Nietzsche's agon with ressentiment: towards a therapeutic reading of critical transvaluation

This paper examines the therapeutic implications of Nietzsche's critique of ressentiment and revenge as our signature malady. §I examines the obstacles to a therapeutic reading of Nietzsche's thought, including his anti-teleological tendencies and the value he places on sickness. Then there is the energetic problem of finding resources to tackle ressentiment, given the volitional exhaustion of modern nihilism. Finally, the self-referential implications of Nietzsche's critique of slave values threaten to trap his thought in a futile ressentiment against ressentiment. If the impulse to cure or redeem us from revenge through critical destruction repeats the logic of revenge, then the challenge for a therapeutic reading is to think through the transformation of revenge on the basis of repetition.An agonal reading of Nietzsche's philosophical practice is proposed to tackle these problems in §II.In Homer's Contest (1872), Nietzsche describes the transference (Übertragung) of Hesiod's evil Eris – goddess of war and destruction – into the good Eris of the contest or agon: destructive impulses are affirmed as stimulants, but also transformed into culture-building forces through an agonal regime of limited aggression. By superimposing this regime, as a model for Nietzsche's textual confrontations, on their unconscious text of embodied ressentiment, a therapeutic perspective emerges, based on three principles: affirmation; mutual empowerment; and externalisation. The agon performs an affirmative transformation of revenge on the basis of a fertile repetition: destructive affects (as in ressentiment) are transferred into constructive deeds of mutual antagonism. Through Nietzsche's agonal discourse, a reactive regime of internalised aggression is externalised in active deeds of limited philosophical aggression – a therapeutic transformation of (self-)destructive into constructive, philosophical impulses.     

Le chant et la dispute (song and dispute)

Résumé Une forme originale de débats poétiques en relation avec la lyrique courtoise s'élabore aux XIIé et XIIIè s. Appelés jeux-partis en langue d'oïl ils connaissent un certain succès dans le cadre urbain du puy d'Arras. Formulant une casuistique amoureuse, ils sont à la croisée de différentes formalisations: poétique, juridique et scolastique.L'enjeu du débat est exprimé sous le mode dilemmatique. L'argumentation mise en oeuvre se déploie autour de trois énoncés fondamentaux: sentences, proverbes et images.La sentence, inscrite dans le discours lyrique qu'elle érige en axiomatique de l'amour, occupe une fonction ambivalente: elle est l'énonce 'e que l'on se propose de discuter et al forme qu'adopte la démonstration. Se combinant avec une syntaxe de la démonstration, elle ne produit que l'illusion de la dialectique et révèle, en creux, le caractère tautologique du jeu-parti. Sur 120 poèmes, il n'y a pas moins de 80 expressions proverbiales qui s'articulent différemment sur le contexte — quoique majoritairement par des formules assertives — mais qui toutes rompent avec son isotopie, illustrant et énonçant en même temps la règle. La procédure d'exemplarisation, sous la forme d'énoncés imagés, opére d'autres déplacements. Si le proverbe, issu de l'univers empirique, universalise la situation à laquelle il se réfère, l'image procède à l'inverse: d'un thème général, elle offre l'exemple d'une ou de plusieurs situations anecdotiques, d'où surgit l'universalité de la règle.Or aucun de ces énonc'es n'entrent dans une logique démonstrative et proprement argumentative. Ils resten clos sur eux-mêmes. Les interlocuteurs ne reprennent pas ce qui vient d'être dit, sinon sous une forme brutale de réfutation. La véritable formalisation est polémique. Discours qui manipule l'ironie, frôle l'insulte et recherche l'effet plus que le raisonnement Discours qui bâtit sa vérité -contradictoire-comme un jeu tourné vers un auditoire dont on saisit et quête les complicités.Car la vérité reste bien au coeur du débat et elle est sans cesse assertée. Comme elle l'est dans les disputes, ces combats des clercs.Disputes et ieux-partis mettent en scéne une logique de la controverse. Ils sont des argumentations spectacles. L'élaboration de la vérité se fait ailleurs, dans les sommes par exemple. Le jeu-parti est aporétique. S'il est une réponse á son questionnement, elle se lit dans le poéme d'amour dont la forme enferme le sic et non de la joy, joie et jeu d'amour.

