Dorr on the language of ontology

Philosophical Studies - In the ‘ordinary business of life’, everyone makes claims about what there is. For instance, we say things like: ‘There are some beautiful chairs in my...     

Constitutive Rules: Games,Language, and Assertion

Many philosophers think that games like chess, languages like English, and speech acts like assertion are constituted by rules. Lots of others disagree. To argue over this productively, it would be first useful to know what it would be for these things to be rule-constituted. Searle famously claimed in Speech Acts that rules constitute things in the sense that they make possible the performance of actions related to those things (Searle 1969). On this view, rules constitute games, languages, and speech acts in the sense that they make possible playing them, speaking them and performing them. This raises the question what it is to perform rule-constituted actions (e. g. play, speak, assert) and the question what makes constitutive rules distinctive such that only they make possible the performance of new actions (e. g. playing). In this paper I will criticize Searle's answers to these questions. However, my main aim is to develop a better view, explain how it works in the case of each of games, language, and assertion and illustrate its appeal by showing how it enables rule-based views of these things to respond to various objections.     

集体问题解决中的认知表征、行为惯例和动态能力

以王建安和张钢(2008)开发的三人TTT纸牌游戏(原游戏)及其变式(变式游戏)为实验任务, 研究了集体问解决中认知表征和行为惯例对提高动态能力的作用。共有240名被试, 分成80个三人小组, 参加了前后两场各20盘游戏。80个小组按照是否被告知游戏的问题表征(即有无认知表征), 以及是玩原游戏还是玩变式游戏, 均分成4个区组来玩第一场游戏。在第二场游戏中, 4个区组都玩变式游戏。以玩每盘游戏的平均步时和在问题表征中走过的路径为指标测量惯例, 以玩第一场原游戏习得的能力向玩第二场变式游戏的迁移率来衡量动态能力。结果发现：一方面, 适当的认知表征有助于提高集体问题解决的动态能力; 另一方面, 没有适当认知表征支持的行为惯例反而会阻碍动态能力的发展。概括地说, 动态能力的决定因素是认知表征而不是行为惯例。     

On preferring God's non-existence

For many centuries, philosophers have debated this question: ‘Does God exist?’ Surprisingly, they have paid rather less attention to this distinct – but also very important – question: ‘Would God's existence be a good thing?’ The latter is an axiological question about the difference in value that God's existence would make (or does make) in the actual world. Perhaps the most natural position to take, whether or not one believes in God, is to hold that it would be a very good thing if such a being were to exist. After all, God is traditionally thought to be perfectly powerful and good, and it might seem obvious that such a being's existence would make things better than they would otherwise be. But this judgment has been contested: some philosophers have held that God's existence would make things worse, and that, on this basis, one can reasonably prefer God's non-existence. We first distinguish a wide array of axiological positions concerning the value of God's existence which might be held by theists, atheists, and agnostics alike. We next construe these positions as comparative judgments about the axiological status of various possible worlds. We then criticize an important recent attempt to show that God's existence would make things worse, in various ways, than they would otherwise be.     

4~7岁儿童对生物目的指向性的认知发展模式

采用结构式访谈法,通过计算机模拟真实情景的动画方式,系统探查4~7岁儿童在目的指向性维度上的本体区分、因果认知发展模式以及在此维度上的朴素生物学“理论”的形成。结果表明：（1）4~7岁儿童在目的指向性维度上进行本体区分的认知发展模式,经历了从低到高的4个发展水平,即目的论模式——基于动物模式——基于生物模式——基于本体区分模式;（2）4~7岁儿童对目的指向性的因果认知与本体区分表现出一致性发展模式,表明学前儿童在目的指向性维度上逐渐形成了朴素生物学“理论”;（3）5~6岁是儿童对目的指向性认知的快速发展期,领域知识对儿童的认知发展具有明显的促进作用,但是受年龄和领域任务的影响     

It takes time and experience to learn how to interpret gaze in mentalistic terms

What capabilities are required for an organism to evince an ‘explicit’ understanding of gaze as a mentalistic phenomenon? One possibility is that mentalistic interpretations of gaze, like concepts of unseen, supernatural beings, are culturally‐specific concepts, acquired through cultural learning. These abstract concepts may either require a shared, symbolic code for intergenerational transmission and therefore be uniquely human cognitive phenomena (like belief in Santa Claus) or, alternatively, language may only facilitate their acquisition. Thus, the possibility remains that other organisms can acquire these mentalistic conceptions of gaze, perhaps over much longer time courses, compared to humans, which would limit to very long‐lived species the possibility of acquiring these abstract concepts. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The emerging self: the convergence of mind,personality and thinking styles

This paper aims to integrate research and theorizing about problem solving, self and personality into a comprehensive theory. With this purpose, the paper attempts to answer three questions: how do humans become aware of themselves and how do the products of self-awareness interrelate to produce an integrated self-system, which includes the domains of cognition and personality? How do persons know and influence each other? How do these processes change with development? The answers given to these questions by self, personality and cognitive developmental psychology are critically examined. It is concluded that an overarching model would have to assume a multilevel and multidimensional architecture. This would involve three main levels: the first includes general-purpose processes and functions, such as processing efficiency and working memory, which define current cognitive potentials; the second includes several domain-specific systems directed to different aspects of the environment; the third includes self-oriented processes that register, represent and regulate processes at the other two levels. Each person’s self-concepts result from the application of the third level on the other two and they differentially reflect their condition. Personality reflects the interaction between these self-concepts and dispositions to act in particular ways. Because humans share this architecture they can negotiate and affect each other’s self- and reflected representations. Thus, the formation of mind, self and personality results from a continuous flow of interactions between the levels and domains of mind within and across persons. The article summarizes a series of studies lending support to this general model.     

