Mixed- versus strong right-handedness is associated with biases towards "remember" versus "know" judgements in recognition memory: role of interhemispheric interaction

Growing evidence supports the hypothesis that episodic versus semantic memories rely primarily on interhemispheric versus intrahemispheric processing, respectively. For example, a recent study found that individuals with presumed greater interhemispheric interaction were superior in episodic recall but inferior at semantic word fragment completion; however, tests of recognition memory yielded no group differences. Interestingly, recognition memory can be based on either explicitly remembering a stimulus or implicitly knowing that a stimulus had been presented. The current experiments administered recognition memory tests to strongly versus mixed handed participants who judged for each recognised item whether their response was based on remembering (episodic memory) or knowing (semantic memory) (Tulving, 1983). Results indicate that strong versus mixed handers are biased towards basing recognition responses on judgements of knowing versus remembering, respectively. As strong versus mixed handedness is associated with greater versus lesser interhemispheric processing, the results support the original hypothesis.     

Memory awareness following speeded compared with unspeeded picture recognition

A remember-know paradigm was used to assess memory awareness following speeded and unspeeded yes/no picture recognition. The beneficial effects of picture size congruency at study and test occurred with speeded as well as with unspeeded recognition. In each case, they were associated with remembering, not with knowing, which remained invariant. Thus, size congruency effects were associated with remembering even when recognition occurred more automatically and hence may be more dependent on a relatively fast familiarity process. In a second experiment, speeded remember responses were compared with remember responses that followed speeded yes/no recognition. There was more remembering when it was the remember responses that were speeded, contrary to what might be expected if remembering reflects a relatively slow recollection process. These results have implications for the ability of dual-process models of recognition memory to account for memory awareness.     

Response deadline and subjective awareness in recognition memory

Level of processing and generation effects were replicated in separate experiments in which recognition memory was tested using either short (500 ms) or long (1500 ms) response deadlines. These effects were similar at each deadline. Moreover, at each deadline these effects were associated with subsequent reports of remembering, not of knowing. And reports of both knowing and remembering increased following the longer deadline. These results imply that knowing does not index an automatic familiarity process, as conceived in some dual-process models of recognition, and that both remembering and knowing increase with the slower, more controlled processing permitted by the longer response time.     

Divided attention at retrieval disrupts knowing but not remembering

The view that remember and know responses can be explained within a dual-process framework has recently been questioned (e.g., Gardiner, Konstantinou, Karayianni, & Gregg, 2005). The aims of the present study were to investigate further discrepancies between remember/know (R/K) studies and dual-process models of recognition memory. In two experiments participants were required to make old/new and R/K decisions under full and divided attention conditions. Experiment 1 used a two-step R/K procedure and showed that attention during retrieval reduced overall recognition performance. Experiment 2 used a one-step R/K procedure and showed that dividing attention at retrieval only affected know responses, suggesting that knowing but not remembering relies on controlled retrieval processes. These findings and findings from recent research provide evidence that is inconsistent with the dual-process explanation for R/K research.     

Divided attention at retrieval disrupts knowing but not remembering

The view that remember and know responses can be explained within a dual-process framework has recently been questioned (e.g., Gardiner, Konstantinou, Karayianni, & Gregg, 2005). The aims of the present study were to investigate further discrepancies between remember/know (R/K) studies and dual-process models of recognition memory. In two experiments participants were required to make old/new and R/K decisions under full and divided attention conditions. Experiment 1 used a two-step R/K procedure and showed that attention during retrieval reduced overall recognition performance. Experiment 2 used a one-step R/K procedure and showed that dividing attention at retrieval only affected know responses, suggesting that knowing but not remembering relies on controlled retrieval processes. These findings and findings from recent research provide evidence that is inconsistent with the dual-process explanation for R/K research.     

The role of decision processes in remembering and knowing

Participants in recognition memory studies are now often asked to partition recognized items into ones that are accompanied by some recollective experience (those they remember) and ones that are not so accompanied (but which they know were previously encountered). Rather than detecting separate memory systems, such attempts to distinguish between remembering and knowing are better understood as a division of positive recognition responses into those that lie above a second decision criterion (remember) and those that do not (know). As such, the amount of memory associated with knowing is strongly dependent on the placement of the decision criteria. A meta-analysis of published data and a simple experiment tested predictions from the decision process analysis of remember/know responses.     