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An original form of poetical debate is elaborated in the 12th and 13th century in relation to court lyricism. Under the appellation of jeux-partis in oil tongue, they meet some success in the urban frame of the puy d'Arras. As they formulate a sophistry of love, they intersect a number of different formalisations such as the poetical, juridical and scholastic ones.What is at stake in the debate is expressed on the dilemmatic mode. The argumentation is worked out at large through three basic enunciations: maxims, proverbs and images.The maxim, inscribed as it is in the lyrical discourse that it lays down as being axiomatical for love, has an ambivalent function: on one hand it is the enunciation one intends to dispute, on the other hand it is the form taken by the demonstration. As it combines with a syntax of demonstration it only brings out the illusion of dialectics incidentally revealing the reduddant tautology of le jeu-parti. Out of a number of 120 poems, there are no less than 80 proverbial expressions which articulate themselves on the context differently — although they do so in majority through assertive formulations — yet disrupting with its isotopy in so much as they illustrate and enunciate the rule at the same time. The process of examplarisation, in the form of imaged enunciations operate other alterations. If the proverb, descending from the empirical universe, universalizes the situation it refers to, the image alone proceeds inversely: from a general theme it gives an example of one or several anecdotical situations out of which the universalness of the rule emerges.Now, none of those enunciations proceeds from a demonstrative or even properly argumentative logic. They are enclosed in themselves. The interlocutors do not resume what has just been said, unless it be in a blunt form of refutation. The true formalisation is polemical. It consists in a discourse which handles irony, lightly touches insult and seeks after effect rather than reasoning. It builds up its own truth — contradictorily though — as a game played on an audience whose complicity is to be grasped and then requested — for truthfulness does lie right in the midst of the debate and asserts itself unendlessly, such as it is in les disputes, those contests between scholars. Disputes and jeux-partis promote a logic of controversy. They are argumentations-spectacles. The elaboration of truth lies elsewhere, in the Summae for example. Le jeu-parti is aporhetical. If ever there exists an answer to its questioning, it can be found in love poetry the form of which includes the sic et non of la joy, mirth and play on love.

     

In and behind a Lenneberg paradigm

Lenneberg suggested that a chimpanzee's linguistic ability could be tested by presenting sentences containing two prepositional phrases joined by a conjunction. This would involve joining two semantic propositions, and thus represents a more complex test of chimpanzee syntactic competence than previously attempted. Jane, a five year-old language trained chimpanzee, was tested on her ability to both produce and comprehend sentences involving a preposition (in or behind) and a conjunction (and). The results from production and comprehension were substantially the same. Jane showed the ability to appropriately deploy and, behind and in, but displayed very little flexibility in their use. It is suggested that a chimpanzee may be able to learn some rules of syntax but is not able to be creative with that syntax.     

Formalization of functionally complete propositional calculus with the functor of implication as the only primitive term

The most difficult problem that Leniewski came across in constructing his system of the foundations of mathematics was the problem of defining definitions, as he used to put it. He solved it to his satisfaction only when he had completed the formalization of his protothetic and ontology. By formalization of a deductive system one ought to understand in this context the statement, as precise and unambiguous as possible, of the conditions an expression has to satisfy if it is added to the system as a new thesis. Now, some protothetical theses, and some ontological ones, included in the respective systems, happen to be definitions. In the present essay I employ Leniewski's method of terminological explanations for the purpose of formalizing ukasiewicz's system of implicational calculus of propositions, which system, without having recourse to quantification, I first extended some time ago into a functionally complete system. This I achieved by allowing for a rule of implicational definitions, which enabled me to define any propositionforming functor for any finite number of propositional arguments.To the memory of Jerzy Supecki     

A reduction rule for Peirce formula

A reduction rule is introduced as a transformation of proof figures in implicational classical logic. Proof figures are represented as typed terms in a -calculus with a new constant P ⁽⁽⁾⁾. It is shown that all terms with the same type are equivalent with respect to -reduction augmented by this P-reduction rule. Hence all the proofs of the same implicational formula are equivalent. It is also shown that strong normalization fails for P-reduction. Weak normalization is shown for P-reduction with another reduction rule which simplifies of (( ) ) into an atomic type.This work was partially supported by a Grant-in-Aid for General Scientific Research No. 05680276 of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, Japan and by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. Hiroakira Ono     

Variations in use of the term “or”

Two studies showed that adults' responses to questions involving the term or varied markedly depending upon the type of question presented. When presented with various objects (A's and B's) and asked to circle all things which are A or B subjects tended to circle A's as well as B's, whereas when asked to circle all the A's or B's subjects showed a relatively stronger tendency to circle one or the other. Moreover the nature of the sets of objects (As and Bs) influenced behavior as well. There was also evidence that the effects due to question wording or set type transferred.     

