Thinking about decisions: An integrative approach of person and task factors

Decisions vary. They may vary in both content and complexity. People also vary. An important way that people vary is how much they think. Some prior research investigating thinking and decision making largely conflicts with most traditional decision theories. For example, if considering an array of products to choose from, thinking more about the alternative's attributes should lead to a better decision. However, some research indicates that thinking more may also lead to focusing on irrelevant aspects of the decision and a less optimal outcome. We propose that this conflict in the literature exists because of a failure to consider the interaction between the individual and the decision task. To test this, we used separate methodologies that enhance or attenuate a person's thinking. In Study 1, we selected people who were especially high or low in need for cognition and had them complete a robust decision-making inventory, which included both complex and simple tasks. In Study 2, we manipulated participant's level of glucose, which acts as the brain's fuel to enhance or attenuate thinking ability. Both studies provide insight for understanding our central tenant that more thought leads to better decisions in complex tasks but does not influence simple decisions. These findings show how the individual's thinking can interact with the constructive elements of the task to shape decision choice.     

How social and non-social information influence classification decisions: A computational modelling approach

Social information such as observing others can improve performance in decision making. In particular, social information has been shown to be useful when finding the best solution on one’s own is difficult, costly, or dangerous. However, past research suggests that when making decisions people do not always consider other people’s behaviour when it is at odds with their own experiences. Furthermore, the cognitive processes guiding the integration of social information with individual experiences are still under debate. Here, we conducted two experiments to test whether information about other persons’ behaviour influenced people’s decisions in a classification task. Furthermore, we examined how social information is integrated with individual learning experiences by testing different computational models. Our results show that social information had a small but reliable influence on people’s classifications. The best computational model suggests that in categorization people first make up their own mind based on the non-social information, which is then updated by the social information.     

Seeing oneself in one’s choices: Construal level and self-pertinence of electoral and consumer decisions

Building on previous research examining the implications for self-regulation and decision making of construing action at varying levels of abstraction, the authors proposed that construing action in terms of its abstract purposes facilitates orienting one’s decisions toward the standards, characteristics, and goals that define one’s desired self-concept. Consistent with this proposal, desiring for oneself a political candidate’s personal qualities predicted evaluating favorably (in Study 1) and voting for (in Study 2) that candidate to a greater extent among participants focused on the distal future (and presumably construing action at a relatively high-level of abstraction) than the proximal future (and presumably construing action at a relatively low-level of abstraction). Moreover, individuals chronically construing action in high-level terms responded more favorably to advertisements appealing to their desired self-concept (in Study 3) than to product quality. These findings’ implications for decision making are discussed.     

Take-the-best and the influence of decision-inconsistent attributes on decision confidence and choices in memory-based decisions

Take-the-best (TTB) is a decision strategy according to which attributes about choice options are sequentially processed in descending order of validity, and attribute processing is stopped once an attribute discriminates between options. Consequently, TTB-decisions rely on only one, the best discriminating, attribute, and lower-valid attributes need not be processed because they are TTB-irrelevant. Recent research suggests, however, that when attribute information is visually present during decision-making, TTB-irrelevant attributes are processed and integrated into decisions nonetheless. To examine whether TTB-irrelevant attributes are retrieved and integrated when decisions are made memory-based, we tested whether the consistency of a TTB-irrelevant attribute affects TTB-users’ decision behaviour in a memory-based decision task. Participants first learned attribute configurations of several options. Afterwards, they made several decisions between two of the options, and we manipulated conflict between the second-best attribute and the TTB-decision. We assessed participants’ decision confidence and the proportion of TTB-inconsistent choices. According to TTB, TTB-irrelevant attributes should not affect confidence and choices, because these attributes should not be retrieved. Results showed, however, that TTB-users were less confident and made more TTB-inconsistent choices when TTB-irrelevant information was in conflict with the TTB-decision than when it was not, suggesting that TTB-users retrieved and integrated TTB-irrelevant information.     

Fundamental motives: How evolutionary needs influence consumer behavior

Can we better understand modern consumer behavior by examining its links to our ancestral past? We consider the underlying motives for consumption and choice from an evolutionary perspective. We review evidence that deep-seated evolutionary motives continue to influence much modern behavior, albeit not always in obvious or conscious ways. These fundamental motives include: (1) evading physical harm, (2) avoiding disease, (3) making friends, (4) attaining status, (5) acquiring a mate, (6) keeping a mate, and (7) caring for family. We discuss how, why, and when these motives influence behavior, highlighting that many consumer choices ultimately function to help fulfill one or more of these evolutionary needs. An important implication of this framework is that a person's preferences, behaviors, and decision processes change in predictable ways depending on which fundamental motive is currently active. We discuss how consideration of evolutionary motives provides fertile ground for future consumer research, while also helping build bridges between consumer behavior, evolutionary biology, and other social sciences.     

