大学应当提供什么样的人文教育--从《大学人文读本》之旨趣谈起

本文从夏中义先生主编的《大学人文读本》的旨趣入手,考察了中西方关于人文一词的来源及涵义,认为人文的内涵是随着人对宇宙人生的真理和价值的认识而不断加深和丰富的,大学的人文教育则旨在型塑人对自身在宇宙中的地位、意义和价值的觉解,人的丰厚蕴涵、独特自我、高尚人格、高雅品德,以及人与人、人与社会、人与自然的良性关系。由此反思了《读本》的缺弊,并为中国大学的人文教育提出一愿景。     

福柯与自由主义:作为意识形态抑或治理技艺?

<正>探讨西方治理史和治理技艺是福柯后期政治哲学的重要学术使命。在西方治理史上,"治理"(gouvernement)并不简单的是政治或法律或经济实践,而是在不同历史时期有其不同侧重面的处理多种人类事务及其行为的复合实践。福柯认为西方治理史发生过两次重大转型:治理技艺于18世纪     

评罗尔斯的《政治自由主义》

政治哲学是当代西方哲学中最活跃和引人注目的领域 ,近几十年来 ,著名的思想家和重要的论著不断涌现。我国学术界在这方面的翻译、介绍工作相当积极、多产 ,尽管如此 ,由于起步很晚 ,不少重要篇章至今尚未译 ,本栏目将择要选介 ,以期研究者和读者能对当代西方政治哲学的脉络和进展有一全面、深入了解。哈贝马斯访华 ,进一步激起了对他的思想的关注 ;当代政治哲学中 ,平等问题和正义问题一样处于中心地位。本栏目的介绍工作从这两个话题做起。     

论意识形态与政党政治

意识形态既是政党的合法性基础,也是政党危机的来源;全球范围内主导意识形态的消长不但决定了一个具体政党的地位,而且型塑了世界政党政治的生态。按照19世纪末以来全球主导意识形态的变化,本文把世界政党政治分成以下四个发展阶段并对其变化规律进行了分析:(1)18世纪至19世纪中叶在自由主义和保守主义思潮主导下的政党发展;(2)19世纪中叶至二战结束时在民族和阶级意识形态主导下的政党发展;(3)冷战下的政党发展;(4)"第三波民主浪潮"下宗教和保守主义的回潮与政党政治。本文还试图解答如下问题:世界各国政党的组织形式有什么重要区别?这些区别又是怎么产生的?为什么政党危机是各国政党不得不经常面对的一个问题?当前世界的政党政治势态形成的原因是什么?针对当前世界局势与政党政治的发展趋势中国应当如何应对?为了让读者更好地了解近代以来意识形态的消长规律及其背后的社会学原理,本文还用了较大的篇幅探讨了阶级、民族、自由主义和零和扩张性宗教这些在现代社会中最为重要的意识形态各自所具有的基本性质。因此,本文还可以被视为一篇分析不同意识形态各自的性质,以及这些性质如何影响世界的政党发展乃至整个世界局势的文章。在本文的最后部分,笔者提出了"道德务实政党"的概念,认为这是解决政党危机的一个途径。     

《莱茵报》时期马克思对古典自由主义的批判

《莱茵报》时期马克思对古典自由主义进行了间接的批判。通过抨击德国封建特权与揭露普鲁士政府扼杀群众自由权利的丑恶行径,马克思间接批判了古典自由主义自然权利的抽象存在、自私本性和虚幻前提。《莱茵报》后期,马克思直面德国底层群众的贫困现实,在深入考察农民贫困问题、探究贫困根源及其解决措施时,间接批判了古典自由主义国家观的阶级属性、理论前提和现实局限。《莱茵报》时期马克思对古典自由主义的间接批判表明其并不完全认同资本主义社会的发展道路,体现了他在价值取向和政治立场上的进步性,即在间接批判的过程中对现存的一切社会思潮保持审慎反思的态度,形成了积极探寻“建立新世界”的价值取向和为广大贫苦群众谋求普遍权利的政治立场,从而与古典自由主义渐行渐远。     

马克思如何认识、使用与定义“Ideologe”——对《德意志意识形态》特别是“圣麦克斯章”的考察

马克思在《德意志意识形态》德文版中共写下45处“Ideologe,-n”(意识形态家),内容涉及对其产生的原因、看待世界的方式及相关定义的阐释。马克思对该词的认识、使用与定义,通篇是一致的,亦即意识形态家是采用脱离现实基础后的观念与思想来认识与解释世界的一群人。马克思并没有对“意识形态家”的本质作过负面的指涉,而是统称哲学、政治、法律等领域的专家,只要从观念出发,颠倒现实与观念的主从关系,他们就是“意识形态家”。     

当代中国“新自由主义”的掩蔽性管窥

当代中国的"新自由主义"与西方新自由主义既有"共相",也有"异相"。20世纪90年代中后期盛行的"新自由主义",其特征是全面扩张的市场与不受约束的权力之间的互相嵌入,表现出泛市场化、非政治化和权贵化的倾向。新自由主义思潮存在着以自由贬低民主,以经济自由化约个人自由,以"消极自由"反对"积极自由"的观念谬误。     