On the logic of nonmonotonic conditionals and conditional probabilities

I will describe the logics of a range of conditionals that behave like conditional probabilities at various levels of probabilistic support. Families of these conditionals will be characterized in terms of the rules that their members obey. I will show that for each conditional, , in a given family, there is a probabilistic support level r and a conditional probability function P such that, for all sentences C and B, CB holds just in case P[B|C]r. Thus, each conditional in a given family behaves like conditional probability above some specific support level.Chris Swoyer provided very helpful comments on drafts of this paper.     

Contextualism and the Skeptic: Comments on Engel

Mylan Engels paper (2004) is divided into two parts: a negative part, criticizing the costs of contextualism and a constructive part proposing a noncontextualist resolution of the skeptical problem. I will only address the constructive part here. The constructive part is composed of three elements: (i) a reconstruction or reformulation of the original skeptical argument, which draws on the notion of epistemic possibility (e-possibility), (ii) a distinction between two senses of knowledge (and two corresponding kinds of e-possibility): fallibilistic and infallibilistic, and (iii) an argument which tries to hoist the skeptic by their own petard, namely the closure principle (CP). As I will argue, there are two ways to understand Engels anti-skeptical argument. Only in one interpretation does the argument depend on the proposed reconstruction of the skeptical argument in terms of e-possibility. But this version of the argument is unsound. More importantly, the skeptic has a strong prima facie objection at her disposal, which applies to both interpretations of the argument. If this objection is valid, Engels argument does not hold. But once it is invalidated, his argument is superfluous.     

On Łukasiewicz-Moisil algebras of fuzzy sets

The set (X, J) of fuzzy subsetsf:XJ of a setX can be equipped with a structure of -valued ukasiewicz-Moisil algebra, where is the order type of the totally ordered setJ. Conversely, every ukasiewicz-Moisil algebra — and in particular every Post algebra — is isomorphic to a subalgebra of an algebra of the form (X, J), whereJ has an order type . The first result of this paper is a characterization of those -valued ukasiewicz-Moisil algebras which are isomorphic to an algebra of the form (X, J) (Theorem 1). Then we prove that (X, J) is a Post algebra if and only if the setJ is dually well-ordered (Theorem 2) and we give a characterization of those -valued Post algebras with are isomorphic to an algebra of the form (X, J) (Theorem 3 and Proposition 2).     

On defining necessity in terms of entailment

In their book Entailment, Anderson and Belnap investigate the consequences of defining Lp (it is necessary that p) in system E as (pp)p. Since not all theorems are equivalent in E, this raises the question of whether there are reasonable alternative definitions of necessity in E. In this paper, it is shown that a definition of necessity in E satisfies the conditions { _E Lpp, _EL(pq)(LpLq), _E pLp} if and only if its has the form C ₁.C₂ .... C_np, where each C _iis equivalent in E to either pp or ((pp)p)p.     

A note on the equivalence of the graded response model and the sequential model

This paper concerns items that consist of several item steps to be responded to sequentially. The item scoreX is defined as the number of correct responses until the first failure. Samejima's graded response model states that each steph=1,...,m is characterized by a parameterb _h , and, for a subject with ability, Pr(Xh; )=F(–b _h ). Tutz's general sequential model associates with each step a parameterdh, and it states that Pr(Xh;)= _r ^=1h G(–d _r ). Tutz's (1991, 1997) conjectures that the models are equivalent if and only ifF(x)=G(x) is an extreme value distribution. This paper presents a proof for this conjecture.     

On the logic of conscious belief

In this paper we are discussing a version of propositional belief logic, denoted by LB, in which so-called axioms of introspection (B BB and B B B) are added to the usual ones. LB is proved to be sound and complete with respect to Boolean algebras equipped with proper filters (Theorem 5). Interpretations in classical theories (Theorem 4) are also considered. A few modifications of LB are further dealt with, one of which turns out to be S5.     

The Longest Faculty Strike in the History of U.S. Institutions of Higher Education: Perceptions of the Union President

The president of the AAUP faculty union at University of Bridgeport, from 1987 to 1991, offers a first-hand account of the circumstances leading to the fatal strike there. He refutes accusations that the union and its leadership destroyed the university and provides a dramatic, personal account of a faculty union under attack by union busters. The faculty, he argues, was resisting a concerted onslaught on traditional faculty rights. It fought desperately to stifle a retrograde revolution in higher education seeking the substitution of absolute Management Rights to traditional collegiality. He refers to faculty as the soul and mind of a university, and to administration as a necessary evil whose duty is primarily to assist the faculty in the accomplishment of the university's mission.     

