逻辑－信念冲突与推理难度对逻辑和信念判断的影响

双加工理论框架下的平行竞争模型和默认干涉模型对推理过程中启发式和分析式加工的启动次序和相互作用的性质提出了不同假设。本研究通过考察被试在信念判断和逻辑判断两种指导语下解决不同难度和不同类型推理问题的正确率和反应时,对两个模型的预测进行了检验。实验结果表明,解决简单问题时,问题类型对信念判断有显著影响,对逻辑判断无显著影响;解决复杂问题时,问题类型对逻辑判断的影响显著大于对信念判断的影响。实验结果支持平行竞争模型的假设,即两类加工在推理过程中同时启动,共同竞争最终的推理反应。     

Intuition and The Junctures of Judgment in Decision Procedures for Clinical Ethics

Moral decision procedures such as principlism or casuistry require intuition at certain junctures, as when a principle seems indeterminate, or principles conflict, or we wonder which paradigm case is most relevantly similar to the instant case. However, intuitions are widely thought to lack epistemic justification, and many ethicists urge that such decision procedures dispense with intuition in favor of forms of reasoning that provide discursive justification. I argue that discursive justification does not eliminate or minimize the need for intuition, or constrain our intuitions. However, this is not a problem, for intuitions can be justified in easy or obvious cases, and decision procedures should be understood as heuristic devices for reaching judgments about harder cases that approximate the justified intuitions we would have about cases under ideal conditions, where hard cases become easy. Similarly, the forms of reasoning which provide discursive justification help decision procedures perform this heuristic function not by avoiding intuition, but by making such heuristics more accurate. Nonetheless, it is possible to demand too much justification; many clinical ethicists lack the time and philosophical training to reach the more elaborate levels of discursive justification. We should keep moral decision procedures simple and user-friendly so that they will provide what justification can be achieved under clinical conditions, rather than trying to maximize our epistemic justification out of an overstated concern about intuition.     

When does explicit justification impair decision making?

The idea that careful analysis leads to better decisions is pervasive in research on decision making. Intriguingly, results raise the possibility that thinking about reasons for decisions before deciding may degrade decision quality. This paper reports the results of a laboratory study which examined whether task characteristics critically influence the effects of thinking about reasons on decision quality. We found that explicit reasoning degraded judgement quality, objectively measured, on an ‘intuitive’ task. However, we also found that explicit reasoning enhanced performance on an ‘analytic’ task. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

信息的充分性和情绪性对推理的影响：时间压力的调节作用

主要探讨推理中信息相关因素对分析系统与启发式系统的影响。通过两个实验考察信息的充分性和情绪性对突发事件情境下推理的影响。实验1任务无时间压力,结果发现：信息充分性对推理的影响显著,表现为信息越充分,被试推理的逻辑指数越高,更多使用了分析系统;且信息充分时,接受积极信息的被试的信念指数显著增高。实验2任务有时间压力,结果发现：信息的情绪性对推理的影响显著,表现为接受积极信息的被试推理的逻辑指数显著大于接受消极信息组,更多使用了分析系统。两个实验结果表明,信息的充分性主要通过分析系统对推理产生影响,而信息的情绪性可通过双系统影响推理过程,即积极信息在推理时间充裕时促进启发式系统,但在有时间压力下促进分析系统。     

Confidence and accuracy in deductive reasoning

In two experiments, we investigated the relationship between confidence and accuracy in syllogistic reasoning. Participants judged the validity of conclusions and provided confidence ratings twice for each problem: once quickly and again after further deliberation. Correlations between confidence and accuracy were small or nonexistent. In addition, confidence and accuracy were mediated by different variables. Confidence judgments appeared to reflect external cues, so that confidence was greater when the participants were allowed additional time to think about the problem, as well as when the conclusion was either believable or unbelievable, rather than neutral. In contrast, accuracy changed little as a function of the amount of time available and did not differ for believable and neutral problems. These data support a model in which initial decisions are made quickly, on the basis of heuristic cues, and analytic processes are used to justify or rationalize the earlier decision.     