镜像神经元:认知具身性的神经生物学证据

传统认知心理学认为认知类似于计算机对抽象符号的加工和运算,这种观点支持了身心二元论。但是近年来兴起的具身认知运动却否定了这一观点的合理性。具身认知认为认知是身体与世界互动的结果,是身体的感觉-运动系统作用于世界而塑造出来的。认知是具身的,离不开身体的构造和感觉运动系统的作用。镜像神经元的发现支持了认知的具身特征,为认知的具身性提供了神经生物学的证据。     

Hindsight Bias: A Primer for Motivational Researchers

Thirty‐five years since the publication of Fischhoff’s (1975) seminal article, we continue to be fascinated by the hindsight bias. Like a well‐developed character in a novel, the bias has something for everyone. Its basic tenet – that things seem less surprising in hindsight than they should – is instantly recognizable as a common human flaw. It is robust, often difficult to reduce, and appeals to researchers with a wide range of interests including history, business, law, medicine, and of course, psychology. This interest stems from the belief that failure to be surprised by an event prevents us from learning from it, and will likely cause us to judge others unfairly for not having been able to foresee it. But just how bad is it? Although guided by a cold cognitive mechanism that ‘creeps up’ on us, hindsight bias is complex, seemingly strengthened, and yet also reduced by self‐serving motives. In this article, I introduce the reader to the basic designs used to study the bias, key cognitive and motivational mechanisms, the major controversies, and some unstudied questions that I hope will guide future research.     

THE ‘EXTENDEDNESS’ OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

In recent years, the idea has been gaining ground that our traditional conceptions of knowledge and cognition are unduly limiting, in that they privilege what goes on inside the ‘skin and skull’ (Clark 1997: 82) of an individual reasoner. Instead, it has been argued, knowledge and cognition need to be understood as embodied (involving both mind and body), situated (being dependent on the complex interplay between the individual and its environment), and extended (that is, continuous with, rather than separate from, the world ‘outside’). Whether these various interrelations and dependencies are ‘merely’ causal, or are in a more fundamental sense constitutive of knowledge and cognition, is as much a matter of controversy as the degree to which they pose a challenge to ‘traditional’ conceptions of cognition, knowledge and the mind. In this paper we argue that when the idea of ‘extendedness’ is applied to a core concept in epistemology and the philosophy of science—namely, scientific evidence—things appear to be on a much surer footing. The evidential status of data gathered through extended processes—including its utility as justification or warrant—do not seem to be weakened by virtue of being extended, but instead are often strengthened because of it. Indeed, it is often precisely by virtue of this extendedness that scientific evidence grounds knowledge claims, which individuals may subsequently ascribe to themselves. The functional equivalence between machine‐based gathering, filtering, and processing of data and human interpretation and assessment is the crucial factor in deciding whether evidence has been gathered, rather than the distinction between intra‐ and extracranial processes or individual and social processes (or combinations thereof). To prioritize biological processes here, and to assert the superiority of human cognitive capacities seems both arbitrary and unwarranted with respect to gathering evidence, and ultimately would lead to an unattractive skepticism about many of the methods used in science to gather evidence. In other words, conceiving of scientific evidence as ‘impersonal’ (or at least not necessarily personal) not only better captures the character of evidence‐gathering in practice, but also makes sense of a large amount of evidence‐gathering that ‘personal’ accounts fail to either acknowledge or accurately describe. Whilst we suggest it is likely that all internally‐distributed evidence‐gathering processes are merely contingently internal processes, a significant number of externally‐distributed evidence‐gathering processes are necessarily externally‐distributed. Some evidence can only be gathered by extended epistemic agents.     

The Theory and Practice of Psychiatry by Frederick C. Redlich and Daniel X. Freedman

Abstract

The noted humorist Dave Barry, in looking back over his life and thinking of things he had learned, said one of the things he learned was that “There is a very fine line between ‘hobby’ and ‘mental illness’” (1998, p. 182).

Following in Dave Barry’s path, I would like to look back over the 45+ years I’ve been practicing group therapy and see if there is anything to be learned by what I have learned over those years.     

