Emotions are real

It is obvious that emotions are real, but the question is what kind of "real" are they? In this article, I outline a theoretical approach where emotions are a part of social reality. I propose that physical changes (in the face, voice, and body, or neural circuits for behavioral adaptations like freezing, fleeing, or fighting) transform into an emotion when those changes take on psychological functions that they cannot perform by their physical nature alone. This requires socially shared conceptual knowledge that perceivers use to create meaning from these physical changes (as well as the circuitry that supports this meaning making). My claim is that emotions are, at the same time, socially constructed and biologically evident. Only when we understand all the elements that construct emotional episodes, in social, psychological, and biological terms, will we understand the nature of emotion.     

Treating disturbed emotional regulation in sexual offenders: The potential applications of mindful self-regulation and controlled breathing techniques

It has been noted that some offenders are characterized by problems in the appropriate regulation of emotional states. Deficits in emotional regulation are particularly pertinent in sexual offenders. Therefore, therapeutic programs should, in part, focus on the development of effective strategies for the control of emotional arousal. In this review, we will provide an outline of how anatomical structures including the amygdala and regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) are involved in the appropriate regulation of emotion. It is argued in this paper that the effective control of emotional states may be helped through the adoption of a group of meditational practices, known as mindfulness techniques, which have emerged from Buddhist philosophy. These techniques involve slow, deep breathing and have been shown to affect vagal modulation of the heart and the functioning of specific neural circuits which are critically involved in emotional regulation.     

Emotion regulation choice: the role of environmental affordances

Which emotion regulation strategy one uses in a given context can have profound affective, cognitive, and social consequences. It is therefore important to understand the determinants of emotion regulation choice. Many prior studies have examined person-specific, internal determinants of emotion regulation choice. Recently, it has become clear that external variables that are properties of the stimulus can also influence emotion regulation choice. In the present research, we consider whether reappraisal affordances, defined as the opportunities for re-interpretation of a stimulus that are inherent in that stimulus, can shape individuals’ emotion regulation choices. We show that reappraisal affordances have stability across people and across time (Study 1), and are confounded with emotional intensity for a standardised set of picture stimuli (Study 2). Since emotional intensity has been shown to drive emotion regulation choice, we construct a context in which emotional intensity is separable from reappraisal affordances (Study 3) and use this context to show that reappraisal affordances powerfully influence emotion regulation choice even when emotional intensity and discrete emotions are taken into account (Study 4).     

Emotion and consciousness

Consciousness and emotion feature prominently in our personal lives, yet remain enigmatic. Recent advances prompt further distinctions that should provide more experimental traction: we argue that emotion consists of an emotion state (functional aspects, including emotional response) as well as feelings (the conscious experience of the emotion), and that consciousness consists of level (e.g. coma, vegetative state and wakefulness) and content (what it is we are conscious of). Not only is consciousness important to aspects of emotion but structures that are important for emotion, such as brainstem nuclei and midline cortices, overlap with structures that regulate the level of consciousness. The intersection of consciousness and emotion is ripe for experimental investigation, and we outline possible examples for future studies.     

The Structure of Emotion

ABSTRACT— One common point of debate in the study of emotion is whether the basic, irreducible elements of emotional life are discrete emotion categories, such as anger , fear , sadness , and so on, or dimensions such as approach and avoidance . Resolving this debate will identify the basic building blocks of emotional life that are the most appropriate targets of scientific inquiry. In this paper, we briefly review meta-analytic work on the neuroimaging of emotion and examine its potential for identifying "natural kinds" of emotion in the brain. We outline criteria for identifying such natural kinds, summarize the evidence to date on category and dimensional approaches, and suggest ways in which neuroimaging studies could more directly address fundamental questions about the nature of emotion.     

