Essential ethics — embedding ethics into an engineering curriculum

Ethical decision-making is essential to professionalism in engineering. For that reason, ethics is a required topic in an ABET approved engineering curriculum and it must be a foundational strand that runs throughout the entire curriculum. In this paper the curriculum approach that is under development at the Padnos School of Engineering (PSE) at Grand Valley State University will be described. The design of this program draws heavily from the successful approach used at the service academies — in particular West Point and the United States Naval Academy. As is the case for the service academies, all students are introduced to the “Honor Concept” (which includes an Honor Code) as freshmen. As an element of professionalism the PSE program requires 1500 hours of co-op experience which is normally divided into three semesters of full-time work alternated with academic semesters during the last two years of the program. This offers the faculty an opportunity to teach ethics as a natural aspect of professionalism through the academic requirements for co-op. In addition to required elements throughout the program, the students are offered opportunities to participate in service projects which highlight responsible citizenship. These elements and other parts of the approach will be described.

King Solomon

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the “Ethics and Social Responsibility in Engineering and Technology” meeting, New Orleans, 2003.     

Professional responsibility: The role of the engineer in society

We argue that the practice of engineering does not exist outside the domain of societal interests. That is, the practice of engineering has an inherent (and unavoidable) impact on society. Engineering is based upon that relationship with society (inter alia). An engineer’s conduct (as captured in professional codes of conduct) toward other engineers, toward employers, toward clients, and toward the public is an essential part of the life of a professional engineer, yet the education process and professional societies pay inadequate attention to the area. If one adopts Skooglund’s definition of professional ethics^I (how we agree to relate to one another), then the codes of professional conduct lay out a road map for professional relationships. As professionals, engineers need to internalize their codes and to realize that they have a personal stake in the application of codes as well as the process of developing the codes. Yet, most engineers view professional codes as static statements developed by “others” with little (or no) input from the individual engineer. Complicating the problem, questions of professionalism (such as ethics) are frequently viewed as topics outside the normal realm of engineering analysis and design. In reality, professional responsibility is an integral part of the engineering process.     

Student development and ownership of ethical and professional standards

Ethics and professional conduct are vital to civil engineering undergraduate curricula. Many programs struggle to ensure that students are given an adequate exposure to and appreciation of ethical and professional conduct issues. This paper describes a two-part ethics/professionalism project used in a senior-level course taught at the University of Arkansas. Initially, students scruitinize ethical canons and standards of professional conduct published by the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) and the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE), and prepare an essay concerning the applicability of these standards. The second part of the project builds on the first: based on the opinion(s) generated in Part 1, students are asked to develop a set of canons or standards targeted specifically to the undergraduate student, and suggest processes for implementing those standards within the department. Project objectives include: (1) exposure to nationally-recognized ethical canons and standards of professional conduct; (2) personal formulation of ethical and professional standards; (3) skill enhancement for non-technical written communications. Feedback by students prior to and after the project indicates success in meeting all objectives. The feedback also indicates that for some students, definitions and applications of ethics and professionalism are being broadened to include more than academic honesty issues. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the “Ethics and Social Responsibility in Engineering and Technology” meeting, New Orleans, 2003.     

Animal Disenhancement and the Non-Identity Problem: A Response to Thompson

In his paper “The Opposite of Human Enhancement: Nanotechnology and the Blind Chicken problem” (Nanoethics 2:305–316, 2008) Paul Thompson argues that the possibility of “disenhancing” animals in order to improve animal welfare poses a philosophical conundrum. Although many people intuitively think such disenhancement would be morally impermissible, it’s difficult to find good arguments to support such intuitions. In this brief response to Thompson, I accept that there’s a conundrum here. But I argue that if we seriously consider whether creating beings can harm or benefit them, and introduce the non-identity problem to discussions of animal disehancement, the conundrum is even deeper than Thompson suggests.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Special Topic:</Emphasis> Filial Piety: The Root of Morality or the Source of Corruption?

Confucianism advocates the lofty moral ideal of “humane love” (ren ai 仁愛) and condemns immoral actions. Strangely enough, however, Mencius, a “paradigmatic Confucian intellectual” who believed that “a true man cannot be corrupted by wealth, subdued by power, or affected by poverty” (Tu 1989a: 15), highly commended such typically corrupt actions as bending the law for the benefit of relatives or appointing people by mere nepotism when he talked about Shun 舜 in the text of the Mencius. In the first four sections of this article, I will address the issue of how Confucianism encourages a special kind of corruption through its fundamentally consanguineous affection. Then, in the remaining sections, I will try to respond to some criticisms of my views by a few Chinese scholars.     

