Evolving judgments of terror risks: foresight, hindsight, and emotion: a reanalysis

The authors examined the evolution of cognitive and emotional responses to terror risks for a nationally representative sample of Americans between late 2001 and late 2002. Respondents' risk judgments changed in ways consistent with their reported personal experiences. However, they did not recognize these changes, producing hindsight bias in memories for their judgments. An intensive debiasing procedure failed to restore a foresightful perspective. A fear-inducing manipulation increased risk estimates, whereas an anger-inducing manipulation reduced them-both in predictions (as previously observed) and in memories and judgments of past risks. Thus, priming emotions shaped not only perceptions of an abstract future but also perceptions of a concrete past. These results suggest how psychological research can help to ensure an informed public.     

Children's interpretive understanding,moral judgments,and emotion attributions: Relations to social behaviour

The study investigated interpretive understanding, moral judgments, and emotion attributions in relation to social behaviour in a sample of 59 5‐year‐old, 123 7‐year‐old, and 130 9‐year‐old children. Interpretive understanding was assessed by two tasks measuring children's understanding of ambiguous situations. Moral judgments and emotion attributions were measured using two moral rule transgressions. Social behaviour was assessed using teachers' ratings of aggressive and prosocial behaviour. Aggressive behaviour was positively related to interpretive understanding and negatively related to moral reasoning. Prosocial behaviour was positively associated with attribution of fear. Moral judgments and emotion attributions were related, depending on age. Interpretive understanding was unrelated to moral judgments and emotion attributions. The findings are discussed in regard to the role of interpretive understanding and moral and affective knowledge in understanding children's social behaviour.     

Acute exercise suppresses judgments of facial emotion intensity

The ability to recognize others’ facial expressions is critical to the social communication of affective states. The present work examined how transient states of high physiological arousal during aerobic exercise influence recognizing and rating morphed facial expressions. Participants exercised at either a low or high work rate. While exercising and then during cool-down and rest periods, participants performed a version of the morphed faces task that involved animated faces changing into or away from five target affective states (happy, surprise, sadness, anger, and disgust); they were asked to stop the animation when the face first corresponded to a target state, and rate its emotional intensity. Results demonstrated no differences in animation stop data, but overall lower ratings of perceived emotion intensity during high versus low work rate exercise; these effects dissipated through cool-down and rest periods. Results highlight important interactions between physiological states and processing emotional information.     

Not the same old hindsight bias: Outcome information distorts a broad range of retrospective judgments

The hindsight bias (e.g., Fischhoff, 1975) illustrates that outcome information can make people believe that they would have (or did) predict an outcome that they would not (or did not) actually predict. In two experiments, participants (N = 226) made a prediction immediately before receiving outcome information. Therefore, participants could not distort or misremember their predictions to make them align with the outcome information. In both experiments, participants distorted their reports of how certain they recalled having been in their prediction, how good of a basis they had for making the prediction, how long they took to make the prediction, and so forth. Experiment 2 showed that these effects were diminished when participants engaged in private thought about the upcoming questions prior to receiving outcome information, suggesting that the effect is not due to impression management concerns.     

Happiness as a belief system: individual differences and priming in emotion judgments

Three studies involving 104 undergraduates sought to examine how an individual's level of life satisfaction organizes their knowledge concerning the self's emotions. Participants judged the self's positive and negative emotions within a computerized task. Key results sought to determine whether judging two positive emotions in a consecutive sequence speeds the second judgment--a pattern of priming that would suggest a tighter, more interconnected structure in semantic memory related to one's positive emotions. As expected, individual differences in life satisfaction predicted the magnitude of this priming effect (Studies 1 & 2), which appeared to be unique to judgments of the self's emotions (Study 3). The results indicate that happy, relative to less happy, individuals organize information concerning their positive emotions in a qualitatively different and tighter semantic manner.     

Observing emotion in infants: facial expression,body behavior,and rater judgments of responses to an expectancy-violating event

Eleven-month-old European-American, Japanese, and Chinese infants (ns = 23, 21, and 15, respectively) were videotaped during baseline and stimulus episodes of a covert toy-switch procedure. Infants looked longer at the object during the expectancy-violating event (stimulus episode) but did not produce more surprise-related facial expressions. American and Japanese infants produced more bodily stilling during stimulus than baseline, and American infants also produced more facial sobering. Naive raters viewing both episodes could correctly identify the expectancy-violating event. Rater judgments of surprise were significantly related to infants' bodily stilling and facial sobering. Judgments of interest were related to cessation of fussing. Thus, observer judgments of infant emotions can be systematically related to behaviors other than prototypic emotional facial expressions.     

Universals and cultural differences in the judgments of facial expressions of emotion

We present here new evidence of cross-cultural agreement in the judgement of facial expression. Subjects in 10 cultures performed a more complex judgment task than has been used in previous cross-cultural studies. Instead of limiting the subjects to selecting only one emotion term for each expression, this task allowed them to indicate that multiple emotions were evident and the intensity of each emotion. Agreement was very high across cultures about which emotion was the most intense. The 10 cultures also agreed about the second most intense emotion signaled by an expression and about the relative intensity among expressions of the same emotion. However, cultural differences were found in judgments of the absolute level of emotional intensity.     

