From Piaget's Epistemic Subject to Pascual-Leone's Metasubject: Epistemic Transition in the Constructivist—Rationalist Theory of Cognitive Development

The explanation of the transition from one epistemic theory to another is an important part of Piaget's genetic epistemology. It is argued that this epistemic transition leads to a retrodictable orthogenetic tendency toward optimizing equilibration. The objective of this paper is to establish a relationship between Piaget's epistemic subject and Pascual-Leone's metasubject and to demonstrate that the postulation of the latter can be considered as an epistemic transition between two constructivist—rationalist theories, which leads to the development of a theory with greater explanatory power. Epistemic transition in this paper refers to a progressive problemshift (cf. Lakatos, 1970), between the theories of Piaget and Pascual-Leone. Piaget builds a “general model” by neglecting individual differences, that is, studies the epistemic subject, whereas Pascual-Leone by incorporating a framework for individual difference variables, studies the metasubject—the psychological organization of the epistemic subject. Empirical evidence is presented to demonstrate that Pascual-Leone's theory of constructive operators is a model of the psychological organism (the metasubject), which is at work inside Piaget's epistemic subject. Finally, it is concluded that the greater explanatory power of Pascual-Leone's theory can be interpreted as an epistemic transition between Piaget's epistemic subject and Pascual-Leone's metasubject.     

The self as a theorist: Individual differences in identity formation

The purpose of this article is to present an integrative review of research on identity development and personal construct theory. Within a constructivist framework, identity is conceptualized as both a self-formulated theory about oneself and an orientation toward self-theorizing. This identity-as-theorist view includes normative (dogmatic), diffuse (ad hoc), and information (scientific) orientations. These orientations are mapped onto the classifications generated by Mania's identity status paradigm. It is argued that structural differences in the extent to which personal theoretical constructions are differentiated, interconnected and hierarchically integrated will be associated with identity status. Evidence supporting this position is presented, and directions for future research are discussed.     

Harré on Piaget's Sociological Studies

Piaget's Sociological Studies is largely taken up with questions of sociology, epistemology, moral, political and legal theory. Roughly, these are by-passed in Harré's (2000, this journal) interpretation of Piaget's social account. Our critique is in two parts. In the first part, we explain the basis of our disagreement with Harré's interpretation of six specific issues. These are Piaget's model of social exchange, sociology, concept of egocentrism, response to Wallon, psycho-social parallelism, distinction between the concrete and the abstract. In the second part, we challenge two central theses invoked in Harré's review, namely (A) all psychological activity is a joint activity, and (B) any society is based on irreducible differences in psychological activity. We have tried to set the record straight as far as Piaget's social account is concerned. Harré's review shows a general lack of acquaintance with Piaget's account and our aim has been to compensate for this.     

Developmental stages,Piagetian stages in particular: A critical review

Developmental stages in general and Piaget's stages in particular have given rise to considerable controversy. Much of this controversy revolves around the responses that have been given to the following five central questions: (1) Do developmental stages exist? (2) If they exist, where are they? (3) What features define a developmental sequence as a sequence of developmental stages? (4) What psychological processes underlie developmental change? (5) Should we abandon the concept of developmental stages? The main goal of this paper is to present a critical review of such responses, while arguing for a strong conception of development and a “non-received” view of Piaget's theory. After an introduction section, we elaborate on each of the five questions. Finally, we present several reasons why this paper often appeals to Piaget's theory, and why his theory has been greatly misunderstood.     

The Inescapability of Ethics and the Impossibility of “Anything Goes”: A Constructivist Model of Ethical Meaning Making

A constructivist model of ethical meaning making is developed. The effort begins by distinguishing three versions of constructivist theory—personal construct psychology, radical constructivism, and social constructionism. Then, the following four premises of an integrated constructivist perspective are presented: (a) People are informationally closed systems, (b) people are active meaning makers, (c) people are social beings, and (d) people construe epistemologically and ontologically. These premises are used to examine and counter criticisms that portray constructivism as endorsing an “anything goes” relativism. This clears a space for the development of a constructivist model of ethical meaning making, outlined in the final section of the article. This model is rooted in personal construct psychology, but is also influenced by radical constructivism and social constructionism.     

Methods of Overcoming Children's Fears

Forty-eight noninstitutionalized elderly were administered Piaget's Conservation of Surfaces Test. Only 13 subjects were designated as conservers in this content domain. A strong relationship existed between conservation ability and educational attainment, but not between sex and performance, and age and performance. Results indicated that cognitive abilities may be subject to qualitative disorganization in the latter portions of the life-span.     

