A role for the anterior insular cortex in the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness

According to the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, consciousness results from the global broadcast of information throughout the brain. The global neuronal workspace is mainly constituted by a fronto-parietal network. The anterior insular cortex is part of this global neuronal workspace, but the function of this region has not yet been defined within the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness. In this review, I hypothesize that the anterior insular cortex implements a cross-modal priority map, the function of which is to determine priorities for the processing of information and subsequent entrance in the global neuronal workspace.     

The global workspace (GW) theory of consciousness and epilepsy

The global workspace (GW) theory proposes that conscious processing results from coherent neuronal activity between widely distributed brain regions, with fronto-parietal associative cortices as key elements. In this model, transition between conscious and non conscious states are predicted to be caused by abrupt non-linear massive changes of the level of coherence within this distributed neural space. Epileptic seizures offer a unique model to explore the validity of this central hypothesis. Seizures are often characterized by the occurrence of brutal alterations of consciousness (AOC) which are largely negatively impacting patients' lives. Recently, we have shown that these sudden AOC are contemporary to non-linear increases of neural synchrony within distant cortico-cortical and cortico-thalamic networks. We interpreted these results in the light of GW theory, and suggested that excessive synchrony could prevent this distributed network to reach the minimal level of differentiation and complexity necessary to the coding of conscious representations. These observations both confirm some predictions of the GW model, and further specify the physiological window of neural coherence (minimum and maximum) associated with conscious processing.     

Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework

This introductory chapter attempts to clarify the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience approach to consciousness can be founded. We isolate three major empirical observations that any theory of consciousness should incorporate, namely (1) a considerable amount of processing is possible without consciousness, (2) attention is a prerequisite of consciousness, and (3) consciousness is required for some specific cognitive tasks, including those that require durable information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, or the spontaneous generation of intentional behavior. We then propose a theoretical framework that synthesizes those facts: the hypothesis of a global neuronal workspace. This framework postulates that, at any given time, many modular cerebral networks are active in parallel and process information in an unconscious manner. An information becomes conscious, however, if the neural population that represents it is mobilized by top-down attentional amplification into a brain-scale state of coherent activity that involves many neurons distributed throughout the brain. The long-distance connectivity of these 'workspace neurons' can, when they are active for a minimal duration, make the information available to a variety of processes including perceptual categorization, long-term memorization, evaluation, and intentional action. We postulate that this global availability of information through the workspace is what we subjectively experience as a conscious state. A complete theory of consciousness should explain why some cognitive and cerebral representations can be permanently or temporarily inaccessible to consciousness, what is the range of possible conscious contents, how they map onto specific cerebral circuits, and whether a generic neuronal mechanism underlies all of them. We confront the workspace model with those issues and identify novel experimental predictions. Neurophysiological, anatomical, and brain-imaging data strongly argue for a major role of prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, and the areas that connect to them, in creating the postulated brain-scale workspace.     

A spiking neuron model of cortical broadcast and competition

This paper presents a computer model of cortical broadcast and competition based on spiking neurons and inspired by the hypothesis of a global neuronal workspace underlying conscious information processing in the human brain. In the model, the hypothesised workspace is realised by a collection of recurrently interconnected regions capable of sustaining and disseminating a reverberating spatial pattern of activation. At the same time, the workspace remains susceptible to new patterns arriving from outlying cortical populations. Competition among these cortical populations for influence on the workspace is effected by a combination of mutual inhibition and top-down amplification.     

Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy

Of the many brain events evoked by a visual stimulus, which are specifically associated with conscious perception, and which merely reflect non-conscious processing? Several recent neuroimaging studies have contrasted conscious and non-conscious visual processing, but their results appear inconsistent. Some support a correlation of conscious perception with early occipital events, others with late parieto-frontal activity. Here we attempt to make sense of these dissenting results. On the basis of the global neuronal workspace hypothesis, we propose a taxonomy that distinguishes between vigilance and access to conscious report, as well as between subliminal, preconscious and conscious processing. We suggest that these distinctions map onto different neural mechanisms, and that conscious perception is systematically associated with surges of parieto-frontal activity causing top-down amplification.     

