The role of cuing and organization in children's memory for events

Children's memory for a standardized, hierarchically organized event, making clay, was tested in two experiments. Immediately after participating in this event and again 2 weeks later, children described how they had made the clay. In Experiment 1, action and object cues were presented but only action cues greatly facilitated recall. Children who remade the clay reported more information and also reported more of the actions most central to the goal of the event during delayed recall. In Experiment 2, verbal cues representing two levels in the event hierarchy were presented, but neither aided recall. These and other patterns in the data indicated that, at most, the rudiments of a hierarchical structure had emerged after a single experience. These results were discussed in terms of their implications for the development and organization of event memories.     

Remembering remembering

We developed a laboratory analogue of the "forgot-it-all-along" effect that J. W. Schooler, M. Bendiksen, and Z. Ambadar (1997) proposed for cases of "recovered memories" in which individuals had forgotten episodes of talking about the abuse when they were supposedly amnestic for it. In Experiment 1, participants studied homographs with disambiguating context words; in Test 1 they received studied- or other-context words as cues; and in Test 2 they received studied-context cues and judged whether they had recalled each item during Test 1. In Experiment 2, retrieval cues were manipulated on both tests. In Experiment 3, both the studied- and other-context cues corresponded to the same meaning of each homograph. In Experiment 4, Test 1 was free recall, and studied- versus other-context cues were presented in Test 2. Participants more often forgot that they had previously recalled an item if they were cued to think of it differently on the two tests.     

A brighter side to memory illusions: false memories prime children's and adults' insight-based problem solving

Can false memories have a positive consequence on human cognition? In two experiments, we investigated whether false memories could prime insight problem-solving tasks. Children and adults were asked to solve compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems, half of which had been primed by the presentation of Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists whose critical lures were also the solutions to the problems. In Experiment 1, the results showed that regardless of age, when the critical lure was falsely recalled, CRAT problems were solved more often and significantly faster than problems that were not primed by a DRM list. When the critical lure was not falsely recalled, CRAT problem solution rates and times were no different from when there was no DRM priming. In Experiment 2, without an intervening recall test, children and adults still exhibited higher solution rates and faster solution times to CRAT problems that were primed than to those that were not primed. This latter result shows that priming occurred as a result of false memory generation at encoding and not at retrieval during the recall test. Together, these findings demonstrate that when false memories are generated at encoding, they can prime solutions to insight-based problems in both children and adults.     

Making the Past Present: Later Verbal Accessibility of Early Memories

A major question in the literature regarding memory development is whether memories of events from early in life are later accessible to verbal report. In a controlled study, we examined this question in toddlers who were 13, 16, or 20 months old at the time of exposure to specific events, and who were evaluated for spontaneous verbal expression of memory after delays of 9 to 12 months (Experiment 1), or 1 to 3 months (Experiment 2). Verbal reports of the events were elicited at the age of 3 years (both experiments). There was little evidence of spontaneous verbal mnemonic expression at the first delayed-recall test; the mnemonic expression that was observed was predicted by concurrent age and concurrent verbal fluency. Children who had been 20 months at the time of first experience of the events, and who were older and more verbally fluent at the first delayed-recall test (i.e., 20-month-olds in Experiment 1), provided verbal evidence of event memory at 3 years. The results are consistent with the suggestion that under some circumstances, early memories later are accessible to verbal report.     

Part-set cuing of false memories

Part-set cuing inhibition describes the common finding that re-presenting items from a word list can reduce subjects’ overall recall performance for studied items. Do part-set cuing effects occur for false memories as well? In the present experiments, subjects studied lists of words drawn from Roediger and McDermott (1995). After studying each list, subjects completed math problems and then recalled the list items either with or without accompanying list cues. In Experiment 1, the recall cues consisted of items drawn randomly from the original list. In Experiment 2, an additional type of cued recall task was added in which the even numbered list items were used as cues. Taken together, these experiments demonstrate robust part-set cuing effects for critical nonpresented items. In addition, they show that whereas recall of critical words is reduced by the presence of cues at test, retrieval cues do not affect critical words and studied words in exactly the same manner.     

