Understanding patterns of attitude change: When implicit measures show change, but explicit measures do not

A common assumption in research on attitudes is that indirect measures assess relatively stable implicit attitudes, whereas traditional self-report measures assess more recently acquired explicit attitudes that coexist with old, presumably stable implicit attitudes. This assumption seems difficult to reconcile with research showing experimentally induced changes on implicit but not explicit measures. The present research tested a process-account of such asymmetrical patterns. Specifically, we argue that implicit measures show experimental effects that do not emerge on explicit measures when (a) the pairing of an attitude object with positive or negative valence creates new automatic associations in memory, and, at the same time, (b) the consideration of additional information about the attitude object eliminates the impact of automatic associations on self-reported evaluative judgments. Results from three studies support these predictions. Implications for research on attitude change are discussed.     

Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: an integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change

A central theme in recent research on attitudes is the distinction between deliberate, "explicit" attitudes and automatic, "implicit" attitudes. The present article provides an integrative review of the available evidence on implicit and explicit attitude change that is guided by a distinction between associative and propositional processes. Whereas associative processes are characterized by mere activation independent of subjective truth or falsity, propositional reasoning is concerned with the validation of evaluations and beliefs. The proposed associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model makes specific assumptions about the mutual interplay of the 2 processes, implying several mechanisms that lead to symmetric or asymmetric changes in implicit and explicit attitudes. The model integrates a broad range of empirical evidence and implies several new predictions for implicit and explicit attitude change.     

Discrepancies between implicit and explicit attitude measures as an indicator of attitude strength

The current research investigates whether implicit–explicit attitudinal discrepancy (IED) weakens attitudes as explicit discrepancies do. Across two experiments, we found that IED is an indicator of weak attitudes. In Experiment 1, we found that individuals with greater IED toward exercise were more swayed by a self‐perceptual manipulation than individuals with lower IED toward exercise. In Experiment 2, we found that the stability and predictive power of attitudes toward alcohol were lessened for participants who had greater IED. These effects occurred independently of the participants' levels of explicit ambivalence and evaluative–cognitive consistency. The present research broadens our understanding of the ways in which evaluations that may not be easily verbalized can affect our thoughts and behavior. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The explicit and implicit dance in psychoanalytic change

How the implicit/non-declarative and explicit/declarative cognitive domains interact is centrally important in the consideration of effecting change within the psychoanalytic arena. Stern et al. (1998) declare that long-lasting change occurs in the domain of implicit relational knowledge. In the view of this author, the implicit and explicit domains are intricately intertwined in an interactive dance within a psychoanalytic process. The author views that a spirit of inquiry (Lichtenberg, Lachmann & Fosshage 2002) serves as the foundation of the psychoanalytic process. Analyst and patient strive to explore, understand and communicate and, thereby, create a 'spirit' of interaction that contributes, through gradual incremental learning, to new implicit relational knowledge. This spirit, as part of the implicit relational interaction, is a cornerstone of the analytic relationship. The 'inquiry' more directly brings explicit/declarative processing to the foreground in the joint attempt to explore and understand. The spirit of inquiry in the psychoanalytic arena highlights both the autobiographical scenarios of the explicit memory system and the mental models of the implicit memory system as each contributes to a sense of self, other, and self with other. This process facilitates the extrication and suspension of the old models, so that new models based on current relational experience can be gradually integrated into both memory systems for lasting change.     

Attitude importance as a moderator of the relationship between implicit and explicit attitude measures

The authors examined attitude importance as a moderator of the relationship between the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and explicit attitude measures. In Study 1 (N = 194), as ratings of attitude importance regarding the 2000 presidential election increased, the strength of the relationship between a Bush-Gore IAT and explicit attitude measures also increased. Study 2 provided a conceptual replication of these results using attitudes toward Coke and Pepsi (N = 112). In addition, across both studies, explicit attitude measures were better predictors of deliberative behaviors than IAT scores. In Study 3 (N = 77), the authors examined the role of elaboration as a mechanism by which attitude importance may moderate IAT-explicit attitude correlations. As predicted, increased elaboration resulted in stronger IAT-explicit attitude correlations. Other possible mechanisms by which attitude importance may moderate the IAT-explicit attitude relationship also are discussed.     

