Do hands attract attention?

Social stimuli, like faces (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997) or bodies (Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001), engage specific areas within the visual cortex. Behavioural research reveals an attentional bias to these same stimuli (Ro, Friggel, & Lavie, 2007). The current study examined whether there is an attentional bias towards hands, and whether such a bias is distinct from any bias towards human bodies. In a two-alternative, forced-choice dot-probe task, participants saw two side-by-side pictures for 500 ms. A probe dot then appeared on either side and participants indicated where the dot appeared. Participants were significantly faster to respond when the probe location coincided with the location of pictures of bodies, hands, or feet, compared to dogs, starfish, hand tools, toaster ovens, inverted hands, or inverted bodies. Results suggest an attentional bias to bodies and body parts but found no evidence of a difference in attentional advantage of hands over bodies or feet.     

Does attention alter appearance?

Abrupt onsets in the visual field can change the appearance of subsequent stimuli, according to one interpretation, by engaging an attentional mechanism that increases effective stimulus contrast. However, abrupt onsets can also engage capacity-unlimited and thus attention-independent sensory mechanisms. We conducted a series of experiments to differentiate the sensory and attentional accounts. Observers compared the contrasts of uncued low-contrast peripheral targets with simultaneous targets cued by one of three cue types with different sensory attributes: white or black peripheral abrupt onsets and central gaze direction cues devoid of sensory activity near the target locations. Each cue facilitated the perception of perithreshold targets; however, the white abrupt onsets increased the perceived contrast of suprathreshold targets, whereas the black abrupt onsets tended to reduce the perceived contrast, and the gaze direction cues had no significant effect. The effectiveness of the gaze direction cues in automatically orienting attention was demonstrated in a control experiment in which they consistently speeded response times. The results suggest that sensory interaction, and not attention, is responsible for changes in appearance.     

On free‐floating attention

This paper is an experimental effort to invite the reader into an interplay between two modes of comprehension: the one predominantly narrative and emotive, and the other predominantly rational and analytic. The interplay of these modes of writing may (or may not, depending on the reader) amplify the thesis of the paper: that Freud's clinical technique of evenly‐suspended attention involves a tension between attentional modes—a paradoxical willing‐not‐to‐will—and this willing unwilling (a kind of free will) undercuts both rational and emotive modes of comprehension, thereby permitting novel prehension of self and other.     

Does dividing attention become harder with age? findings from the divided attention questionnaire

Abstract

We developed a self-assessment scale, the Divided Attention Questionnaire (DAQ), to investigate whether adults report that dividing attention between two activities becomes more difficult with increasing age, as would be predicted by a model of age-related reductions in inhibition (Hasher & Zacks, 1988). the DAQ difficulty rating scale produced satisfactory estimates of internal consistency and test-retest stability. Older adults, relative to young adults, rated most combinations of activities as more difficult, and also reported that most combinations had become more difficult over time. However, self-perceptions of ability in old age varied with task domain, such that activities that involved monitoring of novel information became increasingly difficult with advanced age, while routine activities and those involving speech processing showed little change across the older groups studied. We suggest that belieft about self-efficacy under conditions of divided attention can have important consequences for the behavior of the elderly.     

Is attention impaired in ADHD?

Explanations of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) in terms of a weakness in Executive Function (EF) or related concepts, such as inhibition, are briefly reviewed. Some alternative views are considered, in particular a proposal by Manly and others that ADHD is a weakness primarily of sustained attention (plus control of attention), but not of selective attention, as measured by the Test of Everyday Attention in Children (TEA-Ch; Manly et al., 2001). The underlying structure of the TEA-Ch is analysed and it is concluded that the distinction between selective attention, sustained attention, and control of attention in this battery is not well-founded. Furthermore, evidence from studies by Wilding and others, from visual search tasks similar to those employed by Manly et al. to measure selective attention, demonstrates that, while unimpaired- and impaired-attention groups do not differ in speed of performance on such tasks (the measure employed in the TEA-Ch), they do differ reliably in accuracy. Available evidence from other visual search tasks comparing such groups is reviewed and found to be inconsistent. An attempt is made to resolve the inconsistencies and it is suggested that search tasks including demands that engage EF processes are more likely to demonstrate differences between these groups. It is concluded therefore that the most plausible explanation at present of impaired attention is in terms of weaknesses in EF. Suggestions for improving the precision and detail of this type of explanation are offered.     

Does affect induce self-focused attention?

Despite growing evidence that depression is linked with self-focused attention, little is known about how depressed individuals become self-focused or, more generally, about what arouses self-focus in everyday life. Two experiments examined the hypothesis that affect itself induces self-focused attention. In Experiment 1, moods were manipulated with an imagination mood-induction procedure. Sad-induction Ss became higher in self-focus than did neutral-induction Ss. Experiment 2 replicated this effect for sad moods by means of a musical mood-induction procedure and different measures of self-focus. However, Experiment 2 failed to support the hypothesis that happy moods induce self-focus. The results have implications for mood-induction research, self-focused attention, and recent models of depression.     