Selective interference with image retention and generation: Evidence for the workspace model

We address three types of model of the relationship between working memory (WM) and long-term memory (LTM): (a) the gateway model, in which WM acts as a gateway between perceptual input and LTM; (b) the unitary model, in which WM is seen as the currently activated areas of LTM; and (c) the workspace model, in which perceptual input activates LTM, and WM acts as a separate workspace for processing and temporary retention of these activated traces. Predictions of these models were tested, focusing on visuospatial working memory and using dual-task methodology to combine two main tasks (visual short-term retention and image generation) with two interference tasks (irrelevant pictures and spatial tapping). The pictures selectively disrupted performance on the generation task, whereas the tapping selectively interfered with the retention task. Results are consistent with the predictions of the workspace model.     

Applying global workspace theory to the frame problem

The subject of this article is the frame problem, as conceived by certain cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind, notably Fodor for whom it stands as a fundamental obstacle to progress in cognitive science. The challenge is to explain the capacity of so-called informationally unencapsulated cognitive processes to deal effectively with information from potentially any cognitive domain without the burden of having to explicitly sift the relevant from the irrelevant. The paper advocates a global workspace architecture, with its ability to manage massively parallel resources in the context of a serial thread of computation, as an answer to this challenge. Analogical reasoning is given particular attention, since it exemplifies informational unencapsulation in its most extreme form. Because global workspace theory also purports to account for the distinction between conscious and unconscious information processing, the paper advances the tentative conclusion that consciousness may go hand-in-hand with a solution to the frame problem in the biological brain.     

Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness

Higher-order theories of consciousness argue that conscious awareness crucially depends on higher-order mental representations that represent oneself as being in particular mental states. These theories have featured prominently in recent debates on conscious awareness. We provide new leverage on these debates by reviewing the empirical evidence in support of the higher-order view. We focus on evidence that distinguishes the higher-order view from its alternatives, such as the first-order, global workspace and recurrent visual processing theories. We defend the higher-order view against several major criticisms, such as prefrontal activity reflects attention but not awareness, and prefrontal lesion does not abolish awareness. Although the higher-order approach originated in philosophical discussions, we show that it is testable and has received substantial empirical support.     

The global workspace theory,the phenomenal concept strategy,and the distribution of consciousness

Peter Carruthers argues that the global workspace theory implies there are no facts of the matter about animal consciousness. The argument is easily extended to other cognitive theories of consciousness, posing a general problem for consciousness studies. But the argument proves too much, for it also implies that there are no facts of the matter about human consciousness. A key assumption is that scientific theories of consciousness must explain away the explanatory gap. I criticize this assumption and point to an alternative strategy for defending scientific theories of consciousness, one that better reflects the ongoing scientific practice. I argue there are introspectable inferential connections from phenomenal concepts to functional concepts that scientists can use to individuate the global workspace in terms of capacities that animals and humans share.     

Extending the global workspace theory to emotion: phenomenality without access

Recent accounts on the global workspace theory suggest that consciousness involves transient formations of functional connections in thalamo-cortico-cortical networks. The level of connectivity in these networks is argued to determine the state of consciousness. Emotions are suggested to play a role in shaping consciousness, but their involvement in the global workspace theory remains elusive. In the present study, the role of emotion in the neural workspace theory of consciousness was scrutinized by investigating, whether unconscious (masked) and conscious (unmasked) display of emotional compared to neutral facial expressions would differentially modulate EEG coherence. EEG coherence was measured by means of computing an average EEG coherence value between the frontal, parietal, and midline scalp sites. Objective awareness checks evidenced that conscious identification of the masked facial expressions was precluded. Analyses revealed reductions in EEG coherence in the lower frequency range for the masked as compared to unmasked neutral facial expressions. Crucially, a decline in EEG coherence was not observed for the emotional facial expressions. In other words, the level of EEG coherence did apparently vary as a function of awareness, but not when emotion was involved. The current finding suggests that EEG coherence is modulated by unconscious emotional processes, which extends common views on the global workspace architecture of consciousness.     

