Differences in Delay Discounting of Some Commodities as a Function of Church Attendance

Recent research has suggested that the positive benefits of religiousness that are reported in the literature may be related to “self-control.” The present study attempted to determine whether religiousness, as measured by self reporting of regularly attending church services, would be related to how participants discount delayed outcomes. Three hundred one university students completed a delay-discounting task involving five commodities (1,000,1,000, 100,000, annual retirement income, federal education legislation, and medical treatment). Participants who reported regularly attending church services discounted both monetary amounts significantly more than did participants who reported not regularly attending church services, indicating that church goers placed less value on those commodities than non-church goers. Rates of delay discounting did not differ between groups for the other commodities. These results suggest that religiousness alters how people frame certain decisions involving delayed outcomes, but not others.     

Impulsive choice and workplace safety: a new area of inquiry for research in occupational settings

A conceptual argument is presented for the relevance of behavior-analytic research on impulsive choice to issues of occupational safety and health. Impulsive choice is defined in terms of discounting, which is the tendency for the value of a commodity to decrease as a function of various parameters (e.g., having to wait or expend energy to receive the commodity). A high degree of discounting is often considered an index of impulsivity. We argue that for workers, possible negative consequences (e.g., injury or disease) are often disregarded, or discounted, in choices about workplace safety because such consequences are typically delayed and uncertain. Furthermore, some evidence suggests that certain environmental conditions, such as those that lead to stress or sleep deprivation, may increase discounting. Increased discounting, by extension, leads to a further devaluation of safety practices and their benefits. A call is made for research aimed at more clearly delineating the relation between impulsive choice and workplace safety.     

What Would It Take to Get You into an Electric Car? Consumer Perceptions and Decision Making about Electric Vehicles

Americans buy millions of vehicles every year, but research on how those decisions are made, including personality and individual difference factors, has rarely taken full advantage of psychological insights. This is an increasingly important topic because, for instance, decisions to buy electric vehicles (EVs) rather than gasoline-powered vehicles have environmental and geopolitical consequences. A series of studies reveal the very different perceptions of EVs and gas vehicles. Although vehicle choices at the aggregate level were strongly correlated with economic considerations, individual consumer choices were correlated with delay discounting rates in Study 1 but not Study 2. These studies also did not find significant correlations between EV purchase decisions and a number of other individual difference traits often thought to be factors in such decisions (i.e., social value orientation, political attitudes, environmental attitudes, preference for novel products, or an array of core social values). Regression models indicate that factors which did predict vehicle choices concerns were about the performance and range of EVs, EV prevalence in general, and beliefs about what statements different vehicle types made about their owners and the owners’ values. More attention to the vehicle-associated values and immediate performance/use issues can help to promote EV purchase decisions and subsequent improvements in environmental and political stability.     

Decision making, risk taking and psychological time: Review of empirical findings and psychological theory

Three domains of research (1) involvement in past and future events, (2) knowledge of the past and the future, and (3) value as a function of time (discounting) were used to elucidate man's limitations when he makes decisions based on earlier experience with consequences in the close and distant future. Evidence from all three areas illustrate that man is captured in a narrow time-space sphere around "here and now".—One consequence of this limitation is that risk-willingness increases the longer ahead the outcome of a decision is likely to occur. To specify, the less we are involved in, the less we know of and the less the consequences are evaluated the larger is our willingness to make decisions with future risks. Learning from experience seems to play a minor role in improving decision making. Ill-defined problems and non-distinct outcomes make "economic man" fairly useless as a norm for decision making in decisions with longranging effects and of a non-repititive character.—The paper ends with a discussion of strategies that can compensate for the limitations of distal cognition.     

Valuing the future: a MADA example involving nuclear waste storage

Intertemporal decision making involves decisions that have consequences that span several periods of time and often extend far into the future. The purpose of this paper is to discuss and highlight the differences associated with different evaluation methods designed to cope with the long-term impacts of a decision including discounting. The concepts and ideas are illustrated in the context of a decision about a nuclear waste facility. We show how applying different discounting methodologies can greatly affect the decision made, especially over long time periods. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Urge to Splurge: A Terror Management Account of Materialism and Consumer Behavior

This article presents terror management theory (TMT) as a way to understand how the human awareness of death affects materialism, conspicuous consumption, and consumer decisions. The pursuit of wealth and culturally desired commodities are hypothesized to reinforce those beliefs that function to protect people from existential anxieties. Following a brief overview of TMT and research, evidence is reviewed that explicates how intimations of mortality increase materialism as a way to enhance self‐esteem and affects consumer decisions that support one's cultural worldview. Adverse consequences of materialistic and consumeristic worldviews are described and the challenges for future research to discover ways to alleviate them are considered.     

