Developing a measure of interpretation bias for depressed mood: An ambiguous scenarios test

The tendency to interpret ambiguous everyday situations in a relatively negative manner (negative interpretation bias) is central to cognitive models of depression. Limited tools are available to measure this bias, either experimentally or in the clinic. This study aimed to develop a pragmatic interpretation bias measure using an ambiguous scenarios test relevant to depressed mood (the AST-D).¹ In Study 1, after a pilot phase (N = 53), the AST-D was presented via a web-based survey (N = 208). Participants imagined and rated each AST-D ambiguous scenario. As predicted, higher dysphoric mood was associated with lower pleasantness ratings (more negative bias), independent of mental imagery measures. In Study 2, self-report ratings were compared with objective ratings of participants’ imagined outcomes of the ambiguous scenarios (N = 41). Data were collected in the experimental context of a functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging scanner. Consistent with subjective bias scores, independent judges rated more sentences as negatively valenced for the high versus low dysphoric group. Overall, results suggest the potential utility of the AST-D in assessing interpretation bias associated with depressed mood.     

元认知与面部认知的结合：切入点及方法

元认知是对认知的认知,包含认知的各个方面,近年来元认知与面部认知的结合开始得到关注。两者结合切入点包括元认知错觉(达克效应和自我中心偏见)在面部认知中的适用性,以及面部认知现象(异族效应和熟悉度优势)在元认知中的适用性。研究方法根据测量时间点和评估对象的选取而各有侧重。当前研究尚停留在元认知监测层面,未来可扩展至面部认知的元认知控制、与机器学习结合等方向,为理解面部认知提供新角度,扩展其应用价值。     

Health anxiety,anxiety sensitivity,and attentional biases for pictorial and linguistic health‐threat cues

The study investigated attentional biases for pictorial and linguistic health‐threat stimuli in high and low health anxious individuals, who were selected from the upper and lower quartile ranges of a normal sample using a screening measure of health anxiety. Attentional bias was assessed using a visual probe task which presented health‐threat and neutral pictures and words at two exposure durations, 500 ms and 1250 ms. The prediction that the high health anxious group would show a greater attentional bias for health‐threat cues than the low health anxious group was not supported despite the groups being well‐differentiated on a general measure of health anxiety, the Illness Attitudes Scale (IAS). Instead, the results indicated that individuals with high levels of anxiety sensitivity showed a significantly greater initial attentional bias for threat pictures compared with those with low anxiety sensitivity, as assessed by the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI).     

The effect of attention modification with explicit vs. minimal instructions on worry

In this experiment we investigated the effect of different instructions on the modification of attentional biases, and subsequently on worry persistence. Participants without excessive worry completed a modified dot-probe task, designed to train attention either to threat or neutral words. Half of each group was given explicit instructions regarding the relationship between word valence and target location, and half were given the more usual minimal instructions. Impact on worry persistence was assessed by categorizing the valence of thought intrusions before and after a period of instructed worry. Response latencies to test items on the dot-probe task showed that attention had been successfully manipulated in the expected direction, and explicit instructions led to more effective attention modification. Moreover, participants in the attend-threat group who received explicit instructions reported significantly more negative thought intrusions following instructed worry, as rated by an assessor, whereas participants in the attend-neutral group did not. These findings suggest that an attentional bias towards threatening information plays a role in worry persistence, and that explicit instructions may be helpful in modifying this bias.     

Attention bias modification for reducing speech anxiety

The mechanisms mediating the anxiolytic effects of attention bias modification (ABM) remain unclear. Accordingly, we randomly assigned speech-anxious subjects to receive four sessions of one of three training conditions: ABM, inverse ABM, and control. In the ABM condition, subjects viewed pairs of photographs of models displaying facial expressions of disgust and joy on a computer screen. Probes always replaced the positive face, and subjects pushed a button to indicate the identity of the probe (E or F) as rapidly as possible. In the inverse condition, the probes always replaced the negative face, and in the control condition, the probes replaced each face type equally often. After four training sessions, all groups exhibited statistically indistinguishable, but significant, reductions on self-report, behavioral, and physiological measures of speech anxiety. Self-report and behavioral measures of attentional control improved likewise. Contrary to early studies, ABM was not superior to control procedures in producing reductions on measures of social anxiety.     