A dual-process account of the development of scientific reasoning: The nature and development of metacognitive intercession skills

Metacognitive knowledge of the dual-processing basis of judgment is critical to resolving conflict between analytic and experiential processing responses [Klaczynski, P. A. (2004). A dual-process model of adolescent development: Implications for decision making, reasoning, and identity. In R. V. Kail (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior, Vol. 31 (pp. 73–123). San Diego, CA: Academic Press]. Such conflict is ubiquitous when reasoning scientifically. Three studies explored the nature, development, and stability of this metacognitive knowledge. In each study, participants completed the ratio-bias judgment task, which assessed their tendency to make analytically based responses, and the ratio-bias evaluation task, which assessed their metacognitive knowledge of the processing basis of judgments on the task (Metacognitive Status). In Study 1, college students’ judgment performance was related to metacognitive status but not to general cognitive ability. In Study 2, metacognitive status was related to age and mathematics-related changes. Metacognitive status again predicted participants’ tendency to make analytically based judgments. In Study 3, college students’ judgments, but not metacognitive status, were affected by task conditions. The evidence suggests that assessing metacognitive knowledge is important for understanding how conflict between analytically and experientially based judgments is resolved.     

Intuition, reason, and metacognition

Dual Process Theories (DPT) of reasoning posit that judgments are mediated by both fast, automatic processes and more deliberate, analytic ones. A critical, but unanswered question concerns the issue of monitoring and control: When do reasoners rely on the first, intuitive output and when do they engage more effortful thinking? We hypothesised that initial, intuitive answers are accompanied by a metacognitive experience, called the Feeling of Rightness (FOR), which can signal when additional analysis is needed. In separate experiments, reasoners completed one of four tasks: conditional reasoning (N = 60), a three-term variant of conditional reasoning (N = 48), problems used to measure base rate neglect (N = 128), or a syllogistic reasoning task (N = 64). For each task, participants were instructed to provide an initial, intuitive response to the problem along with an assessment of the rightness of that answer (FOR). They were then allowed as much time as needed to reconsider their initial answer and provide a final answer. In each experiment, we observed a robust relationship between the FOR and two measures of analytic thinking: low FOR was associated with longer rethinking times and an increased probability of answer change. In turn, FOR judgments were consistently predicted by the fluency with which the initial answer was produced, providing a link to the wider literature on metamemory. These data support a model in which a metacognitive judgment about a first, initial model determines the extent of analytic engagement.     

Reasoning and mathematical skills contribute to normatively superior decision making under risk: evidence from the game of dice task

In this study, we assessed to what extent reasoning improves performance in decision making under risk in a laboratory gambling task (Game of Dice Task-Double, GDT-D). We also investigated to what degree individuals with above average mathematical competence decide better than those with average mathematical competence. Eighty-five participants performed the GDT-D and several numerical tasks. Forty-two individuals were asked to calculate the probabilities and the outcomes associated with the different options of the GDT-D before performing it. The other 43 individuals performed the GDT-D at the beginning of the test session. Both reasoning and mathematical competence had a positive effect on decision making. Different measures of mathematical competence correlated with advantageous performance in decision making. Results suggest that decision making under explicit risk conditions improves when individuals are encouraged to reflect about the contingencies of a decision situation. Interventions based on numerical reasoning may also be useful for patients with difficulties in decision making.     

The role of verbal labels in the judgment of orientation and location

In an earlier study it was found that judgments of right-left orientations and locations were more difficult than judgments of up-down only when spatial words were used in the tasks. Experiments are reported in which pictures of many objects were presented to eliminate the possibility that subjects in previous studies had used strategies specific to single-stimulus tasks. In experiment 1, right-left orientations were judged more slowly than up-down orientations both when the spatial words were used and when arbitrary letters replaced the spatial words. In experiment 2, judgments of the right-left locations of pictures took longer than judgments of their up-down locations only when spatial words were used in the task; the right-left difficulty was eliminated when arbitrary letters replaced the words. The differential effect of words and letters in location judgments seems to be due to the different coding strategies adopted by subjects under the two conditions. It is concluded that a right-left difficulty does not depend on the use of spatial terms: word and letter conditions yield different results only when the task permits different judgments to be made under the two conditions.     