Financial product sensitivity predicts financial health

Recent research has aimed to understand how people consider financial decisions because they have important consequences for well-being. Yet existing research has largely failed to examine how attitudes and behaviors vary as a function of the specific financial product (e.g., debt type). We ask to what extent people differentiate between similarly categorized financial products (e.g., debt or investment) as a function of their terms (e.g., interest costs and expected returns) and whether such differentiation predicts financial health. Across four studies, we find not only that there are individual differences in attitudes toward similar financial products (e.g., two distinct loans), but also that the extent to which a consumer is averse to high-cost versus low-cost products predicts financial health. This relationship cannot be fully explained by financial literacy, numeracy, or intertemporal discounting. In addition, nudging people toward differentiating between financial products promotes decisions that are aligned with financial health.     

Choice patterns reveal qualitative individual differences among discounting of delayed gains,delayed losses,and probabilistic losses

A new probabilistic losses questionnaire as well as Kirby's delayed gains questionnaire and a previously developed delayed losses questionnaire were administered to a large online sample. Almost all participants showed the positive discounting choice pattern expected on the Kirby questionnaire, decreasing their choice of a delayed gain as time to its receipt increased. In contrast, approximately 15% of the participants showed negative discounting on the delayed losses questionnaire and/or the probabilistic losses questionnaire, decreasing their choice of an immediate loss as time to a delayed loss decreased and/or decreasing their choice of a certain loss as likelihood of the probabilistic loss increased. Mixture model analysis confirmed the existence of these negative discounting subgroups. The inconsistent findings observed in previous research involving delayed/probabilistic losses may be due to differences in the proportion of negative discounters who participated in previous studies. Further research is needed to determine how negative discounting of delayed and probabilistic losses manifests itself in everyday decisions. It should be noted that the presence of individuals who show atypical choice patterns when losses are involved may pose challenges for efforts to modify discounting in order to ameliorate behavioral problems, especially because many such problems concern choices that have negative consequences, often delayed and/or probabilistic.     

Misery is not miserly: sad and self-focused individuals spend more

Misery is not miserly: Sadness increases the amount of money that decision makers give up to acquire a commodity. The present research investigated when and why the misery-is-not-miserly effect occurs. Drawing on William James's concept of the material self, we tested a model specifying relationships among sadness, self-focus, and the amount of money that decision makers spend. Consistent with our Jamesian hypothesis, results demonstrated that the misery-is-not-miserly effect occurs only when self-focus is high. That is, self-focus moderates the effect of sadness on spending. Moreover, mediational analyses revealed that, at sufficiently high levels, self-focus mediates (explains) the relationship between sadness and spending. Because the study used real commodities and real money, the results hold implications for everyday decisions, as well as implications for the development of theory. For example, economic theories of spending may benefit from incorporating psychological theories -- specifically, theories of emotion and the self -- into their models.     

Do commodities reproduce themselves through human beings? Toward an ecology of goods

The argument of this paper—'an ecology of goods'—could be summarized as follows: Goods exist only in relation to each other. Goods form groups, and in time higher organizational levels, groups of groups, i.e. networks of artifacts emerge. Mass consumption society is the most developed manifestation of this organizing process. The process of association and dissociation of goods is only partly controllable through human decisions. Human beings making decisions about buying, using and disposing of goods are constrained by the “logic” of the general organizing process. This process emerges out of different kinds interactions between commodities and feedback cycles with unintended consequences. In routinization and institutionalization processes commodity interactions become stabilized, i.e. the fidelity of replicative cycles increases. From this perspective, a system of commodities could be seen as an entity, which reproduces itself in a continuous resource exchange with its co‐actors and environment. In a system there is both a tendency toward functional differentiation and integration with other systems. Accordingly, systems of goods are cyclic processes within processes rather than given stable entities. This approach places many theoretical and practical problems of consumer society in a new perspective.     

Do Measures of Executive Functioning and Manipulation of Ego Depletion Predict How University Students Discount Probabilistic Gains and Losses?

