Emotion in Personal Construct Theory: A Controversial Question

George Kelly's personal construct theory (PCT) has been accused of disregarding the role of emotion in human life. This charge originates from a misunderstanding of PCT's basic assumptions. Kelly deals with experiences commonly called “emotional” in terms of dimensions of transition according to a genuinely constructivist epistemology. A review of the literature shows few elaborations of Kelly's original formulation of constructs relating to transitions, and even some contributions critical of Kelly's approach to emotions. This article rebuts the criticisms while making clear the epistemological and theoretical bases of Kelly's treatment of transitional experiences, its peculiarities, and its role in the diagnostic/therapeutic process.     

Kelly and the concept of developmental stages

Abstract

Although personal construct theory (PCT; Kelly, 1955) shares with developmental-stage theories an emphasis on process and qualitative change, the concept of developmental stages is incompatible with PCT in several ways. Building on biological analogies of maturation and evolution, developmental-stage theories posit an inevitability of content or structure in the occurrence of stages and a directionality of the developmental process toward extraspective (as opposed to introspective) definitions of psychological maturity. PCT, in contrast, lacks these features of inevitability and directionality. Kelly intended an introspective view of development based on personal choice, conceived in psychological rather than biological terms. Implications of the Choice, Fragmentation, Commonality, Dichotomy, Modulation, and Experience Corollaries for the concept of stages are discussed. Kelly's PCT is compared with the theories of Piaget, Kegan, and Erikson to illustrate these points.     

The insanity plea: Szaszian ethics and epistemology

The traditional legal verdict of ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’ as well as the more recent verdict of ‘guilty but mentally ill’ rest on often unquestioned epistemological assumptions about human behavior and its causes, unjustified reliance on forensic psychiatrists, and questionable, if not deplorable ethical standards. This paper offers a critique of legal perspectives on insanity, historical and current, based on the altermative epistemological and ethical assumptions of Thomas S. Szasz. In addition, we examine Szasz's unique rhetorical analysis of ‘mental illness’ and its implications for forensic psychiatry.     

The two faces of hostility: The implications of personal construct theory for understanding alienation

Although Kelly did not deal with alienation directly, the theory of personal constructs makes an important contribution to a comprehensive understanding of this complex phenomenon. By relating to specific functions of the individual, personal construct psychology explains how alienation is perpetuated by the very people who are its victims. In this article, 1 point out the link of PCT with the phenomenon of alienation that confirms the implicit presence of the social in the personal construction of reality. This elaboration provides an interpretation of Kelly's theory that escapes the limitations of radical individualism and enhances our understanding of sociocultural processes.     

Mindfulness and the myth of mental illness: implications for theory and practice

Over the past 60 years Thomas Szasz (1960, 1961[1974], 2008) has forcefully argued that mental illnesses are mythical since all medical diseases are located in the body and, thus, have somatic causes. This has been accompanied by a scathing and coruscating critique of the whole mental health profession—particularly, those psychologists, psychiatrists and psychotherapists who collude in and exploit the alleged mythology of counterfeit mental disorders and often (unwittingly or deliberately) justify coercion, oppression and pharmacological manipulation of so-called ‘mental patients’ in the name of ‘treatments’. Since mindfulness practitioners—perhaps especially teachers of mindfulness-based cognitive therapy, mindfulness-based stress reduction and related programmes—may, by association, be partially implicated in Szasz's allegations, this article seeks to explore and examine the implications for theory and practice in the field. It will be suggested that the strong foundational, theoretical, research and teaching bases of mindfulness-based interventions offer practitioners a solid defence against the general critique offered by Szasz, and more specific challenges advanced by critics such as Boysen (2007) and Whitaker (2010). However, there may still be potential pitfalls for those mindfulness-based interventions which are too closely allied to the psychiatric/pscychotheraputic establishment, and some suggestions for avoiding such obstacles will be offered through recommendations for maintaining connections between mindfulness and its Buddhist origins.     

