Mentalizing eye contact with a face on a video: Gaze direction does not influence autonomic arousal

Recent research has revealed enhanced autonomic and subjective responses to eye contact only when perceiving another live person. However, these enhanced responses to eye contact are abolished if the viewer believes that the other person is not able to look back at the viewer. We purported to investigate whether this “genuine” eye contact effect can be reproduced with pre‐recorded videos of stimulus persons. Autonomic responses, gaze behavior, and subjective self‐assessments were measured while participants viewed pre‐recorded video persons with direct or averted gaze, imagined that the video person was real, and mentalized that the person could see them or not. Pre‐recorded videos did not evoke similar physiological or subjective eye contact effect as previously observed with live persons, not even when the participants were mentalizing being seen by the person. Gaze tracking results showed, however, increased attention allocation to faces with direct gaze compared to averted gaze directions. The results suggest that elicitation of the physiological arousal in response to genuine eye contact seems to require spontaneous experience of seeing and of being seen by another individual.     

The time windows of the sense of agency

The sense of agency depends on some internal cues that derive from action control, as well as external cues like contextual information and prior information (degree of contingency between an action and is effect). We assessed whether external agency cues are combined with internal agency cues to affect the sense of agency. In two experiments participants performed a movement (button press) that elicited, after a varying delay, an effect (ball appearing on a screen), and reported their sense of agency over the effect (full, partial or no-agency) while internal cues (premotor information) and external cues (contextual and prior information) were manipulated. We assessed the effect of agency cues on the delays at which the sense of agency varied. The delays were increased with premotor signals but were decreased with contextual information. These findings favour a model of integration of internal and external agency cues over time.     

Children's knowledge of deceptive gaze cues and its relation to their actual lying behavior

Eye gaze plays a pivotal role during communication. When interacting deceptively, it is commonly believed that the deceiver will break eye contact and look downward. We examined whether children’s gaze behavior when lying is consistent with this belief. In our study, 7- to 15-year-olds and adults answered questions truthfully (Truth questions) or untruthfully (Lie questions) or answered questions that required thinking (Think questions). Younger participants (7- and 9-year-olds) broke eye contact significantly more when lying compared with other conditions. Also, their averted gaze when lying differed significantly from their gaze display in other conditions. In contrast, older participants did not differ in their durations of eye contact or averted gaze across conditions. Participants’ knowledge about eye gaze and deception increased with age. This knowledge significantly predicted their actual gaze behavior when lying. These findings suggest that with increased age, participants became increasingly sophisticated in their use of display rule knowledge to conceal their deception.     

Understanding the referential nature of looking: infants' preference for object-directed gaze

In four experiments, we investigated whether 9-month-old infants are sensitive to the relationship between gaze direction and object location and whether this sensitivity depends on the presence of communicative cues like eye contact. Infants observed a face, which repeatedly shifted its eyes either toward, or away from, unpredictably appearing objects. We found that they looked longer at the face when the gaze shifts were congruent with the location of the object. A second experiment ruled out that this effect was simply due to spatial congruency, while a third and a fourth experiment revealed that a preceding period of eye contact is required to elicit the gaze-object congruency effect. These results indicate that infants at this age can encode eye direction in referential terms in the presence of communication cues and are biased to attend to scenes with object-directed gaze.     

Effects of gaze‐aversion on visual‐spatial imagination

Research suggests that averting gaze from an interlocutor can improve both children's and adults' performance in a range of cognitive tasks. With the present experiments, we investigated the effect of gaze aversion on adults' visual‐spatial imagination, using a methodology adapted from Kerr (1987). Participants mentally kept track of a pathway through an imaginary matrix, while either maintaining eye‐contact with the experimenter, closing their eyes, gazing at a static or a dynamic visual stimulus (in Experiment 1), or fixating an upright or inverted image of the experimenter's face (in Experiment 2). The results show that whereas maintaining eye‐contact with another person disrupts accurate imagination of this pathway, averting gaze or looking at other visual stimuli does not. We conclude that gaze aversion benefits cognitive performance, not just by disengaging visual attention from irrelevant visual information, but also by interrupting social interaction processes involved in face‐to‐face communication.     

Genuine eye contact elicits self-referential processing

The effect of eye contact on self-awareness was investigated with implicit measures based on the use of first-person singular pronouns in sentences. The measures were proposed to tap into self-referential processing, that is, information processing associated with self-awareness. In addition, participants filled in a questionnaire measuring explicit self-awareness. In Experiment 1, the stimulus was a video clip showing another person and, in Experiment 2, the stimulus was a live person. In both experiments, participants were divided into two groups and presented with the stimulus person either making eye contact or gazing downward, depending on the group assignment. During the task, the gaze stimulus was presented before each trial of the pronoun-selection task. Eye contact was found to increase the use of first-person pronouns, but only when participants were facing a real person, not when they were looking at a video of a person. No difference in self-reported self-awareness was found between the two gaze direction groups in either experiment. The results indicate that eye contact elicits self-referential processing, but the effect may be stronger, or possibly limited to, live interaction.     