How accounts shape lending decisions through fostering perceived trustworthiness

We examine the roles of social accounts in influencing lenders’ decisions about loaning money to borrowers. Using field data and a laboratory experiment, we show that lenders will lend money depending on the accounts borrowers tell. In Study 1, field data from a peer-to-peer lending website reveal that two-account combinations (explanation–acknowledgment and explanation–denial) increase the likelihood of favorable lending decisions. A laboratory study helps explain the important role of accounts by unpacking the process of perceived borrower trustworthiness in lending decisions. A final field study assessing the performance of loans 2 years after origination shows that accounts, despite having a positive effect on the loan decision process, negatively predict loan performance. Collectively, the three studies show that accounts facilitate economic exchanges between unacquainted transaction partners because of their role in increasing perceived trustworthiness, but that ironically, accounts can negatively relate to loan performance.     

The gap between medical and monetary choices under risk persists in decisions for others

Decisions under risk in the medical domain have been found to systematically diverge from decisions in the monetary domain. When making choices between monetary options, people commonly rely on a decision strategy that trades off outcomes with their probabilities; when making choices between medical options, people tend to neglect probability information. In two experimental studies, we tested to what extent differences between medical and monetary decisions also emerge when the decision outcomes affect another person. Using a risky choice paradigm for medical and monetary decisions, we compared hypothetical decisions that participants made for themselves to decisions for a socially distant other (Study 1) and to recommendations as financial advisor or doctor (Study 2). In addition, we examined people's information search in a condition in which information about payoff distributions had to be learned from experiential sampling. Formal modeling and analyses of search behavior revealed a similarly pronounced gap between medical and monetary decisions in decisions for others as in decisions for oneself. Our results suggest that when making medical decisions, people try to avoid the worst outcome while neglecting its probability—even when the outcomes affect others rather than themselves.     

Ethical ends: Effect of abstract mindsets in ethical decisions for the greater social good

We explore the impact of construal level on decisions involving conflicts between multiple ethical principles. Whereas abstract mindsets are associated with a focus on ethical issues and superordinate concerns, concrete mindsets are associated with financial self-interest. With abstract mindsets, we find that people abide by rather than violate ethical principles when only the self would benefit (single principle) but they violate ethical principles when doing so is a conduit for a greater social good (multiple principles). With concrete mindsets, people violate ethical principles for personal gain with less concern for the impact on the greater social good. Specifically, with abstract mindsets, people were dishonest to secure larger donations (Study 1) and dishonest to make larger (smaller) donations to charities that supported (threatened) the greater social good (Study 2a, Study 2b) whereas with concrete mindsets, people focused more on dishonesty for personal gain (Study 1, Study 2a, Study 2b).     

Integration and segregation of prior outcomes in risky decisions

Two experiments were conducted to test if a prior outcome influences the likelihood to accept a current gamble. Undergraduate students participating as subjects imagined that they on a fictitious betting day at a horse-race track did not gamble in the prior race, that they gambled and won, or that they gambled and lost. Subjects rated in one session the likelihood of gambling in the current race. In another session they rated how satisfied they would be with not gambling, with winning, and with losing, respectively. The results of Experiment 1 showed that as compared to no prior outcome the ratings of likelihood of gambling increased after a gain and decreased after a loss. This was explained by the assumption, supported by the ratings of satisfaction, that the prior outcome only affected the satisfaction with the expected loss of the current choice, making it less negative after a gain and more negative after a loss. These results were replicated in Experiment 2. In addition, if subjects did not know with certainty the outcome of a previous choice to gamble, the likelihood to accept the current gamble and the ratings of the satisfaction with its expected outcomes were largely unaffected.     