The missing link: A reply to Joseph Rychlak

We oppose Rychlak's (1991a, 1991b) claim that the view of mind entailed in artificial intelligence (AD and cognitive psychology is fundamentally at odds with Kelly's (1955) personal construct theory. Kelly's model and Al have much in common: They both are centrally concerned with representation, cognitive processes and their structure, and are ultimately empirical in their methodology. Many Al researchers have usefully embraced personal construct theory as a working conceptual framework, in this article, we examine Rychlak's assertions and identify several mistakes.     

Departing from Classical Logic: A Logical Analysis of Personal Construct Theory

This article draws a parallel between personal construct theory and intuitionistic logic i, in order to account for Kelly's claim to have departed from classical logic. Assuming that different theoretical paradigms correspond to different logical languages, it is argued that the constructivist paradigm is linked to intuitionism. Similarities between some key syntactic and semantic features of i logic and the underlying logic of Kelly's theory are made explicit. The strengths and limitations of such an approach are discussed in light of issues emerging from clinical observation and from the philosophy of science.     

Mental Illness: Fact or Myth? Revisiting the Debate Between Albert Ellis and Thomas Szasz

Although it is widely accepted that mental illnesses affect millions of people worldwide, there is still disagreement among scholars about the facts of mental illness. The orthodox position is that mental illness is a fact; critics argue that it is a myth. Thomas Szasz was perhaps the most influential critic of mental illness while Albert Ellis was one of the most influential psychotherapists of the twentieth century. Yet, they disagreed about the facts of mental illness. Ellis argued that mental illness is a fact; Szasz argued that mental illness is a metaphor that we have mistaken for a fact. Both men were practicing psychotherapists: Ellis developed Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy and treated mentally ill clients as irrational thinkers; Szasz developed Autonomous Psychotherapy and treated clients as existential game-players who choose, or have been coerced into, the role of sick patient. Szasz vehemently disagreed with Ellis’s view that some people with serious mental illnesses should be institutionalized and treated against their will. While Ellis argued that mental illness is a convenient label for people who are a danger to themselves and others, Szasz argued that mental illness is a metaphor for moral problems in living and involuntary institutionalization and treatment are crimes against humanity. This paper, then, revisits the debate between Ellis and Szasz on the vexed topic of mental illness.     

PERSONAL CONSTRUCT PSYCHOLOGY AND AUTISM

There has been no significant writing within personal construct psychology about autistic spectrum disorders, despite the fact that this approach provides promising models in a number of other specific areas of human difficulty. This article outlines a PCP model of autism, based on a wide variety of recent research findings and writings, including those of autism sufferers themselves. Autism is considered in the light of Kelly's fundamental postulate and 11 corollaries as well as Procter's (1978) group and family corollaries. It is argued that Kelly's theory provides an integrative framework for considering this complex set of disorders with implications for further research in autism and the early development of social cognition as well as for therapeutic and educational intervention in helping people struggling with autistic spectrum disorders.     

Kelly and issues of power

Abstract

Whether Kelly's personal passion for egalitarianism and democracy is translated into tenets of personal construct theory is addressed. First, Kelly's convictions as they appear in the writings are examined. Then sociological criteria are outlined for assessing the degree to which the theory supports the implementation of those convictions and, in its therapeutic application, facilitates autonomy and empowerment. It is concluded that personal construct theory has potential for encouraging people to realize their full liberated potential. Furthermore, it can be extended to enlarge its scope.     

A Constructivist Approach to Defining Human Emotion: From George Kelly to Rue Cromwell

In Being Human: Human Being, Rue Cromwell proposed that scientific knowledge does not need to converge in order to progress and that embracing diversity of knowledge domains benefits researchers more than the quest for unification. Principles from Kelly's personal construct theory and Cromwell's book are used to suggest a more meta-theoretical approach to emotion research, as well as defining emotion, by explaining how (a) various theories of emotion are not necessarily in competition with one another, as one can view various theories of emotion as simply being different (and perhaps not similar enough to one another to be compared in a clear-cut fashion); and (b) one cannot definitively claim that one theory of emotion is the correct or best account of all of emotional life, without simultaneously ignoring the difficulties that arise when considering multiple theories (or alternative constructions) that rely on different fundamental assumptions. This second point draws on Cromwell's discussion of how “unity of knowledge” is an oxymoronic concept.     

