The role of strategies in deciding advantageously in ambiguous and risky situations

In decision situations of everyday life, the potential positive or negative consequences of a decision are often specified and the associated probabilities are known or they are principally calculable ("decisions under risk"). On the basis of correlations reported in patient studies, it has been recently proposed that decisions under risk involve strategic components, i.e. calculation of the risk, as well as emotional processes, i.e. processing feedback from previous decisions. However, the potential impact of calculative strategies on decision-making under risk has not been investigated systematically, so far. In the current study, we examined 42 healthy subjects (21 females) with the Game of Dice Task measuring decisions under risk, and a questionnaire assessing strategy application in items comparable to the choices in the Game of Dice Task. In addition, the subjects performed the Iowa Gambling Task, examining decision-making under ambiguity, and a neuropsychological test battery focusing on executive functions. Results indicate that deciding advantageously in a decision-making task with explicit and stable rules is linked to applying calculative strategies. In contrast, individuals who decide intuitively prefer risky or disadvantageous choices in the Game of Dice Task. Applying calculative strategies was correlated with executive functions but not with performance on the Iowa Gambling Task. The results support the view that calculative processes and strategies may improve decision-making under explicit risk conditions.     

The contribution of “cool” and “hot” components of decision-making in adolescence: Implications for developmental psychopathology

Impairments in either “cool” or “hot” processes may represent two pathways to deficient decision-making. Whereas cool processes are associated with cognitive and rational decisions, hot processes are associated with emotional, affective, and visceral processes. In this study, 168 boys were administered a card-playing task at ages 13 and 14 years to assess response perseveration. This task was designed to initially reward playing and gradually associate playing with punishment. Measures of subjective ordering (cool processes) and neuroticism (hot processes) at age 13 years were used to examine how these individual characteristics relate to perseveration over time. A decrease in perseveration from age 13 to 14 was associated with cool processes whereas hot processes were associated with response perseveration only over time. A complementary but simultaneous assessment of cool and hot processes, such as neuropsychological and personality tests, could facilitate treatment planning of children with behavioral problems.     

The link between ego-resiliency and changes in Big Five traits after decision making: The case of Extraversion

After performing such solitary decision making tasks as the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and the Game of Dice Task (GDT), we expected that changes will occur in Extraversion trait measured by a short Hungarian Big Five Inventory (BFI). We also hypothesized that ego-resiliency (Block, 2002)—a dimension measuring the ability to adapt to situational demands—will be linked to the magnitude of Extraversion change. After a pre-task measurement of the Big Five traits and ego-resiliency, participants (N = 93) completed the IGT and the GDT tasks. After each task, they filled out the BFI again. Pre- and post-task Big Five trait values showed significant differences. Participants reported lower post task scores on the Extraversion dimension and the magnitude of Extraversion change between pre- and post-task measurements correlated with ego-resiliency. The results highlight some short term effects of contextual factors influencing self-characterizations in BFI dimensions. Especially, individuals with high ego-resiliency give characteristically more introverted self-characterization after solitary tasks. The present results show an example of how the interplay between contextual factors and ego-resiliency can modify self-characterization within a very short period of time.     

Trait impulsiveness and executive function in healthy young adults

Performance-based neuropsychological tests are often used to assess planning and impulse control, but the extent to which these measures reflect trait impulsiveness or specific dimensions of trait impulsiveness is not clear. This study used the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-11 (BIS-11; [Patton, J. H., Stanford, M. S., & Barratt, E. S. (1995). Factor structure of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 51, 768–774.]) to examine the relationship between various dimensions of trait impulsiveness and performance on several executive function tests in healthy young adults. Total BIS-11 scores correlated with performance on measures of planning and impulse control. Higher non-planning impulsiveness scores, which indicate poorer self-control and lower cognitive complexity, correlated most strongly with performance on a maze test that measures planning and impulse control (r = .58). These results provide support for the convergent validity of pencil-and-paper maze-based measures of planning and impulse control.     