Do new objects capture attention?

The visual system relies on several heuristics to direct attention to important locations and objects. One of these mechanisms directs attention to sudden changes in the environment. Although a substantial body of research suggests that this capture of attention occurs only for the abrupt appearance of a new perceptual object, more recent evidence shows that some luminance-based transients (e.g., motion and looming) and some types of brightness change also capture attention. These findings show that new objects are not necessary for attention capture. The present study tested whether they are even sufficient. That is, does a new object attract attention because the visual system is sensitive to new objects or because it is sensitive to the transients that new objects create? In two experiments using a visual search task, new objects did not capture attention unless they created a strong local luminance transient.     

Object-based attention: Shifting or uncertainty?

The contribution of object-based attentional guidance to visual processing is widely accepted, and recent models of attentional selection now include both space- and object-based representations. Nevertheless, although the mechanism of space-based attentional selection has been well characterized, the mechanism underlying object-based attentional selection remains poorly understood. Recent attempts at identifying the mechanism giving rise to object-based attentional selection have put forth two conflicting alternatives. The first suggests that object-based effects are driven by attentional uncertainty (i.e., the attentional prioritization hypothesis), whereas the second suggests that objects guide attentional selection only when an attentional shift is necessitated (i.e., the attentional-shifting hypothesis). Here, we directly investigated which of the two suggested accounts drives object-based effects, by pitting attentional certainty against attentional shifting. In a series of four experiments, we manipulated the certainty of target location, shifting of attention, and the stimulus onset asynchrony. It was observed that object-based effects depended solely on certainty of the forthcoming target location. These results suggest that attentional prioritization, and not a mere shift of attention, gives rise to object-based guidance of attentional selection. In addition, these results lend further support to the attentional prioritization account of object-based attention and provide further constraints on the mechanisms of object-based selection.     

How do infants recognize joint attention?

The emergence of joint attention is still a matter of vigorous debate. It involves diverse hypotheses ranging from innate modules dedicated to intention reading to more neuro-constructivist approaches. The aim of this study was to assess whether 12-month-old infants are able to recognize a “joint attention” situation when observing such a social interaction. Using a violation-of-expectation paradigm, we habituated infants to a “joint attention” video and then compared their looking time durations between “divergent attention” videos and “joint attention” ones using a 2 (familiar or novel perceptual component) × 2 (familiar or novel conceptual component) factorial design. These results were enriched with measures of pupil dilation, which are considered to be reliable measures of cognitive load. Infants looked longer at test events that involved novel speaker and divergent attention but no changes in infants’ pupil dilation were observed in any conditions. Although looking time data suggest that infants may appreciate discrepancies from expectations related to joint attention behavior, in the absence of clear evidence from pupillometry, the results show no demonstration of understanding of joint attention, even at a tacit level. Our results suggest that infants may be sensitive to relevant perceptual variables in joint attention situations, which would help scaffold social cognitive development. This study supports a gradual, learning interpretation of how infants come to recognize, understand, and participate in joint attention.     

Does size rescaling require central attention?

The goal of the present experiment was to determine if object size rescaling in the shape-matching task requires central resources. Two polygons were presented side by side as the second task in a psychological refractory period paradigm. The polygons could be the same as each other or mirror images of each other and the size ratio between the two polygons was varied. In the first task, subjects were required to make a speeded response to the pitch of a tone. The polygon task followed at varying SOAs and the subjects then made a speeded same/mirror image judgement on the polygons. The size ratio effect was additive with SOA indicating that size rescaling is capacity demanding and that it requires central attention.     

Do isoluminant color changes capture attention?

Four experiments are reported in which the effects of peripheral cues on visual orienting were investigated. In the luminance condition, the cues consisted of a peripheral change in stimulus luminance. In the isoluminance condition, the cues consisted of an isoluminant color change, using the transient tritanopic technique. In Experiments 1 and 2, it was found that peripheral luminance cues captured attention, whereas peripheral isoluminance cues did not. In Experiments 3 and 4, the participants detected a peripheral target that was also isoluminant with the background. Under these conditions, it was found that both luminance and isoluminance cues captured attention. The results are discussed in terms of the roles of the dorsal and ventral streams in visual orienting, and it is concluded that our findings provide partial support for the contingent involuntary orienting hypothesis of C. Folk and colleagues.     

Does attention affect visual feature integration?

Two questions are investigated in this work: first, whether the integration of color and shape information is affected by attending to the stimulus location, and second, whether attending to a stimulus location enhances the perceptual representation of the stimulus or merely affects decision processes. In three experiments, subjects were briefly presented with colored letters. On most trials, subjects were precued to the stimulus location (valid cue); on some trials, a nonstimulus location was cued (invalid cue). Subjects were less likely to incorrectly combine colors and letter shapes following a valid cue. The attentional facilitation afforded by the cue was not limited to feature integration but also affected the registration of features. However, when the amount of feature information was strictly controlled, attention still affected feature integration. The results indicate that orienting attention to the location of the cue affects the quality of the perceptual representation for features and their integration.     