The Problem of De Se Assertion

It has been long known (Perry in Philos Rev 86: 474–497, 1977; No?s 13: 3–21, 1979, Lewis in Philos Rev 88: 513–543 1981) that de se attitudes, such as beliefs and desires that one has about oneself, call for a special treatment in theories of attitudinal content. The aim of this paper is to raise similar concerns for theories of asserted content. The received view, inherited from Kaplan (1989), has it that if Alma says “I am hungry,” the asserted content, or what is said, is the proposition that Alma is hungry (at a given time). I argue that the received view has difficulties handling de se assertion, i.e., contents that one expresses using the first person pronoun, to assert something about oneself. I start from the observation that when two speakers say “I am hungry,” one may truly report them as having said the same thing. It has often been held that the possibility of such reports comes from the fact that the two speakers are, after all, uttering the same words, and are in this sense “saying the same thing”. I argue that this approach fails, and that it is neither necessary nor sufficient to use the same words, or words endowed with the same meaning, in order to be truly reported as same-saying. I also argue that reports of same-saying in the case of de se assertion differ significantly from such reports in the case of two speakers merely implicating the same thing.     

Nietzche’s Echo—A Dialogue with Thomas Altizer

Prophets provoke psychological unrest, especially when exposing accepted beliefs as profound deceptions. The biblical prophets exemplify such confrontation as do certain atheists ardently opposed to the images of God created by those seers. The German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche dramatically illustrates this type of counterforce to the Judeo-Christian tradition. His prophet Zarathustra is intended to be a model for the modern mind, one free of superstitions inflicted by antiquated religious dogma. Nietzsche’s credo “God is dead” served as a declaration for the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, it became a theological diagnosis. As a “movement,” or “tenor,” the death of God or radical theology was spearheaded by Thomas Altizer, a well-published young professor center-staged during the turbulent 1960s. His work foreshadows a new strain of atheism currently represented by biologist Richard Dawkins (2006, The God delusion. New York: Houghton Mifflin), philosopher Daniel Dennett (2006, Breaking the spell. New York: Penquin), neuroscientist Sam Harris (2004, The end of faith. New York: W.W. Norton; 2008, Letter to a Christian nation. New York: Vintage), journalist Christopher Hitchens (2007, God is not great. New York: Twelve), and mathematician John Allen Paulos (Paulos 2008, Irreligion. New York: Hill & Wang). This twenty-first century crusade against belief in God is best understood as a psychodynamic ignited by Altizer’s Christian atheism. The present dialogue reflects that dynamic while the prologue and epilogue reveal evidence of Providence amidst claims of God’s demise in contemporary history.     

Arguments,Meta-arguments,and Metadialogues: A Reconstruction of Krabbe,Govier, and Woods

Krabbe (2003, in F.H. van Eemeren, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation, Sic Sat, Amsterdam, pp. 641–644) defined a metadialogue as a dialogue about one or more dialogues, and a ground-level dialogue as a dialogue that is not a metadialogue. Similarly, I define a meta-argument as an argument about one or more arguments, and a ground-level argument as one which is not a meta-argument. Krabbe (1995, in F.H van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation, Sic Sat, Amsterdam, pp. 333–344) showed that formal-fallacy criticism (and more generally, fallacy criticism) consists of metadialogues, and that such metadialogues can be profiled in ways that lead to their proper termination or resolution. I reconstruct Krabbe’s metadialogical account into monolectical, meta-argumentative terminology by describing three-types of meta-arguments corresponding to the three ways of proving formal invalidity he studied: the trivial logic-indifferent method; the method of counterexample situation; and the method of formal paraphrase. A fourth type of meta-argument corresponds to what Oliver (1967, Mind 76, 463–478), Govier (1985, Informal Logic 7, 27–33), and Copi (1986) call refutation by logical analogy. A fifth type of meta-argument represents my reconstruction of arguments by parity of reasoning studied by Woods and Hudak (1989, Informal Logic 11, 125–139). Other particular meta-arguments deserving future study are Hume’s critique of the argument from design in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and Mill’s initial argument in The Subjection of Women about the importance of established custom and general feeling vis-à-vis argumentation.     

