信仰理性·认知理性·反思理性--理性"天然合法性"的根据何在

人类文明的发展,经过了"信仰理性"、"认知理性"的支配阶段后,将进入一个"人性自主一反思理性"的时代.在已往的历史中,理性并没有真正握有自主权,它更多地充当了一种工具化的角色.信仰理性是"本性在外"的理解方式,理智理性是"本性对外"的理解方式,二者均未达到人性的自主.反思理性作为理性的自我反省,是向生成自身的那个人性根基的回归.理性的"天然合法性"的根据即在理性自身.反思理性使"理性自洁"的功能得以发挥,它一定能够解决理性自身造成的问题."反思理性"将成为新世纪人类文明的主导理性.     

Faith, Reason, and Worldviews

This critical review of Responses to the Enlightenment focuses on the relationship between faith and reason as advanced by Hendrick Hart and William Sweet, respectively. It does so in the context of Enlightenment critique of faith, from which both Hart and Sweet seek to salvage religious faith. While faith as trust is admitted to be performative (Hart), faith is also belief with cognitive content (Sweet). However, faith and reason, as I contend, stand in a dialectical relationship between the need for commitment and understanding at the root of religious as well as secular traditions or worldviews.     

Bullshit,Truth, and Reason

Philosophia - This article argues that bullshit is not an offense against truth but against reason. It maintains that bullshit occurs when speakers intentionally assert vague premises to make...     

Reason,Representation, and Participation

This paper argues that the contrast between direct and representative democracy is less important than that between simple majoritarianism and deliberative i.e., public reason centred, democracy, as only the latter is sufficiently sensitive to the problem of domination. Having explored a range of arguments in favour of direct democracy it is argued that moves in this direction are only warranted when the practice of public reasoning will be enhanced. Both symbolic representation and delegate democracy are rejected in favour of substantive measures to formalise communication between voters and representatives and permit the formal contestation of political decision on the ground that these will provide stronger defences against domination within the political system.     

Reason,emotion, and love

Wittgenstein's private language argument is interpreted as an example of a kind of transcendental argument which, if valid, explains why a certain concept must possess certain features. Cognition and affect are shown to require each other by an application of Bennett's account of what beings capable of true cognition must be capable of, and the necessity of certain emotions to the existence of any rules in a community is argued in similar fashion. Hume's account of love and admiration being rejected, an account of love, intended to explain some of love's familiar features, is defended, and various proposed additions to the analysis are rejected. The idea of love is linked to those of value, agency, and the transcendental self by argument showing that each of these ideas requires all of the others. Finally, the idea of love is linked by a direct argument to that of the transcendental self.     

逻辑、理性与反讽——就《游叙弗伦篇》的解读与邓晓芒教授商榷

在柏拉图的《游叙弗伦篇》中,游叙弗伦欲控告老父,苏格拉底对其反讽、非难与劝阻。然而,以西方作参照系统来批判儒家“亲亲互隐”的邓晓芒教授却解读出苏格拉底“赞同甚至鼓励”游氏“子告父罪”。此种惊人的误读表明邓氏没能理解“苏格拉底的反讽”并误解了逻辑与理性。论辩表明,诸多西方哲人也都倾向或认同“容隐”观念,这也证明了批判者的“参照系统”的虚幻性。至于如何理解“亲亲互隐”所蕴含的伦理困境,那是一件生存论而非逻辑论证之画。     

Tradition and Reason: Two Uses of Reason, Critical and Contemplative

Abstract: Reason, as it is proper to the task of theology, has two uses: critical and contemplative. This twofold appropriation of reason sets the stage for this article, a stage occupied in turn by Newman and by Aquinas. The critical function of theological work is expressed via the 1877 preface which Newman wrote for his Lectures on the Prophetic Office of the Church. The critical office of theology is vital not only to the practice of theology itself but to the liturgical and spiritual life of the church, and to the exercise of church leadership if that leadership is not to descend into tyranny. For the theologian, reason is not antithetical to contemplation; rather, contemplation includes a form of reasoning. Theology is ‘a schooling in the discipline of contemplating the self‐revealing God’, a discipline of ‘metaphysical ascesis’ which compels both intellectual conversion and moral practice. Such an ascesis was practised well by Aquinas, and Kerr reflects on the Summa Theologiae as ‘a training in a form of metaphysical reasoning’, being schooled in the knowledge of God which strips away our ‘idolatorous inclinations’.     