精神分裂症患者的情绪调节

日常生活中, 个体通常有不同的理想与目标, 当个体被特定的目标驱动, 试图去影响自身将要体验到的情绪类别、将要体验到的情绪感受发生的时间, 以及如何体验、表达此种情绪时, 情绪调节就发生了。精神分裂症是一种复杂的精神疾病, 该类疾病患者普遍存在情绪方面的缺陷, 通过操控各种内外因素, 可以帮助精神分裂症患者进行有效的情绪调节, 有利于帮助他们构建健全的情绪体验, 对促进其身心健康发展具有现实临床意义。     

Positive emotion impedes emotional but not cognitive conflict processing

Cognitive control enables successful goal-directed behavior by resolving a conflict between opposing action tendencies, while emotional control arises as a consequence of emotional conflict processing such as in irony. While negative emotion facilitates both cognitive and emotional conflict processing, it is unclear how emotional conflict processing is affected by positive emotion (e.g., humor). In 2 EEG experiments, we investigated the role of positive audiovisual target stimuli in cognitive and emotional conflict processing. Participants categorized either spoken vowels (cognitive task) or their emotional valence (emotional task) and ignored the visual stimulus dimension. Behaviorally, a positive target showed no influence on cognitive conflict processing, but impeded emotional conflict processing. In the emotional task, response time conflict costs were higher for positive than for neutral targets. In the EEG, we observed an interaction of emotion by congruence in the P200 and N200 ERP components in emotional but not in cognitive conflict processing. In the emotional conflict task, the P200 and N200 conflict effect was larger for emotional than neutral targets. Thus, our results show that emotion affects conflict processing differently as a function of conflict type and emotional valence. This suggests that there are conflict- and valence-specific mechanisms modulating executive control.     

The effects of context on facial affect recognition

In a sample of 325 college students, we examined how context influences judgments of facial expressions of emotion, using a newly developed facial affect recognition task in which emotional faces are superimposed upon emotional and neutral contexts. This research used a larger sample size than previous studies, included more emotions, varied the intensity level of the expressed emotion to avoid potential ceiling effects from very easy recognition, did not explicitly direct attention to the context, and aimed to understand how recognition is influenced by non-facial information, both situationally-relevant and situationally-irrelevant. Both accuracy and RT varied as a function of context. For all facial expressions of emotion other than happiness, accuracy increased when the emotion of the face and context matched, and decreased when they mismatched. For all emotions, participants responded faster when the emotion of the face and image matched and slower when they mismatched. Results suggest that the judgment of the facial expression is itself influenced by the contextual information instead of both being judged independently and then combined. Additionally, the results have implications for developing models of facial affect recognition and indicate that there are factors other than the face that can influence facial affect recognition judgments.     

Making Human Rights Emotional: A Research Agenda to Recover Shame in “Naming and Shaming”

Shame is an emotion that is the cornerstone of International Relations (IR) human rights scholarship but remains undertheorized from an explicitly emotional perspective. Given the dubious and unsettled efficacy of human rights “naming and shaming” campaigns, in this article, we outline the theoretical and methodological contours of a research agenda designed (1) to uncover the emotional content of naming and shaming and (2) to pay greater attention to how nonstate actors, especially human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), evoke and experience shame, thus engaging in “emotional diplomacy.” Drawing on theories of emotions in IR and political psychology, we present a thicker account of shame by highlighting the individual and social origins of shame, discussing different varieties of shame, and by distinguishing between emotions that are often conflated with shame. We end with a discussion of the methodological tools suitable for pursuing this agenda, using examples of prominent human rights NGOs.     

Prospective emotion enables episodic prospection to shift time preference

The episodic effect suggests that episodic prospection (imagining future events) can effectively reduce time discounting, the propensity to discount the value of delayed rewards relative to immediate ones. However, less clear is how episodic prospection modulates time preference. As engagement in episodic prospection usually evokes prospective emotions, it was proposed that episodic prospection might work by inducing prospective emotions. Although one previous study has attempted to provide evidence to the emotional account of the episodic effect, shortcomings in its experimental design make its conclusion questionable. In this study, we replicated previous experimental design with improvements to further test the effects of prospective emotion on time preference. By manipulating the emotional valency associated with episodic prospection in a delay discounting task, we found that positive episodic prospection attenuated time discounting; negative episodic prospection exacerbated time discounting; and episodic prospection did not shift time preference when prospective emotion is removed. These results were essentially identical to the result of the previous study. Together, these studies suggested that the effects of episodic prospection depended on prospective emotion. Thus, one cannot ignore prospective emotion if counting on episodic prospection to combat humans’ impulsive behaviours.     

