Subjective visibility depends on level of processing

Is visual awareness graded or binary? Experimental work has provided support for both possibilities, leading to two coexisting but contradictory theoretical accounts. Here we propose a promising candidate factor through which to integrate both accounts: the depth of stimulus processing required by the task. We compared color identification (a low-level task) with numerical judgements (a high-level task) performed on the very same colored number stimuli. Psychophysical curves were analyzed for both objective discrimination performance and subjective visibility ratings on a trial-by trial basis. We observed a graded relationship between stimulus duration and visibility in the low-level task, but a more non-linear relationship in the high-level task. Both patterns of results have previously been consistently associated with the graded and the dichotomous account, respectively. Follow-up experiments that manipulate the level of processing can further unify previously inconsistent results, thus integrating two major theories of visual awareness.     

Being confident without seeing: What subjective measures of visual consciousness are about

Can observers be confident about the accuracy of a discrimination response without a visual experience of the stimulus? In a series of five experiments, observers performed a masked orientation discrimination task, a masked shape discrimination task, or a random-dot motion discrimination task, followed by two subjective ratings after each trial, in which participants reported either their visual experience of the stimulus or their confidence in being correct. We observed that the threshold for ratings of the perception of the stimulus was above the threshold for ratings of a decision, that decision ratings outperformed stimulus ratings in predicting trial accuracy, and that different decision-related scales were more strongly associated with other decision-related scales than with ratings of stimulus clarity. We propose a taxonomy of subjective measures of consciousness that differentiates between subjective measures relating to the percept of the stimulus and measures relating to a discrimination decision and discuss the relation to type II blindsight.     

Visual awareness and the levels of processing hypothesis: A critical review

Does a visual percept emerge to consciousness in a graded manner (i.e. evolving through increasing degrees of clarity), or according to a dichotomous, “all-or-none” pattern (i.e. abruptly transitioning from unawareness to awareness)? The level of processing hypothesis (LoP; B. Windey and A. Cleeremans, 2015) recently proposed a theoretical framework where the transition from unaware to aware visual experience is graded for low-level stimulus representations (i.e. stimulus “energy” or “feature” levels) whereas it is dichotomous for high-level (i.e. the perception of “letters”, “words” or “meaning”) stimulus perception. Here, we will critically review current behavioral and brain-based evidence on the LoP hypothesis and discuss potential challenges (such as differences in LoP conceptualizations, awareness scale related issues, attentional confounds and divergences on experimental factors or statistical analyses) which might be of use for future research within the field. Overall, the LoP hypothesis is a recent and promising proposal that attempts to integrate divergent evidence on the graded vs. dichotomous emergence of awareness debate. Whereas current evidence validates some of the assumptions proposed by the LoP account, there is still much work to do on both methodological and experimental levels. Future neuroimaging studies might help to disentangle the current complex pattern of results found in LoP studies and, importantly, shed some light on the ongoing debate about the search for the Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC).     

Prestimulus alpha-band power biases visual discrimination confidence,but not accuracy

The magnitude of power in the alpha-band (8–13 Hz) of the electroencephalogram (EEG) prior to the onset of a near threshold visual stimulus predicts performance. Together with other findings, this has been interpreted as evidence that alpha-band dynamics reflect cortical excitability. We reasoned, however, that non-specific changes in excitability would be expected to influence signal and noise in the same way, leaving actual discriminability unchanged. Indeed, using a two-choice orientation discrimination task, we found that discrimination accuracy was unaffected by fluctuations in prestimulus alpha power. Decision confidence, on the other hand, was strongly negatively correlated with prestimulus alpha power. This finding constitutes a clear dissociation between objective and subjective measures of visual perception as a function of prestimulus cortical excitability. This dissociation is predicted by a model where the balance of evidence supporting each choice drives objective performance but only the magnitude of evidence supporting the selected choice drives subjective reports, suggesting that human perceptual confidence can be suboptimal with respect to tracking objective accuracy.     