Eye contact elicits bodily self-awareness in human adults

Eye contact is a typical human behaviour known to impact concurrent or subsequent cognitive processing. In particular, it has been suggested that eye contact induces self-awareness, though this has never been formally proven. Here, we show that the perception of a face with a direct gaze (that establishes eye contact), as compared to either a face with averted gaze or a mere fixation cross, led adult participants to rate more accurately the intensity of their physiological reactions induced by emotional pictures. Our data support the view that bodily self-awareness becomes more acute when one is subjected to another’s gaze. Importantly, this effect was not related to a particular arousal state induced by eye contact perception. Rejecting the arousal hypothesis, we suggest that eye contact elicits a self-awareness process by enhancing self-focused attention in humans. We further discuss the implications of this proposal.     

The cost of being watched: Stroop interference increases under concomitant eye contact

Current models in social neuroscience advance that eye contact may automatically recruit cognitive resources. Here, we directly tested this hypothesis by evaluating the distracting strength of eye contact on concurrent visual processing in the well-known Stroop’s paradigm. As expected, participants showed stronger Stroop interference under concomitant eye contact as compared to closed eyes. Two control experiments allowed ruling out low-level account of this effect as well as non-specific effect of the presence of open eyes. This suggests that refraining from processing eye contact is actually as difficult as refraining from word reading in the Stroop task. Crucially, the eye contact effect was obtained while gaze was not under the direct focus of attention and the participants were faced with another powerful distracter (the incongruent word) in the task at hand. Thus, there is a cost of being watched even in circumstances where the processing of direct gaze is strongly disfavored. The present results emphasize the crucial status of eye contact in human cognition.     

威胁相关面孔表情对眼睛注视方向知觉的影响

以往研究发现眼睛注视方向知觉受面孔表情的影响,愤怒面孔相较于恐惧面孔更倾向被判断为看着观察者。虽然研究者对此提出了不同的解释,但目前尚不清楚愤怒和恐惧表情在注视方向知觉中的这种差异影响到底来自于面孔的结构信息还是物理特征信息。本研究采用注视方向辨别任务,计算直视知觉范围（The Cone of Direct Gaze,CoDG）为因变量,分别以直立,倒置及模糊图片为实验材料,试图通过分离面孔结构信息和物理特征信息,对以上问题进行探讨。结果发现在保留面孔全部信息的情况下（实验1）愤怒面孔的CoDG大于恐惧面孔;在破坏结构信息加工,只保留特征信息加工的情况下（实验2））愤怒和恐惧表情在直视知觉范围上的差异消失了;在削弱物理特征信息加工,保留结构信息加工的情况下（实验3）二者在CoDG上的差异又复现。本研究结果说明不同威胁性面孔表情对眼睛注视知觉的影响主要来自于二者在与情绪意义相关的结构信息加工上的不同,而二者非低级的物理信息上的差异,支持信号共享假说和情绪评价假说对威胁性面孔表情与注视方向整合加工解释的理论基础。     

Human ostensive signals do not enhance gaze following in chimpanzees,but do enhance object-oriented attention

The previous studies have shown that human infants and domestic dogs follow the gaze of a human agent only when the agent has addressed them ostensively—e.g., by making eye contact, or calling their name. This evidence is interpreted as showing that they expect ostensive signals to precede referential information. The present study tested chimpanzees, one of the closest relatives to humans, in a series of eye-tracking experiments using an experimental design adapted from these previous studies. In the ostension conditions, a human actor made eye contact, called the participant’s name, and then looked at one of two objects. In the control conditions, a salient cue, which differed in each experiment (a colorful object, the actor’s nodding, or an eating action), attracted participants’ attention to the actor’s face, and then the actor looked at the object. Overall, chimpanzees followed the actor’s gaze to the cued object in both ostension and control conditions, and the ostensive signals did not enhance gaze following more than the control attention-getters. However, the ostensive signals enhanced subsequent attention to both target and distractor objects (but not to the actor’s face) more strongly than the control attention-getters—especially in the chimpanzees who had a close relationship with human caregivers. We interpret this as showing that chimpanzees have a simple form of communicative expectations on the basis of ostensive signals, but unlike human infants and dogs, they do not subsequently use the experimenter’s gaze to infer the intended referent. These results may reflect a limitation of non-domesticated species for interpreting humans’ ostensive signals in inter-species communication.     

