共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 296 毫秒
1.
Daniel C. Russell 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2008,46(2):299-315
Virtue ethicists sometimes say that a right action is what a virtuous person would do, characteristically, in the circumstances. But some have objected recently that right action cannot be defined as what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances because there are circumstances in which a right action is possible but in which no virtuous person would be found. This objection moves from the premise that a given person ought to do an action that no virtuous person would do, to the conclusion that the action is a right action. I demon‐strate that virtue ethicists distinguish “ought” from “right” and reject the assumption that “ought” implies “right.” I then show how their rejection of that assumption blocks this “right but not virtuous” objection. I conclude by showing how the thesis that “ought” does not imply “right” can clarify a further dispute in virtue ethics regarding whether “ought” implies “can.” 相似文献
2.
Michelle Ciurria 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2014,17(3):545-557
P.F. Strawson’s theory of moral responsibility remains eminently influential. However, moral philosophers such as G. Watson and T.M. Scanlon have called into question it explanatory basis, which grounds moral responsibility in human nature and interpersonal relationships. They demand a deeper normative explanation for when it is appropriate to modify or mollify the reactive attitudes. In this paper, following A. Sneddon, I argue that the best interpretation of Strawson is an externalistic one which construes moral responsibility as an interpersonal social competence, as this approach uniquely satisfies Strawson’s demand that we justify the reactive attitudes from within the participant perspective. I then show that this is the only interpretation capable of preserving Strawson’s well-known excuse of being peculiarly unfortunate in one’s formative circumstances. 相似文献
3.
Ty Landrum 《Philosophical Investigations》2014,37(1):1-17
In the wake of Aristotle, it is often thought that moral virtue is a matter of feeling and acting for the right reasons. This notion is not incorrect, but it obscures one of the most interesting dimensions of virtue. It overlooks the formative role that virtue can play in bringing forth the kinds of considerations that count as reasons. To illustrate this point, I discuss some instances of love and resentment that are not plausibly conceived as responses to reasons, but which exemplify virtue nonetheless. They do so, I argue, because they positively assert human worth. 相似文献
4.
LIEZL VAN ZYL 《Journal of applied philosophy》2011,28(1):80-92
According to qualified‐agent virtue ethics, an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. I discuss two closely related objections to this view, both of which concern the actions of the non‐virtuous. The first is that this criterion sometimes gives the wrong result, for in some cases a non‐virtuous agent should not do what a virtuous person would characteristically do. A second objection is it altogether fails to apply whenever the agent, through previous wrongdoing, finds herself in circumstances that a virtuous person cannot be in. I focus on Rosalind Hursthouse's account of right action, and argue that it can provide a satisfactory response to both these objections. I do so by drawing attention to the distinction between action guidance and action assessment, and arguing that while the above criterion is adequate as a means of action assessment, we should turn to the virtue‐ and vice‐rules (v‐rules) for action guidance. 相似文献
5.
Lisa L. Fuller 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2012,15(3):369-386
Following John Rawls, nonideal theory is typically divided into: (1) “partial-compliance theory” and (2) “transitional theory." The former is concerned with those circumstances in which individuals and political regimes do not fully comply with the requirements of justice, such as when people break the law or some individuals do not do their fair share within a distributive scheme. The latter is concerned with circumstances in which background institutions may be unjust or may not exist at all. This paper focuses on issues arising in transitional theory. In particular, I am concerned with what Rawls’ has called “burdened societies," that is, those societies that find themselves in unfavorable conditions, such that their historical, social or economic circumstances make it difficult to establish just institutions. The paper investigates exactly how such burdened societies should proceed towards a more just condition in an acceptable fashion. Rawls himself tells us very little, except to suggest that societies in this condition should look for policies and courses of action that are morally permissible, politically possible and likely to be effective. In this paper I first try to anticipate what a Rawlsian might say about the best way for burdened societies to handle transitional problems and so move towards the ideal of justice. Next, I construct a model of transitional justice for burdened societies. Ultimately, I argue for a model of transitional justice that makes use of a nonideal version of Rawls’ notion of the worst-off representative person. 相似文献
6.
Frans Svensson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2010,13(3):255-271
Conceived of as a contender to other theories in substantive ethics, virtue ethics is often associated with, in essence, the
following account or criterion of right action: VR: An action A is right for S in circumstances C if and only if a fully virtuous
agent would characteristically do A in C. There are serious objections to VR, which take the form of counter-examples. They
present us with different scenarios in which less than fully virtuous persons would be acting rightly in doing what no fully
virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. In this paper, various proposals for how to revise VR in
order to avoid these counter-examples are considered. I will argue that in so far as the revised accounts really do manage
to steer clear of the counter-examples to VR, something which it turns out is not quite true for all of them, they instead
fall prey to other damaging objections. I end by discussing the future of virtue ethics, given what has come to light in the
previous sections of the paper. In particular, I sketch the outlines of a virtue ethical account of rightness that is structurally
different from VR. This account also faces important problems. Still, I suggest that further scrutiny is required before we
are in a position to make a definitive decision about its fate. 相似文献
7.