The perception of visual emotion: Comparing different measures of awareness

Here, we explore the sensitivity of different awareness scales in revealing conscious reports on visual emotion perception. Participants were exposed to a backward masking task involving fearful faces and asked to rate their conscious awareness in perceiving emotion in facial expression using three different subjective measures: confidence ratings (CRs), with the conventional taxonomy of certainty, the perceptual awareness scale (PAS), through which participants categorize “raw” visual experience, and post-decision wagering (PDW), which involves economic categorization. Our results show that the CR measure was the most exhaustive and the most graded. In contrast, the PAS and PDW measures suggested instead that consciousness of emotional stimuli is dichotomous. Possible explanations of the inconsistency were discussed. Finally, our results also indicate that PDW biases awareness ratings by enhancing first-order accuracy of emotion perception. This effect was possibly a result of higher motivation induced by monetary incentives.     

Measuring consciousness: Is one measure better than the other?

What is the best way of assessing the extent to which people are aware of a stimulus? Here, using a masked visual identification task, we compared three measures of subjective awareness: The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), through which participants are asked to rate the clarity of their visual experience; confidence ratings (CR), through which participants express their confidence in their identification decisions, and Post-decision wagering (PDW), in which participants place a monetary wager on their decisions. We conducted detailed explorations of the relationships between awareness and identification performance, looking to determine (1) which scale best correlates with performance, and (2) whether we can detect performance in the absence of awareness and how the scales differ from each other in terms of revealing such unconscious processing. Based on these findings we discuss whether perceptual awareness should be considered graded or dichotomous. Results showed that PAS showed a much stronger performance-awareness correlation than either CR or PDW, particularly for low stimulus intensities. In general, all scales indicated above-chance performance when participants claimed not to have seen anything. However, such above-chance performance only showed when we also observed a correlation between awareness and performance. Thus (1) PAS seems to be the most exhaustive measure of awareness, and (2) we find support for above-chance performance in the absence of subjective awareness, but such unconscious knowledge only contributes to performance when we observe conscious knowledge as well. Similarities and differences between scales are discussed in the light of consciousness theories and response strategies.     

The levels of perceptual processing and the neural correlates of increasing subjective visibility

According to the levels-of-processing hypothesis, transitions from unconscious to conscious perception may depend on stimulus processing level, with more gradual changes for low-level stimuli and more dichotomous changes for high-level stimuli. In an event-related fMRI study we explored this hypothesis using a visual backward masking procedure. Task requirements manipulated level of processing. Participants reported the magnitude of the target digit in the high-level task, its color in the low-level task, and rated subjective visibility of stimuli using the Perceptual Awareness Scale. Intermediate stimulus visibility was reported more frequently in the low-level task, confirming prior behavioral results. Visible targets recruited insulo-fronto-parietal regions in both tasks. Task effects were observed in visual areas, with higher activity in the low-level task across all visibility levels. Thus, the influence of level of processing on conscious perception may be mediated by attentional modulation of activity in regions representing features of consciously experienced stimuli.     

The P3 component of the ERP reflects conscious perception, not confidence

Consistent with numerous electrophysiological studies, we recently reported that conscious perception is associated with a widely distributed modulation of the P3 component (Lamy, Salti, & Bar-Haim, 2009). We also showed that correct objective performance in the absence of subjective awareness is associated with a spatially more restricted modulation of the P3. The relatively late occurrence of the P3 along with lack of control for post-perceptual processes suggests that this component might reflect processes related to stimulus evaluation or confidence rather than to visual awareness or objective performance. The main aim of the current study was to test this hypothesis. While EEG was recorded, participants performed a forced-choice localization task and reported their subjective perception of the target on a 3-level scale that also indexed their confidence. The results showed that our previous findings are replicated when confidence is controlled for.     

Gradedness of visual awareness depends on attentional scope: Global perception is more graded than local perception

The gradedness or discreteness of our visual awareness has been debated. Here, we investigate the influence of spatial scope of attention on the gradedness of visual awareness. We manipulated scope of attention using hierarchical letter-based tasks (global: broad scope; local: narrow scope). Participants reported the identity of a masked hierarchical letter either at the global level or at the local level. We measured subjective awareness using the perceptual awareness scale ratings and objective performance. The results indicate more graded visual awareness (lesser slope for the awareness rating curve) at the global level compared to the local level. Graded perception was also observed in visibility ratings usage with global level task showing higher usage of the middle PAS ratings. Our results are in line with the prediction of level of processing hypothesis and show that global/local attentional scope and contextual endogenous factors influence the graded nature of our visual awareness.     

