Grammar and Grace: Reformulations of Aquinas and Wittgenstein

Book reviewed:
Grammar and Grace: Reformulations of Aquinas and Wittgenstein edited by Jeffrey Stout and Robert MacSwain (London: SCM Press, 2004) xiv + 286 pp. Reviewed by Scott D. Moringiello Department of Theology University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, IN 46556 USA     

Thomas Aquinas and the Potential Catholic Integration of a Dynamic Occasionalist Understanding of Grace

Starting out from John Barclay's Lutheran‐inclined, actualist reading of the in‐breaking quality of grace and the Spirit in Paul, this article asks how a Catholic theology of grace – typically more focused on identifying the relatively stable structures and effects of grace – might with integrity learn from the Barclayan‐Lutheran‐Pauline difference. By pursuing a close, four‐step reading of Thomas Aquinas' theology of grace, as that appears in the Summa Theologiæ and his lectures on the Pauline epistles, the article demonstrates that just such a Catholic appropriation of a more dynamic graced actualism is indeed possible; one which leads, with dynamic integrity, to a deepened understanding, articulation and practice of core Catholic instincts rather than to their reduction or distortion.     

Aquinas and the Natural Law

Recent decades have seen a shift away from the traditional view that Aquinas's theory of the natural law is meant to supply us with normative guidance grounded in a substantive theory of human nature. In the present essay, I argue that this is a mistake. Expanding on the suggestions of Jean Porter and Ralph McInerny, I defend a derivationist reading of ST I‐II, Q. 94, A. 2 according to which Aquinas takes our knowledge of the genuine goods of human life and their proper ordering to one another to be self‐evident only to the wise who are able to discern the truth about our God‐given human nature. I then show that this reading provides a better account of Aquinas's view than two recent alternatives: John Finnis's brand of inclinationism and Daniel Mark Nelson's virtue‐based interpretation.     

Renegotiating Aquinas

While Roman Catholic feminist ethicists typically endorse moral realism and crosscultural standards of justice, they also have been influenced by the postmodern interrogation of abstract reason and moral universalism. As theologians writing after the Second Vatican Council, they are increasingly sensitive to the communal and ecclesial dimensions of morality and of Christian ethics, and to the integral relation of Christian faith and ethics. This essay will consider two approaches to Catholic feminist ethics that differ in the relative weight they give to constructive work for social justice (realist gender justice ethics), or to the grounding of ethics in prayer and mysticism (postmodern gendered faith ethics). Using critical feminist reappropriations of the theology and ethics of Aquinas as examples, this essay will argue that the two approaches are overlapping and interdependent.     

Aquinas and modern consequentialism

Because the moral philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas is egoistic while modern consequentialism is impartialistic, it might at first appear that the former cannot, while the latter can, provide a common value on the basis of which inter‐personal conflicts may be settled morally. On the contrary, in this paper I intend to argue not only that Aquinas’ theory does provide just such a common value, but that it is more true to say of modern consequentialism than of Thomism that it gives in to the partiality of different interests and fails to provide a robust common value on the basis of which disagreements may be settled morally. This is so primarily because the egoism of Aquinas represents a fundamental commitment to personal moral development which is absent from modern teleological theories.     

Aquinas and quantifier mistakes

In his “Third Way” Aquinas appears to argue in a way that relies upon shifting quantifiers in a fallacious way. Some have tried to save this and other parts of the “Third Way” by introducing sophisticated logical and metaphysical machinery. Alternatively, Aquinas’ apparently fallacious quantifier shift can be seen to be part of a valid argument if we supply a simple premise which an Aristotelian natural philosopher would surely hold. In this short paper, I consider candidates for this premise, defend a specific premise, and from that discussion draw a moral about quantifier predicate logic. I conclude that Aristotelian natural philosophy is more than an historical backdrop to Aquinas’ arguments.     

Aquinas and Weakness of Will

Aquinas's admirers, reacting against Donald Davidson's criticisms of him, commonly argue (a) that the will does play a role in Aquinas's account of incontinence, and (b) that his explanation of incontinent action turns on the weakness of the will. The first part of this paper argues that they are correct about (a) but wholly mistaken about (b). Aquinas rarely even mentions the weakness of the will, and he never invokes it to explain why someone acts counter to her own better judgment. In his view, such a person has the capacity for self-control but fails to exercise it.
  The second part of the paper considers Gary Watson's account of incontinence, including and especially his objections to analyzing it as the failure to exercise one's capacity for self-control. Here I argue that Aquinas's account better serves the purposes of moral discourse and that it should not be expected to provide the kind of causal explanation Watson seeks.     

Aquinas on Quality

For Kant, Aristotle's categories are arbitrary but brilliant and they do not ultimately correspond to extramental reality. For Aquinas, however, they are rational divisions of extramental being. In this perennial and ongoing dispute, the various positions seem to dissolve upon delving into the particulars of any one category. If, however, the categories are divisions of extramental being, it should be possible to offer plausible accounts of particular categories. I offer Aquinas's unstudied derivation of quality as a test case to see how one could hold, and how Aquinas did hold, to a realism about Aristotle's categories at a highly specific level. Although Aristotle divides quality into four species and some further subspecies, unlike Aquinas, he offers no reasons for these divisions. For Aquinas each accident is a particular mode of existing, that is, it is a particular way that an accident exists in a substance. In the case of quality, this mode of existing follows substantial form and its real extramental causes or effects further divide it into four species. Aquinas's account is both compelling and original, inspired by Aristotle but also un-Aristotelian. The paper concludes by comparing Aquinas's account of quality with the best extant account of Aristotle's quality, namely, Paul Studtmann's.