Walker on the voluntariness of judgment 1

In his paper ‘The Voluntariness of Judgment’ Mark Thomas Walker claims that judgments are voluntary acts. According to Walker, theoretical reasoning can be seen as an instance of practical reasoning, and the outcomes of practical reasoning are actions. There are two reasons why Walker's argument does not establish this conclusion: (i) There are non‐reflective judgments which cannot reasonably be described as instances of practical reasoning; Walker's argument does not apply to these judgments, (ii) If one judges that p as a result of deliberation, one has had no choice sincerely to judge as well that non‐p instead of p, that is, one cannot judge contrary to one's evidence. Therefore, reflective judgments are not voluntary actions. Walker cannot show that reflective judgments are voluntary, because he fails to give a clear notion of a voluntary action and the role of choice.     

Diagnostic causal reasoning with verbal information

In diagnostic causal reasoning, the goal is to infer the probability of causes from one or multiple observed effects. Typically, studies investigating such tasks provide subjects with precise quantitative information regarding the strength of the relations between causes and effects or sample data from which the relevant quantities can be learned. By contrast, we sought to examine people’s inferences when causal information is communicated through qualitative, rather vague verbal expressions (e.g., “X occasionally causes A”). We conducted three experiments using a sequential diagnostic inference task, where multiple pieces of evidence were obtained one after the other. Quantitative predictions of different probabilistic models were derived using the numerical equivalents of the verbal terms, taken from an unrelated study with different subjects. We present a novel Bayesian model that allows for incorporating the temporal weighting of information in sequential diagnostic reasoning, which can be used to model both primacy and recency effects. On the basis of 19,848 judgments from 292 subjects, we found a remarkably close correspondence between the diagnostic inferences made by subjects who received only verbal information and those of a matched control group to whom information was presented numerically. Whether information was conveyed through verbal terms or numerical estimates, diagnostic judgments closely resembled the posterior probabilities entailed by the causes’ prior probabilities and the effects’ likelihoods. We observed interindividual differences regarding the temporal weighting of evidence in sequential diagnostic reasoning. Our work provides pathways for investigating judgment and decision making with verbal information within a computational modeling framework.     

The grim reasoner: Analytical reasoning under mortality salience

The human species enjoys uniquely developed capacities for analytical reasoning and rational decision making, but these capacities come with a price: They make us aware of our inevitable physical death. Drawing on terror management theory and dual-process theories of cognition, we investigate the impact of mortality awareness on analytical reasoning. Two experiments show that experimentally induced thoughts of death impair analytical reasoning performance, just as cognitive load would. When made aware of their own mortality, reasoners allocate their executive resources to the suppression of this disturbing thought, therefore impairing their performance on syllogisms that require analytic thought. This finding has consequences for all aspects of rational thinking that draw on executive resources, and calls for an integrated approach to existential psychology and the psychology of rational thought.     

A Reverse Outcome Bias: The Influence of Multiple Reference Points on the Evaluation of Outcomes and Decisions

Two experiments examined the influence of multiple reference points on the evaluation of outcomes and decisions that lead to those outcomes. Norm theory is applied as a conceptual framework for understanding the conditions under which alternative norms may be evoked by the decision context and how they are subsequently used as reference points in the evaluation process. Of primary interest, in these studies, was how an outcome is evaluated when two reference points, the status quo and an evoked alternative, provide conflicting information about the "goodness" of the outcome (the outcome is good from the perspective of one reference point and bad from the perspective of the other). A gambling paradigm, based on regret theory, is employed to address these questions. We find that an alternative outcome is more likely to be evoked as a reference point when: (1) it is certain that another choice would have led to the alternative outcome; (2) a social comparison other receives the alternative outcome; and (3) the alternative outcome is in a different evaluative domain than the outcome received (i.e., is negative when the outcome received is positive). When these conditions hold, and the alternative outcome is used as a reference point for evaluation, the evaluations which result are quite counterintuitive: winners are rated as more regretful over their choices than losers are considered to be less satisfied with their outcomes than losers, and are rated as having made poorer quality decision than losers, who made the same choice! The latter finding represents a complete reversal of the outcome bias often observed in judgments of decisions made under uncertainty.     