Ignition’s glow: Ultra-fast spread of global cortical activity accompanying local “ignitions” in visual cortex during conscious visual perception

Despite extensive research, the spatiotemporal span of neuronal activations associated with the emergence of a conscious percept is still debated. The debate can be formulated in the context of local vs. global models, emphasizing local activity in visual cortex vs. a global fronto-parietal “workspace” as the key mechanisms of conscious visual perception. These alternative models lead to differential predictions with regard to the precise magnitude, timing and anatomical spread of neuronal activity during conscious perception. Here we aimed to test a specific aspect of these predictions in which local and global models appear to differ – namely the extent to which fronto-parietal regions modulate their activity during task performance under similar perceptual states. So far the main experimental results relevant to this debate have been obtained from non-invasive methods and led to conflicting interpretations. Here we examined these alternative predictions through large-scale intracranial measurements (Electrocorticogram – ECoG) in 43 patients and 4445 recording sites. Both ERP and broadband high frequency (50–150 Hz – BHF) responses were examined through the entire cortex during a simple 1-back visual recognition memory task. Our results reveal short latency intense visual responses, localized first in early visual cortex followed (at ∼200 ms) by higher order visual areas, but failed to show significant delayed (300 ms) visual activations. By contrast, oddball image repeat events, linked to overt motor responses, were associated with a significant increase in a delayed (300 ms) peak of BHF power in fronto-parietal cortex. Comparing BHF responses with ERP revealed an additional peak in the ERP response – having a similar latency to the well-studied P3 scalp EEG response. Posterior and temporal regions demonstrated robust visual category selectivity. An unexpected observation was that high-order visual cortex responses were essentially concurrent (at ∼200 ms) with an ultra-fast spread of signals of lower magnitude that invaded selected sites throughout fronto-parietal cortical areas. Our results are compatible with local models in demonstrating a clear task-dependence of the 300 ms fronto-parietal activation. However, they also reveal a more global component of low-magnitude and poor content selectivity that rapidly spreads into fronto-parietal sites. The precise functional role of this global “glow” remains to be elucidated.     

Accounting for the phenomenology and varieties of auditory verbal hallucination within a predictive processing framework

Two challenges that face popular self-monitoring theories (SMTs) of auditory verbal hallucination (AVH) are that they cannot account for the auditory phenomenology of AVHs and that they cannot account for their variety. In this paper I show that both challenges can be met by adopting a predictive processing framework (PPF), and by viewing AVHs as arising from abnormalities in predictive processing. I show how, within the PPF, both the auditory phenomenology of AVHs, and three subtypes of AVH, can be accounted for.     

The unfolding argument: Why IIT and other causal structure theories cannot explain consciousness

How can we explain consciousness? This question has become a vibrant topic of neuroscience research in recent decades. A large body of empirical results has been accumulated, and many theories have been proposed. Certain theories suggest that consciousness should be explained in terms of brain functions, such as accessing information in a global workspace, applying higher order to lower order representations, or predictive coding. These functions could be realized by a variety of patterns of brain connectivity. Other theories, such as Information Integration Theory (IIT) and Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT), identify causal structure with consciousness. For example, according to these theories, feedforward systems are never conscious, and feedback systems always are. Here, using theorems from the theory of computation, we show that causal structure theories are either false or outside the realm of science.     

Brain stimulation and conscious experience: electrical stimulation of the cortical surface at a threshold current evokes sustained neuronal activity only after a prolonged latency

Libet demonstrated that a substantial duration (>0.5-1.0 s) of direct electrical stimulation of the surface of a sensory cortex at a threshold or liminal current is required before a subject can experience a percept. Libet and his co-workers originally proposed that the result could be due either to spatial and temporal facilitation of the underlying neurons or additionally to a prolonged central processing time. However, over the next four decades, Libet chose to attribute the prolonged latency for evoking conscious experience to a prolonged central processing time. In my view, Libet has not provided any convincing evidence, either on the basis of his own past work or in his critique of my paper, for his hypothesis of a central processing time exceeding 0.5s before conscious experience emerges following direct electrical threshold stimulation of the cortical surface. I stand by my original results and conclusion that such prolonged latencies are largely the consequence of a dynamically increasing cortical facilitatory process that begins hundreds of milliseconds before there is a sustained neuronal activation. In some cases, the facilitatory process must overcome an initial stimulus-induced inhibition before neuronal firing commences.     

A cognitive architecture that combines internal simulation with a global workspace

This paper proposes a brain-inspired cognitive architecture that incorporates approximations to the concepts of consciousness, imagination, and emotion. To emulate the empirically established cognitive efficacy of conscious as opposed to non-conscious information processing in the mammalian brain, the architecture adopts a model of information flow from global workspace theory. Cognitive functions such as anticipation and planning are realised through internal simulation of interaction with the environment. Action selection, in both actual and internally simulated interaction with the environment, is mediated by affect. An implementation of the architecture is described which is based on weightless neurons and is used to control a simulated robot.     