Does attention cause illusory line motion?

Illusory line motion (ILM) has been shown to occur when a line is presented with one end next to a previously stimulated location. The line appears to be drawn away from the site of stimulation. It has been suggested that this is because of the allocation of attention to the stimulated site. Using an endogenous attentional manipulation (a central arrow cue) with no differences in the display between the two ends of the line at the time of line presentation or immediately prior, no ILM was detected, though there was a small effect in the opposite direction. Those who have found endogenously induced ILM have used an endogenous cue based on a property of a location marker that indicated the cued location. Changing the method of cuing to one based on a property of a peripheral marker instead of a central arrow produced a small but significant report of ILM. The small magnitude of the effect, participant self-reports, and the absence of the effect in the purely endogenous condition, suggest that this was merely a bias. ILM is not generated by endogenous attention shifts.     

When can attention not be divided?

Humans can guide simple concurrent and seemingly independent movements of digits between hands, but it is shown here that they find it impossible to do this with digits within a hand. This inability demonstrates a basic characteristic of the relation between attention and the control of the skeletal musculature. Mechanisms that are available to provide the illusion of concurrent and independent guidance of separate movements between hands are not available within a single-hand control system. There is no reason to believe that the inability to divide focal attention in the guidance of two concurrent controlled activities, as exemplified in the example of within-hand movements, does not also extend to nonmotor processes.     

Does the isolation effect require attention?

An item that differs from the surrounding items is remembered better than an item that is consistent with its surroundings; this is known as the von Restorff effect or isolation effect (von Restorff, Psychologische Forschung, 18, 299–342, 1933). Theoretical explanations have proposed that the isolate is processed differently from control items, though some research has suggested that this processing might require more attention for semantic than for physical isolates. To test this possibility, in the present study we examined the isolation effects for physical isolates and semantic isolates under full and divided attention. Participants viewed lists of categorized words, with some lists containing either a physical or a semantic isolate, followed by immediate written free recall. Across three experiments, divided attention eliminated the semantic isolation effect but did not impact the physical isolation effect. Furthermore, semantic isolates were output earlier in recall than controls, whereas physical isolates were output more similarly to controls. These findings suggest that semantic isolation effects require attention during encoding, whereas physical isolation effects are relatively automatic.     

When do microsaccades follow spatial attention?

Following up on an exchange about the relation between microsaccades and spatial attention (Horowitz, Fencsik, Fine, Yurgenson, & Wolfe, 2007; Horowitz, Fine, Fencsik, Yurgenson, & Wolfe, 2007; Laubrock, Engbert, Rolfs, & Kliegl, 2007), we examine the effects of selection criteria and response modality. We show that for Posner cuing with saccadic responses, microsaccades go with attention in at least 75% of cases (almost 90% if probability matching is assumed) when they are first (or only) microsaccades in the cue—target interval and when they occur between 200 and 400 msec after the cue. The relation between spatial attention and the direction of microsaccades drops to chance level for unselected microsaccades collected during manual-response conditions. Analyses of data from four cross-modal cuing experiments demonstrate an above-chance, intermediate link for visual cues, but no systematic relation for auditory cues. Thus, the link between spatial attention and direction of microsaccades depends on the experimental condition and time of occurrence, but it can be very strong.     

When do luminance changes capture attention?

In two experiments, we examined the ability of task-irrelevant changes in luminance to capture attention in an irrelevant singleton search. By using uniform increment and decrement arrays, we were able to create changes of the same absolute magnitude, but resulting in a singleton with either higher or lower contrast magnitude, relative to other elements in the search array. A condition where a singleton changed contrast polarity without a concomitant change in the overall contrast magnitude was also included. It was found that only luminance changes resulting in a singleton having increased contrast (or saliency) were effective in capturing attention. In addition, no attentional capture was observed when the irrelevant singleton was characterized by the equivalent amount of static luminance differences, suggesting a unique attentional prioritization of luminance changes that increase singleton saliency.     

Is attention shared between the ears?

This study tests the locus of attention during selective listening for speech-like stimuli. Can processing be differentially allocated to the two ears? Two conditions were used. The simultaneous condition involved one of four randomly chosen stop-consonants being presented to one of the ears chosen at random. The sequential condition involved two intervals; in the first S listened to the right ear; in the second S listened to the left ear. One of the four consonants was presented to an attended ear during one of these intervals. Experiment I used no distracting stimuli. Experiment II utilized a distracting consonant not confusable with any of the four target consonants. This distractor was always presented to any ear not containing a target. In both experiments, simultaneous and sequential performance were essentially identical, despite the need for attention sharing between the two ears during the simultaneous condition. We conclude that selective attention does not occur during perceptual processing of speech sounds presented to the two ears. We suggest that attentive effects arise in short-term memory following processing.