Personal Construct Theory and Cognitive Science

Abstract

Warren (1990) claims to have formulated an argument “that personal construct psychology is not a cognitive psychology” (p. 379). Nonetheless, he presents very little in the way of logical demonstration or empirical evidence to support this conclusion. Moreover, the theoretical significance of the question posed in the title of his essay (“Is Personal Construct Psychology a Cognitive Psychology?”) is far from obvious. He asserts that “what is at dispute here is the proper characterization of a position” however, his listing several textbooks that refer to Kelly's theory as a “cognitive” approach to the study of personality does nothing at all to either clarify the specific implications of this question or explain its importance. Interestingly, in a recent introductory personality text by one of Kelly's former students (Phares, 1988), this theory is designated as a “phenomenological approach,” which is consistent with Warren's own notion that “he [Kelly] was more phenomenological than he himself believed” Kelly vigorously resisted all such attempts to classify his model in terms of the usual textbook categories (cf. Adams-Webber & Mancuso, 1983).     

A 21st-Century Personal Construct Psychology Upgrade

Cromwell's (2010) Being Human: Human Being. Manifesto for a New Psychology described many familiar elements of Kelly's (1955) Psychology of Personal Constructs. Cromwell regarded Kelly's theory as having a range of untapped implications, and he extended and elaborated many of these elements and links them to contemporary research in a variety of fields and subdomains. These extensions and elaborations might serve as a basis for maintaining the fundamental identity of personal construct psychology (PCP) while also modifying it in a manner that could enhance its contemporary relevance and effectiveness.     

Origins of george kelly's constructivism in the work of korzybski and moreno

Although Mahoney (1988) has traced the heritage of general constructive metatheory and 7 Lelhart and Jackson (1983) have examined the influences of Kelly's Kansas environment on his developing theory, there has been relatively little investigation of the origins of Kelly's constructivism. Although Kelly (1955) was undoubtedly influenced by many philosophers and psychologists as he developed the psychology of personal constructs, the roles of these people have not been extensively investigated. However, Kelly (1955, 1969) cited, in a general way, the works of Korzybski and Moreno several times in describing the origins of his theory. Lecture notes taken by one of Kelly's students (Barry, 1948) reveal more specifically the sources (Korzybski, 1933, 1943; Moreno, 1937) that seemed influential as Kelly developed his theories. Kelly borrowed ideas of Korzybski and Moreno, among many others, in creating parts of his role therapy and personality theory. In adapting Korzybski's notion that semantic and linguistic labels are used to understand phenomena in the world, Kelly also accepted the idea that these semantic labels are indeed constructed by individuals. In adapting Moreno's spontaneous improvisation and self-presentation techniques as a way to change semantic labels, Kelly emphasized that construction processes occur and change in a social realm.     

George Kelly and the Concept of Construction

Abstract

A distinction is drawn between a predicational and a mediational model. Predication involves the act of affirming, denying, or qualifying broader patterns of meaning in relation to narrower or targeted patterns of meaning. Mediation occurs when something formed outside a process is taken in and comes to play a role in that process that is not intrinsic to it. Fundamental to predication is the fact that meanings under processing are oppositional. George Kelly's theoretical understanding of construction was as a predicational process. The term construction is often confounded with these two views of cognition. Kelly's interpretation of construction is contrasted with the cognitive approach of Piaget and the social constructionist views of Harre and Gergen. It is demonstrated that Kelly's clearer understanding of construction as a predicational process enables him to lend the individual a capacity for personal agency that the other theories fail to capture     