Anxious ultimatums: How anxiety disorders affect socioeconomic behaviour

Although the role of emotion in socioeconomic decision making is increasingly recognised, the impact of specific emotional disorders, such as anxiety disorders, on these decisions has been surprisingly neglected. Twenty anxious patients and twenty matched controls completed a commonly used socioeconomic task (the Ultimatum Game), in which they had to accept or reject monetary offers from other players. Anxious patients accepted significantly more unfair offers than controls. We discuss the implications of these findings in light of recent models of anxiety, in particular the importance of interpersonal factors and assertiveness in an integrated model of decision making. Finally, we were able to show that pharmacological serotonin used to treat anxious symptomatology tended to normalise decision making, further confirming and extending the role of serotonin in co-operation, prosocial behaviour, and social decision making. These results show, for the first time, a different pattern of socioeconomic behaviour in anxiety disordered patients, in addition to the known memory, attentional and emotional biases that are part of this pathological condition.     

When family considerations influence work decisions: Decision-making processes

The work–family literature has provided an abundance of evidence that various family factors are linked to various work decisions, suggesting that the “family-relatedness” of work decisions is a prevalent phenomenon (Greenhaus & Powell, 2012). However, the cognitive processes by which such linkages occur have received little attention. We offer a framework by which to examine individuals' decision-making processes when they take family considerations into account in their work decisions. The framework suggests stages through which individuals proceed when making a work decision that takes family considerations into account and cognitive processes that influence how they proceed through each stage.     

From individual preference construction to group decisions: Framing effects and group processes

Two choice tasks known to produce framing effects in individual decisions were used to test group sensitivity to framing, relative to that of individuals, and to examine the effect of prior, individual consideration of a decision on group choice. Written post-decision reasons and pre-decision group discussions were analyzed to investigate process explanations of choices made by preexisting, naturalistic groups. For a risky choice problem, a similar framing effect was observed for groups and individuals. For an intertemporal choice task where consumption was either delayed or accelerated, naïve groups (whose members had not preconsidered the decision) showed a framing effect, less discounting in the delay frame, opposite to that observed in individuals. Predecided groups showed a non-significant effect in the other, expected direction. In all cases, process measures better explained variability in choices across conditions than frame alone. Implications for group decision research and design considerations for committee decisions are addressed.     

Regulatory focus and investment decisions in small groups

Regulatory Focus Theory was applied to small interactive groups. Based on previous research, it was expected that groups with a promotion focus would discuss gain-relevant information, whereas groups with a prevention focus would be concerned with potential losses. Furthermore, promotion groups were expected to make riskier decisions than prevention groups. Regulatory focus was manipulated by rewarding good or penalizing poor group performance on a preliminary task. Subsequently, three-person groups discussed several investment funds and made a consensual investment decision. Results supported the hypotheses and suggested that regulatory focus requires time to exert its influence in groups.     

Salience Not Status: How Category Labels Influence Feature Inference

Two main uses of categories are classification and feature inference, and category labels have been widely shown to play a dominant role in feature inference. However, the nature of this influence remains unclear, and we evaluate two contrasting hypotheses formalized as mathematical models: the label special‐mechanism hypothesis and the label super‐salience hypothesis. The special‐mechanism hypothesis is that category labels, unlike other features, trigger inference decision making in reference to the category prototypes. This results in a tendency for prototype‐compatible inferences because the labels trigger a special mechanism rather than because of any influences they have on similarity evaluation. The super‐salience hypothesis assumes that the large label influence is due to their high salience and corresponding impact on similarity without any need for a special mechanism. Application of the two models to a feature inference task based on a family resemblance category structure yields strong support for the label super‐salience hypothesis and in particular does not support the need for a special mechanism based on prototypes.     

Memories of past episodes shape current intentions and decisions

This research tested the hypothesis that people's decisions and future plans are influenced by recently activated autobiographical memories. University students rated the overall quality of their college experiences. They were also asked to describe a specific memory of being either satisfied or dissatisfied with the university. Control participants did not describe a memory. After statistically controlling for pre-existing attitudes towards the university, students who recounted a positive memory expressed the strongest intentions to donate money to the university, attend a class reunion, and recommend the university to others, and they were more likely than controls to specify that an actual donation be made to the university rather than to another charity. Emotional intensity of positive memories predicted future plans and donation decisions. Students who recounted a negative memory also tended to favour the university in their actual donation decisions compared to controls. Prompting the recall of emotional memories may be an effective way to influence intentions and decisions.     