The Logic of Theory Assessment

This paper starts by indicating the analysis of Hempel’s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation (Hempel, 1945) as presented in Huber (submitted). There I argue contra Carnap (1962, Section 87) that Hempel felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at plausible theories and another aiming at informative theories. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative theories. The main part of the paper consists in working out the claim that one can have Hempel’s cake and eat it too — in the sense that there is a logic of theory assessment that takes into account both of the two conflicting aspects of plausibility and informativeness. According to the semantics of this logic, α is an acceptable theory for evidence β if and only if α is both sufficiently plausible given β and sufficiently informative about β. This is spelt out in terms of ranking functions (Spohn, 1988) and shown to represent the syntactically specified notion of an assessment relation. The paper then compares these acceptability relations to explanatory and confirmatory consequence relations (Flach, 2000) as well as to nonmonotonic consequence relations (Kraus et al., 1990). It concludes by relating the plausibility-informativeness approach to Carnap’s positive relevance account, thereby shedding new light on Carnap’s analysis as well as solving another problem of confirmation theory. A precursor of this paper has appeared as “The Logic of Confirmation and Theory Assessment” in L. Běhounek & M. Bílková (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2004, Prague: Filosofia, 2005, 161–176.     

Does the Modality Effect Exist? and if So, Which Modality Effect?

The modality effect is a central issue in multimedia learning [see Mayer (Cambridge University Press, 2005a), for a review]. Sweller’s Cognitive Load Theory (CLT), for example, presumes that an illustrated text is better understood when presented visually rather than orally. The predictive power of CLT lies in how it links in to Baddeley’s (1986) model of working memory and Penney’s (Mem Cognit 17:398–442, 1989) Separate-Streams Hypothesis. Ginns’s (Learn Instr 4:313–331, 2005) recent meta-analysis also supports the modality effect (d = 0.72, based on 43 independent effects). This article replicates the meta-analysis of the modality effect based on 86 independent effects (with within-study subgroups as the unit of analysis and with mean of the outcomes as the dependent measure), with results showing a reduction of the overall effect size by almost half (d = 0.38), and even more when Duval and Tweedie’s Trim and Fill method is used to correct publication bias (d = 0.20). This article also widens the scope of the analysis of moderator variables (e.g. Pace of presentation, Type of visualization, Research group) as well as their potentially confounded effects. Finally, it is argued that, for theoretical reasons, the so-called modality effect cannot be based on Penney’s or Baddeley’s theories and must be explained in a different way.     

Responsible engineering: Gilbane Gold revisited

This paper addresses several concerns in teaching engineering ethics. First, there is the problem of finding space within already crowded engineering curricula for meaningful discussions of ethical dimensions in engineering. Some engineering programs may offer entire courses on engineering ethics; however, most do not at present and may not in the foreseeable future. A promising possibility is to weave ethics into already existing courses using case studies, but most current case studies are not well integrated with engineering technical analysis. There is a danger that case studies will be viewed by both instructors and students as departures from “business as usual”—interesting perhaps, but not essentially connected with “real” engineering. We offer a case study, inspired by the National Society of Professional Engineer’s popular video Gilbane Gold, that can be used to make the connection. It requires students to engage in technical analysis, but in a context that makes apparent the ethical responsibility of engineers. Further, the case we present marks a significant departure from more typical cases that primarily focus on wrongdoing and its prevention. We concentrate more positively on what responsible engineering requires. There is a need for more such cases, regardless of whether they are to be used in standard engineering courses or in separate courses in engineering ethics. This article is the product of the NSF/Bovay Endowment “Workshop to Develop Numerical Problems Associated With Ethics Cases for use in Required Undergraduate Engineering Courses” (NSF Grant DUE-9455141) held at Texas A&M University in August 1995. For further information about this project, contact Michael J. Rabins, Director of the Ethics and Professionalism Program in the Look College of Engineering at Texas A&M University. Additional case studies from this workshop are available on the Internet site http://ethics.tamu.edu. The writing of this article was supported in part by “Engineering Ethics: Good Works” (NSF/EVS Grant SBR-930257). Michael Pritchard teaches ethics and is co-author of Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases (1995) with C.E. Harris and Michael Rabins (Wadsworth, Belmont CA). Mark Holtzapple teaches chemical engineering and is author of Foundations of Engineering (McGraw-Hill) which includes an ethics chapter suitable for freshman engineering students.     

