Is evil just very wrong?

Is evil a distinct moral concept? Or are evil actions just very wrong actions? Some philosophers have argued that evil is a distinct moral concept. These philosophers argue that evil is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. Other philosophers have suggested that evil is only quantitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. On this view, evil is just very wrong. In this paper I argue that evil is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. The first part of the paper is critical. I argue that Luke Russell’s attempt to show that evil is only quantitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing fails. Russell’s argument fails because it is based on an implausible criterion for determining whether two concepts are qualitatively distinct. I offer a more plausible criterion and argue that based on this criterion evil and wrongdoing are qualitatively distinct. To help make my case, I sketch a theory of evil which makes a genuinely qualitative distinction between evil and wrongdoing. I argue that we cannot characterize evil as just very wrong on plausible conceptions of evil and wrongdoing. I focus on act-consequentialist, Kantian, and contractarian conceptions of wrongdoing.     

Changed subject or wrong subject?

Abstract

In a provocative and an interesting article, Ogden (1995) argues that the focus of health psychology has changed. Early in the century, theorists regarded the individual as a passive responder to external events. Later, emphasis on the environment, made the individual a passive recipient of external events. Current theories emphasize individual control over the environment in an “intra-active” modality. Thus, as Ogden argues, theory has historical significance and the theory is data that describes thought at a particular point in time. Further, data are the product of methodology and the selection of methods must also be considered another piece of data.     

What is wrong with incest?

Incest taboos should be seen as involving non‐sexual objections to sexual relations, that is, objections based on who people are in relation to each other, rather than their activities. What is at stake is brought out by considering certain objections to father‐daughter incest and certain features of taboos. The objections that matter do not depend on social ties and distinctions having a biological basis, but there is nonetheless a biological element in incest taboos. To see it, one must look to the nature of the Oedipus complex, and to the conditions for the development of the individual and of society. There may be prohibitions which are necessary (to morality, to society, to humanity) even though they may not be justifiable within a narrower conception (e.g. utilitarian) of morality and justification. And so taboos which are universal (occur, in one form or another, in every society), and absolute (allow no questioning), and impose strict liability (allow no excuse), may not be irrational: they may mark the boundaries that shape a way of life.     

What is wrong with imagery questionnaires?

Research evidence is reviewed which shows that the questionnaire method represents a deviant case in imagery research: Whereas experimental techniques consistently produce strong effects for the imagery variable in a large specter of cognitive tasks, research based on imagery questionnaires yields ambiguous and most frequently negative results. Existing explanations of the discrepant findings are critically examined and found to be inadequate. An alternative interpretation is offered, where it is hypothesized that the questionnaire approach to the study of imagery is infected by a serious methodological flaw, due to differences in subjective conceptions of the rating scale employed in imagery questionnaires. Experimental evidence is reported which supports this interpretation.     

What’s wrong with vote buying

Philosophical Studies - Almost everyone would agree that vote buying is morally wrong, and that prohibitions on vote buying are morally justified. Yet, recently, several philosophers have argued...     

Done wrong or said wrong? Young children understand the normative directions of fit of different speech acts

Young children use and comprehend different kinds of speech acts from the beginning of their communicative development. But it is not clear how they understand the conventional and normative structure of such speech acts. In particular, imperative speech acts have a world-to-word direction of fit, such that their fulfillment means that the world must change to fit the word. In contrast, assertive speech acts have a word-to-world direction of fit, such that their fulfillment means that the word must fit the world truly. In the current study, 3-year-olds understood this difference explicitly, as they directed their criticisms selectively to actors when they did not follow the imperatives of the speaker, but to speakers when they did not describe an actor’s actions correctly. Two-year-olds criticized appropriately in the case of imperatives, but showed a more ambiguous pattern in the case of assertions. These findings identify another domain in which children’s normative understanding of human activity emerges around the third year of life.     

What’s wrong with Moorean buck-passing?

In this paper I discuss and try to remove some major stumbling blocks for a Moorean buck-passing account of reasons in terms of value (MBP): There is a pro tanto reason to favour X if and only if X is intrinsically good, or X is instrumentally good, or favouring X is intrinsically good, or favouring X is instrumentally good. I suggest that MBP can embrace and explain the buck-passing intuition behind the far more popular buck-passing account of value, and has the means to avoid the wrong kind of reasons problem. Further, I counter the common suspicion that a Moorean account cannot make sense of deontological views such as Ross’s, and that it generally leaves no room for agent-relative reasons. In order to do this, I appeal to the idea that a Moorean account does not dictate the substantive view that values have to be maximized. In some cases, expressing them might be a better response. Finally I lay out and reply to a potentially devastating argument to the effect that a Moorean account makes oughts and reasons non-normative. I also criticize Scanlon’s attempt to favour his own buck-passing account via consideration of the open question argument. MBP thus emerges as a live option in the buck-passing debate.     

What's wrong with chemoprevention of prostate cancer?

When prostate-specific antigen (PSA) testing was introduced, proponents expected it to cut prostate-cancer mortality and did not expect it to unleash an epidemic of unnecessary treatments. Now that evidence of a mortality benefit remains unclear while evidence of overtreatment in undeniable, there is understandable interest in reducing the human costs of the PSA system. Two related drugs, finasteride and dutasteride, both proven to reduce the incidence of prostate cancer and the "risk of diagnosis," are being promoted accordingly. However, if not for the flaws of the PSA system the use of these drugs for purposes of prevention would lose its rationale. Not only are the drugs in this sense dependent on a faulty system, but their own mortality benefits are as speculative as PSA's-in addition to which, they introduce new risks.     

Revisiting the “strong but wrong“ effect

In the 1930s, J. M. Stephens found that strong verbal associations called wrong are more likely to be changed than weak verbal associations called wrong, relative to items with no feedback. The present study produced a much larger "strong but wrong" effect, apparently as a result of defining "strong" in terms of meanings presumably stored in long-term memory. It was also found that such items are followed by high recall of feedback on the next trial, and that, indeed, when feedback recall is statistically controlled, the effect disappears. An explanation of why feedback is better recalled for "strong but wrong" items is offered, and several predictions are generated, some of which are tested (and confirmed) from the present data.