Spatial interference between gaze direction and gaze location: A study on the eye contact effect

Perceived gaze in faces is an important social cue that influences spatial orienting of attention. In three experiments, we examined whether the social relevance of gaze direction modulated spatial interference in response selection, using three different stimuli: faces, isolated eyes, and symbolic eyes (Experiments 1, 2, and 3, respectively). Each experiment employed a variant of the spatial Stroop paradigm in which face location and gaze direction were put into conflict. Results showed a reverse congruency effect between face location to the right or left of fixation and gaze direction only for stimuli with a social meaning to participants (Experiments 1 and 2). The opposite was observed for the nonsocial stimuli used in Experiment 3. Results are explained as facilitation in response to eye contact.     

The power of subliminal and supraliminal eye contact on social decision making: An individual-difference perspective

We conducted two experiments to explore how social decision making is influenced by the interaction of eye contact and social value orientation (SVO). Specifically, participants with a Prosocial (Prosocials) or a Proself (Proselfs) SVO played Prisoner Dilemma games with a computer partner following supraliminal (Experiment 1) and subliminal (Experiment 2) direct gaze from that partner. Results showed that participants made more cooperative decisions after supraliminal eye contact than no eye contact, and the effect only existed for the Prosocials but not for the Proselfs. Nevertheless, when the computer partner made a subliminal eye contact with the participants, although more cooperative choices were found among the Prosocials following subliminal eye contact, relative to no contact, the Proselfs demonstrated reduced cooperation rates. These findings suggest that Prosocials and Proselfs interpreted eye contact in distinct ways at different levels of awareness, which led to various social decision making.     

Spatial interference between gaze direction and gaze location: a study on the eye contact effect

Perceived gaze in faces is an important social cue that influences spatial orienting of attention. In three experiments, we examined whether the social relevance of gaze direction modulated spatial interference in response selection, using three different stimuli: faces, isolated eyes, and symbolic eyes (Experiments 1, 2, and 3, respectively). Each experiment employed a variant of the spatial Stroop paradigm in which face location and gaze direction were put into conflict. Results showed a reverse congruency effect between face location to the right or left of fixation and gaze direction only for stimuli with a social meaning to participants (Experiments 1 and 2). The opposite was observed for the nonsocial stimuli used in Experiment 3. Results are explained as facilitation in response to eye contact.     

Inferring sense of agency from the quantitative aspect of action outcome

The sense of agency refers to an experience in which one’s own action causes a change in environment. It is strongly modulated by both the contingency between action and its outcome and the consistency between predicted and actual action outcomes. Recent studies have suggested that the action outcome can retrospectively modulate action awareness. We suspect that the sense of agency can also be retrospectively modulated. This study examined whether the quantity of action outcome could influence the sense of agency. The participants’ task was to trigger dot motion in a display and rate the extent to which they could control the initiation of dot motion. Independently of both the temporal contiguity between action and its outcome and the consistency between predicted and actual action outcomes, the speed of dot motion as an action’s outcome strongly influenced the sense of agency rating. The present study suggests that the sense of agency stems partly from the inference of action efficiency based on the quantitative aspect of action outcome.     

Power to the will: How exerting physical effort boosts the sense of agency

The sense of agency refers to the experience of being in control of one’s actions and their consequences. The 19th century French philosopher Maine de Biran proposed that the sensation of effort might provide an internal cue for distinguishing self-caused from other changes in the environment. The present study is the first to empirically test the philosophical idea that effort promotes self-agency. We used intentional binding, which refers to the subjective temporal attraction between an action and its sensory consequences, as an implicit measure of the sense of agency. Effort was manipulated independent of the primary task by requiring participants to pull stretch bands of varying resistance levels. We found that intentional binding was enhanced under conditions of increased effort. This suggests not only that the experience of effort directly contributes to the sense of agency, but also that the integration of effort as an agency cue is non-specific to the effort requirement of the action itself.     