When choices give in to temptations: Explaining the disagreement among importance measures

Respondents’ overt statements of relative importance rarely correspond to weights derived from a regression analysis of their decisions. This paper conjectures that differential effects of high-level goals on importance beliefs and choices can explain these discrepancies. It is argued that the goal to justify decisions influences importance beliefs more than choices whereas the goal to assess preferences accurately affects choices more than importance beliefs. It is also argued that differential effects of high-level goals on importance statements and choices vary as a function of whether decision-maker controls the information flow and the extent of prior knowledge and experiences with choice options. These predictions were tested within the context of a contraceptive decision-making task. Choices among contraceptives made the justification goal salient to subjects by requiring tradeoffs between attributes that are either considered rational or tempting in making such decisions (e.g., health risks vs. pleasure/convenience). As predicted, subjects assigned larger importance weights to rational attributes in their subjective evaluations than in their choices whereas the impact of tempting attributes was stronger for choices than for subjective importance evaluations. Moreover, these observed discrepancies between importance measures were reduced in favor of rational attributes when subjects controlled the information flow and could not access their prior experiences. Overall, the results suggest that, although tempting attributes affect choices, decision makers appear to be unwilling to acknowledge the impact of tempting attributes on their decisions in judging attribute importance.     

Effects of approach and withdrawal motivation on interactive economic decisions

Although recent economic models of human decision making have recognised the role of emotion as an important biasing factor, the impact of incidental emotion on decisions has remained poorly explored. To address this question, we jointly explored the role of emotional valence (i.e., positive vs. negative) and motivational direction (i.e., approach vs. avoidance) on performance in a well-known economic task, the Ultimatum Game. Participants had to either accept or reject monetary offers from other players, offers that vary in their degree of unfairness. A main effect of motivational direction, but not valence, was observed, with withdrawal-based emotion (disgust and serenity) prompting more rejections relative to approach-based emotion (anger and amusement) and a neutral state. These results further confirm that subtle incidental moods can bias decision making, and suggest that motivational state may be a useful framework to study such decisions. Implications with regard to emotion, cognitive neuroscience, and clinical psychology are discussed.     

Rewards decrease risky decisions for adolescent drivers: Implications for crash prevention

Motor vehicle crashes (MVCs) are a major contributor to adolescent mortality. Adolescent drivers are more likely to make risky decisions in the presence of peers. However, rewards have also been shown to improve decision making in adolescence. Our goal was to determine if peer observation and reward effects on decision-making were dependent upon adolescent driving styles.Twenty-four healthy adolescents played a driving game in a 2 (no peer; peer) × 2 (no rewards; rewards) within-subjects experiment. Driving styles were measured by self-report.Rewards favoring safe choices reduced risky decision making, but this effect was especially robust for adolescents with driving styles that increase risk of MVCs (i.e., dangerous, fast, angry, or distracted styles). Findings suggest that rewards for safe driving can be an effective mechanism for reducing MVCs, especially for the most at-risk drivers, if they can be made appetizing to adolescents.     

The benefits of retail therapy: Making purchase decisions reduces residual sadness

People often shop when feeling sad, but whether and why shopping reduces residual (lingering) sadness remains an open question. Sadness is strongly associated with a sense that situational forces control the outcomes in one's life, and thus we theorized that the choices inherent in shopping may restore personal control over one's environment and reduce residual sadness. Three experiments provided support for our hypothesis. Making shopping choices helped to alleviate sadness whether they were hypothetical (Experiment 1) or real (Experiment 2). In addition, all experiments found support for the underlying mechanism of personal control restoration. Notably, the benefits of restored personal control over one's environment do not generalize to anger (Experiments 2 and 3), because anger is associated with a sense that other people (rather than situational forces) are likely to cause negative outcomes, and these appraisals are not ameliorated by restoring personal control over one's environment.     

Take The First: Option-generation and resulting choices

Experimental decision-making research often uses a task in which participants are presented with alternatives from which they must choose. Although tasks of this type may be useful in determining measures (e.g., preference) related to explicitly stated alternatives, they neglect an important aspect of many real-world decision-making environments—namely, the option-generation process. The goal of the present research is to extend previous literature that fills this void by presenting a model that attempts to describe the link between the use of different strategies and the subsequent option-generation process, as well as the resulting choice characteristics. Specifically, we examine the relationship between strategy use, number and order of generated options, choice quality, and dynamic inconsistency. “Take The First” is presented as a heuristic that operates in ill-defined tasks, based on our model assumptions. An experiment involving a realistic (sports) situation was conducted on suitable participants (athletes) to test the predictions of the model. Initial results support the model’s key predictions: strategies producing fewer generated options result in better and more consistent decisions.