Are risk preferences consistent?: The influence of decision domain and personality

This paper examines the consistency of risk preferences across three decision domains important in most people’s lives: work, health and personal finance. We consider the degree to which the five factor model of personality and a range of factors that influence risk-related decision-making (perceived risk, framing, emotions and cost–benefit analysis) impact upon cross-domain consistency. Data were gathered from a sample of participants for whom approaches to risk were likely to vary (academics, chess players, firefighters, mountaineers and City traders). The results showed that participants could be categorised into two groups: those who were consistent in their risk preferences in three decision domains, and those who were inconsistent or domain-specific. The consistent group was significantly lower on neuroticism and higher on agreeableness and conscientiousness with a less variable approach to weighing up the costs and benefits of taking risks than the inconsistent group. The majority of the consistent group was risk averse.When the domain-specific risk preferences of the inconsistent group were examined, data showed that different combinations of personality and decision-making factors predicted risk preferences within each domain.     

Do amnesic patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome use feedback when making decisions under risky conditions? An experimental investigation with the Game of Dice Task with and without feedback

We investigated the role of feedback processing in decision making under risk conditions in 50 patients with amnesia in the course of alcoholic Korsakoff's syndrome (KS). Half of the patients were administered the Game of Dice Task (GDT) and the remaining 25 patients were examined with a modified version of the GDT in which no feedback was provided. Patients' results in the GDT and in the modified version were compared with that of 50 healthy subjects of whom 25 subjects performed the original GDT and 25 performed the modified version. While performance on the original GDT was superior to performance on the modified GDT in healthy subjects, KS patients performed similarly on both the GDT with and GDT without feedback. Performance on both task versions was correlated with categorization and set-shifting. The findings indicate that amnesic patients do not profit from receiving feedback for their decisions in explicit risk conditions.     

Task switching training effects are mediated by working-memory management

Task switching is an important executive function, and finding ways to improve it has become a major goal of contemporary scientists. Karbach and Kray (2009) found that training in the Alternating-Runs Task-Switching (AR-TS) paradigm (in which the task changed every second trial) reduced the costs of switching in untrained tasks, as well as led to far transfer to interference control ability and fluid intelligence. However, AR-TS is known to involve working memory updating (WMU). Therefore, we hypothesized that AR-TS training involves WMU and not task-switching proper. Participants were trained using Karbach and Kray's protocol. Results indicate a highly specific transfer pattern in which participants showed near transfer to switching cost in the AR-TS paradigm, but did not significantly improve in another version of the task switching paradigm in which the tasks were randomly ordered or a version in which the task changed every 3rd trial. The results suggest that what has been trained is not a broad task-switching ability but rather a specific skill related to the unique WMU requirements of the training paradigm.     

The ability to process emotional information predicts loss aversion

On the basis of previous research it was hypothesized that alexithymia is associated with a higher tolerance for losses. This hypothesis is extended to explore whether the putative link between loss aversion and alexithymia remains once traits associated with risk taking (sensation seeking) and broad based personality traits (the Big 5) are controlled. Participants (N = 260) completed indices of alexithymia, sensation seeking and the Big 5 and both a riskless (endowment effect) and risky (lottery task) measure of loss aversion. It was found that the higher the alexithymia score the lower the loss aversion for both riskless and risky decisions even when sex, sensation seeking and the Big 5 are taken into account. The implications for this finding are discussed in the light of a neurological explanation of the relationship between alexithymia and loss aversion.     

Risk taking under the influence: A fuzzy-trace theory of emotion in adolescence

Fuzzy-trace theory explains risky decision making in children, adolescents, and adults, incorporating social and cultural factors as well as differences in impulsivity. Here, we provide an overview of the theory, including support for counterintuitive predictions (e.g., when adolescents “rationally” weigh costs and benefits, risk taking increases, but it decreases when the core gist of a decision is processed). Then, we delineate how emotion shapes adolescent risk taking—from encoding of representations of options, to retrieval of values/principles, to application of those values/principles to representations of options. Our review indicates that: (i) gist representations often incorporate emotion including valence, arousal, feeling states, and discrete emotions; and (ii) emotion determines whether gist or verbatim representations are processed. We recommend interventions to reduce unhealthy risk taking that inculcate stable gist representations, enabling adolescents to identify quickly and automatically danger even when experiencing emotion, which differs sharply from traditional approaches emphasizing deliberation and precise analysis.     

