迷信招来的横祸

2003年7月5日,浙江省杭州市沈家新村80高龄的陈老太来到派出所报案,称自己于当日被人骗去现金6.3万元、金项链1条(价值3000多元)、金戒指一枚、天然珍珠23颗、祖传天然大颗珍珠3颗,陈老太说完捶胸顿足,后悔自己皆因迷信破大财。     

谈吉凶宜忌--传统历和迷信之三

历忌学说古已有之,战国时期已大体形成。西汉时期逐渐同历谱相结合。唐宋时期历谱逐渐发展成为历书。每年每月每日都有繁多的历注,吉凶宜忌项目也越来越多。因此.历书几乎成为迷信教科书。人们办事、出行、修造、会亲、求婚、安床、动土、上梁、赴任、临政、祭祀、祈福、修仓、捕捉、栽种、牧养、纳畜、开仓、出货、沐浴、剃头、穿井、迁徙、安葬等须查阅皇历或请人卜日。     

Weal and Woe: Suffering,Sociology, and the Emotions of Julian of Norwich

The power which narratives of mystical experience exert on our thinking derives from the central place of emotions within them. These narratives are crucial to the phenomenon of healing: not as cure, but as a means of accepting, understanding, and minimising suffering. Contemporary religious thought draws heavily on social theory but this paper shows not only that mystical emotions have escaped the attention of sociology, but also that sociology is unable to provide an adequate account of them or of their place in overcoming pain of all kinds. It does so by comparing three very different books about the emotions: Deborah Lupton's The Emotional Self (1998), Jack Barbalet's Emotions, Social Theory and Social Structure (1998), and the fourteenth century Revelations of Divine Love by Julian of Norwich. The last of these illuminates what the other two call the extra-discursive, embodied and unconscious dimensions of emotions. The first part of the paper makes a general comparison and the second turns to a range of specific emotions: shame and guilt, sorrow and depression, anger, fear, and anxiety, and the positive emotions of joy, love, and desire. This comparison helps explain how people live with chronic suffering and transcend it. It also shows that sociology, by making society itself a thing and elevating it to God-like status, cannot provide the critique of theology which was one of its original intentions, nor fully account for the healing influence of mystical phenomena.     

Everything I make is a sinkhole

Written in the form of a travelogue, this paper looks at the holes created by the implosions of casinos and the holes in the desert created by atomic bomb testing to cull psychogeographic meaning. It explores holes through the prism of Las Vegas and its surrounding atomic testing site and relates them to my use in my artwork: drawings and sculptures. It suggests that a darker tourism to Las Vegas is most elucidating. It contributes to understanding of holes in urbanism and its changing contours, the exploitative economy and loss, as well as the degradation of the surrounding landscape for military purposes.     

"This is Simply What I Do"

Wittgenstein's discussion of rule‐following is widely regarded to have identified what Kripke called “the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date”. But does it? This paper examines the problem in the light of Charles Peirce's distinctive scientific hierarchy. Peirce identifies a phenomenological inquiry which is prior to both logic and metaphysics, whose role is to identify the most fundamental philosophical categories. His third category, particularly salient in this context. pertains to general predication. Rule‐following scepticism, the paper suggests, results from running together two questions: “How is it that I can project rules?”, and, “What is it for a given usage of a rule to be right?”. In Peircean terms the former question, concerning the irreducibility of general predication (to singular reference), must be answered in phenomenology, while the latter, concerning the difference between true and false predication, is answered in logic. A failure to appreciate this distinction, it is argued, has led philosophers to focus exclusively on Wittgenstein's famous public account of rule‐following rightness, thus overlooking a private, phenomenological dimension to Wittgenstein's remarks on following a rule which gives the lie to Kripke's reading of him as a sceptic.     

What I like is How I Am: Impact of Alexithymia on Aesthetic Preference

Aim of this work was to explore the impact of alexithymia on art works appreciation, to examine the influence of emotion regulation on art judgment. While observing a painting, the viewer's cognitive structure contains several types of information (semantic, episodic, and strategic) and is the repository of personal traits, motivations, and emotional dispositions that are involved in this interaction. The study of how personal traits influence work of art appreciation, and especially the study of the way emotion regulation impacts on art judgment, was aimed at improving the comprehension of the aesthetic experience costruct. One hundred adults, divided into 2 groups (high and low scores in alexithymia), observed 20 works of art and were then asked to give an evalutative judgment on three dimentions: cognitive, emotional, aesthetic. As hypothesized, the two groups had significant differences in their aesthetic preferences. Although subjects without affective regulation disorders preferred excitation related pictures, subjects with alexithymia appreciated works evoching emotions of pleasure inhibition. These results confirm the impact of personality traits on aesthetic preference and support the need to include emotional regulation in a comprehensive model of aesthetic experience.     

The neural evidence for simulation is weaker than I think you think it is

Simulation theory accounts of mind-reading propose that the observer generates a mental state that matches the state of the target and then uses this state as the basis for an attribution of a similar state to the target. The key proposal is thus that mechanisms that are primarily used online, when a person experiences a kind of mental state, are then co-opted to run Simulations of similar states in another person. Here I consider the neuroscientific evidence for this view. I argue that there is substantial evidence for co-opted mechanisms, leading from one individual’s mental state to a matching state in an observer, but there is no evidence that the output of these co-opted mechanisms serve as the basis for mental state attributions. There is also substantial evidence for attribution mechanisms that serve as the basis for mental state attributions, but there is no evidence that these mechanisms receive their input from co-opted mechanisms.     