Alida Liberman 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2019,100(3):881-900
I offer a philosophical account of vowing and the rationality of vow‐making. I argue that vows are most productively understood as exceptionless resolutions that do not have any excusing conditions. I then articulate an apparent problem for exceptionless vow‐making: how can it be rational to bind yourself unconditionally, when circumstances might change unexpectedly and make it the case that vow‐keeping no longer makes sense for you? As a solution, I propose that vows can be rational to make only if they are implicitly conditional on a personal identification or social role that is itself escapable. 相似文献
8.
The Power of Testing Memory 总被引:9,自引:1,他引:8
ABSTRACT— A powerful way of improving one's memory for material is to be tested on that material. Tests enhance later retention more than additional study of the material, even when tests are given without feedback. This surprising phenomenon is called the testing effect, and although it has been studied by cognitive psychologists sporadically over the years, today there is a renewed effort to learn why testing is effective and to apply testing in educational settings. In this article, we selectively review laboratory studies that reveal the power of testing in improving retention and then turn to studies that demonstrate the basic effects in educational settings. We also consider the related concepts of dynamic testing and formative assessment as other means of using tests to improve learning. Finally, we consider some negative consequences of testing that may occur in certain circumstances, though these negative effects are often small and do not cancel out the large positive effects of testing. Frequent testing in the classroom may boost educational achievement at all levels of education. 相似文献
9.
Martin Montminy 《Synthese》2010,173(3):317-333
I examine the radical contextualists’ two main arguments for the semantic underdeterminacy thesis, according to which all,
or almost all, English sentences lack context-independent truth conditions. I show that both arguments are fallacious. The
first argument, which I call the fallacy of the many understandings, mistakenly infers that a sentence S is semantically incomplete from the fact that S can be used to mean different things
in different contexts. The second argument, which I call the open texture fallacy, wrongly concludes that a sentence S lacks context-independent truth conditions from the fact that there are circumstances
in which the truth value of S would be indeterminate. I do however defend the claim that a certain class of sentences not
containing any indexicals do lack context-independent truth conditions, and put forward an argument to that effect. But this
argument, as I show, does not generalize to all sentences, and thus fails to support the semantic underdeterminacy thesis. 相似文献
10.
Nicholas J.J. Smith 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2016,50(4):740-758
Different formal tools are useful for different purposes. For example, when it comes to modelling degrees of belief, probability theory is a better tool than classical logic; when it comes to modelling the truth of mathematical claims, classical logic is a better tool than probability theory. In this paper I focus on a widely used formal tool and argue that it does not provide a good model of a phenomenon of which many think it does provide a good model: I shall argue that while supervaluationism may provide a model of probability of truth, or of assertability, it cannot provide a good model of truth—supertruth cannot be truth. The core of the argument is that an adequate model of truth must render certain connectives truth‐functional (at least in certain circumstances)—and supervaluationism does not do so (in those circumstances). 相似文献
11.
Daniel Halliday 《亚里斯多德学会会刊》2004,105(1):377-386
12.
The problem of measurement model misspecification in behavioral and organizational research and some recommended solutions 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
The purpose of this study was to review the distinction between formative- and reflective-indicator measurement models, articulate a set of criteria for deciding whether measures are formative or reflective, illustrate some commonly researched constructs that have formative indicators, empirically test the effects of measurement model misspecification using a Monte Carlo simulation, and recommend new scale development procedures for latent constructs with formative indicators. Results of the Monte Carlo simulation indicated that measurement model misspecification can inflate unstandardized structural parameter estimates by as much as 400% or deflate them by as much as 80% and lead to Type I or Type II errors of inference, depending on whether the exogenous or the endogenous latent construct is misspecified. Implications of this research are discussed. 相似文献
13.
Ludger van Dijk 《Philosophical Psychology》2016,29(7):993-1003
This paper aims to provide a starting point for a non-representational approach to language. It will do so by undoing some of the reifying tendencies that are at the heart of the ontology of scientific psychology. Although non-representational theories are beginning to emerge, they remain committed to giving explanations in terms of ontological structures that are independent of human activity. If they maintain this commitment it is unlikely that they will displace representationalism in domains such as language. By following some of Wittgenstein’s remarks on language, I explain the phenomenon of reification by carefully considering the formative, situational flow of language—thus without invoking representations. In this way, the paper sketches a direction of approach for a non-representational theory of language, undercutting the most important assumptions that justify an explanatory ontology devoid of human activity. 相似文献
14.