“Emotionally, Soulfully, Spiritually ‘Free to Think and Act’: The Helen Flanders Dunbar (1902–59) Memorial Lecture on Psychosomatic Medicine and Pastoral Care”

This essay aims to stimulate rethinking about religious and medical healing and wholeness. While psychiatrist (Helen) Flanders Dunbar (1902–1959) is well known as a psychosomatic investigator and as Medical Director of the Council for Clinical Training, the initial home of Anton Boisen's groundbreaking movement for the clinical pastoral education of institutional chaplains and parish ministers, she is less appreciated as a theologically-trained scholar. This essay explores an earlier era's understanding of the spiritual and the more soulful components of healing and how Dunbar combined these to focus on helping all peoples become free to think and act. This essay was originally delivered as The Helen Flanders Dunbar Memorial Lecture on Psychosomatic Medicine and Pastoral Care at Columbia Presbyterian Center of the New York-Presbyterian Hospital, New York on November 2, 1999.     

Syntactical investigations intoBI logic andBB′I logic

In this note, we will study four implicational logicsB, BI, BB and BBI. In [5], Martin and Meyer proved that a formula is provable inBB if and only if is provable inBBI and is not of the form of » . Though it gave a positive solution to theP - W problem, their method was semantical and not easy to grasp. We shall give a syntactical proof of the syntactical relation betweenBB andBBI logics. It also includes a syntactical proof of Powers and Dwyer's theorem that is proved semantically in [5]. Moreover, we shall establish the same relation betweenB andBI logics asBB andBBI logics. This relation seems to say thatB logic is meaningful, and so we think thatB logic is the weakest among meaningful logics. Therefore, by Theorem 1.1, our Gentzentype system forBI logic may be regarded as the most basic among all meaningful logics. It should be mentioned here that the first syntactical proof ofP - W problem is given by Misao Nagayama [6].Presented byHiroakira Ono     

On a certain class ofm-address machines

Conclusion It follows from the proved theorems that ifM =Q, (whereQ={0,q ₁,q ₂,...,q }) is a machine of the classM _F then there exist machinesM _i such thatM _i(1,c)=M (q _i,c) andQ _i={0, 1, 2, ..., +1} (i=1, 2, ..., ).And thus, if the way in which to an initial function of content of memorycC a machine assigns a final onecC is regarded as the only essential property of the machine then we can deal with the machines of the formM ={0, 1, 2, ..., }, and processes (t) (wheret=1,c,cC) only.Such approach can simplify the problem of defining particular machines of the classM _F , composing and simplifying them.Allatum est die 19 Januarii 1970     

Model theoretic results for infinitely deep languages

We define a subhierarchy of the infinitely deep languagesN described by Jaakko Hintikka and Veikko Rantala. We shall show that some model theoretic results well-known in the model theory of the ordinary infinitary languages can be generalized for these new languages. Among these are the downward Löwenheim-Skolem and o's theorems as well as some compactness properties.     

Supererogation in Deontic Logic: Metatheory for DWE and Some Close Neighbours

In "Doing Well Enough: Toward a Logic for Common Sense Morality", Paul McNamara sets out a semantics for a deontic logic which contains the operator It is supererogatory that. As well as having a binary accessibility relation on worlds, that semantics contains a relative ordering relation, . For worlds u, v and w, we say that u w v when v is at least as good as u according to the standards of w. In this paper we axiomatize logics complete over three versions of the semantics. We call the strongest of these logics DWE for Doing Well Enough.     

On objectivity

The following definition of objective is proposed: A statement S is objective if and only if in S all parameters that are relevant to its truth value are made explicit. The objectivity of predicates and relations can be defined in a similar manner. This simple conception of objectivity-which could be called explicitness conception of objectivity-can be found in Hermann Weyl and plays a central part in the natural sciences. There are grades of objectivity depending on the quality and the number of parameters our predicates are relativized to A relativistic Ockham principle has to be recognized: Relativization parameters are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. The explicitness conception of objectivity is accessible to mathematical specifications, is the core of the idea of invariance, has a lot of philosophical applications and leads to precise notions of subjectivity and a precise formulation of the problem of the limits of objectivity.I am grateful to Andreas Bartels, Ulrich Gähde, Mark Helme, Andreas Kamlah, Andreas Kemmerling, Winfred Klink, Toni Koch, Hilary Putnam and Matthias Varga von Kibéd who have, in one way or another, contributed to the present content and form of this paper.     

Completeness theorem for dummett's LC quantified and some of its extensions

Dummett's logic LC quantified, Q-LC, is shown to be characterized by the extended frame Q⁺, ,D, where Q⁺ is the set of non-negative rational numbers, is the numerical relation less or equal then and D is the domain function such that for all v, w Q⁺, D_v and if v w, then D _v . D _v D _w . Moreover, simple completeness proofs of extensions of Q-LC are given.