施特劳斯论德性与古今自由主义

施特劳斯批评现代自由主义放弃了对德性的追求,不再把自由与德性联系起来。以霍布斯为视角批评现代自由主义的过程中,施特劳斯指出,作为现代自由主义的奠基者,霍布斯修正了西方传统道德法则,用有利于和平的习惯取代了传统意义上有利于灵魂完美的德性,造成节制等严肃德性的丧失。以古代自由主义为视角批评现代自由主义的过程中,施特劳斯指出,自由的原初含义是追求德性,古代自由主义追求德性,但现代自由主义不再将自由与德性联系起来,甚至不再认为自由与德性有何联系。施特劳斯表明,现代自由主义对德性的弃绝是坚定彻底的。     

马克思恩格斯为什么没能出版《德意志意识形态》?——以MEGA~2为基础

《德意志意识形态》是标志唯物史观诞生的重要著作。遗憾的是,这部著作在马克思恩格斯在世时并未出版。因此,马克思在《政治经济学批判》序言中所作的有关"两厚册八开本"未能在威斯特伐里亚出版的说明就成为困扰学界的历史之谜。本文通过对MEGA~2第Ⅲ部分即书信部分,特别是对他人在1845—1847年写给马克思恩格斯的书信的考证研究,基本重建了那段历史,从而揭开了这一历史之谜。这有助于学人更深刻地体会《德意志意识形态》的珍贵价值。     

罗尔斯政治美德观的义理疏解——以《政治自由主义》为文本依据

罗尔斯对政治美德的关注是一贯的,在《政治自由主义》中,他构造了一种独立于各种完备性学说的政治观,给出了政治美德的内在基础,即在一个自由宪政的社会中,人们具有并可以得到发挥和发展的两个基本道德能力:形成正义感的能力以及形成、修正和追求善观念的能力,设定了使政治美德能够得以形成和发展的良序社会的环境条件,在严格限定了的政治范围中,考察了诸种政治美德及其塑造途径。他以一种理论上自洽的方式捍卫了自由主义关于美德的信念。     

Mill's Liberalism and Liberalism's Posterity

It is argued that the moral theory undergirding J.S. Mill's argumentin On Liberty is a species of perfectionism rather than any kind of utilitarianism. The conception of human flourishing that itinvokes is one in which the goods of personal autonomy and individualityare central. If this conception is to be more than the expression ofa particular cultural ideal it needs the support of an empiricallyplausible view of human nature and a defensible interpretation ofhistory. Neither of these can be found in Mill. Six traditionalcriticisms of Mill's argument are assessed. It is concluded thatin addition to depending on implausible claims about human natureand history Mill's conception of the good contains disablingincommensurabilities. It is argued that these difficulties andincommensurabilities plague later liberal thinkers such as IsaiahBerlin and Joseph Raz who have sought to ground liberalism in avalue-pluralist ethical theory. No thinker in Mill's liberal posterity has been able to demonstrate the universal authority of liberal ideals.     

Liberalism,Autonomy and Conjugal Love

Res Publica - This paper argues that a liberal state is justified in promoting relationships of conjugal love – the form of relationship that is the basis of the institution of marriage...     

Liberalism,Citizenship, and the Private Interest in Schooling

Schools in liberal societies are responsible for producing liberal citizens. However, if they have too robust a view of citizenship, they may find themselves undermining the view of good lives held by many pacific and law abiding groups. Here I argue against treating citizenship as an educational good that simply trumps private values when they conflict and in favor of a view that seeks a context sensitive balance between such conflicting goods. The paper explores Rawls's distinction between two moral powers as a way of understanding the character of some of the private interests in schooling.     

Liberalism,nationality and education

Yael Tamir's (1993) book Liberal Nationalism seeks to show that liberalism and nationalism are not incompatible political philosophies. Nationalism need not take the closed, authoritarian form it has so often taken; and liberalism is premised on certain national ideas, including national self-determination. This critical discussion of her account is broadly sympathetic to the compatibility thesis, but takes issue both with her notion of nationalism, with her account of a nation as a self-conscious cultural community, and with the sharp line she draws between civic and cultural concerns. Although her book does not deal with education, this paper concludes with remarks about what the role of nationality should be in education, in both a Tamirian and a non-Tamirian framework. The latter is applied to education in Britain.This paper takes the form of a discussion of some leading themes in Yael Tamir's (1993) book Liberal Nationalism and of their bearing on educational policy.     

A Strange Alliance: Isaiah Berlin and the Liberalism of the Fringes

This paper is a homage to Isaiah Berlin. It argues that Berlin's philosophy has preceded many of the present discussions concerning liberalism-culturalism. In an age in which most liberal philosophers ignored the importance of belonging, of member-ship, identity, cultural affiliations and historical continuity, Berlin stands out as a welcome exception. His philosophy is therefore fresh and innovative as it was in the sixties and seventies when it was written. It carries within it the germs of the liberalism of the fringes advocated nowadays by members of national minorities, immigrants, women, and gays, the kind of liberalism which fits well the politics of identity and recognition.     