Childhood amnesia in children and adolescents: their earliest memories

Investigations of childhood amnesia have almost exclusively focused on the earliest memories of adults. Here we investigate the earliest memories of children of 6--19 years old. Parents confirmed the memory events and dated the memories. There were surprisingly few developmental differences between the earliest memories of children. Although 6--9-year-olds recalled earlier events than did older children, there were no differences between older age groups. Memories from all age groups were similar in structure, social orientation, and the nature of the recalled event. However, memories of older children were more likely to involve negative affect. There were also few gender differences, although girls were more likely to recall traumatic or transitional events while boys were more likely to recall play events. Overall, results deepen the paradox of early memory: 6--9-year-olds have verbally accessible memories from very early childhood that then seem to disappear as they get older.     

Childhood amnesia in children and adolescents: Their earliest memories

Investigations of childhood amnesia have almost exclusively focused on the earliest memories of adults. Here we investigate the earliest memories of children of 6–19 years old. Parents confirmed the memory events and dated the memories. There were surprisingly few developmental differences between the earliest memories of children. Although 6–9-year-olds recalled earlier events than did older children, there were no differences between older age groups. Memories from all age groups were similar in structure, social orientation, and the nature of the recalled event. However, memories of older children were more likely to involve negative affect. There were also few gender differences, although girls were more likely to recall traumatic or transitional events while boys were more likely to recall play events. Overall, results deepen the paradox of early memory: 6–9-year-olds have verbally accessible memories from very early childhood that then seem to disappear as they get older.     

A 2‐year‐old child's memory of hospitalization during early infancy

A child who had had surgery at 5 months of age, and who had been treated at the time for post‐traumatic symptoms (reported in a previous paper by the author), was interviewed 2 years later and almost 3 years later to test for possible verbal recall of his hospitalization. He appeared to have some memories of the experience at 29 months of age, and he was able to superimpose verbal labels onto the preverbal memories. At 40 months of age, however, the memories were no longer verbally accessible. The results are discussed in the context of different theories of encoding, storage, retrieval, and loss of early memories. The findings from this study support other findings indicating that there appears to be some form of long‐term memory in place early in life, at least for highly salient, traumatic events. There may be one memory system for traumatic memories, fully functional at birth, and a later developing, different system for neutral memories. It is further hypothesized that there may be a sensitive period around 2–3 years of age for the recall of early traumatic memories, and that verbal recall is more likely to be present in verbally precocious children during that period. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Construction of a more coherent story: Prior verbal recall predicts later verbal accessibility of early memories

The question of whether early event memories are later accessible for verbal report is of major interest to those concerned with mnemonic processes. In a controlled laboratory study, we examined this question in children 16 and 20 months of age at the time of exposure to event sequences in the context of an elicited-imitation paradigm and who were subsequently tested for memory for the events at delays of 1, 3, 6, 9, or 12 months, and again at the age of 36 months. Stepwise regressions revealed that the number of mnemonic utterances elicited by direct interview at 36 months is predicted by the number of spontaneous mnemonic utterances at the first delayed recall session. Language abilities at exposure were not predictive of verbal report at 36 months of age. Thus, variables from the most recent exposure were of more import than were variables from the time of the initial experience of the events.     

Construction of a more coherent story: prior verbal recall predicts later verbal accessibility of early memories

The question of whether early event memories are later accessible for verbal report is of major interest to those concerned with mnemonic processes. In a controlled laboratory study, we examined this question in children 16 and 20 months of age at the time of exposure to event sequences in the context of an elicited-imitation paradigm and who were subsequently tested for memory for the events at delays of 1, 3, 6, 9, or 12 months, and again at the age of 36 months. Stepwise regressions revealed that the number of mnemonic utterances elicited by direct interview at 36 months is predicted by the number of spontaneous mnemonic utterances at the first delayed recall session. Language abilities at exposure were not predictive of verbal report at 36 months of age. Thus, variables from the most recent exposure were of more import than were variables from the time of the initial experience of the events.     