重量对元认知监控的无意识影响

采用结构知识归因的方法,以学习判断和项目优先选择作为元认知监测和控制的指标,考察重量对元认知监控的影响是否是无意识的。被试学习粘贴在不同重量纸盒上的词对,进行学习判断(实验1)或项目选择(实验2),并报告其判断或选择的依据。结果:(1)重量影响学习判断和项目优先选择,相对于轻纸盒,被试给予重纸盒上的词对更高的JOL并优先选择重纸盒上的词对进行学习;(2)重量对学习判断的影响只发生在判断依据为猜测的情况下,重量对项目优先选择的影响只发生在判断依据为猜测和直觉的情况下。上述结果支持了元认知的具身性,并提示重量对元认知监控的影响可能是无意识的。     

Heuristic and analytic processing: age trends and associations with cognitive ability and cognitive styles

Developmental and individual differences in the tendency to favor analytic responses over heuristic responses were examined in children of two different ages (10- and 11-year-olds versus 13-year-olds), and of widely varying cognitive ability. Three tasks were examined that all required analytic processing to override heuristic processing: inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning under conditions of belief bias, and probabilistic reasoning. Significant increases in analytic responding with development were observed on the first two tasks. Cognitive ability was associated with analytic responding on all three tasks. Cognitive style measures such as actively open-minded thinking and need for cognition explained variance in analytic responding on the tasks after variance shared with cognitive ability had been controlled. The implications for dual-process theories of cognition and cognitive development are discussed.     

Many-Valued Logic and Event-Related Potentials

In previous experiments on event-related potentials (ERPs) during linguistic judgments, the subjects' decisions have been categorical (e.g., true vs false). In this experiment, more realistic variations in truth value and subject certainty were used. Thirty-eight naive undergraduates read a story about a fictional murder. ERPs were recorded as the subjects rated the strength of their beliefs about statements relating to suspects in the crime. Because no subject was sure which of the suspects was guilty of committing the crime, binary (true–false) category judgments were inappropriate. Three components of the ERP waveforms were affected by the experimental manipulations. An early positive component was largest to sentences concerning the suspect considered most likely to have committed the crime. A subsequent broad posterior positivity (LPC) also showed significant sentence-type differences, but it was larger to sentences considered probable—whether they were true or false—than to more ambiguous sentences. A third ERP component (N400) was negative at midline electrode sites and peaked at approximately 420 ms. Subjects' truth-value judgments had no effect on the N400. N400 was, however, affected by the subject's task. It was more negative when subjects made graded judgments about truth value than when they made binary true–false judgments. Overall, naturalistic judgments of sentence validity produced a variety of brain responses that reflected different aspects of linguistic decision making.     

Effects of salience and time pressure on ratings of social causality

A model is proposed to account for the effects of a target person's salience on judgments of that target. It is argued that salience leads to more extreme inferences in the direction implied by prior knowledge that is relevant to the judgment. This knowledge may include both specific information about the target being rated and general information about the class of stimuli to which the target belongs. Two experiments supported these hypotheses. When subjects were under time pressure to make judgments of a target person's influence in a social situation, their judgments increased with the salience of the target when they had prior knowledge that the target was generally high in social influence. However, their judgments decreased with the target's salience when subjects had prior knowledge that the target was generally low in social influence. When subjects were given ample time to make their judgments, however, the effects of target salience were attenuated. Possible implications of these findings for prior research on salience effects are discussed.     

Children's understanding of promising, lying, and false belief

Understanding promising and lying requires an understanding of intention and the ability to interpret mental states. The author examined (a) the extent to which 4- to 6-year-olds focus on the sincerity of the speaker's intention when the 4-to 6-year-olds make judgments about promises and lies and (b) whether false-belief reasoning skills are related to understanding promising and lying. Participants watched videotaped stories and made promise and lie judgments from their own perspective and from the listener-character's perspective. Children also completed false-belief reasoning tasks. Older children made more correct promise judgments from both perspectives. All children made correct lie judgments from the listener's perspective. The author found that Ist-order false-belief reasoning was related to making judgments from the participant's perspective; 2nd-order false-belief reasoning was related to making judgments from the listener-character's perspective. Results suggest that children's understanding of promising and lying moves from a focus on outcome toward a focus on the belief that each utterance is designed to create.