Interpretation and matching bias in a reasoning task

Subjects were required to construct verifying and falsifying cases of conditional rules in which the presence and absence of negative components was varied. Their responses gave some indication of consistent interpretation of the rules, generally conforming to Wason's (1966) idea of a “defective” truth table. Much of their behaviour, however, seemed to be determined by a task variable in the form of a tendency to construct instances which matched, rather than altered, the values named in the rules.     

The matching relation and situation-specific bias modulation in professional football play selection

The utility of a quantitative model depends on the extent to which its fitted parameters vary systematically with environmental events of interest. Professional football statistics were analyzed to determine whether play selection (passing versus rushing plays) could be accounted for with the generalized matching equation, and in particular whether variations in play selection across game situations would manifest as changes in the equation's fitted parameters. Statistically significant changes in bias were found for each of five types of game situations; no systematic changes in sensitivity were observed. Further analyses suggested relationships between play selection bias and both turnover probability (which can be described in terms of punishment) and yards-gained variance (which can be described in terms of variable-magnitude reinforcement schedules). The present investigation provides a useful demonstration of association between face-valid, situation-specific effects in a domain of everyday interest, and a theoretically important term of a quantitative model of behavior. Such associations, we argue, are an essential focus in translational extensions of quantitative models.     

The effect of instructions on performance in the Wason selection task

The effect of instructions on performance on the standard abstract form of Wason’s selection task was examined. Instructions to determine whether or not the statement is violated did not lead to an increase in correct responding, contrary to previous suggestions that such instructions would induce falsification strategies, but rather to an increase in verification bias. Instructions to determine whether the statement is true or false led to increased variability in performance, supporting the suggestion that such instructions are inherently ambiguous. Thus, the results demonstrate that the form of instructions can have a significant effect on performance in the selection task. Verification bias did better as an explanation of the data than did matching bias, which only fared well when its predictions coincided with those of verification bias. A substantial proportion of the data was unaccounted for by either of these strategies, which is consistent with the findings of a number of other recent studies.     

The elusive wishful thinking effect

Abstract

We define a desirability effect as the inflation of the judged probability of desirable events or the diminution of the judged probability of undersirable events. A series of studies of this effect are reported. In the first four experiments, subjects were presented with visual stimuli (a grid matrix in two colours, or a jar containing beads in two colours), and asked to estimate the probability of drawing at random one of the colours), and asked to estimate the probability of drawing at random one of the colours. The estimated probabilities for a defined draw were not higher when the draw entailed a gain than when it entailed a loss. In the fifth and sixth experiments, subjects read short stories each describing two contestants competing for some desirable outcome (e.g. parents fighting for child custody, or firms bidding for a contract). Some judged the probability that A would win, others judged the Desirability that A would win. Story elements that enhanced a contestant's desirability did not cause the favoured contestant to be judged more likely to win. Only when a contestant's desirability was enhanced by promising the subject of payoff contingent on that contestant's victory was there some slight evidence for a desirability effect: contestants were judged more likely to win when the subject expected a monetary prize if they won than when the subject expected a prize if the other contestant won. In the last experiment, subjects estimated the probability of an over-20-point weekly change in the Dow Jones average, and were promised prizes contingent on such a change either occurring, or failing to occur. They were also given a monetary incentive for accuracy. Subjects who desired a small change. We conclude that desirability effects, when they exist, operate by biasing the evidence brought to mind regarding the event in question, but when a given body of evidence is considered, its judged probability is not influenced by desirability considerations.     

Voluntary task switching: chasing the elusive homunculus

In the voluntary task switching procedure, subjects choose the task to perform on a series of bivalent stimuli, requiring top-down control of task switching. Experiments 1-3 contrasted voluntary task switching and explicit task cuing. Choice behavior showed small, inconsistent effects of external stimulus characteristics, supporting the assumption of top-down control of task choice. Switch costs were smaller when subjects chose to switch tasks than when instructed by an external cue. Experiments 4-6 separated choice costs from switch costs. These findings support models of task switching that incorporate top-down processes in accounts of switch costs. The degree to which task switching procedures capture top-down versus bottom-up processes may depend on the extent of environmental support provided by the procedure.     