Reason,Recognition, and Internal Critique

Normative political philosophy always refers to a standard against which a society's institutions are judged. In the first, analytical part of the article, the different possible forms of normative criticism are examined according to whether the standards it appeals to are external or internal to the society in question. In the tradition of Socrates and Hegel, it is argued that reconstructing the kind of norms that are implicit in practices enables a critique that does not force the critic's particular views on the addressee and can also be motivationally effective. In the second part of the article, Axel Honneth's theory of recognition is examined as a form of such reconstructive internal critique . It is argued that while the implicit norms of recognition made explicit in Honneth's philosophical anthropology help explain progressive social struggles as moral ones, his theory faces two challenges in justifying internal critique. The Priority Challenge asks for the reasons why the implicit norms of recognition should be taken as the standard against which other implicit and explicit norms are to be judged. The Application Challenge asks why a social group should, by its own lights, extend equal recognition to all its members and even non-members. The kind of functional, prudential, conceptual, and moral considerations that could serve to answer these challenges are sketched.     

理由、情感与道德的规范性——西方伦理学与元伦理学的论争进路

道德的规范性问题是道德哲学的核心问题之一,对该问题的回答决定了我们在多大程度上能够为道德责任奠定合理性的基础.从古希腊至启蒙时期,道德哲学体系围绕理由还是情感作为道德规范性渊源进行了探索.在当今的元伦理学争论中,虽然实践理由成为道德规范性问题的标准话语体系,但该体系下的争论仍然围绕理由与情感而展开.     

Pleasure,Desire and Practical Reason

This paper examines the role of stability in the constitution of pleasure and desire, its relevance to the intimate ways the two are related and to their role in the constitution of practical reason.     

Intrinsic Value,Alternative Possibilities,and Reason

I address three issues in this paper: first, just as many have thought that there is a requirement of alternative possibilities for the truth of judgments of moral responsibility, is there reason to think that the truth of judgments of intrinsic value also presupposes our having alternatives? Second, if there is this sort of requirement for the truth of judgments of intrinsic value, is there an analogous requirement for the truth of judgments of moral obligation on the supposition that obligation supervenes on goodness? Third, if the truth of judgments of intrinsic value and those of moral obligation do presuppose our having access to alternatives, what should be said about whether determinism imperils the truth of such judgments? I defend an affirmative answer to the first question, a more guarded answer to the second, and a yet more restrained answer to the third.     

Global Public Reason,Diversity, and Consent

Abstract

In this paper, I examine global public reason as a method of justifying a global state. Ultimately, I conclude that global public reason fails to justify a global state. This is the case, because global public reason faces an unwinnable dilemma. The global public reason theorist must endorse either a hypothetical theory of consent or an actual theory of consent; if she endorses a theory of hypothetical consent, then she fails to justify her principles; and if she endorses a theory of actual consent, her theory will lead to a highly unstable political system. On either side of the dilemma, global public reason faces untenable implications. Although similar criticisms have been advanced against domestic public reason, my argument is not repeating points made before me. My argument is new, in that it raises these objections specifically against global public reason, and in that it shows how, due to increased diversity of belief in the global arena, these problems are more pressing for global public reason than they are for domestic public reason.     

Sobel on Pleasure,Reason, and Desire

The paper begins with a well-known objection to the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires. The objection holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of the argument by David Sobel. Sobel invokes a counterexample: hedonic desires, i.e. the likings and dislikings of our present conscious states. The aim of the paper is to defend the premise by bringing the alleged counterexample under its scope. I first point out that reference to hedonic desires as a counterexample presupposes a particular understanding of pleasure, which we might call desire-based. In response, following Sobel, I draw up two alternative accounts, the phenomenological and the tracking views of pleasure. Although Sobel raises several objections to both accounts, I argue in detail that the phenomenological view is not as implausible as he claims it to be, whereas the tracking view, on its best version advocated by Thomas Scanlon, is an instance of the phenomenological view and is therefore also defensible.     

理由、表达与哲学事业

布兰顿在这篇论文中回应了"什么是哲学"的问题,概括介绍了其推理主义的基本思想.布兰顿将哲学视为广义的认知性事业和自身反思的事业.概念本质上是规范性的,因此判断和行动表达了属于我们的承诺.哲学研究的主题是规范性和推理.哲学的任务是表达性的,阐释性的,即从给出和寻求理由的社会性实践开始,去理解概念性的规范和活动的条件、本性和后果,我们使这些规范和活动成为可能,而这些规范和活动也使我们得以可能.