Persistent overconfidence despite practice: The role of task experience in preschoolers’ recall predictions

In three experiments, preschoolers’ ability to predict their picture recall was examined. Children studied 10 pictures, predicted how many they would recall, and then attempted to recall them. This study-prediction-recall trial was repeated multiple times with new pictures on each trial. In Experiment 1, children were overconfident on the initial trial, and this overconfidence persisted across three trials. In Experiment 2, children predicted either their own performance or another child’s performance. Their predictions were overconfident across all trials regardless of whether they made predictions for themselves or for another child, suggesting that wishful thinking cannot fully account for their overconfidence. In Experiment 3, some children postdicted their previous recall performance prior to making each prediction. Although their postdictions were quite accurate, their predictions were still overconfident across five trials. Preschoolers’ overconfidence was remarkably resistant to the repeated experience of recalling fewer pictures than the children had predicted. Even asking them to report the number that they recalled on a previous trial, which they could do accurately, did not cause them to lower their predictions across trials.     

The Effect of a Nonverbal Aid on Preschoolers' Recall for Color

The purpose of the present study was to investigate whether the provision of a nonverbal memory aid would improve preschoolers' recall of color. Forty 4-year-old children carried out 2 tasks with the same set of colored objects. Colors were not referred to, nor were children told that their recall would later be tested. One day later, the children were split into 2 groups. One group was given a chart containing both the colors of the objects and distractor colors. The other group was not given a chart. Recall for object color was tested. There was an effect of chart provision; children who used the chart recalled more colors correctly than did those who did not use a chart. This result indicates (a) that even very young children can make use of props to facilitate their recall and (b) that such memory aids need not be exact copies of previously seen objects. Implications of these findings for eyewitness recall are discussed.     

The effect of a nonverbal aid on preschoolers' recall for color

The purpose of the present study was to investigate whether the provision of a nonverbal memory aid would improve preschoolers' recall of color. Forty 4-year-old children carried out 2 tasks with the same set of colored objects. Colors were not referred to, nor were children told that their recall would later be tested. One day later, the children were split into 2 groups. One group was given a chart containing both the colors of the objects and distractor colors. The other group was not given a chart. Recall for object color was tested. There was an effect of chart provision; children who used the chart recalled more colors correctly than did those who did not use a chart. This result indicates (a) that even very young children can make use of props to facilitate their recall and (b) that such memory aids need not be exact copies of previously seen objects. Implications of these findings for eyewitness recall are discussed.     

Limits on the role of retrieval cues in memory for actions: Enactment effects in the absence of object cues in the environment

Verb-object phrases (open the umbrella, knock on the table) are usually remembered better if they have been enacted during study (also called subject-performed tasks) than if they have merely been learned verbally (verbal tasks). This enactment effect is particularly pronounced for phrases for which the objects (table) are present as cues in the study and test contexts. In previous studies with retrieval cues for some phrases, the enactment effect in free recall for the other phrases has been surprisingly small or even nonexistent. The present study tested whether the often replicated enactment effect in free recall can be found if none of the phrases contains context cues. In Experiment 1, we tested, and corroborated, the suppression hypothesis: The enactment effect for a given type of phrase (marker phrases) is modified by the presence or absence of cues for the other phrases in the list (experimental phrases). Experiments 2 and 3 replicated the enactment effect for phrases without cues. Experiment 2 also showed that the presence of cues either at study or at test is sufficient for obtaining a suppression effect, and Experiment 3 showed that the enactment effect may disappear altogether if retrieval cues are very salient.     

Preschoolers' comprehension of goal structure in narratives

Preschool children's understanding and use of goals were studied in two experiments. Children heard stories in the presence of pictures or props. The stories were varied by goal success occurring early or late in the story, with late goal success resulting in more causal connections in the narrative. The results showed that children recalled goals spontaneously and that their recall benefited from goal structure of the stories. Pictures benefited the children when the stories were short. Enactment of the props versus static displays of the props did not enhance recall in the second experiment. Preschool children thus demonstrated ability to infer and use goal and causal information in stories for both picture and object support.     

