A Comparison of What U.S. Judges and Students Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony

We compared what 160 U.S. judges, 57 law students, and 121 undergraduates know and believe about factors affecting the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Judges were no more knowledgeable than were undergraduates, and both groups were less knowledgeable than were law students. For all 3 groups, increased knowledge of eyewitness factors was associated with beliefs that might reduce wrongful convictions. Participants in all 3 groups underestimated what potential jurors know about eyewitness testimony. The results suggest that increasing judges' knowledge of eyewitness testimony might help them to reduce wrongful convictions and to more accurately assess when eyewitness experts are needed. The results also suggest that law schools need to do a better job of educating law students about eyewitness testimony.     

Solving the eyewitness problem

Faulty eyewitness testimony is a major source of wrongful convictions. Four solutions are examined to safeguard against mistaken testimony having undue impact: (1) to overturn any conviction based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, (2) to require that an attorney be present at any pretrial identification procedure, (3) to allow an expert to testify during the trial about factors of perception and memory that could affect a witness's accuracy, and (4) to have the judge deliver a cautionary instruction to the jury, admonishing them to carefully scrutinize eyewitness testimony, or to educate them about such testimony. Each alternative is discussed within the context of psychological research and legal cases.     

Eyewitness memory is still not common sense: comparing jurors,judges and law enforcement to eyewitness experts

Knowledge of factors affecting eyewitness accuracy was examined in a sample of jurors, judges and law enforcement professionals. Participants completed a survey in which they were asked to agree or disagree with 30 statements about eyewitness issues, and their responses were compared to a sample of eyewitness experts who completed the same survey. Participant responses differed significantly from responses of eyewitness experts. Jurors disagreed with the experts on 87% of the issues, while judges and law enforcement disagreed with the experts on 60% of the issues. The findings show a large deficiency in knowledge of eyewitness memory amongst jurors, judges and law enforcement personnel, indicating that the legal system may benefit from expert assistance in the evaluation of eyewitness evidence. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Expert testimony and jury decision making: An empirical analysis

This experiment examines the influence of expert psychological testimony on juror decision making in eyewitness identification cases. Experienced jurors and undergraduate mock jurors viewed versions of a videotaped trial, rated the credibility of the eyewitness and the strength of the prosecution's and defense's cases, and rendered verdicts. In the absence of expert testimony jurors were insensitive to eyewitness evidence. Expert testimony improved juror sensitivity to eyewitness evidence without making them more skeptical about the accuracy of the eyewitness identification. Few differences emerged between the experienced jurors and undergraduate mock jurors.     

Beliefs about factors affecting the Reliability of eyewitness testimony: A Comparison of judges,jurors and the general public

We surveyed 164 members of the juror pool of the Court of Appeal and a representative sample of 1000 adult Norwegians without juror experience, about their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony, and compared their answers to a prior survey of Norwegian judges. Although the judges were somewhat more knowledgeable than jurors and the general public, all groups had limited knowledge of eyewitness testimony. Juror experience, in terms of number of times serving as juror, did not correlate with eyewitness knowledge. Consistent with this finding, the knowledge scores of the jurors were similar to the scores of the general public, tested with an abridged seven‐item version of the questionnaire. Comparisons with the results of surveys conducted in the US, indicate similar levels of knowledge among law professionals and jurors in the two countries. Increasing the knowledge of eyewitness testimony among the principal participants in the judiciary system may be an important component of the solution to eyewitness error. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Eyewitness testimony: tracing the beliefs of Swedish legal professionals

This paper examines beliefs held by Swedish legal professionals about eyewitness testimony. In a survey including questions about 13 key issues of eyewitness testimony, three groups were investigated: police officers (n = 104), prosecutors (n = 158), and judges (n = 251). The response rate was 74%. Examples of findings are that the beliefs were in line with scientific findings concerning the weapon focus effect, but were not in line for simultaneous vs. sequential lineups. Between-group differences were found for seven items. Judges were much more sceptical than police officers about the reliability and completeness of children's testimonies. The groups seldom agreed about one answer alternative, and they reported not being up to date about scientific research on eyewitness testimony. The results suggest that some important research findings have reached those working on the field. However, they hold many wrongful beliefs about eyewitness testimony, beliefs that might compromise the accuracy of legal decisions.     

Judge's Instruction on Eyewitness Testimony: Evaluation and Revision1

Studies of the reliability of eyewitness identification show that such testimony may frequently be inaccurate; because of this inherent unreliability, the law has established certain safeguards to the use of eyewitness evidence. One safeguard has been the development of an instruction that a judge may use to focus jurors' attention on the eyewitness issue. The effectiveness of this instruction has never been assessed, although other studies confirm that jurors frequently misunderstand or incorrectly use instructions they get from the judge. The purpose of these studies was to evaluate comprehension of this instruction in the context of a videotaped trial and to develop a simplified instruction that would be easier for jurors to understand. Compared to jurors who heard the existing instruction, those with the revised version were more knowledgeable of the factors to consider when listening to eyewitness testimony and were less likely to convict the defendant. A sample of superior court judges in the U.S. thought the simplified instruction was more effective than the existing version at conveying the intended legal concepts to the jury, but also rated it as more strongly biased toward the defense.     

How effective are the cross-examination and expert testimony safeguards? Jurors' perceptions of the suggestiveness and fairness of biased lineup procedures

Mock jurors (N = 800) viewed a videotaped trial that included information about a lineup identification procedure. Suggestiveness of the eyewitness identification procedure varied in terms of foil, instruction, and presentation biases. Expert testimony regarding the factors that influence lineup suggestiveness was also manipulated. Criteria included juror ratings of lineup suggestiveness and fairness, ratings of defendant culpability, and verdicts. Jurors were sensitive to foil bias but only minimally sensitive to instruction and presentation biases. Expert testimony enhanced juror sensitivity only to instruction bias. These results have implications for the effectiveness of cross-examination and expert testimony as safeguards against erroneous convictions resulting from mistaken identifications.     