The effect of scene structure on time perception

The current experiments examined the hypothesis that scene structure affects time perception. In three experiments, participants judged the duration of realistic scenes that were presented in a normal or jumbled (i.e., incoherent) format. Experiment 1 demonstrated that the subjective duration of normal scenes was greater than subjective duration of jumbled scenes. In Experiment 2, gridlines were added to both normal and jumbled scenes to control for the number of line terminators, and scene structure had no effect. In Experiment 3, participants performed a secondary task that required paying attention to scene structure, and scene structure's effect on duration judgements reemerged. These findings are consistent with the idea that perceived duration can depend on visual–cognitive processing, which in turn depends on both the nature of the stimulus and the goals of the observer.     

虚拟学习环境下图形加工的认知负荷研究

基于单探测变化觉察和双任务范式,采用项目数量（3）×呈现时间（2）×文字线索（2）混合实验设计,对沉浸式虚拟学习环境图形加工特征和认知负荷进行探讨,以任务绩效法与主观测量法评定认知负荷。44名大学生的实验结果显示：（1）项目数量对虚拟空间图形识记主任务绩效和主观认知负荷有显著影响,项目数量越多,主任务正确率越低,反应时越长,主观评定认知负荷越高,同时加工刺激数量以4个为宜;（2）呈现时间对虚拟空间图形识记次任务绩效有显著影响,呈现时间越长,次任务正确率越高,呈现时间超过0.5s有利于次任务加工;（3）文字线索对虚拟图形识记认知负荷有显著影响,重复性文字线索会增加认知负荷。结果表明,在沉浸式虚拟环境中,图形加工的认知负荷特点与平面和三维图形基本一致,项目数量多、呈现时间短以及有重复性文字线索时,认知负荷更高;任务绩效和主观测量评定指标在反映认知负荷强度上不完全一致。     

Great expectations: Temporal expectation modulates perceptual processing speed

In a crowded dynamic world, temporal expectations guide our attention in time. Prior investigations have consistently demonstrated that temporal expectations speed motor behavior. We explore effects of temporal expectation on perceptual speed in three nonspeeded, cued recognition paradigms. Different hazard rate functions for the cue-stimulus foreperiod were used to manipulate temporal expectations. By computational modeling we estimated two distinct components of visual attention: the temporal threshold of conscious perception (t? ms) and the speed of subsequent encoding into visual short-term memory (v items/s). Notably, these components were measured independently of any motor involvement. The threshold t? was unaffected by temporal expectation, but perceptual processing speed v increased with increasing expectation. By employing constant hazard rates to keep expectation constant over time, we further confirmed that the increase in perceptual speed was independent of the cue-stimulus duration. Thus, our results strongly suggest temporal expectations optimize perceptual performance by speeding information processing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Varieties of cognitive penetration in visual perception

Is our perceptual experience a veridical representation of the world or is it a product of our beliefs and past experiences? Cognitive penetration describes the influence of higher level cognitive factors on perceptual experience and has been a debated topic in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Here, we focus on visual perception, particularly early vision, and how it is affected by contextual expectations and memorized cognitive contents. We argue for cognitive penetration based on recent empirical evidence demonstrating contextual and top-down influences on early visual processes. On the basis of a perceptual model, we propose different types of cognitive penetration depending on the processing level on which the penetration happens and depending on where the penetrating influence comes from. Our proposal has two consequences: (1) the traditional controversy on whether cognitive penetration occurs or not is ill posed, and (2) a clear-cut perception–cognition boundary cannot be maintained.     

Release of inattentional blindness by high working memory load: elucidating the relationship between working memory and selective attention

An unexpected stimulus often remains unnoticed if attention is focused elsewhere. This inattentional blindness has been shown to be increased under conditions of high memory load. Here we show that increasing working memory load can also have the opposite effect of reducing inattentional blindness (i.e., improving stimulus detection) if stimulus detection is competing for attention with a concurrent visual task. Participants were required to judge which of two lines was the longer while holding in working memory either one digit (low load) or six digits (high load). An unexpected visual stimulus was presented once alongside the line judgment task. Detection of the unexpected stimulus was significantly improved under conditions of higher working memory load. This improvement in performance prompts the striking conclusion that an effect of cognitive load is to increase attentional spread, thereby enhancing our ability to detect perceptual stimuli to which we would normally be inattentionally blind under less taxing cognitive conditions. We discuss the implications of these findings for our understanding of the relationship between working memory and selective attention.     