Constructive Logic with Strong Negation is a Substructural Logic. I

The goal of this two-part series of papers is to show that constructive logic with strong negation N is definitionally equivalent to a certain axiomatic extension NFL _ew of the substructural logic FL _ew . In this paper, it is shown that the equivalent variety semantics of N (namely, the variety of Nelson algebras) and the equivalent variety semantics of NFL _ew (namely, a certain variety of FL _ew -algebras) are term equivalent. This answers a longstanding question of Nelson [30]. Extensive use is made of the automated theorem-prover Prover9 in order to establish the result. The main result of this paper is exploited in Part II of this series [40] to show that the deductive systems N and NFL _ew are definitionally equivalent, and hence that constructive logic with strong negation is a substructural logic over FL _ew . Presented by Heinrich Wansing     

I know your face but not where I saw you: Context memory is impaired for other-race faces

People are more likely to falsely identify a face of another race than a face of their own race. When witnesses make identifications, they often need to remember where they have previously encountered a face. Failure to remember the context of an encounter can result in unconscious transference and lead to misidentifications. Forty-five White participants were shown White and Black faces, each presented on one of five backgrounds. The participants had to identify these faces in an old/new recognition test. If participants stated that they had seen a face, they had to identify the context in which the face had originally appeared. Participants made more context errors with Black faces than with White faces. This shows that the own-race bias extends to context memory.     

也谈"我即神,神即是我"--拜读《无神论、宗教与道德》有感

好几年前,《中国青年报》有篇题为《向青年毛泽东学习什么》的文章。该文向公众推介了青年毛泽东不同凡俗的先进思想和行为。其中提及毛泽东曾说过“我即神,神即是我”这句话。当时读来颇为惊诧。今天拜读李申老师的文章《无神论、宗教与道德》时,又一次引发对这句话的深思。“我即神,神即是我”,丝毫没有神化自我的用心。正相反,其目的在于淡化“神”,将人们想像中至高无上的“神”普通     

Ignorance is not a victimless crime: The case of the caring teacher,part I

Intrapsychic factors, including the dissociation of childhood wounds, rendered a mandated reporter of child abuse impotent to report a child's disclosure of abuse. The defenses of projective identification, splitting, denial, devaluation, and cognitive impairment prevented her from taking proper action. Passivity trained into her by the church and society reinforced her refusal to act to protect the child.     

The narrow use of the term ego in analytical psychology: the 'not-I' is also who I am

This paper(1) explores some aspects of the narrowness of Jung's usage of the term ego and the consequences which are understood to follow there from. Jung is understood to see the ego as a surface phenomenon and, essentially, as the focal point of consciousness, not recognizing its potential to function more broadly, deeply, and unconsciously. Furthermore, although he does recognize the ego as 'the total conscious personality' his use of the term frequently does not reflect that definition. Whilst Jung's analysis of the narrowly functioning ego is enlightening and groundbreaking, he treats this narrow functioning as if it is characteristic of the ego itself, ascribing any 'broad functioning' primarily to the Self. This narrow use of the term ego, and the corresponding use of the term Self, are understood to have significant consequences for clinical practice, including leading the analyst into an over-identification with the patient and a loss of the analyst's sense of self. It is also understood to lead to difficulties dealing with more disturbed individuals, to stuck and broken down analyses, to wear and tear on the analyst and, potentially, splits between the different schools of analytical psychology. These concerns all represent difficulties with working in the transference, and Jung's own experience of this is briefly explored.     

I OUGHT,THEREFORE I CAN

I defend the following version of the ought-implies-can principle: (OIC) by virtue of conceptual necessity, an agent at a given time has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation to do only what the agent at that time has the ability and opportunity to do. In short, obligations correspond to ability plus opportunity. My argument has three premises: (1) obligations correspond to reasons for action; (2) reasons for action correspond to potential actions; (3) potential actions correspond to ability plus opportunity. In the bulk of the paper I address six objections to OIC: three objections based on putative counterexamples, and three objections based on arguments to the effect that OIC conflicts with the is/ought thesis, the possibility of hard determinism, and the denial of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.     

I Think,Therefore I Persist

Suppose that you're lying in bed. You just woke up. But you're alert. Your mind is clear and you have no distractions. As you lie there, you think to yourself, ‘2?+?2 = 4.’ The thought just pops into your head. But, wanting to be sure of your mathematical insight, you once again think ‘2?+?2 = 4’, this time really meditating on your thought. Now suppose that you're sitting in an empty movie theatre. The lighting is normal and the screen in front of you is blank. Then at some point an image of a peach is flashed on the screen. The image isn't up there for long. In fact, it's only on the screen for what seems like an instant—just long enough for you to see it. These two scenarios are a bit mundane. But, as I will show, reflection on them can yield significant results concerning the nature of persons and their persistence through time. First I will show that thought and perception have temporal constraints whereby your thinking or perceiving in the above scenarios implies that you exist through a temporally extended interval. Then I will argue that this allows us to rule out several prominent theories of personal identity.