-related DRM lists prime participants for the actual critical colours themselves. Despite these findings, false memory for critical colour names does not extend to the actual colours themselves (font colours). Rather than leading to source confusion about which colours were self-generated and which were studied, presenting the study lists in varied font colours actually worked to reduce false memory overall. Results are interpreted within the framework of the visual distinctiveness hypothesis.     

Exhaustive and heuristic retrieval processes in person cognition: further tests of the TRAP model

The twofold retrieval by associative pathways (TRAP) model (L. Garcia-Marques & D. L. Hamilton, 1996) proposes that two distinct modes of retrieval typically underlie recall and frequency estimation. The model accounts for the simultaneous occurrence of greater recall of incongruent information and higher frequency estimation of congruent information. Three experiments provided further tests of the TRAP model. Experiment 1 manipulated cognitive load (at encoding and at retrieval) and the selectivity of the retrieval goal. Under either high load or a selective retrieval goal, incongruent items ceased to be better recalled. Experiment 2 manipulated the accessibility of expectancy-congruent, -incongruent, or -neutral episodes and found corresponding effects in frequency estimates. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that providing part-list retrieval cues inhibits recall but increases frequency estimates. The TRAP model predicted these results.