Inside the Creative Sifter: Recognizing Metacognition in Creativity Development

The parallels between cognitive development and creativity are neglected in the literature. Piaget's information transformations are personalized, meaning individual constructions can involve creativity. Vygotsky's work considers the implications and interactions of social influences, conventions, and personal implications for creative development. The Cognitive‐Creative Sifting Model is proposed to focus attention on these and other connections between cognitive development and creativity. Other common methods of assessing creativity are compared to the proposed model. It is argued that the model provides a foundation to evaluate individual creative potentials more holistically. Specifically, the conceptual elements of metacognition are described and their role in the development of creativity is suggested. It is argued that future researchers should pay particular attention to the interaction effects metacognition has with traditional measures of creativity focused on ideation and product evaluation.     

Experimental Studies of Children's Learning

This article compares John Dewey's theory of inquiry with Jean Piaget's analysis of the mechanisms implied in the increase of knowledge. The sources for this paper are Dewey's studies on logic and the theory of inquiry and Piaget's historical-critical and psychogenetic investigations. Three major conclusions result from the comparison: first, there are significant convergences between the two theories; second, Piaget's developmental analysis makes explicit what is programmatic in Dewey's investigations; and, finally, Piaget is incorrect in characterizing Dewey's pragmatism as a method that does not meet the criteria of intelligent activity.     

Eight good questions for developmental epistemology and psychology

My reply to eight good questions arising from commentary is an elaboration of my main argument that there are parallels in the epistemologies of Frege and Piaget and that these parallels have distinctive implications for developmental psychology. The eight questions are: (i) was Piaget really an epistemologist? (ii) is Piaget's epistemic subject psychological or epistemological? (iii) is Frege's non-modal logic consistent with Piaget's account of necessity? (iv) does Piaget's constructivism entail realism? (v) what is the relation between thinking and thought? (vi) is Frege's concept of mind too narrow? (vii) how are cause and reason related in the interpretation of thought? (viii) what is the status of an act of judgment in the interpretation of thought? These questions are productive, and can be developed.     

Accuracy in Interpersonal Expectations: A Reflection-Construction Analysis of Current and Classic Research

ABSTRACT Research and theory on interpersonal expectations have been dominated by a strong social constructivist perspective arguing that expectancies are often inaccurate and a major force in the creation of social reality. The reflection-construction model is an attempt to examine these strong claims conceptually and empirically. This model assumes that social perception includes both constructivist phenomena and accuracy. When this model is used as a framework for interpreting research on teacher expectations and on the role of stereotypes in person perception, it shows that interpersonal expectancies are often accurate, and usually lead only to relatively small biases and self-fulfilling prophecies. The model also is used to interpret research on expectancies that has provided some of the foundations for the strong constructivist perspective. This reflection-construction analysis shows that even those studies strongly suggest that people's expectations generally will be highly accurate.     

ORGANISMIC PROCESSES FOR NEO-PIAGETIAN THEORIES: A DIALECTICAL CAUSAL ACCOUNT OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

The paper criticizes some epistemological presuppositions of Piaget's and of neo-Piagetian's work, in particular, the psycho-Logical principle. This principle is contrasted with a more valid psycho-dialectical one. It is suggested that a dialectical-constructivist (i.e., causal-dynamic) perspective offers a causal theoretical framework for cognitive development that is superior to that of Piaget and many neo-Piagetians. I outline criteria for evaluating causal developmental theories, and point out deficiencies in Piaget's and neo-Piagetian's stage theories vis-à-vis the criteria. An organismic theory of constructive operators - a dialectical/causal theory - is introduced as a remedy for these deficiencies. I focus on a modular model of mental attention that is constituted by four dynamically interacting functional systems. These systems together explain the ‘beam’ of mental attention and its phenomenological/behavioural effects. I claim that the stages of cognitive development are caused by growth of mental attention. The validity of this model is supported by data on a motor performance task (Rho task). The Rho data show: (a) the existence of stage-wise plateaus in children's performance at ages congruent with the redefined Piagetian stages; (b) the psychological structures which, driven by mental attention (M-capacity), are responsible for performance on the task, appear to be located in the left hemisphere of the brain. These findings, predicted by the dialectical theory of mental attention, highlight its causal-predictive power.     

Change in Symptoms and Personal Construct Structure in Anxiety Disorders: A Preliminary Study on the Effects of Constructivist Therapy

In recent years, constructivist psychotherapy has evolved as a plausible treatment for different disorders. The present study aimed to explore the effectiveness of this therapy in terms of symptom improvement and changes in the personal construct system. Forty-seven anxiety clients received brief integrative constructivist therapy. Scores on symptom and personal construct measures decreased after the treatment, but not all of them showed a statistically significant change. The percentage of clients with implicative dilemmas decreased after psychotherapy. The results provide preliminary support for the effectiveness of brief constructivist psychotherapy as a treatment for anxiety disorders in primary care services. Several limitations are acknowledged. Further controlled research is needed.     