Behind Our I’s: Grief and Loss in the Poetry of Li-Young Lee

This article uses Kenneth R. Mitchell and Herbert Anderson’s (1983) six modalities of grieving as presented in Donald Capps’ (1993) The Poet’s Gift to bring a pastoral theological perspective to bear on Li-Young Lee’s Behind My Eyes (2008), a collection of thirty-nine poems. In specifically focusing on Lee’s poem “To Hold,” it makes the case for a seventh grieving modality, that of preemptive loss. Employing Mitchell and Anderson’s distinction between faithful and unfaithful grieving, it argues that preemptive loss is an unfaithful form or expression of grieving, and notes the irony and sadness in this regard, as this unfaithful response to grief is informed by what is widely considered to be a faithful Judeo–Christian perspective, rooted in the inescapable sinfulness of humanity.     

Quantum logic as a dynamic logic

We address the old question whether a logical understanding of Quantum Mechanics requires abandoning some of the principles of classical logic. Against Putnam and others (Among whom we may count or not E. W. Beth, depending on how we interpret some of his statements), our answer is a clear “no”. Philosophically, our argument is based on combining a formal semantic approach, in the spirit of E. W. Beth’s proposal of applying Tarski’s semantical methods to the analysis of physical theories, with an empirical–experimental approach to Logic, as advocated by both Beth and Putnam, but understood by us in the view of the operational- realistic tradition of Jauch and Piron, i.e. as an investigation of “the logic of yes–no experiments” (or “questions”). Technically, we use the recently-developed setting of Quantum Dynamic Logic (Baltag and Smets 2005, 2008) to make explicit the operational meaning of quantum-mechanical concepts in our formal semantics. Based on our recent results (Baltag and Smets 2005), we show that the correct interpretation of quantum-logical connectives is dynamical, rather than purely propositional. We conclude that there is no contradiction between classical logic and (our dynamic reinterpretation of) quantum logic. Moreover, we argue that the Dynamic-Logical perspective leads to a better and deeper understanding of the “non-classicality” of quantum behavior than any perspective based on static Propositional Logic.     

Piety as a concept underpinning Muslim women’s online discussions of marriage and professional career

In this article, I address piety as a concept shaping Muslim women’s online discussions about gender roles, marriage and professional careers. I also investigate cross-cultural religious encounters in these women-only groups as I am interested in the potential of such online environments to facilitate women’s religious reflection and intellectual engagement. Finally, I explore motivations and religious interpretations of three categories of participants in these discussions: egalitarians, for whom gender equality is a necessary component of piety (Barlas 2006); traditionalists, identified by other authors as Islamists (Karam 1998) or social conservatives (Gül and Gül 48:1–26, 2000; Mahmood 2005) and finally, holists, a group that cannot be mapped out on the political landscape by using the progressive–conservative binary (Badran, Agenda 50:41–57, 2001) and which exists and acts outside of it, neither subverting nor enacting norms of any dominant system, be it secular–liberal or patriarchal. Following Mahmood’s argument that formulating an analysis based exclusively on such a binary is simplistic (Mahmood 2005), I argue that actions of holists can be only addressed by formulating a set of questions different to those used to analyse self-defined egalitarians or traditionalists.     

Computational Theories of Conscious Experience: Between a Rock and a Hard Place

Very plausibly, nothing can be a genuine computing system unless it meets an input-sensitivity requirement. Otherwise all sorts of objects, such as rocks or pails of water, can count as performing computations, even such as might suffice for mentality—thus threatening computationalism about the mind with panpsychism. Maudlin in J Philos 86:407–432, (1989) and Bishop (2002a, b) have argued, however, that such a requirement creates difficulties for computationalism about conscious experience, putting it in conflict with the very intuitive thesis that conscious experience supervenes on physical activity. Klein in Synthese 165:141–153, (2008) proposes a way for computationalists about experience to avoid panpsychism while still respecting the supervenience of experience on activity. I argue that his attempt to save computational theories of experience from Maudlin’s and Bishop’s critique fails.     

Locating the Extrema of Fungible Regression Weights

In a multiple regression analysis with three or more predictors, every set of alternate weights belongs to an infinite class of “fungible weights” (Waller, Psychometrica, in press) that yields identical SSE (sum of squared errors) and R ² values. When the R ² using the alternate weights is a fixed value, fungible weights (a _i ) that yield the maximum or minimum cosine with an OLS weight vector (b) are called “fungible extrema.” We describe two methods for locating fungible extrema and we report R code (R Development Core Team, 2007) for one of the methods. We then describe a new approach for populating a class of fungible weights that is derived from the geometry of alternate regression weights. Finally, we illustrate how fungible weights can be profitably used to gauge parameter sensitivity in linear models by locating the fungible extrema of a regression model of executive compensation (Horton & Guerard, Commun. Stat. Simul. Comput. 14:441–448, 1985).     

