The impact of chess research on cognitive science

Summary Although chess research has not been a mainstream activity in cognitive science, it has had a significant impact on this field because of the experimental and theoretical tools it has provided. The two most-cited references in chess research, de Groot (1965) and Chase and Simon (1973 a), have accumulated over 250 citations each (SSCI andSCI sources summed), with the majority of citations coming a decade or more from their publication dates. Both works are frequently cited in contemporary cognitive-psychology textbooks. Chess playing provides a model task environment for the study of basic cognitive processes, such as perception, memory, and problem solving. It also offers a unique opportunity for the study of individual differences (chess expertise) because of Elo's (1965, 1978) development of a chess-skill rating scale. Chess has also enjoyed a privileged position in Artificial-Intelligence research as a model domain for exploring search and evaluation processes.     

Chess knowledge predicts chess memory even after controlling for chess experience: Evidence for the role of high-level processes

The expertise effect in memory for chess positions is one of the most robust effects in cognitive psychology. One explanation of this effect is that chess recall is based on the recognition of familiar patterns and that experts have learned more and larger patterns. Template theory and its instantiation as a computational model are based on this explanation. An alternative explanation is that the expertise effect is due, in part, to stronger players having better and more conceptual knowledge, with this knowledge facilitating memory performance. Our literature review supports the latter view. In our experiment, a sample of 79 chess players were given a test of memory for chess positions, a test of declarative chess knowledge, a test of fluid intelligence, and a questionnaire concerning the amount of time they had played nontournament chess and the amount of time they had studied chess. We determined the numbers of tournament games the players had played from chess databases. Chess knowledge correlated .67 with chess memory and accounted for 16% of the variance after controlling for chess experience. Fluid intelligence accounted for an additional 13% of the variance. These results support the conclusion that both high-level conceptual processing and low-level recognition of familiar patterns play important roles in memory for chess positions.     

Chess databases as a research vehicle in psychology: Modeling large data

The game of chess has often been used for psychological investigations, particularly in cognitive science. The clear-cut rules and well-defined environment of chess provide a model for investigations of basic cognitive processes, such as perception, memory, and problem solving, while the precise rating system for the measurement of skill has enabled investigations of individual differences and expertise-related effects. In the present study, we focus on another appealing feature of chess—namely, the large archive databases associated with the game. The German national chess database presented in this study represents a fruitful ground for the investigation of multiple longitudinal research questions, since it collects the data of over 130,000 players and spans over 25 years. The German chess database collects the data of all players, including hobby players, and all tournaments played. This results in a rich and complete collection of the skill, age, and activity of the whole population of chess players in Germany. The database therefore complements the commonly used expertise approach in cognitive science by opening up new possibilities for the investigation of multiple factors that underlie expertise and skill acquisition. Since large datasets are not common in psychology, their introduction also raises the question of optimal and efficient statistical analysis. We offer the database for download and illustrate how it can be used by providing concrete examples and a step-by-step tutorial using different statistical analyses on a range of topics, including skill development over the lifetime, birth cohort effects, effects of activity and inactivity on skill, and gender differences.     

Expertise in complex decision making: the role of search in chess 70 years after de Groot

One of the most influential studies in all expertise research is de Groot's (1946) study of chess players, which suggested that pattern recognition, rather than search, was the key determinant of expertise. Many changes have occurred in the chess world since de Groot's study, leading some authors to argue that the cognitive mechanisms underlying expertise have also changed. We decided to replicate de Groot's study to empirically test these claims and to examine whether the trends in the data have changed over time. Six Grandmasters, five International Masters, six Experts, and five Class A players completed the think-aloud procedure for two chess positions. Findings indicate that Grandmasters and International Masters search more quickly than Experts and Class A players, and that both groups today search substantially faster than players in previous studies. The findings, however, support de Groot's overall conclusions and are consistent with predictions made by pattern recognition models.     