Interpretation bias and depressive symptoms: The role of self-relevance

Cognitive theories of depression emphasize negatively biased interpretations as an important target of therapy. Much of the research on interpretation bias in depression has focused on selection, or deciding which of several interpretations is likely. However, depressive biases may also exist in the generation of possible interpretations, or the ability to think of positive alternatives. If biases exist for generation as well as selection, therapeutic techniques to encourage the generation of more positive interpretations would be warranted. Asking therapy clients to consider someone else in a similar situation is a commonly used therapy strategy but has not been sufficiently examined empirically. In the current studies, we examine interpretation generation and selection in dysphoric and nondysphoric individuals, and contrast interpretations made for the self to interpretations made for two types of “other.” Our studies reveal depressive biases in both interpretation generation and selection, and indicate that interpretation valence is highly sensitive to the type of other considered. All participants generated and selected significantly more positive interpretations for friends than for themselves, but generated significantly more negative interpretations for hypothetical others than for themselves. Our results suggest that encouraging dysphoric individuals to imagine others can be beneficial, but the type of “other” used is critically important, with instructions to consider a close friend most likely to be effective in decreasing negativity in interpretation.     

Validation of an interpretation bias assessment for body dissatisfaction

Currently, research on interpretation bias and body dissatisfaction is limited. The few experimental paradigms that have been used to explore this phenomenon utilized a method that may not accurately capture the nature of interpretation bias as explained by cognitive theory. The present study investigated the reliability and validity of a novel computerized assessment of interpretation bias (WSAP) for body dissatisfaction, which may more accurately reflect the cognitive processing involved in such bias by implementing the Word Sentence Association Paradigm (WSAP), a previously established method of measuring interpretation bias in other clinical populations. Undergraduate females (n = 214) completed the WSAP and other measures. Results indicate initial support for the WSAP as a valid, reliable measure of interpretation bias for body dissatisfaction. Although preliminary, this study contributes to the minimal research in this area and serves as the first psychometric investigation of the WSAP to measure such interpretation bias for body dissatisfaction.     

Are cognitive biases associated with body image concerns similar between cultures?

This experimental investigation examined judgment and memory biases associated with body image concerns in American and Chinese young adult samples. In Study 1, 50 American university students (43 female, 7 males) screened into groups high and low in self-reported concerns about body size and weight engaged in a computer-based experiment involving the evaluation and later recognition of randomly presented fat and thin body words and matched control words. Participants high in reported body image concerns judged certain kinds of fat words more negatively and remembered them more accurately than individuals low in perceived body image disturbances. In general, significant group differences remained, after controlling for BMI. In contrast, groups did not differ in judgment or memory of thin words or control words. This pattern of differences was partially replicated in similar groups from the People's Republic of China (52 female, 7 male). Cross-cultural comparisons of responses to the subset of fat and thin words used in both experiments indicated the American sample evaluated fat words more negatively and was faster in responding to fat words than the Chinese sample, although there were no cultural differences in responses to thin words. Findings support the hypothesis that information-processing biases related to body image problems are specific to these concerns within samples from both Western and non-Western cultures, albeit cultural differences in responses to fat stimuli were also identified.     

Is manipulation of mood a critical component of cognitive bias modification procedures?

This paper investigates whether changes in mood state are an important component of cognitive bias modification (CBM) procedures. In a novel CBM procedure participants read either positive or negative statements relating to social issues for 5 min. Interpretation bias was measured by means of a scrambled sentence test, which was presented both before and after the CBM procedure. Participants who read the positive statements made more positive resolutions to the scrambled sentences, while participants who read the negative statements made more negative resolutions. Thus, the appropriate positive and negative interpretative biases were induced by the CBM procedure. However, significant mood changes also occurred following CBM. In Experiment 2, a musical mood induction procedure was presented with depressing or elating music. As before, a scrambled sentence test was presented both before and after the musical mood induction. Mood changed in accordance with the valence of the music to the same extent as with CBM. Critically however, performance on the scrambled sentence task did not change for both groups. This demonstrates that a change in mood state is not sufficient for a change in cognitive bias to occur.     

Interpretations and judgments regarding positive and negative social scenarios in childhood social anxiety

The present study extended our understanding of cognitive biases in childhood social anxiety. A non-clinical sample of 11-13-year olds completed social anxiety and depression scales and were presented with scenarios depicting positive and mildly negative social events. Social anxiety was associated with tendencies to interpret positive social events in a discounting fashion, to catastrophize in response to mildly negative social events, and to anticipate more negative emotional reactions to the negative events. Implications for understanding and treating social anxiety are discussed.     