Evidence from a response choice task reveals a selection bias in the attentional cueing paradigm

In a typical attentional cueing paradigm, irrelevant peripheral cues produce early facilitation (fast responses) followed by later inhibition (slow responses) to cued locations. Here we examine whether cues not only influence the speed with which responses are produced, but also impact or bias which location is ultimately selected as requiring a response. Specifically, can cues influence not only the speed with which we respond but also influence the behavior produced? To examine this question, a choice localization task was used in which no targets were presented, and subjects were asked to choose which effector (left hand, right hand) to use in response to a centrally presented tone. Thus, following either a left or right peripheral cue, and then a central tone, subjects were free to respond with either their left or right hand. Early facilitation and later inhibition with this choice procedure were found in both response times and the proportion of responses to the cued and uncued locations. These results suggest that there are processes which initially bias response selection toward cued locations and then subsequently bias response selection away from cued locations.     

Conditional reasoning and the Wason selection task: Biconditional interpretation instead of reasoning bias

Two experiments were conducted to show that the IF … THEN … rules used in the different versions of Wason's (1966 Wason, P. C. 1966. “Reasoning”. In New horizons in psychology I, Edited by: Foss, B. M. Harmondsworth, , UK: Penguin.  [Google Scholar]) selection task are not psychologically—though they are logically—equivalent. Some of these rules are considered by the participants as strict logical conditionals, whereas others are interpreted as expressing a biconditional relationship. A deductive task was used jointly with the selection task to show that the original abstract rule is quite ambiguous in this respect, contrary to deontic rules: the typical “error” made by most people may indeed be explained by the fact that they consider the abstract rule as a biconditional. Thus, there is no proper error or bias in the selection task as it is still argued, but a differential interpretation of the rule. The need for taking into account a pragmatic component in the process of reasoning is illustrated by the experiments.     

The elusive pragmatic reasoning schemas effect

The present study examined the pragmatic reasoning schema theory of deductive reasoning—specifically, its explanation of performance on the selection task. Experiment 1 replicated a result crucial to the theory, the finding of facilitation on abstract versions of the selection task based on pragmatic reasoning schemas. However, Experiments 2, 3, and 4 established that this facilitation was dependent upon two presentation factors: (1) the presence of explicit negatives on the NOT P and NOT Q cards and (2) the inclusion of a checking context in the problem statement. These results are discussed in terms of Evans's two-stage (heuristic/analytic processing) model of reasoning.     

Negations and natural sampling in data selection: Ecological versus heuristic explanations of matching bias

Matching bias occurs when people ignore negations when testing a hypothesis--for example, if A, then not 2--and select possible data types that are named in the hypothesis (i.e., A and 2; Evans & Lynch, 1973). There are two explanations of this bias: the heuristic account and the contrast class account. The latter is part of Oaksford and Chater's (1994) ecological approach to data selection. On this account, a contrast set (i.e., birds that are not ravens) has a higher probability than the original set (i.e., birds that are ravens). This article reports two experiments in which these accounts make divergent predictions. The same materials were used as those in Yama (2001), who found more support for the heuristic approach. Experiment 1 replicated Yama with Western participants. Experiment 2 used a procedure introduced by Oaksford and Wakefield (2003). Rather than present participants with one of each of the four possible data types all at once, 50 were presented one at a time. The proportions of each data type reflected the relevant probabilities. The results supported the ecological approach, showing that people constructed contrast sets that strongly influenced their data selection behavior. The results were not consistent with the heuristic approach.     

The effects of familiarity in a perceptual matching task

Latencies of same-different judgments to pairs of two-digit numerals were recorded for stimuli presented in familiar or unfamiliar (inverted) orientation. Familiar stimuli were responded to more quickly than unfamiliar. For both stimulus types, latencies were correlated with the syllable length of the verbal representation of the numerals, allowing the interpretation that the effect of stimulus orientation is on encoding processes. In two other experiments, it was found that familiarity had no effect on different judgments when the stimuli were relatively simple (e.g., a single digit), but did affect different judgments with more complex stimuli. These results were related to the hypothesis that the complexity of verbal material determines whether different judgments are instigated by visual or by verbal representations of the stimuli.     