Renaissance Catholicism and Contemporary Liberalism

Contemporary (post‐1945) liberalism functions analogously to Roman Catholicism in the decades after 1443. Both ideologies, in their respective periods, represent the hegemonic ideology of Western civilization, despite the fact that both comprise a miscellany of competing belief systems. Both ideologies are dominated by a single hegemonic power—the United States and the Renaissance papacy, respectively—which strives for doctrinal stability. All who reject official “doctrine,” however, are rendered liable to violent suppression. In this, papal Catholicism and American liberalism display an ultra‐conservative outlook; but they also evince a powerfully millenarian streak, as evidenced by their dual proclamations of the “end of history” and their zealous missionary responses to macro‐historical events in the final decades of the fifteenth and twentieth centuries. For ideologues of both regimes, those events speak to an ultimate harmony of truth and value that only serves to entrench their own dogmatism. This, however, has dire consequences when it comes to war, as can be seen in the “crusading” character of contemporary liberal warfare. Ultimately, the Renaissance papacy proves unable to maintain its monopoly on Christian doctrine; and one has to wonder if a similar fate may befall America's perceived role as the champion of liberalism.     

Perfectionist Liberalism,Tolerance And American Law

I attempt to show that toleranceis part of the idea of American law: for any legalsystem must incorporate the capacity toaccommodate differences in order to meet theminimal standards necessary to apply a rule. There are multiple forms of tolerance, however, some ofwhich are inconsistent with liberal principles.By examining several lines of jurisprudencerelating to speech and privacy, I show thatAmerican law reflects elements of bothliberalism and conservative communitarianism. I attempt to reconcile these by suggesting they actuallyreflect a perfectionist foundation of liberalautonomy. That is to say, American law doesnot value moral autonomy and reasoned discoursebecause they protect neutrality betweendifferent ideas of the good life: rather, thelaw reflects an idea of the good life that seesmoral autonomy as advancing well being.This perfectionist liberal foundation oftolerance reflects the evolution of Americanlaw. Through slavery, sexism and the controlof erotic speech we see how it expanded theideas of who is capable of rationaldiscourse and what activities incorporatethe exercise of reasoned moral autonomy;and how the law imposes this autonomouscapacity on individuals as the price ofcitizenship, even if they belong to groups whodeny the value of reason or autonomy.     

Liberalism,Abstract Individualism,and the Problem of Particular Obligations

In the following I take issue with the allegation that liberalism must inevitably be guilty of ‘abstract individualism’. I treat Michael Sandel’s well-known claim that there are ‘loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are’ as representative of this widely held view. Specifically, I argue: (i) that Sandel’s account of the manner in which ‘constitutive’ loyalties function as reasons for action presupposes the possibility of there being (what I call) ‘underivable particular obligations’, but that such obligations are, in fact, a logical impossibility; and (ii) that Sandel’s account of the self as necessarily ‘encumbered’ presupposes an account of personal identity which confuses identification with definition, and which is, therefore, fundamentally flawed. For their constructive and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the following: Clare Chambers, Roger Crisp, Cécile Fabre, Paul Kelly, David Lloyd-Thomas. Thanks also go to Res Publica’s two anonymous referees.     

Reason,Education and Liberalism: Family Resemblance within an Overlapping Consensus

This paper focuses on recent debates over the nature ofliberalism and its central feature of reason, both inside and outside ofeducational philosophy. Central ideas from Jonathan and Hirst contributeas do those from Rawls, Gadamer, Wittgenstein, Taylor, and Ackermantoward a less traditional contextualized and contingent view.     

Ethnocentrism,Social Contract Liberalism and Positivistic-Conservatism: Rorty's Three Theses on Politics

In this article I argue that Rorty has three separatearguments for liberalism. The pragmatic-ethnocentric argument for liberalism,as a system which works for `us liberals', is rejectedfor entailing relativism. The social contract argument results in an extreme formof individualism. This renders politics redundantbecause there is no need for the (liberal) state toprotect poetic individuals, who are capable ofdefending themselves. Even if the less able areharmed, the state could not prevent this, givenRorty's arguments about discursive enrichment withina language game. Finally, the positivistic-conservative argument legitimisesliberal politics by fiat, and makes normativediscussion about the status quo illegitimate. Herethe argument is that politics is a matter of reactivetechnical piecemeal problem-solving, to restore theharmony of the status quo. As politics deals with`facts', normative `problematisations' of thefunctional status quo are illegitimate (in the public/political sphere). So, either anything goes, andpolitics is redundant, or discussion of politics isdepoliticised and confined to the private sphere.Consequently, Rorty has no way to explore issues ofpower, or normative contestation. Therefore he isunable to address issues of social justice withinliberal democracies, such as feminist arguments aboutan ascribed gender status limiting equalityof opportunity.