Subjective awareness scale length influences the prevalence,not the presence,of graded conscious states

There is an ongoing debate about the graded or dichotomous form of visual consciousness. Studies involved in the disagreement have typically employed subjective awareness ratings in psychophysical experiments. Variations in scale length have made comparisons across studies difficult and have even been suspected of influencing conclusions about the form of consciousness. We tested the proposal that a 21-point awareness scale produces dichotomous awareness state reports. The experiment described in this article randomly assigned participants to use one of four scale lengths used in previous studies in a backward masking task. Our findings suggest that all scales indicate the presence of graded awareness states, but that the resulting proportion of degraded state reports differed across the scales. Consequently, we argue that the decision of whether the form of consciousness observed in a given study is dichotomous or graded is dependent on an interpretation of the relative degree of degradation.     

Attentional load inhibits vection

In this study, we examined the effects of cognitive task performance on the induction of vection. We hypothesized that, if vection requires attentional resources, performing cognitive tasks requiring attention should inhibit or weaken it. Experiment 1 tested the effects on vection of simultaneously performing a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task. The results revealed that the RSVP task affected the subjective strength of vection. Experiment 2 tested the effects of a multiple-object-tracking (MOT) task on vection. Simultaneous performance of the MOT task decreased the duration and subjective strength of vection. Taken together, these findings suggest that vection induction requires attentional resources.     

Relation between cognitive and motor-oriented systems of visual position perception

Although subjects failed to detect a target displacement if it occurred near the time of a saccadic eye movement (a cognitive visual task), they were still able to point to the center of the target with an unseen pointer (a motor visual task). Pointing performance was not affected by detecting or failing to detect a stimulus displacement. The experiments demonstrate that some information that is available to a motor-oriented visual system is unavailable to the cognitive visual system, under conditions simulating normal perception.     

Working memory modulates the perception of time

Recent research has indicated that reentrant feedback from the contents of working memory can enhance neural representations and the perceptual strengths of matching stimuli in the visual field. However, whether the contents of working memory can also distort conscious experiences of perception remains unclear. Our present results show that the durations of perceptual stimuli matching the nontemporal representations in working memory tend to be perceived as longer than those of mismatching stimuli. This is the first demonstration that working memory can lead to distortions of time perception. Our findings are consistent with the ideas that the perceived duration of a stimulus depends on the magnitude of the neural responses to that stimulus in visual cortex and that there is a common system for representing both temporal and nontemporal magnitudes. We conclude that top-down modulation from the nontemporal contents of working memory distorts the perceptual experience of temporal duration.     

Working memory can compare two visual items without accessing visual consciousness

Recent studies argued that unconscious visual information could access the working memory, however, it is still unclear whether the central executive could be activated unconsciously. We investigated, using a delayed match-to-sample task, whether the central executive is an unconscious process. In the experiment of the present study, participants were asked to compare the locations of two given visual targets. Both targets (or one of the two targets, depending on the experimental condition) were masked by a visual masking paradigm. The results showed an above-chance-level performance even in the condition that participants compared two unconscious targets. However, when the trials with the non-visual conscious experience of the target were removed from the analysis, the performance was no longer significantly different from chance level. Our results suggest that the central executive could be activated unconsciously by some level of stimulus signal, that is still below the threshold for a subjective report.     

Overconfidence in an objective anticipatory motor task

Overconfidence can place humans in hazardous situations, and yet it has been observed in a variety of cognitive tasks in which participants have to rate their own performance. We demonstrate here that overconfidence can be revealed in a natural and objective visuo-motor task. Participants were asked to press a key in synchrony with a predictable visual event and were rewarded if they succeeded and sometimes penalized if they were too quick or too slow. If they had used their own motor uncertainty in anticipating the timing of the visual stimulus, they would have maximized their gain. However, they instead displayed an overconfidence in the sense that they underestimated the magnitude of their uncertainty and the cost of their error. Therefore, overconfidence is not limited to subjective ratings in cognitive tasks, but rather appears to be a general characteristic of human decision making.