Ageing, remembering, and executive function

This study was designed to investigate the relationship between executive functions and the age-related decline in episodic memory through the states-of-awareness approach. Following the presentation of a word list, a group of younger adults and a group of older adults undertook a recognition test in which they classified their responses according to the Remember-Know-Guess procedure (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). In order to operationalise the executive function hypothesis, we investigated three specific executive functions (updating, shifting, and inhibition of a prepotent response) described in Miyake et al.'s (2000) theoretical model, and a complex executive task. The results revealed that fewer "R" responses were made during the recognition test by the older than the younger group, whereas there was no difference between the groups in the number of "K" responses. In addition, correlations indicated that remembering depended on executive function measures, whereas knowing did not. The hierarchical regression analyses showed that controlling for executive function, and particularly for the 2-back test, largely removed the age-related variance in remembering. These findings support the notion that executive dysfunction, and specifically updating decline, plays a central role in age-related memory loss.     

Transferring voice effects in recognition memory from remembering to knowing

In five experiments, we investigated the effects of voice congruency (same vs. different voices at study and at test) on remembering and knowing in recognition memory. With low- and medium-frequency three- or four-syllable words, a voice congruency effect occurred only in remembering. With nonwords, voice congruency effects occurred both in remembering and in knowing. With nonwords and divided attention at study, the voice congruency effect transferred almost completely from remembering to knowing. By showing a transfer of effects from remembering to knowing as encoding became more impoverished, these findings support a distinctiveness/fluency account of remembering and knowing as well as the theory that remembering and knowing indicate retrieval of events from episodic and semantic memory systems, respectively.     

Conscious control and memory awareness when recognising famous faces

We describe an experiment that investigated levels-of-processing effects in recognition memory for famous faces. The degree of conscious control over the recognition decisions was manipulated by using a response deadline procedure, and memory awareness associated with those decisions was assessed using a standard remember-know paradigm. Levels-of-processing effects were found at both short and long response deadlines, and at both deadlines those effects occurred only in remembering. Moreover, knowing, as well as remembering, increased with the greater opportunity for conscious control over recognition decisions at the long deadline. These results have implications for dual-process theories that distinguish between a slower, more controlled recollection process, reflected in remembering, and a faster, more automatic familiarity process, reflected in knowing.     

Perceptual effects and recollective experience in face recognition

Four experiments were conducted investigating the effect of size congruency on facial recognition memory, measured by remember, know and guess responses. Different study times were employed, that is extremely short (300 and 700 ms), short (1,000 ms), and long times (5,000 ms). With the short study time (1,000 ms) size congruency occurred in knowing. With the long study time the effect of size congruency occurred in remembering. These results support the distinctiveness/ fluency account of remembering and knowing as well as the memory systems account, since the size congruency effect that occurred in knowing under conditions that facilitated perceptual fluency also occurred independently in remembering under conditions that facilitated elaborative encoding. They do not support the idea that remember and know responses reflect differences in trace strength.     

Conscious control and memory awareness when recognising famous faces

We describe an experiment that investigated levels-of-processing effects in recognition memory for famous faces. The degree of conscious control over the recognition decisions was manipulated by using a response deadline procedure, and memory awareness associated with those decisions was assessed using a standard remember-know paradigm. Levels-of-processing effects were found at both short and long response deadlines, and at both deadlines those effects occurred only in remembering. Moreover, knowing, as well as remembering, increased with the greater opportunity for conscious control over recognition decisions at the long deadline. These results have implications for dual-process theories that distinguish between a slower, more controlled recollection process, reflected in remembering, and a faster, more automatic familiarity process, reflected in knowing.     

Impact of encoding depth on awareness of perceptual effects in recognition memory

Pictorial stimuli are more likely to be recognized if they are the same size, rather than a different size, at study and at test. This size congruency effect was replicated in two experiments in which the encoding variables were respectively undivided versus divided attention and level of processing. In terms of performance, these variables influenced recognition and did not influence size congruency effects. But in terms of awareness, measured by remember and know responses, these variables did influence size congruency effects. With undivided attention and with a deep level of processing, size congruency effects occurred only in remembering. With divided attention and with a shallow level of processing, size congruency effects occurred only in knowing. The results show that effects that occur in remembering may also occur independently in knowing. They support theories in which remembering and knowing reflect different memory processes or systems. They do not support the theory that remembering and knowing reflect differences in trace strength.     

On interpreting the relationship between remember–know judgments and confidence: The role of instructions

Two experiments were designed to test the hypothesis that the nature of the remember–know instructions given to participants influences whether these responses reflect different memory states or different degrees of memory confidence. Participants studied words and nonwords, a variable that has been shown to dissociate confidence from remember–know judgments and were given a set of published remember–know instructions that either emphasized know judgments as highly confident (Experiment 1) or as less confident (Experiment 2) states of recognition. Experiment 1 replicated the standard finding showing that remembering and knowing were differently influenced by the word–nonword variable, whereas confidence responses were not. By contrast, Experiment 2 showed a similar pattern of data for remember–know and sure–unsure responses, thus demonstrating the importance of the instructions for interpreting the relationship between remembering and knowing and confidence.     