负性情绪调节中认知重评和分心策略的作用:ERPs研究

采用事件相关电位技术,考察了认知重评和分心两种情绪调节策略对负性情绪体验和脑电活动的影响。结果发现,认知重评后被试的负性情绪体验强度和LPP波幅(300~1300ms)比简单注视条件下低;分心后被试的负性情绪体验强度比简单注视条件下低,但LPP波幅显示比简单注视条件下高。这说明认知重评和分心对负性情绪体验和脑电活动的影响不同,负性刺激再次呈现时认知重评优于分心策略的调节。该研究为认知重评和分心的比较研究提供了神经电生理学方面的证据。     

Mapping emotions through time: how affective trajectories inform the language of emotion

The words used to describe emotions can provide insight into the basic processes that contribute to emotional experience. We propose that emotions arise partly from interacting evaluations of one's current affective state, previous affective state, predictions for how these may change in the future, and the experienced outcomes following these predictions. These states can be represented and inferred from neural systems that encode shifts in outcomes and make predictions. In two studies, we demonstrate that emotion labels are reliably differentiated from one another using only simple cues about these affective trajectories through time. For example, when a worse-than-expected outcome follows the prediction that something good will happen, that situation is labeled as causing anger, whereas when a worse-than-expected outcome follows the prediction that something bad will happen, that situation is labeled as causing sadness. Emotion categories are more differentiated when participants are required to think categorically than when participants have the option to consider multiple emotions and degrees of emotions. This work indicates that information about affective movement through time and changes in affective trajectory may be a fundamental aspect of emotion categories. Future studies of emotion must account for the dynamic way that we absorb and process information.     

Residual effects of emotion are reflected in enhanced visual activity after sleep

Research has investigated how sleep affects emotional memory and how emotion enhances visual processing, but these questions are typically asked by re-presenting an emotional stimulus at retrieval. For the first time, we investigate whether sleep affects neural activity during retrieval when the memory cue is a neutral context that was previously presented with either emotional or nonemotional content during encoding. Participants encoded scenes composed of a negative or neutral object on a neutral background either in the morning (preceding 12 hours awake; wake group) or evening (preceding 12 hours including a night of sleep; sleep group). At retrieval, participants viewed the backgrounds without their objects, distinguishing new backgrounds from those previously studied. Occipital activity was greater within the sleep group than the wake group specifically during the successful retrieval of neutral backgrounds that had been studied with negative (but not neutral) objects. Moreover, there was enhanced connectivity between the middle occipital gyrus and hippocampus following sleep. Within the sleep group, the percentage of REM sleep obtained correlated with activity in the middle occipital gyrus, lingual gyrus, and cuneus during the successful retrieval of neutral backgrounds previously paired with negative objects. These results confirm that emotion affects neural activity during retrieval even when the cues themselves are neutral, and demonstrate, for the first time, that this residual effect of emotion on visual activity is greater after sleep and may be maximized by REM sleep.     

Emotion and decision-making: affect-driven belief systems in anxiety and depression

Emotion processing and decision-making are integral aspects of daily life. However, our understanding of the interaction between these constructs is limited. In this review, we summarize theoretical approaches that link emotion and decision-making, and focus on research with anxious or depressed individuals to show how emotions can interfere with decision-making. We integrate the emotional framework based on valence and arousal with a Bayesian approach to decision-making in terms of probability and value processing. We discuss how studies of individuals with emotional dysfunctions provide evidence that alterations of decision-making can be viewed in terms of altered probability and value computation. We argue that the probabilistic representation of belief states in the context of partially observable Markov decision processes provides a useful approach to examine alterations in probability and value representation in individuals with anxiety and depression, and outline the broader implications of this approach.     

The assessment of emotional clarity via response times to emotion items: shedding light on the response process and its relation to emotion regulation strategies

Researchers have begun to use response times (RTs) to emotion items as an indirect measure of emotional clarity. Our first aim was to scrutinise the properties of this RT measure in more detail than previously. To be able to provide recommendations as to whether (and how) emotional intensity – as a possible confound – should be controlled for, we investigated the specific form of the relation between emotional intensity and RTs to emotion items. In particular, we assumed an inverted U-shaped relation at the item level. Moreover, we analysed the RT measure’s convergent validity with respect to individuals’ confidence in their emotion ratings. As a second aim, we compared the predictive validity of emotional clarity measures (RT measure, self-report) with respect to daily emotion regulation. The results of three experience sampling studies showed that the association between emotional intensity and RT followed an inverted U shape. RT was in part related to confidence. Emotional clarity measures were unrelated to reappraisal. There was some evidence that lower emotional clarity was related to a greater use of suppression. The findings highlight that emotional intensity and squared emotional intensity should be controlled for when using the RT measure of emotional clarity in future research.     