Discounting occurs when the subjective value of an outcome is altered because the outcome is delayed or uncertain. Previous research has suggested that how individuals discount delayed gains is related to executive functioning. The present study attempted to extend this relationship to discounting of probabilistic gains and losses, and to examine whether diminishing cognitive resources would impact how participants discounted monetary outcomes. In Experiment 1, university students completed an executive function measure and then a probability-discounting task that involved the hypothetical sum of either $1,000 or $100,000 framed as either a gain or a loss. The executive function of organization was a significant predictor of how participants discounted all four outcomes while motivational drive predicted discounting of losses, but not gains. In Experiment 2, participants completed the same measures with the addition of an ego-depletion task to deplete cognitive resources before making discounting decisions. The executive function of motivational drive and empathy were significant predictors of how participants discounted both loss outcomes. The results suggest that discounting of monetary outcomes is related to the executive function of organization for gains and motivational drive, and empathy for losses. They also support the notion that the discounting of gains may be a distinct process from the discounting of losses.     

Discounting of food,sex, and money

Discounting is a useful framework for understanding choice involving a range of delayed and probabilistic outcomes (e.g., money, food, drugs), but relatively few studies have examined how people discount other commodities (e.g., entertainment, sex). Using a novel discounting task, where the length of a line represented the value of an outcome and was adjusted using a staircase procedure, we replicated previous findings showing that individuals discount delayed and probabilistic outcomes in a manner well described by a hyperbola-like function. In addition, we found strong positive correlations between discounting rates of delayed, but not probabilistic, outcomes. This suggests that discounting of delayed outcomes may be relatively predictable across outcome types but that discounting of probabilistic outcomes may depend more on specific contexts. The generality of delay discounting and potential context dependence of probability discounting may provide important information regarding factors contributing to choice behavior.     

Theory and data on developmental changes in novelty preference

The present study was designed to investigate the predictive value of an informational analysis of vicarious consequences. Two levels of amount of vicarious consequences (complete, partial) were varied with three types of vicarious consequences (reward, punishment, reward-punishment). Each of six groups of preschool age boys and girls observed an adult male model receive one of the combinations of amount and type of vicarious consequences for his choices from a commodity preference series. A seventh group of boys and girls observed the model receive no consequences for his choices. After observing the model, each subject was asked to make his own choices from the commodity preference series and to recall the choices which the model made. In contradiction to the predictions of an informational analysis of vicarious consequences, the amount of vicarious consequences did not differentially affect the recall of modeled behavior while the type of vicarious consequences did have a differential effect.     

The effect of temporal constraints on the value of money and other commodities

The value of hypothetical rewards of various delays and durations, consisting of money or other commodities, such as automobile use and vacations, was measured by the psychophysical up-down staircase method using an amount of unrestricted immediate money as the titrated variable. A model of temporal discounting based on implied constraints on anticipated consumption rate described the data. Further explicit constraints on consumption produced predictable deviations from the model. The concept that consumption is normally constrained together with time discounting may also explain the interaction between amount and delay of monetary reward in determining value and may provide the basis for a theory of addiction based on learning to increase consumption rate.     

Comparisons, mental models, and the action effect in judgments of regret

People tend to attribute more regret to a character who has decided to take action and experienced a negative outcome than to one who has decided not to act and experienced a negative outcome. For some decisions, however, this finding is not observed in a between-participants design and thus appears to rely on comparisons between people's representations of action and their representations of inaction. In this article, we outline a mental models account that explains findings from studies that have used within- and between-participants designs, and we suggest that, for decisions with uncertain counterfactual outcomes, information about the consequences of a decision to act causes people to flesh out their representation of the counterfactual states of affairs for inaction. In three experiments, we confirm our predictions about participants' fleshing out of representations, demonstrating that an action effect occurs only when information about the consequences of action is available to participants as they rate the nonactor and when this information about action is informative with respect to judgments about inaction. It is important to note that the action effect always occurs when the decision scenario specifies certain counterfactual outcomes. These results suggest that people sometimes base their attributions of regret on comparisons among different sets of mental models.     

DISCOUNTING OF DELAYED FOOD REWARDS IN PIGEONS AND RATS: IS THERE A MAGNITUDE EFFECT?