A Deranged Argument Against Public Languages

Are there really such things as public languages? Are things like English and Urdu mere myths? I urge that, despite an intriguing line of thought which may be extracted from Davidson’s ‘A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs’, philosophers are right to countenance such things in their final ontology. The argument rebutted, which I concede may not have been one which Davidson himself ultimately embraced, is that knowledge of a public language is neither necessary nor sufficient for successful conversational interaction, so that such shared languages are explanatorily otiose. In particular, the ability of interlocutors to communicate in the face of linguistic novelty and error seems to support this conclusion. I respond with two main points. First, initial impressions aside, knowledge of things like English and Urdu is explanatorily necessary. Second, even if successful conversation could be explained without positing such knowledge, we have other reasons to take public languages ontologically seriously. The ultimate result is that what I label a ‘deranged argument against public languages’ is unsound.     

Convergence of biological and psychological perspectives on cognitive coordination in schizophrenia

The concept of locally specialized functions dominates research on higher brain function and its disorders. Locally specialized functions must be complemented by processes that coordinate those functions, however, and impairment of coordinating processes may be central to some psychotic conditions. Evidence for processes that coordinate activity is provided by neurobiological and psychological studies of contextual disambiguation and dynamic grouping. Mechanisms by which this important class of cognitive functions could be achieved include those long-range connections within and between cortical regions that activate synaptic channels via NMDA-receptors, and which control gain through their voltage-dependent mode of operation. An impairment of these mechanisms is central to PCP-psychosis, and the cognitive capabilities that they could provide are impaired in some forms of schizophrenia. We conclude that impaired cognitive coordination due to reduced ion flow through NMDA-channels is involved in schizophrenia, and we suggest that it may also be involved in other disorders. This perspective suggests several ways in which further research could enhance our understanding of cognitive coordination, its neural basis, and its relevance to psychopathology.     

决策者的认知特征对决策过程及企业战略选择的影响

在不确定环境下,企业的最高决策者的个人特性和行为对于企业的战略决策起着关键的作用。本研究探讨决策者的认知特征对于战略决策的过程以及最终形成的战略决策的影响。研究采用情境实验法,根据某企业的实际情形编写了一个商业案例,案例提供了决策者所需要的信息,并制造出高不确定的情境。148名来自大学管理学院的学生被要求对于该案例进行分析并填写有关量表。对数据进行结构方程模型的分析后得到如下结果：决策者的认知复杂性和认知需要与他们对企业内外环境的周密分析具有显著的正向关系,而且通过后者影响到对于环境中蕴含的机会的判断,并最终影响是否进入某项业务的决策。     

Image representation,scaling and cognitive model of object perception

Neuropsychological investigations of visual imagery and representations have led to a deeper understanding of the spatial perception, representation and memory. But how each individual perceives object’s geometrical properties and how they differ from person to person, both under event-related memory and normal recollecting memory in the presence or in the absence of direct sensory stimulation is still unclear. Spatial knowledge is diverse, complex, and multi-modal, as are the situations in which it is used. All seem to agree that a cognitive map is a mental representation of an external environment. The image scaling is important in understanding the psychological dysfunctions of patients suffering from spatial cognition problems. The scaling becomes self-evident in art forms, when people are asked to draw image of objects they see actively or from their short or long term memory. In this paper we develop a comprehensive model of this scaling factor and its implications in spatial image representation and memory. We also extend its notion in understanding the perception of objects whose representations are normally not possible (like the perception of universal scales, infinities and parallel lines) but are well comprehended by the human brains. Here we give a scaling factor which is variable depending on the situations for a person based on his visual memory and drawing capabilities. And then extend it to analyse his cognitive strengths, disorders and any imperfections. This model also helps in formalizing the architectural cognitive maps needed to change the scaling factor, depending on the types of visual works one performs.     

源于“反常”终于“常理”的禀赋效应

如果忽略收入影响和交易成本, 愿意为一样物品支付的价格应等于愿意出售的价格。而塞勒教授却发现, 现实生活中有一些“反常”现象, 个体会对自己所拥有的物品赋予更高的价值, 造成“愿意支付价格”和“愿意出售价格”的不一致。塞勒利用预期理论中的损失厌恶对这些反常现象进行解释, 并将该现象称为禀赋效应(endowment effect)。此后, 众多研究者从不同角度对该效应进行了探索和论证。文章详细梳理了禀赋效应的多种解释机制, 包括损失厌恶、心理所有权理论、偏差的认知过程以及进化的观点等, 论证了禀赋效应符合“常理”的原因, 同时也探讨了禀赋效应在商业销售策略和政府拆迁政策等方面的应用前景。     

Should We Want God to Exist?

Whether God exists is a metaphysical question. But there is also a neglected evaluative question about God’s existence: Should we want God to exist? Very many, including many atheists and agnostics, appear to think we should. Theists claim that if God didn’t exist things would be far worse, and many atheists agree; they regret God’s inexistence. Some remarks by Thomas Nagel suggest an opposing view: that we should want God not to exist. I call this view anti‐theism. I explain how such view can be coherent, and why it might be correct. Anti‐theism must be distinguished from the argument from evil or the denial of God’s goodness; it is a claim about the goodness of God’s existence. Anti‐theists must claim that it’s a logical consequence of God’s existence that things are worse in certain respects. The problem is that God’s existence would also make things better in many ways. Given that God’s existence is likely to be impersonally better overall, anti‐theists face a challenge similar to that facing nonconsequentialists. I explore two ways of meeting this challenge.