Primitive religious thought and the evolution of religion

In an article in this journal about the ideas of Levy-Brühl, Don Wiebe reviewed ideas from anthropology to argue that there is indeed a primitive mentality, and that mythopoeic religious thought is an instance of this mentality. Wiebe ends by declaring religious thought generally to be mythopoeic. The anthropological literature does support well Wiebe's thesis that primitive thought is primitive, in particular those studies which use Piaget's theory of cognitive development as a guide for interpreting primitive and other thought styles. But Piaget's theory can be extended to interpret other stages of culture and thought. This aids in recognizing that religious thought develops in stages also, from primitive folktales to archaic complex myths, and then to classical rationalized theologies and most recently to symbolic theologies.     

Emotion in Personal Construct Theory: A Controversial Question

George Kelly's personal construct theory (PCT) has been accused of disregarding the role of emotion in human life. This charge originates from a misunderstanding of PCT's basic assumptions. Kelly deals with experiences commonly called “emotional” in terms of dimensions of transition according to a genuinely constructivist epistemology. A review of the literature shows few elaborations of Kelly's original formulation of constructs relating to transitions, and even some contributions critical of Kelly's approach to emotions. This article rebuts the criticisms while making clear the epistemological and theoretical bases of Kelly's treatment of transitional experiences, its peculiarities, and its role in the diagnostic/therapeutic process.     

EPISTEMIC ASSUMPTIONS: UNDERSTANDING SELF AND THE WORLD (A NOTE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDENTITY STYLE,WORLD VIEW,AND CONSTRUCTIVIST ASSUMPTIONS USING AN AUSTRALIAN SAMPLE)

Berzonsky (1994) has investigated the role that personal epistemological assumptions play in the construction and revision of self-identity.He developed the Constructivist Assumption Scale (CAS) to measure the constructivist assumptions of persons, relating this to identity style as measured by the Identity Style Inventory, 3rd edition. Botella and Gallifa (1995) have outlined a constructivist model of epistemic development moving from positivism to constructivism (measured by the CAS), and preferred worldviews moving from mechanism to organicism (measured by the Organicism-Mechanism Paradigm Inventory). This study investigated the relationship between identity style, preferred worldview, and level of constructivist assumptions. Results indicate a significant positive relationship between the constructivist assumptions and people having an information-oriented, self-identity style, and significant negative relationships between the constructivist assumptions and preferred worldview for individuals with a normative oriented identity style. Age was significantly related to worldview, but not to the constructivist assumptions of the individuals. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed, including whether people have different epistemic assumptions when describing self versus those used when describing the world. An additional measure is suggested which may relate findings to Kelly's (1991) notions of aggressiveness and hostility.     

Departing from Classical Logic: A Logical Analysis of Personal Construct Theory

This article draws a parallel between personal construct theory and intuitionistic logic i, in order to account for Kelly's claim to have departed from classical logic. Assuming that different theoretical paradigms correspond to different logical languages, it is argued that the constructivist paradigm is linked to intuitionism. Similarities between some key syntactic and semantic features of i logic and the underlying logic of Kelly's theory are made explicit. The strengths and limitations of such an approach are discussed in light of issues emerging from clinical observation and from the philosophy of science.     

Epistemological principles for developmental psychology in Frege and Piaget

My main aim is to identify and discuss parallels between the epistemologies of Gottlob Frege and Jean Piaget. Although their work has attracted massive attention individually, parallels in their work have gone unnoticed. My discussion is in four parts and covers psychologism and epistemology; five epistemological criteria in Frege's rational epistemology under an AEIOU mnemonic, namely autonomy, entailment, intersubjectivity, objectivity and universality; the elaboration of these same criteria in Piaget's developmental epistemology; their implications for developmental psychology and epistemology. One main conclusion is that the same criteria fit both Frege's and Piaget's epistemology. A second conclusion is that Piaget's developmental epistemology can be regarded as an elaboration of Frege's rational epistemology in each of these five respects on both methodological and substantive grounds. Both conclusions are compatible with non-psychologism, which was accepted by both Frege and Piaget.     

The missing link: A reply to Joseph Rychlak

We oppose Rychlak's (1991a, 1991b) claim that the view of mind entailed in artificial intelligence (AD and cognitive psychology is fundamentally at odds with Kelly's (1955) personal construct theory. Kelly's model and Al have much in common: They both are centrally concerned with representation, cognitive processes and their structure, and are ultimately empirical in their methodology. Many Al researchers have usefully embraced personal construct theory as a working conceptual framework, in this article, we examine Rychlak's assertions and identify several mistakes.     

TOWARDS REFLEXIVE SCRUTINY IN REPERTORY GRID METHODOLOGY

This article advocates a position of critical reflection in relation to common adaptations of repertory grid procedures. The fact that even subtle procedural variations can register a substantial impact on the content and structure of personal construct systems highlights the responsibility that researchers and practitioners have to understand their own contributions to the grid outcomes that they interpret. A position of "reflexive scrutiny" is developed in a way that is consistent with the tenets of Kelly's (1955) personal construct psychology, and exemplified in the subsequent articles in this special section on repertory grid methodology.