The other-race effect does not rely on memory: Evidence from a matching task

Viewers are typically better at remembering faces from their own race than from other races; however, it is not yet established whether this effect is due to memorial or perceptual processes. In this study, UK and Egyptian viewers were given a simultaneous face-matching task, in which the target faces were presented upright or upside down. As with previous research using face memory tasks, participants were worse at matching other-race faces than own-race faces and showed a stronger face inversion effect for own-race faces. However, subjects' performance on own and other-race faces was highly correlated. These data provide strong evidence that difficulty in perceptual encoding of unfamiliar faces contributes substantially to the other-race effect and that accounts based entirely on memory cannot capture the full data. Implications for forensic settings are also discussed.     

The other-race effect does not rely on memory: Evidence from a matching task

Viewers are typically better at remembering faces from their own race than from other races; however, it is not yet established whether this effect is due to memorial or perceptual processes. In this study, UK and Egyptian viewers were given a simultaneous face-matching task, in which the target faces were presented upright or upside down. As with previous research using face memory tasks, participants were worse at matching other-race faces than own-race faces and showed a stronger face inversion effect for own-race faces. However, subjects' performance on own and other-race faces was highly correlated. These data provide strong evidence that difficulty in perceptual encoding of unfamiliar faces contributes substantially to the other-race effect and that accounts based entirely on memory cannot capture the full data. Implications for forensic settings are also discussed.     

Allocating time to future tasks: The effect of task segmentation on planning fallacy bias

The scheduling component of the time management process was used as a "paradigm" to investigate the allocation of time to future tasks. In three experiments, we compared task time allocation for a single task with the summed time allocations given for each subtask that made up the single task. In all three, we found that allocated time for a single task was significantly smaller than the summed time allocated to the individual subtasks. We refer to this as the segmentation effect. In Experiment 3, we asked participants to give estimates by placing a mark on a time line, and found that giving time allocations in the form of rounded close approximations probably does not account for the segmentation effect. We discuss the results in relation to the basic processes used to allocate time to future tasks and the means by which planning fallacy bias might be reduced.     

The processing of fundamental frequency in a dichotic matching task

The temporal characteristics of auditory memory were investigated using a reaction time paradigm. The study attempted to determine whether or not there are functionally distinct left and right hemisphere components of auditory memory with different capacities for the retention of nonlinguistic information, such as fundamental frequency, over the course of several seconds. The results indicated that fundamental frequency information in auditory memory remains substantially unchanged over the course of 2 sec. No evidence was found for the existence of separate left and right hemisphere components of auditory memory with different temporal characteristics. The implications of this finding for the organization of auditory memory in the brain are discussed.     

Matching versus optimal data selection in the Wason selection task

It has been reported as a robust effect that people are likely to select a matching case in the Wason selection task. For example, they usually select the 5 case, in the Wason selection task with the conditional “if an E, then a not-5”. This was explained by the matching bias account that people are likely to regard a matching case as relevant to the truth of the conditional (Evans, 1998). However, because a positive concept usually constructs a smaller set than its negative one does (a rarity assumption), it is more effective to get information on the truth of the conditional in a positive set than in a negative set. Thus the optimal data selection account can also explain the effect. The set size of Q and matching by introducing negation were manipulated independently in four experiments. From the results it was inferred that the so-called matching bias was an amalgam of two different cognitive components—relevance judgement by matching and optimal data selection.     

The role of response selection for inhibition of task sets in task shifting

Response selection in task shifting was explored using a go/no-go methodology. The no-go signal occurred unpredictably with stimulus onset so that all trials required task preparation but only go trials required response selection. Experiment 1 showed that shift costs were absent after no-go trials, indicating that response processes are crucial for shift costs. In Experiment 2, backward inhibition was absent after no-go trials. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that response selection, rather than execution, causes backward inhibition. All 4 experiments showed effects of preparation time in go trials, suggesting that advance preparation must have also occurred in no-go trials. The authors concluded that inhibition of irrelevant task sets arises only at response selection and that residual shift costs reflect such persisting inhibition.