Effects of perceived mutual gaze and gender on face processing and recognition memory

Perceived gaze contact in seen faces may convey important social signals. We examined whether gaze perception affects face processing during two tasks: Online gender judgement, and later incidental recognition memory. Individual faces were presented with eyes directed either straight towards the viewer or away, while these faces were seen in either frontal or three-quarters view. Participants were slower to make gender judgements for faces with direct versus averted eye gaze, but this effect was particularly pronounced for faces with opposite gender to the observer, and seen in three-quarters view. During subsequent surprise recognition-memory testing, recognition was better for faces previously seen with direct than averted gaze, again especially for the opposite gender to the observer. The effect of direct gaze was stronger in both tasks when the head was seen in three-quarters rather than in frontal view, consistent with the greater salience of perceived eye contact for deviated faces. However, in the memory test, face recognition was also relatively enhanced for faces of opposite gender in front views when their gaze was averted rather than direct. Together, these results indicate that perceived eye contact can interact with facial processing during gender judgements and recognition memory, even when gaze direction is task-irrelevant, and particularly for faces of opposite gender to the observer (an influence which controls for stimulus factors when considering observers of both genders). These findings appear consistent with recent neuroimaging evidence that social facial cues can modulate visual processing in cortical regions involved in face processing and memory, presumably via interconnections with brain systems specialized for gaze perception and social monitoring.     

Using computer‐assisted instruction to increase the eye gaze of children with autism

Many children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorders have difficulty making appropriate eye contact and engaging in joint attention. The current study evaluated a computer‐assisted instruction package (pairing visual stimuli with vocal stimuli) as a novel treatment to improve the eye gaze accuracy in 3 elementary school children with autism. The researchers measured the latency from a recorded verbal stimulus to the students making eye contact with pictures of familiar individuals displayed on a computer screen, and the duration for which eye gaze on the stimulus was maintained. An automated infrared camera system for measuring eye gaze was utilized that eliminated the need for an instructor to make subjective judgments regarding participants' eye gaze. For all three participants, duration of eye contact increased, and latency to responding decreased following exposure to the computer‐assisted instruction. The implications of these findings for the treatment of individuals with autism are discussed, along with suggestions for future research on the topic.     

Infants perceiving and acting on the eyes: tests of an evolutionary hypothesis

It has been hypothesized that an evolutionarily ancient mechanism underlies the ability of human infants to detect and act upon the direction of eye gaze of another human face. However, the evidence from behavioral studies with infants is also consistent with a more domain-general system responsive to the lateral motion of stimuli regardless of whether or not eyes are involved. To address this issue three experiments with 4-month-old infants are reported that utilize a standard face-cueing paradigm. In the first experiment an inverted face was used to investigate whether the motion of the pupils elicits the cueing effect regardless of the surrounding face context. In the second experiment pupil motion and eye gaze direction were opposed, allowing us to assess their relative importance. In a third experiment, a more complex gaze shift sequence allowed us to analyse the importance of beginning with a period of mutual gaze. Overall, the results were consistent with the importance of the perceived direction of motion of pupils. However, to be effective in cueing spatial locations this motion needs to be preceded by a period of direct mutual gaze (eye contact). We suggest that evolution results in information-processing biases that shape and constrain the outcome of individual development to eventually result in adult adaptive specializations.     

线索类型对阈下注视线索效应的影响

实验结合连续闪烁抑制范式和线索化范式, 通过操纵直视面孔和斜视面孔的呈现方式, 考察了动静线索类型对注视线索效应的影响。结果表明：两种线索在阈上条件都能产生注视线索效应, 且动态线索诱发的效应更大; 无意识条件下有且仅有动态注视线索能诱发注视线索效应。这说明眼睛运动是产生阈下注视线索效应的必要条件; 眼睛运动会增强阈上注视线索效应, 静态注视线索效应依赖于意识。研究结果支持了社会知觉与心理理论交互模型。     

The Incomplete Tyranny of Dynamic Stimuli: Gaze Similarity Predicts Response Similarity in Screen-Captured Instructional Videos

Although eye tracking has been used extensively to assess cognitions for static stimuli, recent research suggests that the link between gaze and cognition may be more tenuous for dynamic stimuli such as videos. Part of the difficulty in convincingly linking gaze with cognition is that in dynamic stimuli, gaze position is strongly influenced by exogenous cues such as object motion. However, tests of the gaze-cognition link in dynamic stimuli have been done on only a limited range of stimuli often characterized by highly organized motion. Also, analyses of cognitive contrasts between participants have been mostly been limited to categorical contrasts among small numbers of participants that may have limited the power to observe more subtle influences. We, therefore, tested for cognitive influences on gaze for screen-captured instructional videos, the contents of which participants were tested on. Between-participant scanpath similarity predicted between-participant similarity in responses on test questions, but with imperfect consistency across videos. We also observed that basic gaze parameters and measures of attention to centers of interest only inconsistently predicted learning, and that correlations between gaze and centers of interest defined by other-participant gaze and cursor movement did not predict learning. It, therefore, appears that the search for eye movement indices of cognition during dynamic naturalistic stimuli may be fruitful, but we also agree that the tyranny of dynamic stimuli is real, and that links between eye movements and cognition are highly dependent on task and stimulus properties.