A Lay Perspective on the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony1

To understand more about what laypeople think they “know” about eyewitness testimony, 276 jury-eligible university students were asked to indicate what factors they believe affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. In contrast to the large proportion of eyewitness-memory research that concerns system variables, the lay respondents overwhelmingly generated factors related to estimator variables, while system-variable factors such as police questioning and identification procedures were rarely mentioned. Respondents also reported that their own common sense and everyday life experiences were their most important sources of information about the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Not only do these results clarify the need for further research on the lay perspective of eyewitness testimony, but they also provide some insight into the way in which many jurors might approach cases involving eyewitness evidence.     

Sensitizing Potential Jurors to Variations in Eyewitness Evidence Quality Using Counterfactual Thinking

Jurors often have difficulty evaluating eyewitness testimony. Counterfactual thinking is a type of mental simulation that informs causal inference. Encouraging jurors to think counterfactually about eyewitness factors may sensitize them to these factors' causal influence on eyewitness identification and testimony accuracy, improving their overall judgments (such as verdicts). One hundred twenty‐one undergraduate participants were randomly assigned to read a scenario containing either high‐quality or low‐quality eyewitness evidence and to evaluate eyewitness factors adopting either their default or a counterfactual mindset via a question‐order manipulation. Logistic regressions and analyses of variance revealed that a counterfactual mindset lowered perceptions of eyewitness accuracy and guilty verdicts (compared with the default mindset) when the evidence was poor; a counterfactual mindset, however, did not increase perceptions of accuracy and guilty verdicts when evidence was strong. We discuss possible mechanisms underlying these effects and identify several potential avenues for future research.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Merkmale eines Fehlurteils

Wrongful convictions punish accused persons who have committed no offence. Because the revision process basically only examines whether a verdict contains judicial errors and not whether it was correct or false, to correct a wrongful conviction there very often only remains the difficult way via an revision and a de novo trial. The author underlines some typical characteristics of wrongful convictions based on own experience in successful appeals which in particular involved wrongful accusations. Required are a systematic training of judges with respect to sources of error and an evaluation of errors of judgement by the Federal Ministry of Justice as a foundation for a reform of the right of appeal.     

Speech style and occupational status affect assessments of eyewitness testimony

This study examined how speech style and occupational status affect mock jurors' assessments of eyewitness testimony. Mock jurors (n = 120) watched a video of a man testifying about witnessing an attempted robbery. The eyewitness exhibited either a powerless or powerful speech style and reported either a high or low (or no) status occupation during his testimony. Results indicated that high occupation status and powerful speech style led to more favorable evaluations of the eyewitness's testimony and of the case against the defendant than powerless speech style and low/no occupation status. Implications of these results on considerations of eyewitness testimony and future research are discussed.     

The Discrediting Effect in Eyewitness Testimony1

Loftus (1974) had subjects read summaries of criminal trials that contained the testimony of either credible or discredited prosecution eyewitnesses, and found no effect of discrediting an eyewitness. Instead, almost as many subjects voted guilty with a discredited eyewitness as with a credible eyewitness; this led Loftus to the conclusion that jurors tend to overbelieve eyewitness testimony. Loftus's conclusion was subsequently challenged by others who reported a strong discrediting effect. A series of three experiments using college students was conducted to explore the characteristics of trial summaries that might account for the discrepancy in results, such as inclusion of judicial instructions concerning proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or an eyewitness's reaffirmation of his testimony following discrediting. In all cases, a strong discrediting effect was found. Apparently the discrediting effect appears regardless of wide variation in content of trial summaries. The present data do not support the overbelief claim.     

Lay knowledge of eyewitness behaviour: A British survey

One of the recent concerns in the study of eyewitness memory is how well lay knowledge, i.e. ‘common sense’, matches the findings of empirical research. A number of American and Canadian studies, some using questionnaire methodology, have found limitations in lay knowledge of eyewitness behaviour. Further studies have extended this general finding beyond the lay public–who are prospective jurors–to legal professionals such as lawyers and policemen. The present study utilized the Knowledge of Eyewitness Behaviour Questionnaire (KEBQ), an inventory used in previous studies, to replicate the North American studies with a British sample of students, including law students, and the general public. The results showed a great similarity between the North American and British samples' knowledge of eyewitness behaviour. A significant number of correct responses were made to eight of the 14 KEBQ items, with a significant number of incorrect responses to the remainder. It was also found that law students were no more knowledgeable than other subjects; that knowledge did not vary with age; and that previous experience as an eyewitness was not related to knowledge of eyewitness behaviour. In responding to some of the criticisms of questionnaire studies it is argued that the evidence is mounting in favour of the need for a recognized system to make jurors aware of the factors known to influence eyewitness testimony.     

Individual differences in face identification postdict eyewitness accuracy

Eyewitnesses frequently mistake innocent suspects for the culprits of an observed crime, and such misidentifications have caused the wrongful convictions of many innocent people. This study attempted to establish the accuracy of individual eyewitnesses by assessing their ability to process unfamiliar faces. Observers viewed a staged crime and later tried to select the culprit from an identity lineup. This was followed by a face test that provides a laboratory analogue to lineup identifications. We found that this face test could determine the reliability of individual witnesses when a positive eyewitness identification had been made. Importantly, this was possible based on the specific response that a witness had made and without prior knowledge of whether the culprit was actually present in the lineup. These findings demonstrate that individual differences in face processing provide a potential instrument for postdicting eyewitness accuracy and for preventing miscarriages of justice.