Motivation in Personal Construct Theory: A Conceptual Critique

Kelly's attempt to derive apparently motiwtional phenomena (hostility, guilt, etc.) solely from the confirmation or disconfirmation of personal constructs cannot adequately explain such phenomena. His account of hostility assumes that some beliefs are so resistant to change that the person seeks to compel confirmation of them; however, this resistance is incompatible with Kelly's own Choice Corollary. Anxiety is said to derive from the fact that disconfirmation would leave one's world in chaos, but “chaos” is shown to be an illogical concept. Humor, in turn, cannot be explained just by cognitive incongruity, since incongruity may as well lead to anxiety or hostility. Finally, guilt cannot be explained without reference to underlying fears of punishment and their rationalization in terms of supposedly objective moral concepts. Nevertheless, Kelly's Repertory Grid technique, supplemented by laddering, may be useful in indicating primary needs, moral convictions, and sources of anxiety.     

A THEORY OF SOCIAL ACTION: WHY PERSONAL CONSTRUCT THEORY NEEDS A SUPERPATTERN COROLLARY

Kelly's Commonality and Sociality corollaries deal with shared meanings. In this article, the authors revisit Kelly's early work on superpatterns to demonstrate the relationship between superpatterns and the concept of corporate construing (Balnaves & Caputi, 1993) as a way of extending the Commonality and Sociality corollaries. The authors argue that corporate construing is joint action. Constructs in such an action originate from corporate, not personal, agents. Corporate agency entails anticipation in joint action of the mode of representation of everyone else (sensus communis), justification of the joint action (reasons as good reasons), recognition that a personal action is corporate (the same) within a style of reasoning (a system of specialized techniques or corporate constructs). It is not the individual patterns of personal constructs, or an individual's interpretations of his or her own actions, that is relevant in an explanation of personal actions. It is an understanding of the genre, the overall template, the superpattern.     

Dewey Between the Lines: George Kelly and the Pragmatist Tradition

In his own somewhat sly and sardonic way, George Kelly always insisted that personal construct theory could not be assimilated into any other kind of psychology. We believe this was not an example of Kelly being difficult or protecting his turf, but that he resisted such efforts at categorization because he formulated personal construct psychology from an entirely different set of assumptions than those which have traditionally guided the construction of psychological theories. We begin by looking at the unusual life path Kelly took in order to enter the field of psychology and what it reveals about the independent turn of mind he brought to creating his own theory of personality. We then examine what we believe is the single most important influence on Kelly's thinking—the tradition of American pragmatism, in general, and the philosophy and psychology of John Dewey, in particular. We argue that Kelly embraced the pragmatic epistemological assumptions that guided Dewey's work, and that he used these assumptions to develop the only pragmatic theory of personality and psychotherapy. It is, in fact, the influence of Dewey and the pragmatists that makes personal construct psychology so different from and, at times, more difficult to understand than other, more traditional, “realist” theories, but it is also this pragmatic orientation that makes Kelly's theory such an important contribution.     

Children's conceptions of mental illness: A naïve theory approach

This paper reports two studies that investigated children's conceptions of mental illness using a naïve theory approach, drawing upon a conceptual framework for analysing illness representations which distinguishes between the identity, causes, consequences, curability, and timeline of an illness. The studies utilized semi‐structured interviewing and card selection tasks to assess 6‐ to 11‐year‐old children's conceptions of the causes and consequences (Study 1) and the curability and timeline (Study 2) of different mental and physical illnesses/ailments. The studies revealed that, at all ages, the children held coherent causal–explanatory ideas about the causes, consequences, curability, and timeline of both mental and physical illnesses/ailments. However, while younger children tended to rely on their knowledge of common physical illnesses when thinking about mental illnesses, providing contagion and contamination explanations of cause, older children demonstrated differences in their thinking about mental and physical illnesses. No substantial gender differences were found in the children's thinking. It is argued that children hold coherent conceptions of mental illness at all ages, but that mental illness only emerges as an ontologically distinct conceptual domain by the end of middle childhood.