The Validity of a New,Self-report Measure of Multiple Intelligence

In all, 187 participants completed a new, self-report measure of eight multiple intelligences (Haselbauer 2005), a General Knowledge test (Irwing et al. Personality and Individual Differences 30:857–871, 2001), a measure of Approaches to Learning Styles (Biggs 1987), a measure of the Big Five personality traits (Costa and McCrae 1992), as well as gave their own estimated scores on the Gardner (1999) multiple intelligences. Alpha co-efficients were modest with only three of the eight test-derived, multiple intelligence scores being over .70. ‘Linguistic’ and Mathematical intelligence alone were correlated with General Knowledge. Five of the eight ‘intelligences’ were correlated both with Extraversion and Openness. Regressions indicated that ‘Intrapersonal intelligence’ was closely linked with Stability and Conscientiousness; ‘Interpersonal intelligence’ with Extraversion; ‘Linguistic intelligence’ with Openness; ‘Mathematical intelligence’ with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. Correlations between self-estimated and test-derived emotional intelligence showed correlations ranging from r = .18 to r = .56 for similar type ‘intelligences’. This study provides modest evidence for the concurrent and construct validity of this measure. It requires more psychometric evidence of validity before it is used.     

The influence of anxiety on processing capacity for threat detection

In the present study, we explored the proposition that an individual’s capacity for threat detection is related to his or her trait anxiety. Using a redundant signals paradigm with concurrent measurements of reaction times and eye movements, participants indicated the presence or absence of an emotional target face (angry or happy) in displays containing no targets, one target, or two targets. We used estimates of the orderings on the hazard functions of the RT distributions as measures of processing capacity (Townsend & Ashby, 1978; Wenger & Gibson, Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 30,708–719, 2004) to assess whether self-reported anxiety and the affective state of the face interacted with the level of perceptual load (i.e., the number of targets). Results indicated that anxiety was associated with fewer eye movements and increased processing capacity to detect multiple (vs. single) threatening faces. The data are consistent with anxiety influencing threat detection via a broadly tuned attentional mechanism (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, Emotion, 7,336–353, 2007).     

Conscious machines: Memory,melody and muscular imagination

A great deal of effort has been, and continues to be, devoted to developing consciousness artificially (A small selection of the many authors writing in this area includes: Cotterill (J Conscious Stud 2:290–311, 1995, 1998), Haikonen (2003), Aleksander and Dunmall (J Conscious Stud 10:7–18, 2003), Sloman (2004, 2005), Aleksander (2005), Holland and Knight (2006), and Chella and Manzotti (2007)), and yet a similar amount of effort has gone in to demonstrating the infeasibility of the whole enterprise (Most notably: Dreyfus (1972/1979, 1992, 1998), Searle (1980), Harnad (J Conscious Stud 10:67–75, 2003), and Sternberg (2007), but there are a great many others). My concern in this paper is to steer some navigable channel between the two positions, laying out the necessary pre-conditions for consciousness in an artificial system, and concentrating on what needs to hold for the system to perform as a human being or other phenomenally conscious agent in an intersubjectively-demanding social and moral environment. By adopting a thick notion of embodiment—one that is bound up with the concepts of the lived body and autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela et al. 2003; and Ziemke 2003, 2007a, J Conscious Stud 14(7):167–179, 2007b)—I will argue that machine phenomenology is only possible within an embodied distributed system that possesses a richly affective musculature and a nervous system such that it can, through action and repetition, develop its tactile-kinaesthetic memory, individual kinaesthetic melodies pertaining to habitual practices, and an anticipatory enactive kinaesthetic imagination. Without these capacities the system would remain unconscious, unaware of itself embodied within a world. Finally, and following on from Damasio’s (1991, 1994, 1999, 2003) claims for the necessity of pre-reflective conscious, emotional, bodily responses for the development of an organism’s core and extended consciousness, I will argue that without these capacities any agent would be incapable of developing the sorts of somatic markers or saliency tags that enable affective reactions, and which are indispensable for effective decision-making and subsequent survival. My position, as presented here, remains agnostic about whether or not the creation of artificial consciousness is an attainable goal.