Modulation of retrieval processing reflects accuracy of emotional source memory

There is considerable evidence that encoding and consolidation of memory are modulated by emotion, but the retrieval of emotional memories is not well characterized. Here we manipulated the emotional context with which affectively neutral stimuli were associated during encoding, allowing us to examine neural activity associated with retrieval of emotional memories without confounding the emotional attributes of cue items and the retrieved context. Using a source memory procedure we were also able to compare how retrieval processing was modulated when the emotional encoding context was recollected or not. An interaction between emotional encoding context and accuracy of source memory revealed that successful retrieval of emotional context was associated with activity in left amygdala, and a left frontotemporal network including anterior insula, prefrontal cortex and cingulate. In contrast, when contextual retrieval was unsuccessful, items encoded in emotional contexts elicited enhanced activity in right amygdala and a right-lateralized network that included extrastriate visual areas. These findings indicate distinct effects of emotion on successful and unsuccessful retrieval of source information, including lateralization of amygdala responses.     

A valence-specific lateral bias for discriminating emotional facial expressions in free field

Findings from subjects with unilateral brain damage, as well as from normal subjects studied with tachistoscopic paradigms, argue that emotion is processed differently by each brain hemisphere. An open question concerns the extent to which such lateralised processing might occur under natural, freeviewing conditions. To explore this issue, we asked 28 normal subjects to discriminate emotions expressed by pairs of faces shown side-by-side, with no time or viewing constraints. Images of neutral expressions were shown paired with morphed images of very faint emotional expressions (happiness, surprise, disgust, fear, anger, or sadness). We found a surprising and robust laterality effect: When discriminating negative emotional expressions, subjects performed significantly better when the emotional face was to the left of the neutral face; conversely, when discriminating positive expressions, subjects performed better when the emotional face was to the right. We interpret this valence-specific laterality effect as consistent with the idea that the right hemisphere is specialised to process negative emotions, whereas the left is specialised to process positive emotions. The findings have important implications for how humans perceive facial emotion under natural conditions.     

Emotion elicitor or emotion messenger? Subliminal priming reveals two faces of facial expressions

Facial emotional expressions can serve both as emotional stimuli and as communicative signals. The research reported here was conducted to illustrate how responses to both roles of facial emotional expressions unfold over time. As an emotion elicitor, a facial emotional expression (e.g., a disgusted face) activates a response that is similar to responses to other emotional stimuli of the same valence (e.g., a dirty, nonflushed toilet). As an emotion messenger, the same facial expression (e.g., a disgusted face) serves as a communicative signal by also activating the knowledge that the sender is experiencing a specific emotion (e.g., the sender feels disgusted). By varying the duration of exposure to disgusted, fearful, angry, and neutral faces in two subliminal-priming studies, we demonstrated that responses to faces as emotion elicitors occur prior to responses to faces as emotion messengers, and that both types of responses may unfold unconsciously.     

The conscious awareness of time distortions regulates the effect of emotion on the perception of time

This study examined how the awareness of emotion-related time distortions modifies the effect of emotion on time perception. Before performing a temporal bisection task with stimulus durations presented in the form of neutral or emotional facial expressions (angry, disgusted and ashamed faces), some of the participants read a scientific text providing either correct or incorrect information on the emotion–time relationship. Other participants did not receive any information. The results showed that the declarative knowledge allowed the participants to regulate (decrease) the intensity of emotional effects on the perception of time, but did not trigger temporal effects when the emotional stimuli did not automatically induce emotional reactions that distorted time.     

Emotion Talk in Mother-Child Conversations of the Shared Past: The Effects of Culture,Gender, and Event Valence

We examined how mother-child emotional reminiscing is affected by culture, gender, and the valence of the event. Thirty-one Euro-American and 30 Chinese middle-class mothers and their 3-year-old children discussed 1 highly positive and 1 highly negative experience. Mothers and children in both cultures used a greater variety of negative emotion words than positive emotion words and were more likely to confirm a shared emotional perspective when discussing the positive event but to negotiate emotion when discussing the negative event. Moreover, Chinese dyads used more negative emotion words overall than did Euro-American dyads but Euro-American dyads engaged in more negotiations of emotion than did Chinese dyads. Surprisingly, there were no effects of gender. Implications of these findings for emotional socialization are discussed.