Memory for media: investigation of false memories for negatively and positively charged public events

Despite a large body of false memory research, little has addressed the potential influence of an event's emotional content on susceptibility to false recollections. The Paradoxical Negative Emotion (PNE) hypothesis predicts that negative emotion generally facilitates memory but also heightens susceptibility to false memories. Participants were asked whether they could recall 20 "widely publicised" public events (half fictitious) ranging in emotional valence, with or without visual cues. Participants recalled a greater number of true negative events (M=3.31/5) than true positive (M=2.61/5) events. Nearly everyone (95%) came to recall at least one false event (M=2.15 false events recalled). Further, more than twice as many participants recalled any false negative (90%) compared to false positive (41.7%) events. Negative events, in general, were associated with more detailed memories and false negative event memories were more detailed than false positive event memories. Higher dissociation scores were associated with false recollections of negative events, specifically.     

Reexposure breeds recall: effects of experience on 9-month-olds' ordered recall

On the basis of three experiences, 9-month-olds recall specific events after one month. We tested whether multiple experiences are necessary, or merely facilitative, of 9-month-olds' long-term recall. In two experiments, using deferred imitation, infants were exposed to multi-step sequences either one time, two times, or three times prior to a one-month delay. In Experiment 1, regardless of the number of experiences, infants did not demonstrate recall. In Experiment 2, infants were tested on and reexposed to the events after one week; recall was tested again one month later. Performance after 1 week in Experiment 2 was greater than performance after one month in Experiment 1. Moreover, presumably as a function of reexposure after one week, infants recalled the individual actions of the events one month later. Infants in the three-experience condition also evidenced ordered recall after one month. Implications for the developmental status of the neural substrate supporting long-term recall are discussed.     

Why I remember that: The influence of contextual factors on beliefs about everyday memory

In the present study, we examined the role of contextual factors in beliefs about remembering personal experiences. Specifically, we examined why individuals think that they remember experiences in everyday life and whether the reasons for remembering varied as a function of recall context, memory theme, and culture. In Experiment 1, we examined young adults’ reported memories in two hypothetical contexts. In Experiment 2, memories were reported in response to cue words in European American and Chinese young adults. The results indicated that social sharing contexts appeared to favor social functions, whereas private reminiscence contexts tended to favor nonfunctional reasons for remembering and, to a lesser extent, directive functions. The European Americans reported more functional reasons for remembering, whereas the Chinese were more likely to report external cues as a reason for remembering. Finally, self functions were rarely reported. The results are interpreted in light of theories of memory functions and the role of contextual factors on remembering.     

Retrieval‐induced forgetting of emotional and unemotional autobiographical memories

This experiment extended the retrieval‐induced forgetting (RIF) procedure from simple, episodic information to emotional and unemotional autobiographical memories. In the elicitation phase, participants generated specific memories from their past in response to negative, neutral, or positive category cues. In the retrieval‐practice phase, they practised retrieving (and elaborated further on) some of the memories for some of the categories. In the final test phase, they tried to recall all memories. Memories that received retrieval practice were recalled more often on final test than baseline memories, whereas memories that were not practised, yet competed with practised memories via a shared category cue, were recalled less often than baseline memories. We discuss the roles of inhibition, competition, emotion, and self‐relevance, and consider what laboratory manipulations of memory might reveal about everyday and pathological personal memory.     

Preschoolers' comprehension of goal structure in narratives

Preschool children's understanding and use of goals were studied in two experiments. Children heard stories in the presence of pictures or props. The stories were varied by goal success occurring early or late in the story, with late goal success resulting in more causal connections in the narrative. The results showed that children recalled goals spontaneously and that their recall benefited from goal structure of the stories. Pictures benefited the children when the stories were short. Enactment of the props versus static displays of the props did not enhance recall in the second experiment. Preschool children thus demonstrated ability to infer and use goal and causal information in stories for both picture and object support.