孔子为政“先有司”思想再探

《论语·子路》记载孔子回答仲弓问政时提出的"先有司"主张,也见于上博简《仲弓》《颜渊问于孔子》篇。三种文献所记内容相近,可以对读,但学者对"先有司"所指仍有不同看法。受清华简《系年》篇"先建"读为"选建"的启发,将"先有司"释为"选有司",不仅能够贯通文献,也使得文义更加顺畅。"选有司"是孔子针对时弊提出的,反映了他的政治思想,具有重要的学术价值。     

《荀子》之“子弓”为“仲弓”而非“馯臂子弓”新证——兼谈儒学之弓荀学派与思孟学派的分歧

古人字前的"伯"、"仲"、"季"或"子",或存或省,并非不可变通。《论语.雍也》篇孔子说"雍也可使南面",上博楚简《仲弓》显示仲弓向孔子请教的多是临民为政之道。《说苑.修文》说"仲弓通于化术,孔子明于王道,而无以加仲弓之言"。《史记.李斯列传》说李斯"乃从荀卿学帝王之术",这些皆可间接证明荀子承传了孔子、仲弓一系之外王儒学。在《孟子》书中,提到孔门十哲中的九位,唯独少了仲弓,荀子则极力批判子思和孟子。由此看来,弓荀学派之外王儒学,与思孟学派之内圣儒学相区分,似并非向壁虚造。     

孔子语录的节本和繁本——从《仲弓》看《论语》与七十子后学散文的形式差异

上博简《仲弓》与《论语·子路》“仲弓为季氏宰章”所记应该是同一件事,但两者在称渭、篇幅、结构、文字方面却差异很大。从这一现象推测,当年孔门七十子后学有记录孔子言行的风气,他们手中都有或多或少的记录孔子言行的素材,今本《论语》就是从七十子后学的笔录素材之中精选出来的,它是孔子语录的“节本”或“精华本”。而在另一方面,七十子后学又在原始笔录素材基础之上进行扩充和阐发,大小戴《礼记》中记载孔子应对弟子时人的文章以及上博简《仲弓》、《子羔》、《鲁邦大旱》等,就是孔子语录的“繁本”或“扩写本”。     

仲弓之儒的思想特征及学术史地位

孔门弟子仲弓是一位久被忽略的大儒,通过对上博竹书《仲弓》的分析,可以更加真切地认识仲弓之儒的政治思想与德刑观念。而这与《荀子》中所推尊的子弓正相符合。仲弓之儒应该是荀子一派的学术渊源所自。通过对传世文献与出土文献的综合考察,孔门弟子仲弓及仲弓之儒的思想特征及学术史地位逐渐凸显出来。     

“君民同构”:孔子政治哲学的一个重要命题——上博简和郭店简《缁衣》篇的启示

<正>上博简《缁衣》篇有一段孔子讲君民关系的言辞,内容与郭店简一致,与《今本.缁衣》篇则有同有异。它牵涉到对于孔子政治哲学的理解,很有深入探讨的必要。对比《缁衣》篇简本与今本的差异,可以看到简本强调君民一体与和谐,今本则多讲君民的差异,强调民对于君的服从。孔子所提出的"君民同构"理念是其政治哲学的重要命题。本文在前人研究基础上,从竹简文字的探讨入手进行分析,提出一些拙见。不当之处,敬请专家指正。     

《论语》"思无邪"与孔子的诗教思想

《论语》各篇材料看似任意罗列,仿佛没有任何秩序,其实不然。孔子评论《诗经》日“思无邪”,该章被编排在《为政》篇的第二章,十分耐人寻味。实际上,“思无邪”被排在这样的位置,也影响到了人们对《论语》的认识。其实,《为政》篇以孔子“为政以德”的政治思想为主旨,孔子《诗》教思想的本质是“政教”,从新出土的上博竹书《诗论》便可以看出孔子《诗》教思想的“德教”内涵,从而可以更准确地理解“思无邪”的含义,也可加深我们对《论语》内在结构的认识。     

美丑之辨:孔子思想的一个起点——简本《缁衣》首章补释

《礼记·缁衣》是阐述孔子政治与伦理道德学说的专篇。郭店简和上博简的《缁衣》篇是目前所见最接近原初状态的古本,两种简本的首章皆为"缁衣"章,可见此章是为全篇的统领。此章内容的中心是通过对于缁衣与巷伯的对比,说明民众能够辨别美、丑之重要。周人的社会理念中,以文王为美的化身,演绎出圣王崇拜,对于中国古代社会有深远影响。     