Gricean Expectations in Online Sentence Comprehension: An ERP Study on the Processing of Scalar Inferences

There is substantial support for the general idea that a formalization of comprehenders' expectations about the likely next word in a sentence helps explaining data related to online sentence processing. While much research has focused on syntactic, semantic, and discourse expectations, the present event‐related potentials (ERPs) study investigates neurolinguistic correlates of pragmatic expectations, which arise when comprehenders expect a sentence to conform to Gricean Maxims of Conversation. For predicting brain responses associated with pragmatic processing, we introduce a formal model of such Gricean pragmatic expectations, using an idealized incremental interpreter. We examine whether pragmatic expectancies derived from this model modulate the amplitude of the N400, a component that has been associated with predictive processing. As part of its parameterization, the model distinguishes genuine pragmatic interpreters, who expect maximally informative true utterances, from literal interpreters, who only expect truthfulness. We explore the model's non‐trivial predictions for an experimental setup which uses picture‐sentence verification with ERPs recorded at several critical positions in sentences containing the scalar implicature trigger some. We find that Gricean expectations indeed affect the N400, largely in line with the predictions of our model, but also discuss discrepancies between model predictions and observations critically.     

大脑视知觉调控的神经机制

大脑的知觉加工并非单纯由外部刺激驱动,而是存在自上而下的知觉调控。尽管这一现象被大量实验研究证实,但其神经机制仍然是认知神经科学研究的重要问题。本研究系统介绍了知觉调控的神经基础、实现形式、研究范式,及其理论模型,分析指出了当前研究面临的主要问题,并对未来的研究进行了展望,以期促进该问题研究的进一步开展。     

Subjective visibility report is facilitated by conscious predictions only

Predictions in the visual domain have been shown to modulate conscious access. Yet, little is known about how predictions may do so and to what extent they need to be consciously implemented to be effective. To address this, we administered an attentional blink (AB) task in which target 1 (T1) identity predicted target 2 (T2) identity, while participants rated their perceptual awareness of validly versus invalidly predicted T2s (Experiment 1 & 2) or reported T2 identity (Experiment 3). Critically, we tested the effects of conscious and non-conscious predictions, after seen and unseen T1s, on T2 visibility. We found that valid predictions increased subjective visibility reports and discrimination of T2s, but only when predictions were generated by a consciously accessed T1, irrespective of the timing at which the effects were measured (short vs. longs lags). These results further our understanding of the intricate relationship between predictive processing and consciousness.     

The temporally-integrated causality landscape: A theoretical framework for consciousness and meaning

Theoretical approaches to understanding consciousness have begun to converge upon areas of general agreement, yet substantive differences remain. Here, I introduce a new theoretical framework for the emergence of consciousness from the functional integration of the thalamocortical system: the Temporally-Integrated Causality Landscape (TICL). TICL presents a novel perspective which addresses important phenomenological characteristics of consciousness that other frameworks, such as IIT, do not. First, the TICL is based upon the observation that conscious experiences are temporally continuous, not discrete. Secondly, the TICL establishes a thalamocortical basis for the point-of-view. According to TICL, consciousness is composed of contents that arise from neuronal subsystems that have meaning from the point-of-view of the larger, integrated system in which they are nested. Meaningful contents emerge from the subsystems because they exhibit a level of temporally-integrated causality (TIC) that is distinguishable from that of the larger system.     

A neuro-cognitive defense of the unified self

The topic of the self remains one of considerable controversy, and many arguments have been put forth suggesting the intuitive concept of self must be in some way mistaken – in part based on results in the cognitive and neural sciences. In this article I offer the alternative positive proposal that “the self” may indeed refer to a physical/computational system within the brain. To do this, I draw on empirical work regarding the neural basis of consciousness and decision-making, and on philosophical work regarding ecological control, unified group perspectives, and functional/mechanistic explanation. The work I review jointly supports the conclusion that a “core-circuit” of interacting cortical regions – the global workspace network – can be understood as a unified system for consciously perceiving and deciding, and thus fulfills many of the roles intuitively assigned to the self. I conclude that this self-concept need not be mistaken given current empirical knowledge.