A 3D framework of implicit attitude change

According to early theories, implicit (automatic) social attitudes are difficult if not impossible to change. Although this view has recently been challenged by research relying on experimental, developmental, and cultural approaches, relevant work remains siloed across research communities. As such, the time is ripe to systematize and integrate disparate (and seemingly contradictory) findings and to identify gaps in existing knowledge. To this end, we introduce a 3D framework classifying research on implicit attitude change by levels of analysis (individual vs. collective), sources of change (experimental, ontogenetic, and cultural), and timescales (short term vs. long term). This 3D framework highlights where evidence for implicit attitude change is more versus less well established and pinpoints directions for future research, including at the intersection of fields.     

Mutual influences between the implicit and explicit self-concepts: The role of memory activation and motivated reasoning

Whereas previous research has predominantly focused on dissociations between the explicit and implicit self-concepts, the current research investigates how these aspects of self-representation come into correspondence through the activation of information about the self in memory. Experiment 1 provides evidence for a “bottom-up” process of self-construal in which information activated in the implicit self-concept produces congruent changes in the explicit self-concept. Experiment 2 provides evidence for a “top-down” process of self-construal in which the motivated assertion of a propositional belief in the explicit self-concept leads, via a process of confirmatory hypothesis testing, to the activation of substantiating information in the implicit self-concept. These two processes of self-concept change are integrated within a framework that specifies how the explicit and implicit self-concepts are related within an overall, dynamic self-system. Possibilities for expanding the framework to account for self-concept dissociations are discussed.     

Modeling single versus multiple systems in implicit and explicit memory

It is currently controversial whether priming on implicit tasks and discrimination on explicit recognition tests are supported by a single memory system or by multiple, independent systems. In a Psychological Review article, Berry and colleagues used mathematical modeling to address this question and provide compelling evidence against the independent-systems approach.     

Associations between visual attention,implicit and explicit attitude and behaviour for physical activity

The current study explored associations between previous physical activity and both implicit and explicit attitudes, as well as visual attention and activity motivation (intention). Analyses were performed on participants initially unaware of the physical activity focus of the study (N = 98). Higher levels of physical activity were associated with positive implicit attitudes and an attentional bias towards exercise cues. There was a quadratic (‘U’ shaped) relationship between implicit attitude and attention: the more extreme individuals’ implicit attitudes towards exercise (positive or negative) the greater their attentional bias to exercise cues. Furthermore, explicit attitude moderated the relationship between attentional bias and physical activity: attentional bias to exercise cues was associated with higher levels of physical activity only for those who had a strong positive explicit attitude. Findings suggested that implicit cognitions are linked with previous physical activity. Future research should consider strategies for strengthening positive implicit and explicit attitudes and directing attention to cues signalling healthy behaviour.     

Distinguishing implicit and explicit learning

I agree with Dienes and Berry’s (1997) and Neal and Hesketh’s (1997) call for investigations of the qualitative differences between implicit and explicit learning and note that such investigations must be guided by a workable definition of what is implicit and by theories that predict what the qualitative differences might be. Following Schacter, Bowers, and Booker’s (1989) retrieval intentionality criterion, I propose using anencoding intentionality criterion to distinguish implicit from explicit learning; we can reasonably infer that implicit learning has occurred when a variable known to influence explicit learning has no effect in a comparable implicit learning condition. I then suggest that implicit learning depends on noncognitive, nonhierarchical associations, whereas explicit learning depends on cognitive, hierarchical associations, and briefly describe an experiment that confirms a qualitative difference between implicit and explicit learning predicted by this hypothesis.     

Auditory attentional capture: implicit and explicit approaches

The extent to which distracting items capture attention despite being irrelevant to the task at hand can be measured either implicitly or explicitly (e.g., Simons, Trends Cogn Sci 4:147–155, 2000). Implicit approaches include the standard attentional capture paradigm in which distraction is measured in terms of reaction time and/or accuracy costs within a focal task in the presence (vs. absence) of a task-irrelevant distractor. Explicit measures include the inattention paradigm in which people are asked directly about their noticing of an unexpected task-irrelevant item. Although the processes of attentional capture have been studied extensively using both approaches in the visual domain, there is much less research on similar processes as they may operate within audition, and the research that does exist in the auditory domain has tended to focus exclusively on either an explicit or an implicit approach. This paper provides an overview of recent research on auditory attentional capture, integrating the key conclusions that may be drawn from both methodological approaches.     

On the existence of independent explicit and implicit learning systems: An examination of some evidence

Hayes and Broadbent (1988), among others, have proposed that there are two independent systems of learning in humans. In their theory, they postulate that theexplicit learning system gives rise to knowledge that is verbally describable, whereas theimplicit learning system deals with knowledge that is not amenable to verbal report. Hayes and Broadbent presented data that they claimed supports a distinction between these two systems of learning. Their experiments involved the performance of subjects on two superficially similar tasks, and their claim was that one of the tasks induced learning in the explicit system, and the other induced learning in the implicit system. However, in five experiments here, we failed to find any convincing support for their empirical or theoretical claims. Our results suggest that the two tasks do not differ by inducing different types of learning, but simply differ in their degree of difficulty.     