Iowa Gambling Task performance and executive function predict low-income urban preadolescents’ risky behaviors

This study examines preadolescents’ reports of risk-taking as predicted by two different, but related inhibitory control systems involving sensitivity to reward and loss on the one hand, and higher order processing in the context of cognitive conflict, known as executive functioning (EF), on the other. Importantly, this study examines these processes with a sample of inner-city, low-income preadolescents and as such examines the ways in which these processes may be related to risky behaviors as a function of children’s levels of both concurrent and chronic exposure to household poverty. As part of a larger longitudinal study, 382 children (ages 9–11) provided a self-report of risky behaviors and participated in the Iowa Gambling Task, assessing bias for infrequent loss (preference for infrequent, high magnitude versus frequent, low magnitude loss) and the Hearts and Flowers task assessing executive functioning. Results demonstrated that a higher bias for infrequent loss was associated with higher risky behaviors for children who demonstrated lower EF. Furthermore, bias for infrequent loss was most strongly associated with higher risk-taking for children facing highest levels of poverty. Implications for early identification and prevention of risk-taking in inner-city preadolescents are discussed.     

Unconscious activation of task sets

Using an explicit task cuing paradigm, we tested whether masked cues can trigger task-set activation, which would suggest that unconsciously presented stimuli can impact cognitive control processes. Based on a critical assessment of previous findings on the priming of task-set activation, we present two experiments with a new method to approach this subject. Instead of using a prime, we varied the visibility of the cue. These cues either directly signaled particular tasks in Experiment 1, or certain task transitions (i.e., task repetitions or switches) in Experiment 2. While both masked task and transition cues affected task choice, only task cues affected the speed of task performance. This observation suggests that task-specific stimulus–response rules can be activated only by masked cues that are uniquely associated with a particular task. Taken together, these results demonstrate that unconsciously presented stimuli have the power to activate corresponding task sets.     

Who do you trust? The impact of facial emotion and behaviour on decision making

During social interactions, we use available information to guide our decisions, including behaviour and emotional displays. In some situations, behaviour and emotional displays may be incongruent, complicating decision making. This study had two main aims: first, to investigate the independent contributions of behaviour and facial displays of emotion on decisions to trust, and, second, to examine what happens when the information being signalled by a facial display is incongruent with behaviour. Participants played a modified version of the Trust Game in which they learned simulated players’ behaviour with or without concurrent displays of facial emotion. Results indicated that displays of anger, but not happiness, influenced decisions to trust during initial encounters. Over the course of repeated interactions, however, emotional displays consistent with an established pattern of behaviour made independent contributions to decision making, strengthening decisions to trust. When facial display and behaviour were incongruent, participants used current behaviour to inform decision making.     

Task conflict,information processing,and decision-making: The damaging effect of relationship conflict

A popular theoretical assumption holds that task-related disagreements stimulate critical thinking, and thus may improve group decision making. Two recent meta-analyses showed, however, that task conflict can have a positive effect, a negative effect, or no effect at all on decision-making quality (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; De Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2012). In two studies, we built upon the suggestion of both meta-analyses that the presence of relationship conflict determines whether a task conflict is positively or negatively related to decision making. We hypothesized and found that the level of perceived relationship conflict during task conflict (Study 1), and the actual presence (vs. absence) of relationship conflict during task conflict (Study 2), increased group members’ rigidity in holding onto suboptimal initial preferences during decision making and thus led to poor decisions. In both studies the effect of relationship conflict on decision making was mediated by biased use of information.