Dr. Ghada Osman 《Islam & Christian-Muslim Relations》2005,16(4):345-359
This article is an examination of the position of foreign slaves in Mecca and Medina in the formative Islamic period. Mainly a reference piece and a prosopography, the article first examines in detail accounts of two contexts featuring slaves in Mecca: the ‘teacher(s)’ of the Prophet, and the builder(s) of the Kacba. It then presents a listing of the names of the slaves given in the early Arabic sources, followed by available details of their lives. The purpose of the study is to present a relatively exhaustive listing of the circumstances of slavery and the names of slaves in the formative Islamic period in order to elucidate the nature of the Meccan and Medinan social and religious systems of the time, as well as to contextualize the position of slavery in subsequent periods. 相似文献
15.
Sukaina Hirji 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2019,98(3):671-696
It is commonly assumed that Aristotle's ethical theory shares deep structural similarities with neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. I argue that this assumption is a mistake, and that Aristotle's ethical theory is both importantly distinct from the theories his work has inspired, and independently compelling. I take neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics to be characterized by two central commitments: (i) virtues of character are defined as traits that reliably promote an agent's own flourishing, and (ii) virtuous actions are defined as the sorts of actions a virtuous agent reliably performs under the relevant circumstances. I argue that neither of these commitments are features of Aristotle's own view, and I sketch an alternative explanation for the relationship between virtue and happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics. Although, on the interpretation I defend, we do not find in Aristotle a distinctive normative theory alongside deontology and consequentialism, what we do find is a way of thinking about how prudential and moral reasons can come to be aligned through a certain conception of practical agency. 相似文献
16.
Abraham Olivier 《Philosophical Studies》2003,115(1):33-53
In Why pains are not mental objects (1998) Guy Douglasrightly argues that pains are modes rather than objects ofperceptions or sensations. In this paper I try to go a stepfurther and argue that there are circumstances when pains canbecome objects even while they remain modes of experience.By analysing cases of extreme pain as presented by Scarry,Sartre, Wiesel, Grahek and Wall, I attempt to show thatintense physical pain may evolve into a force that, likeimagination, can make our most intense state of experiencebecome a mental object. I shall finally argue that, thoughextreme pains cannot serve as paradigm cases, they do showthe general importance of taking pain states to be objects. 相似文献
17.
Mark Schroeder 《Philosophical Studies》2012,160(2):265-285
Several authors have recently endorsed the thesis that there is what has been called pragmatic encroachment on knowledge??in other words, that two people who are in the same situation with respect to truth-related factors may differ in whether they know something, due to a difference in their practical circumstances. This paper aims not to defend this thesis, but to explore how it could be true. What I aim to do, is to show how practical factors could play a role in defeating knowledge by defeating epistemic rationality??the very kind of rationality that is entailed by knowledge, and in which Pascalian considerations do not play any role??even though epistemic rationality consists in having adequate evidence. 相似文献
18.
John Harris 《亚里斯多德学会增刊》2000,74(1):41-57
Frances Kamm sets out to draw and make plausible distinctions that would show how and why it is, in some circumstances, permissible to kill some to save many more, but is not so in others. To do so she draws on a famous, and famously artificial, example of Judith Thomson, which illustrates the fact that people intutitively reject some instances of such killings but not others. The irrationality, implausibility and in many cases the self-defeating nature of such distinctions I had attempted to expose in my 'The Survival Lottery' over 25 years ago. I still think these distinctions irrational and implausible and I will try, in this response, to show why this remains the case and why doctrines of additional effects, to however many powers they are taken, remain unhelpful in ethics. 相似文献
19.
Joel Katzav 《Ratio》2004,17(2):159-175
Paul Horwich claims that theories of meaning ought to accommodate the commonsense intuition that meanings play a part in explaining the use of words. Further, he argues that the view that best does so is that according to which the meaning of a word is constituted by a disposition to accept, in some circumstances, sentences in which it features. I argue that if meanings are construed thus, they will in fact fail to explain the use of words. I also argue that if we insist, as Horwich does, on the commonsense assumption that meanings are a species of entity, all versions of the view that meaning is constituted by our dispositions to use words will have to be rejected. I do not, however, claim that such theories ought to be rejected. My point is that they are incompatible with the requirements of commonsense. Further, I suggest that it is premature to impose such requirements on theories of meaning. 相似文献
20.
Joshua Shepherd 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2016,50(2):419-444
I argue that the neural realizers of experiences of trying (that is, experiences of directing effort towards the satisfaction of an intention) are not distinct from the neural realizers of actual trying (that is, actual effort directed towards the satisfaction of an intention). I then ask how experiences of trying might relate to the perceptual experiences one has while acting. First, I assess recent zombie action arguments regarding conscious visual experience, and I argue that contrary to what some have claimed, conscious visual experience plays a causal role for action control in some circumstances. Second, I propose a multimodal account of the experience of acting. According to this account, the experience of acting is (at the very least) a temporally extended, co‐conscious collection of agentive and perceptual experiences, functionally integrated and structured both by multimodal perceptual processing as well as by what an agent is, at the time, trying to do. 相似文献