Walking through doorways differentially affects recall and familiarity

Previous research has reported that walking through a doorway to a new location makes memory for objects and events experienced in the previous location less accurate. This effect, termed the location updating effect, has been used to suggest that location changes are used to mark boundaries between events in memory: memories for objects encountered within the current event are more available than those from beyond an event boundary. Within a computer‐generated memory task, participants navigated through virtual rooms, walking through doorways, and interacting with objects. The accuracy and their subjective experience of their memory for the objects (remember/know and confidence) were assessed. The findings showed that shifts in location decreased accurate responses associated with the subjective experience of remembering but not those associated with the experience of knowing, even when considering only the most confident responses in each condition. These findings demonstrate that a shift in location selectively impacts recollection and so contributes to our understanding of boundaries in event memory.     

Recognition memory and awareness: Occurrence of perceptual effects in remembering or in knowing depends on conscious resources at encoding, but not at retrieval

We report four experiments in which a remember-know paradigm was combined with a response deadline procedure in order to assess memory awareness in fast, as compared with slow,recognition judgments. In the experiments, we also investigated the perceptual effects of study-test congruence, either for picture size or for speaker's voice, following either full or divided attention at study. These perceptual effects occurred in remembering with full attention and in knowing with divided attention, but they were uninfluenced by recognition speed, indicating that their occurrence in remembering or knowing depends more on conscious resources at encoding than on those at retrieval. The results have implications for theoretical accounts of remembering and knowing that assume that remembering is more consciously controlled and effortful, whereas knowing is more automatic and faster.     

Mine to remember: The impact of ownership on recollective experience

Evaluating information with reference to self is associated with enhanced memory, the “self-reference effect”. The effect is found in recognition accompanied by recollective experience (remembering), but not in recognition based on a feeling of knowing. The current research employed an ownership procedure to investigate whether less evaluative forms of self-referential cognition produce similar enhancement of recollective experience. Participants were asked to sort items into baskets that belonged to themselves or a fictitious other. A subsequent remember–know recognition test showed that items encoded in the context of self-ownership were more likely to be correctly recognized than other-owned items. This ownership effect was found in remember, but not know, responses. This finding suggests that creating a self-referential encoding context leads to elaborative representations in episodic memory, even in the absence of explicit self-evaluation.     

Effects of exact and category repetition in true and false recognition memory

Two experiments used the distinction between remembering and knowing to investigate the effects of exact and category repetition in recognition memory. In Experiment 1, exact repetition enhanced remember responses but had no reliable effect on know responses. In Experiment 2, category repetition enhanced correct know responses but had no effect on correct remember responses. Category repetition also increased false positive remember and know responses. It is argued that exact repetition influences the recollection component of recognition memory via the creation of multiple episodic traces, each of which is potentially capable of supporting a remember response, whereas category repetition influences the familiarity component of recognition memory by enhancing the fluency with which test items are processed.     

Processing speed, executive function, and age differences in remembering and knowing.

A group of young (n = 52, M = 23.27 years) and old (n = 52, M = 68.62 years) adults studied two lists of semantically unrelated nouns. For one list a time of 2 s was allowed for encoding, and for the other, 5 s. A recognition test followed where participants classified their responses according to Gardiner's (1988) remember-know procedure. Age differences for remembering and knowing were minimal in the faster 2-s encoding condition. However, in the longer 5-s encoding condition, younger persons produced significantly more remember responses, and older adults a greater number of know responses. This dissociation suggests that in the longer encoding condition, younger adults utilized a greater level of elaborative rehearsal governed by executive processes, whereas older persons employed maintenance rehearsal involving short-term memory. Statistical control procedures, however, found that independent measures of processing speed accounted for age differences in remembering and knowing and that independent measures of executive control had little influence. The findings are discussed in the light of contrasting theoretical accounts of recollective experience in old age.     

Recognition memory and awareness: An experiential approach

Abstract

This article reviews recent studies that have adopted an experiential approach to recognition memory and awareness. This approach measures two subjective states of awareness in recognition memory, remembering (or conscious recollection) and knowing (or familiarity). There is now evidence of quite a few experimental dissociations between these two states of awareness. These dissociations impose additional constraints on theories about relations between awareness and memory systems or processes.     

Expertise and recollective experience: recognition memory for familiar and unfamiliar academic subjects

Two experiments investigated whether expertise effects in recognition memory could be found for different academic subjects. The roles of subjective experience and repetition on such effects were also explored. Experiment 1 showed that overall recognition memory was greater for familiar than for unfamiliar academic words (the expertise effect). Additionally, this effect was attributable to the subjective experience of remembering rather than knowing. Experiment 2 showed that repetition of stimulus items at study eliminated these expertise effects. Previous research has generally failed to find expertise effects in overall recognition memory. The present findings show that expertise effects do occur in overall recognition memory and are associated with the richer memorial experience of remembering rather than knowing. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.