帛书《昭力》易学观初探

帛书《易传》中的《昭力》篇虽然字效较少,但其结构完备,内涵清晰,属于帛书《易传》中十分具有特色的一篇释文。然而由于其篇末的字数标记,许多学者认为《昭力》与《缪和》属于一篇文章。亦有的学者认为《昭力》中论及“卿大夫”与“国君”,乃以《易》论政,属于政治论的范畴,不属于解《易》范畴。笔者通过研究《昭力》对卦爻辞的解读,认为《昭力》恰恰是一篇独立成章的解《易》文章,而且其所体现的是与帛书《易传》其他篇章不尽相同的解《易》理念,其“六经注我”的解释学理念也是我国典籍中出现较早的。《昭力》篇的研读对于我们认识孔子的政治论点与易学观念都有着十分积极的意义。     

孔子的时命观与上博简《孔子诗论·兔爰》之评——兼与晁福林先生商榷

上博简《孔子诗论》评析《诗.兔爰》篇"不奉时"之语,晁福林先生认为应理解为是对于此诗不遵奉"天命(时命)"的批评。而《兔爰》篇以默求容的处世态度与孔子强调"邦无道免于刑戮"的全身远害的时命观相合,所以简文"不奉时"仍应释为"不逢时",表明孔子对诗人处世态度的赞同。     

子思与《易》关系新证

子思与《易》有关。对易学"卜筮"知识、《周易》古经和《易传》,子思都学习而熟知。更值得注意的是,子思作《易》,其著作即帛书《衷》篇。在孔子之后的先秦儒家"中道"思想传承中,子思最能体会"中道"在孔子思想体系中的重要地位,故一方面从形而上层面阐发"中道",而作《中庸》;另一方面在孔子所开创的经学易学上,凸显孔子所"观"、所新诠的易学"中道",专门辑录孔子有关"中道"的论述,而作《衷》篇。子思在先秦儒家易学传承中应有重要的地位。     

How to Construct Marxian Thoughts as a Political Philosophy?

Importance of contemporary political philosophy has increased in recent decades. Since the 1970s, studies of Marx’s theories have become an important part of the discussion within contemporary theories of justice. More extensive studies concerning Marxist political philosophy from multiple perspectives are becoming a focal point in other fields of academic research. “How to understand Marx’s political philosophy?” has been a classic question for over a hundred years. Not an academic philosopher himself, Marx seems not to have issued a complete or consistent political philosophy by today’s standards, so it is only natural that his views would be interpreted differently by different scholars. While it is justifiable for us to construct Marx’s political philosophy, we must do it through a comprehensive theoretical reflection, and our construction must take full account of the history of the interpretations of Marx’s political philosophy. This applies especially of his theory of justice—a history which has lasted for more than a century. It is even more important for us to reread the original texts, particularly Marx’s early philosophical writings, and take them as the textual foundation for Marx’s political philosophy.     

孔、孟“乐”理念比较研究

本文对孔子和孟子的"乐"理念的各自特点及其异同之处进行了初步分析和评价。作者认为,孔子的"乐"理念具有明显的泛伦理化倾向。他所关注和注重的,乃是"乐"的社会教化、社会整合的伦理调节功能。孔子视"礼""仁"为"乐"之魂魄,视"至善"为"乐"之归宿和极致。"乐"的艺术审美特质被淡化和边缘化。孟子对孔子"乐"理念的最大修正,在于他将其"民本"的政治诉求贯彻于其"乐"理念之中,诉诸"与民同乐"的政治氛围,从而将"乐"理念平等化、平民化、感性化,扬弃了孔子对"乐"的种种宗法等级束缚,破除了对"乐"的雅俗之别的偏见,从而使"乐"理念向其平等的、感性的审美氛围迈出了重要的一步。同孔子泛伦理化的"乐"理念相比较,孟子的"乐"理念则具有泛政治化的理论倾向。     

Confucius’ Complaints and the Analects’ Account of the Good Life

The Analects appears to offer two bodies of testimony regarding the felt, experiential qualities of leading a life of virtue. In its ostensible record of Confucius’ more abstract and reflective claims, the text appears to suggest that virtue has considerable power to afford joy and insulate from sorrow. In the text’s inclusion of Confucius’ less studied and apparently more spontaneous remarks, however, he appears sometimes to complain of the life he leads, to feel its sorrows, and to possess some despair. Where we attend to both of these elements of the text, a tension emerges. In this essay, I consider how Confucius’ complaints appear to complicate any clean conclusion that Confucius wins a good life, particularly where we attend to important pre-theoretical sensibilities regarding what a “good life” ought to include and how it ought to feel for the one who leads it.     

Eliminating Terms of Confusion: Resolving the Liberal–Republican Dispute

John Rawls thinks republicanism is compatible with his political liberalism. Philip Pettit insists that the two conflict in important ways. In this paper, I make sense of this dispute by employing David Chalmers’s method of elimination to reveal the meaning underlying key terms in Rawls’s political liberalism and Pettit’s republicanism. This procedure of disambiguating terms will show how the two theories defend the same institutional arrangement on the same grounds. The procedure thus vindicates Rawls’s view of the two theories being compatible. The reason for this compatibility is that both theories are politicized—that is, they are constructed to attract the compliance of all reasonable members of a modern, pluralistic society.