Processing implicit and explicit representations.

This article summarizes the results of a 15-year research program dedicated to understanding how implicitly activated memories affect remembering and proposes a model for describing such influences. Implicit memories are manipulated by varying the number of associates preexperimentally linked to test cues or to studied words. Assumptions of the model specify when implicit memories of various types are likely to contribute to performance in various tasks. The main assumptions are that encoding involves both explicit and implicit processing components and that these components provide mutually exclusive sources of information during testing. Experiments designed to evaluate the exclusivity assumption are reported, and implications of the findings for several theoretical frameworks are discussed.     

The effect of expertise on the relation between implicit and explicit attitude measures: An information availability/accessibility perspective

Three experiments investigate expertise as a moderator of the relationship between implicit and explicit attitude measures. Prior research suggests that greater expertise leads to stronger implicit–explicit relations; however, a cognitive view of expertise can also predict a weaker implicit–explicit relation. Our framework helps to resolve that seeming contradiction on the basis of the availability/accessibility of attributes versus attitudes in explicit attitude measures. We show that object specificity and contextual factors (e.g., instructions and prior evaluations in a survey) differentially affect the availability/accessibility of global attitudes and attribute information for novices versus experts, thus determining how expertise moderates the implicit–explicit relation.     

Affect in the eyes: explicit and implicit evaluations

The present study investigated whether another individual’s gaze direction influences an observer’s affective responses. In Experiment 1, subjective self-ratings and an affective priming paradigm were employed to examine how participants explicitly and implicitly, respectively, evaluated the affective valence of direct gaze, averted gaze, and closed eyes. The explicit self-ratings showed that participants evaluated closed eyes more positively than direct gaze. However, the implicit priming task showed an inverse pattern of results indicating that direct gaze was automatically evaluated more positively than closed eyes were. Experiment 2 confirmed that the opposite patterns of results between the two tasks were not due to differences in presentation times of the gaze stimuli. The results provide evidence for automatic affective reactions to eye gaze and indicate a dissociation between explicit and implicit affective evaluations of eyes and gaze direction.     

Mutual influence of implicit and explicit attitudes

Research and theory distinguish two types of attitude: automatic evaluative reactions and deliberate evaluative judgments, referred to as implicit and explicit attitudes, respectively. Although these attitudes are distinct, they may influence each other. Four studies tested whether implicit and explicit attitudes are both influenced by propositional and associative learning. We also tested whether changes in one kind of attitude mediate changes in the other. Study 1 found that propositional learning about novel individuals directly influenced explicit attitudes and indirectly influenced implicit attitudes through changes in explicit attitudes. Studies 2 and 3 replicated this finding and extended it by simultaneously demonstrating that associative learning through Evaluative Conditioning directly influences implicit attitudes and indirectly influences explicit attitudes through changes in implicit attitudes. Study 4 replicated these effects for attitudes toward familiar, rather than novel, targets. These results suggest that implicit and explicit attitudes can share common antecedents and influence each other.     

Context-dependence of implicit and explicit memory characteristics

The present experiments explore whether repetition priming in a word-stem completion task is context-dependent. In the first experiment, the environmental context was changed or remained constant at the testing stage. Implicit memory performance did not reveal any effects of environmental context. When tested by free recall, however, the same subjects showed an environmental congruency effect. On the other hand, effects of a change in presentation modality were restricted to implicit memory measures. In the second experiment, self-awareness was manipulated to create congruent or incongruent internal contexts at the testing stage. Performance on the word-stem completion task was seen to be influenced by internal contextual information. This pattern of results corroborates a processing account of implicit memory phenomena. Implicit and explicit expressions of memory utilize episodic information, but in a different way.     

The projection of implicit and explicit goals

In 3 studies, the authors analyzed whether projection occurs for both conscious and nonconscious goals. In Experiment 1, participants who were predisposed to hold a learning goal over a performance goal rated others as possessing more of a learning goal. In Experiment 2, participants who were either implicitly primed with or explicitly assigned to have the goal to compete perceived others as striving for competitive goals more than control participants. In Experiment 3, the authors demonstrated that it was the actual goal to compete rather than the trait construct of competitiveness that was projected. The control of automatic goal projection effects is discussed, and interpersonal consequences of goal projection are delineated.