Controllability and hindsight components: Understanding opposite hindsight biases for self-relevant negative event outcomes

There is an anomaly in the hindsight bias literature with respect to hindsight effects obtained after self-relevant negative event outcomes: Whereas some studies have reported reduced hindsight bias, others have shown increases. This article contrasts two explanations for the anomaly. The first points to an influence of perceived control over the event outcome: In hindsight, people decrease foreseeability (and hence, responsibility and blame) for controllable events, but they increase the perceived inevitability of uncontrollable events for coping reasons. The second explanation, derived from a reconception of hindsight bias in terms of separate components (Blank, Nestler, von Collani, & Fischer, 2008), traces the anomaly to differences in the observed hindsight components: Hindsight decreases are to be expected for foreseeability, whereas increases are restricted to the inevitability component. Our experiment (N=210) manipulated controllability and the hindsight component orthogonally and showed strong support for the component explanation, but also some influence of perceived control.     

A terror management analysis of self-awareness and anxiety: The hierarchy of terror

Abstract

In this article, we apply terror management theory to the operation of self-awareness processes. According to the theory, self-esteem consists of accepting a cultural conception of reality and believing that one is living up to the standards of value inherent in that conception. The function of self-esteem is to buffer the anxiety that results from the awareness of human vulnerability and mortality that results from our capacity for self-awareness. We argue that self-awareness leads to comparisons with standards, and to behavior aimed at reducing any discrepancies that are detected, because of the potential for existential terror that self-awareness creates. Existential terror is seen as the emotional manifestation of the instinct for self-preservation. Management of this terror is conceptualized as the superordinate goal in a hierarchy of standards through which behavior is regulated. A hierarchical terror management model is proposed. This structure provides a unique analysis of the self-system and its relationship to other attitudes, values, and beliefs. The theory posits several dynamic principles that specify how self-awareness and disruptions determine the movement of conscious attention through various levels of the hierarchy. The implications of this analysis for unresolved theoretical questions about self-awareness processes, unconscius sources of motivation, and clinical problems are discussed.     

On the role of attention and emotion in morality: attentional control modulates unrelated disgust in moral judgments

The emotion of disgust can influence people's moral judgments, even if this emotion objectively is unrelated to the moral judgment in question. The present work demonstrates that attentional control regulates this effect. In three studies, disgust was induced. In an unrelated part of the studies, participants then judged a moral transgression. Disgust resulted in more severe moral judgments when attentional control (either measured by means of individual predisposition or manipulated with experimental control) was weak as opposed to strong (Studies 1-3). Findings further showed that attentional control mediated the positive relation between the intensity of participants' disgust responses and the severity of their moral judgments (Study 2). Moreover, attentional control has its effects through the regulation of affective processing (Study 3). Taken together, the findings suggest that unrelated influences of disgust on moral judgments are contingent on the attention system.     

Ethnic differences in affect intensity,emotion judgments,display rule attitudes,and self-reported emotional expression in an American sample

Research of the past two decades has shown that cultures exert considerable influence over emotion. Most, if not all, of the cross-cultural research reported to date have been on samples obtained in different countries. Although it is important to address questions of cross-cultural similarities and differences via the testing of between-country differences, we need to be concerned with possible cultural differenceswithin countries as well. The assessment of cultural differences within countries would have implications for not only our conceptual understanding of cultural influences on emotion, but also our empirical methods and procedures. In this study, American subjects were self-classified into one of four ethnic groups, and provided us with data concerning affect intensity, display rule attitudes, self-reported emotional expression, emotion labeling, and intensity ratings. The results indicated considerable differences in emotion judgments, display rules, and self-reported emotional expressions as a function of ethnicity within an American sample. The differences are discussed in terms of the need to search for psychologically meaningful and relevant definitions of culture which would cut across ethnicity or country.     

Physiology and functioning: Parents' vagal tone, emotion socialization, and children's emotion knowledge

This study examined relationships among parents’ physiological regulation, their emotion socialization behaviors, and their children’s emotion knowledge. Parents’ resting cardiac vagal tone was measured, and parents provided information regarding their socialization behaviors and family emotional expressiveness. Their 4- or 5-year-old children (N = 42) participated in a laboratory session in which their knowledge of emotional facial expressions and situations was tested and their own resting vagal tone was monitored. Results showed that parents’ vagal tone was related to their socialization behaviors, and several parent socialization variables were related to their children’s emotion knowledge. These findings suggest that parents’ physiological regulation may affect the emotional development of their children by influencing their parenting behaviors.     

The role of emotions for moral judgments depends on the type of emotion and moral scenario

Emotions seem to play a critical role in moral judgment. However, the way in which emotions exert their influence on moral judgments is still poorly understood. This study proposes a novel theoretical approach suggesting that emotions influence moral judgments based on their motivational dimension. We tested the effects of two types of induced emotions with equal valence but with different motivational implications (anger and disgust), and four types of moral scenarios (disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs) on moral judgments. We hypothesized and found that approach motivation associated with anger would make moral judgments more permissible, while disgust, associated with withdrawal motivation, would make them less permissible. Moreover, these effects varied as a function of the type of scenario: the induced emotions only affected moral judgments concerning impersonal and personal scenarios, while we observed no effects for the other scenarios. These findings suggest that emotions can play an important role in moral judgment, but that their specific effects depend upon the type of emotion induced. Furthermore, induced emotion effects were more prevalent for moral decisions in personal and impersonal scenarios, possibly because these require the performance of an action rather than making an abstract judgment. We conclude that the effects of induced emotions on moral judgments can be predicted by taking their motivational dimension into account. This finding has important implications for moral psychology, as it points toward a previously overlooked mechanism linking emotions to moral judgments.