Day Persons,Night Persons,and Time of Birth: Preliminary Findings

Abstract

The authors conducted 2 surveys to determine the relationship between time of birth and being a day person or a night person. Day persons are most alert during daylight hours; night persons are most alert during hours of darkness. In Survey 1, the authors asked U.S. high school students to complete the Alertness Questionnaire (B. Wallace, 1993) and to respond to other items related to daytime or nighttime activity. In Survey 2, the authors administered the same items to a U.S. college population. In both surveys, time of birth was significantly related to being a day person or a night person. The results suggest that a critical period for setting the biological clock for alertness may be the moment of birth.     

Beliefs, Persons and Practices: Beyond Tolerance

The central thesis of this paper is that, for most issues of multiculturalism, regarding them as a problem of tolerance puts us on the wrong track because there are certain biases inherent in the principle of tolerance. These biases – individualism, combined with a focus on religion and a focus on beliefs rather than on persons or practices – can be regarded as distinctly Protestant. Extending the scope of tolerance may seem a solution but if we really want to counter these biases, the principle of tolerance becomes so general that it loses any distinctive meaning. Therefore, we should accept the limited scope of tolerance and its biases. The principle of tolerance can still be useful for some problems where there is a clear and direct link to political or religious beliefs. Moreover, it should be cherished as a more general attitude or practice in Dutch society. For most problems of multiculturalism, however, we should appeal to broader theoretical frameworks that do justice to persons and practices.     

Bullies, Victims, and Antipathy: The Feeling is Mutual

In this study we consider whether bullies and victims are disliked by most of their classmates, or whether antipathy is concentrated among the occupants of these roles. Antipathy nominations were collected from a community sample of 699 Finnish adolescents (14 to 17 years of age), who described their own bullying and victimization, as well as problem behaviors and school engagement. Victimization was associated with antipathy, but the strength of the association differed according to characteristics of the nominator. Victimization was related to antipathy when the nominator was high on bullying but not low. Similarly, bullying was related to antipathy when the nominator was high on victimization, but not low. The findings indicate that although bullies and victims have elevated mean levels of rejection, they are not disliked by most peers but rather by those who report themselves to be high on these attributes.     

Seeing by Feeling: Virtues,Skills, and Moral Perception

Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt a perceptual moral epistemology, such as intuitionism – which John McDowell criticizes for illicitly “borrow[ing] the epistemological credentials” of perception. In this paper, I suggest that the most promising way for virtue ethics to use perceptual metaphors innocuously is by adopting a skill model of virtue, on which the virtues are modeled on forms of practical know-how. Yet I contend that this model is double-edged for virtue ethics. The skill model belies some central ambitions and dogmas of the traditional view, especially its most idealized claims about virtue and the virtuous. While this may be a cost that its champions are unprepared to pay, I suggest that virtue ethics would do well to embrace a more realistic moral psychology and a correspondingly less sublime conception of virtue.     

理由、情感与道德的规范性——西方伦理学与元伦理学的论争进路

道德的规范性问题是道德哲学的核心问题之一,对该问题的回答决定了我们在多大程度上能够为道德责任奠定合理性的基础.从古希腊至启蒙时期,道德哲学体系围绕理由还是情感作为道德规范性渊源进行了探索.在当今的元伦理学争论中,虽然实践理由成为道德规范性问题的标准话语体系,但该体系下的争论仍然围绕理由与情感而展开.     

Persons,animals, and identity

The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution rather than the “is” of identity, and that a person is identical with an animal in a sense of “animal” different from that which requires the persistence conditions of animals to be biological. Another challenge is the “too many minds problem”: if persons and their coincident biological animals share the same physical properties, and mental properties supervene on physical properties, the biological animal will share the mental properties of the person, and so should itself be a person. The response to this invokes a distinction between “thin” properties, which are shared by coincident entities, and “thick” properties which are not so shared. Mental properties, and their physical realizers, are thick, not thin, so are not properties persons share with their bodies or biological animals. The paper rebuts the objection that neo-Lockean accounts cannot explain how persons can have physical properties. To meet a further problem it is argued that the biological properties of persons and those of biological animals are different because of differences in their causal profiles.     

Persons,Simplicity, and Substance

A novel argument has recently been advanced against materialism—the view that human persons are identical to composite, material objects. The argument claims that pairs of people are not conscious and that the only viable explanation for why they are not is because pairs of people are not simple. The argument concludes that only a simple thing can be the subject of conscious states. In this paper, I offer an alternative explanation for why pairs of people are not conscious: pairs of people are not substances. I provide two characterizations of substantiality. The first proposal claims that substances have irreducible causal powers, and the second claims that substances cannot have other substances as proper parts. The alternative explanation based on these characterizations of substantiality shows that being conscious is compatible with materialism.     

Children's Pets and Adults' Self-Concepts

Self-concepts of adults were related to the age when they had their first pet. The Tennessee Self Concept Scale (TSCS) (Fitts, 1965) Total Positive self-concept scores were higher if subjects were under 6 years or over 10 years old than if they were between 6 and 10 years old when they had their first pet. Similar results were found for the TSCS Physical and Social subscales. Whereas gender effects were also found, no significant pet ownership or other childhood Companion Animal Bonding Scale (Poresky, Hendrix, Mosier, & Samuelson, 1987) effects were found.     

Persons,situations, interactions and error: consistency,variability and confusion

Here we justify an approach to the analysis of person-situation research which acknowledges the theoretical significance of monitoring behavioural variability when seeking to determine patterns of consistency. This approach contrasts with that advocated by Furnham and Jaspars (1983, 1985).     

Feeling Global,Acting Ethically: Global Identification and Fairtrade Consumption

Global identification has become a popular construct in recent psychological debate as it relates to harmonious intergroup relations and a caring for all humanity. Based on social identity theorizing, the current research tests whether global identification can also predict consumer choices, at the expense of lower personal benefit. Importantly, we assumed that concerns about global injustice represent a crucial component of that relation. We predicted that participants who identified strongly with all humanity would rather choose a Fairtrade product alternative over a conventional one, compared with low identifiers. In addition, we assumed that this effect be mediated by perceived global injustice. Both predictions were confirmed in a consumer choice study (N = 68). Overall, global identification and globally relevant consumer behavior seem meaningfully interconnected, and we discuss these findings with regard to recent theoretical developments in Fairtrade consumption research.