Temporal discounting refers to the decrease in the present, subjective value of a reward as the time to its receipt increases. Results from humans have shown that a hyperbola-like function describes the form of the discounting function when choices involve hypothetical monetary rewards. In addition, magnitude effects have been reported in which smaller reward amounts are discounted more steeply than larger amounts. The present research examines the cross-species generality of these findings using real rewards, namely food pellets, with both pigeons and rats. As with humans, an adjusting amount procedure was used to estimate the amount of immediate reward judged equal in value to a delayed reward. Different amounts of delayed food rewards (ranging from 5 to 32 pellets in pigeons and from 5 to 20 pellets in rats) were studied at delays varying from 1 s to 32 s. A simple hyperbola, similar to the hyperbola-like mathematical function that describes the discounting of hypothetical monetary rewards in humans, described the discounting of food rewards in both pigeons and rats. These results extend the generality of the mathematical model of discounting. Rates of discounting delayed food rewards were higher for pigeons than for rats. Unlike humans, however, neither pigeons nor rats showed a reliable magnitude effect: Rate of discounting did not vary systematically as a function of the amount of the delayed reward.     

Modeling the effect of reward amount on probability discounting

The present study with college students examined the effect of amount on the discounting of probabilistic monetary rewards. A hyperboloid function accurately described the discounting of hypothetical rewards ranging in amount from $20 to $10,000,000. The degree of discounting increased continuously with amount of probabilistic reward. This effect of amount was not due to changes in the rate parameter of the discounting function, but rather was due to increases in the exponent. These results stand in contrast to those observed with the discounting of delayed monetary rewards, in which the degree of discounting decreases with reward amount due to amount-dependent decreases in the rate parameter. Taken together, this pattern of results suggests that delay and probability discounting reflect different underlying mechanisms. That is, the fact that the exponent in the delay discounting function is independent of amount is consistent with a psychophysical scaling interpretation, whereas the finding that the exponent of the probability-discounting function is amount-dependent is inconsistent with such an interpretation. Instead, the present results are consistent with the idea that the probability-discounting function is itself the product of a value function and a weighting function. This idea was first suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), although their prospect theory does not predict amount effects like those observed. The effect of amount on probability discounting was parsimoniously incorporated into our hyperboloid discounting function by assuming that the exponent was proportional to the amount raised to a power. The amount-dependent exponent of the probability-discounting function may be viewed as reflecting the effect of amount on the weighting of the probability with which the reward will be received.     

Alcoholism and memory: broadening the scope of alcohol-expectancy research

Current biopsychosocial research on the etiology of alcoholism has begun to focus on memory processes as a possible common pathway for drinking decisions. The alcohol-expectancy construct is rooted both in cognitive psychology and alcohol research and can serve as a vehicle for this study. Reexamination of one recent review of issues in alcohol-expectancy research provides an opportunity to broaden the scope of this research with theoretical and methodological alternatives to those suggested in that review. Most importantly, this article shows that expectancy findings, discussed by Leigh (1989a) as reflecting "psychometric" limitations, are instead quite consistent with recent network models of memory structure. Such models can provide an informative guide to future research activities. It is also recommended that alcohol-expectancy research remain open to inputs from expectancy theories already developed in several psychological domains, as well as to theories of social cognition and attitude structure in addition to those advanced by Leigh.     

Does young adults’ preferred role in decision making about health,money, and career depend on their advisors’ leadership skills?

Few empirical data exist on how decision making about health differs from that in other crucial life domains with less threatening consequences. To shed light on this issue we conducted a study with 175 young adults (average age 19 years). We presented the participants with scenarios involving advisors who provided assistance in making decisions about health, money, and career. For each scenario, participants were asked to what extent they wanted the advisor to exhibit several leadership styles and competencies and what role (active, collaborative, or passive) they preferred to play when making decisions. Results show that decision making about health is distinct from that in the other domains in three ways. First, most of the participants preferred to delegate decision making about their health to their physician, whereas they were willing to collaborate or play an active role in decision making about their career or money. Second, the competencies and leadership style preferred for the physician differed substantially from those desired for advisors in the other two domains: Participants expected physicians to show more transformational leadership—the style that is most effective in a wide range of environments—than those who provide advice about financial investments or career. Finally, participants’ willingness to share medical decision making with their physician was tied to how strongly they preferred that the physician shows an effective leadership style. In contrast, motivation to participate in decision making in the other domains was not related to preferences regarding advisors’ leadership style or competencies. Our results have implications for medical practice as they suggest that physicians are expected to have superior leadership skills compared to those who provide assistance in other important areas of life.