     

A Comparative Study on Confucius’ and Chrysippus’ Cosmopolitan Theories

A large number of papers and books on cosmopolitanism have been published since 1990, marking a renewed interest in the field among Western scholars. When we try to locate the original source of cosmopolitan ideas in human civilization, we find Chrysippus’ thought in western philosophy, and Confucius’ as its eastern counterpart. In this paper, I offer a comparative analysis of Confucius’ and Chrysippus’ cosmopolitan theories from the following three perspectives. I begin with the theoretical origins of the two thinkers on cosmopolitanism, which mainly center on the relationship between human beings and nature in their respective natural philosophies, and on the question of how to be a good person from their moral philosophies. Then, I explain the concrete schemes they posit for a cosmopolitan society. Finally, I compare their differing concerns regarding one’s attitude to family members or fellow citizens, which constitutes the main source of disagreement between them. In conclusion, I propose that both of their ideas can be located within a continuum of “moral cosmopolitanism.” The difference being that Confucius holds to a moderate cosmopolitan idea, while Chrysippus prefers a stricter version of cosmopolitanism.     

孔子“晚而喜易”与其晚年思想的变化

<正>孔子与《易经》的关系是一个古老的话题,从司马迁提出孔子"晚而喜易"后,孔子作《易传》之说流行了近千年,"先儒更无异论"(孔颖达《周易正义序》)。然而,欧阳修《易童子问》的     

孔子是怎样解释《周易》的

孔子与《易》是有密切关系的,抛开《史记》和帛书的记载不言,仅就《论语》中两条最直接的材料来看确实如此。"加我数年……"当为孔子五十之前所说。五十之前,孔子也曾学《易》,而孔子认为知天命之年尤需学《易》。"不占而已"表明孔子解《易》以德,判定吉凶不需要占筮,而是取决于人的德性。孔子以"生生之德性"解《易》,以"道德必然性"解"天命",通过揭去《周易》的神秘外衣,发掘并发展其天人之学,将隐微难言的性与天道托诸于显著的人道德性,发展出天人合一的德性学说。     

儒家“消极伦理”不适用于全球化的世界吗?

父子互隐的言论表明,孔子主张伦理的有限性或"消极伦理"。这种"消极伦理"否定特定情况下的伦理原则,给予诸如基于亲情和友情的行为以优先权。从古希腊悲剧《安提戈涅》看,作为伦理学两种最重要替代品的"爱"与"法律"是两种"非道德"(amoral)状态。在谈论儿子对待偷羊的父亲的态度时,孔子的道德不是道德主义意义上的道德,而正是这种非道德。在儒家看来,所有美德都根植于孝弟之类的非道德因素,即根植于一种情感。儒家"有限的"或"消极的伦理"不仅适用于中国,而且具有普世性。     

Political efficacy,respect for agency,and adaptive preferences

Serene Khader and Rosa Terlazzo have each recently proposed theories of adaptive preferences (APs) which purport to both respect persons’ agency and provide an effective political tool. While Khader and Terlazzo thus share a similar goal, they take fundamentally different paths in its pursuit: Khader offers a perfectionist account of APs and Terlazzo an autonomy-based theory. In this paper, I argue first that if it is to adequately respect persons’ agency, a theory of APs should in some way include autonomy considerations. If it is to provide an effective political tool, however, our theory should not be entirely autonomy-based, but include a condition addressing a preference’s compatibility with basic flourishing. The suggestion is thus that it is worth considering the possibility of a ‘mixed,’ rather than exclusively perfectionist or exclusively autonomy-based, theory of APs. I outline two such theories. The first, I argue, does quite well with respect to the political efficacy aim of AP theorizing, but has difficulty satisfying the respect for agency aim. The reverse is true of the second. I conclude by suggesting that respect for agency should in this context take priority over political efficacy and that we therefore should accept the latter of the two theories outlined.     

What to Do in an Unjust State?: On Confucius’s and Socrates’s Views on Political Duty

Confucius argued for the centrality of the superior man’s political duty to his fellow human beings and to the state, while Socrates suggested that the superior man (the philosopher) may have no such political duty. However, Confucius also suggested that one not enter or stay—let alone save—a troubled state, while Socrates stayed in an unjust state, apparently fulfilling his political duty to the state by accepting an unjust verdict. In this essay, I will try to show how Confucius could solve these apparent contradictions. I will then examine the reasons Socrates directly and indirectly offers to resolve his seemingly conflicting positions in light of the discussion of the Confucian case. This article is a first step toward a deeper understanding of both Confucius and Socrates (Plato) by way of comparative studies, and of the general issue of a superior man’s political duty to a bad state.