A case series of attention modification in clinically anxious youths

Research in the last fifteen years suggests that anxious individuals selectively attend towards threatening information. Attention modification interventions for internalizing adults have been developed to target cognition at this basic level; these programs have demonstrated initial efficacy in attention bias and anxiety symptom reduction. To date, there have been no published studies of attention modification in youths with clinical levels of anxiety. The current case series examined the initial efficacy of a four-week (12 sessions) attention modification program (AMP) designed to train attention away from threat in 16 children and adolescents (ages 10 to 17) diagnosed with DSM-IV anxiety disorders. Overall, youths experienced a significant decrease in anxiety and depression symptoms, and 12 of 16 youths no longer met criteria for any anxiety diagnosis at post-treatment. AMP was feasible with youths, and all youths and parents deemed the program acceptable. These findings provide support for further research on the use of cognitive bias modification interventions with clinically anxious youths.     

Spider fear and covariation bias in children and adolescents

Covariation bias can be defined as phobic people's tendency to overestimate the association between fear-relevant stimuli and negative outcomes. The current article presents two studies that examined this type of cognitive bias in children and adolescents aged 8-16 years. Study 1 was concerned with a thought experiment during which youths (N=150) were asked to imagine that they participated in an experiment during which they had to view a series of pictures showing spiders, guns, and flowers, that were occasionally followed by a negative outcome (i.e., a mild electric shock). Participants were asked to estimate the relation between each type of picture and the negative outcome. The results indicated that youths with higher levels of spider fear displayed a specific tendency to relate spider pictures to a negative outcome. In Study 2, youths (N=220) actually participated in a computer game during which they were confronted with pictures of spiders, guns, and flowers, each of which was equally often followed by a negative (i.e., losing candy), positive (i.e., winning candy), or neutral outcome. After the game, participants had to estimate the relation between each type of picture and various outcomes. It was found that youths with higher levels of spider fear estimated more negative and less positive outcomes in relation to spider pictures. Taken together, these findings provide support for a fear-related covariation bias in youths. Further developmental analyses indicated that this type of cognitive bias seems to be more consistently present among adolescents than among children.     

Practice makes perfect: Training the interpretation of emotional ambiguity

The interpretation of emotionally ambiguous words, sentences, or scenarios can be altered through training procedures that are collectively called cognitive bias modification for interpretation (CBM-I). In three experiments, we systematically manipulated the nature of the training in order to discriminate between emotional priming and ambiguity resolution accounts of training effects. In Experiment 1 participants completed word fragments that were consistently related to either a negative or benign interpretation of an ambiguous sentence. In a subsequent semantic priming task they demonstrated an interpretation bias, in that they were faster to identify relatedness of targets that were associated with the training-congruent meaning of an emotionally ambiguous homograph. We then manipulated the training sentences to show that interpretation bias was eliminated when participants simply completed valenced word fragments following unrelated sentences (Experiment 2), or completed fragments that were related to emotional but unambiguous sentences (Experiment 3). Only when participants were required to actively resolve emotionally ambiguous sentences during training did changes in interpretation emerge at test. Findings suggest that CBM-I achieves its effects by altering a production rule that aids the selection of meaning from emotionally ambiguous alternatives, in line with an ambiguity resolution account.     

Interpretation and judgmental biases in social phobia

Previous research demonstrated that social phobia is characterized by content-specific interpretation and judgmental biases. The present study investigated whether this interpretation bias occurs not only in ambiguous, but also in positive and negative social events, and whether social phobic patients (SPs) are more characterized by a judgmental bias in costs than in probability. Besides, we argued that the judgmental bias observed in former studies could also be attributed to accurate estimations of SPs (of, for example, stuttering). Therefore, we assessed judgmental bias by the ratings of probability and costs of a negative evaluation (e.g. ‘people dislike me’) and not, as in previous studies, of negative social events (e.g. ‘stuttering’). SPs (n=228) and normal controls (n=33) were presented social and non-social events ranging from positive to profoundly negative. They ranked four different interpretations on likelihood to assess interpretation bias, and rated the profoundly negative interpretation on probability and cost to assess judgmental bias. SPs demonstrated content-specific interpretation and judgmental biases that also occurred in positive and negative social events. In contrast with expectations, SPs were characterized by a judgmental bias in both costs and probability.