Slow and fast chess performance across three expert levels

ObjectivesSlow and fast thinking are crucial for human decision making in several domains of human activity including sports. These cognitive processes are remarkable in the intellectually demanding sport of chess. Slow and fast thinking underlie chess performance. However, the relative influence of each process has elicited controversial findings. Moreover, individual differences in chess skill are likely to moderate the integration of both processes.DesignThe simultaneous change over six time points in slow and fast chess performance was analyzed with a cross-domain latent curve model (LCM).MethodArchival data from an extensive group of chess players (n = 32,173) were included in these analyses at untitled, intermediate, and advanced levels of expertise. Intercept and slope latent factors of growth were specified and correlated for both processes.ResultsThere were remarkable differences in the change in slow and fast performance regarding the three expert levels, and in the concurrent interrelationship of both processes. The interdependence between both processes was more robust for the advanced than for the untitled and intermediate players.ConclusionsThese findings suggest that a better integration of slow and fast performance is produced at higher levels of expertise.     

Visualization,pattern recognition,and forward search: effects of playing speed and sight of the position on grandmaster chess errors

A new approach examined two aspects of chess skill, long a popular topic in cognitive science. A powerful computer‐chess program calculated the number and magnitude of blunders made by the same 23 grandmasters in hundreds of serious games of slow (“classical”) chess, regular “rapid” chess, and rapid “blindfold” chess, in which opponents transmit moves without ever seeing the actual position. Rapid chess led to substantially more and larger blunders than classical chess. Perhaps more surprisingly, the frequency and magnitude of blunders did not differ in rapid versus blindfold play, despite the additional memory and visualization load imposed by the latter. We discuss the involvement of various cognitive processes in human problem‐solving and expertise, especially with respect to chess. Prior opposing views about the basis of general chess skill have emphasized the dominance of either (a) swift pattern recognition or (b) analyzing ahead, but both seem important and the controversy appears currently unresolvable and perhaps fruitless.     

Individual differences in chess expertise: a psychometric investigation

Starting from controversies over the role of general individual characteristics (especially intelligence) for the attainment of expert performance levels, a comprehensive psychometric investigation of individual differences in chess expertise is presented. A sample of 90 adult tournament chess players of varying playing strengths (1311-2387 ELO) was screened with tests on intelligence and personality variables; in addition, experience in chess play, tournament participation, and practice activities were assessed. Correlation and regression analyses revealed a clear-cut moderate relationship between general (and in particular numerical) intelligence and the participants' playing strengths, suggesting that expert chess play does not stand in isolation from superior mental abilities. The strongest predictor of the attained expertise level, however, was the participants' chess experience which highlights the relevance of long-term engagement for the development of expertise. Among all analysed personality dimensions, only domain-specific performance motivation and emotion expression control incrementally contributed to the prediction of playing strength. In total, measures of chess experience, current tournament activity, intelligence, and personality accounted for about 55% of variance in chess expertise. The present results suggest that individual differences in chess expertise are multifaceted and cannot be reduced to differences in domain experience.     

A psychometric analysis of chess expertise

This study introduces the Amsterdam Chess Test (ACT). The ACT measures chess playing proficiency through 5 tasks: a choose-a-move task (comprising two parallel tests), a motivation questionnaire, a predict-a-move task, a verbal knowledge questionnaire, and a recall task. The validity of these tasks was established using external criteria based on the Elo chess rating system. Results from a representative sample of active chess players showed that the ACT is a very reliable test for chess expertise and that ACT has high predictive validity. Several hypotheses about the relationships between chess expertise, chess knowledge, motivation, and memory were tested. Incorporating response latencies in test scores is shown to lead to an increase in criterion validity, particularly for easy items.     

Mechanisms and neural basis of object and pattern recognition: a study with chess experts

Comparing experts with novices offers unique insights into the functioning of cognition, based on the maximization of individual differences. Here we used this expertise approach to disentangle the mechanisms and neural basis behind two processes that contribute to everyday expertise: object and pattern recognition. We compared chess experts and novices performing chess-related and -unrelated (visual) search tasks. As expected, the superiority of experts was limited to the chess-specific task, as there were no differences in a control task that used the same chess stimuli but did not require chess-specific recognition. The analysis of eye movements showed that experts immediately and exclusively focused on the relevant aspects in the chess task, whereas novices also examined irrelevant aspects. With random chess positions, when pattern knowledge could not be used to guide perception, experts nevertheless maintained an advantage. Experts' superior domain-specific parafoveal vision, a consequence of their knowledge about individual domain-specific symbols, enabled improved object recognition. Functional magnetic resonance imaging corroborated this differentiation between object and pattern recognition and showed that chess-specific object recognition was accompanied by bilateral activation of the occipitotemporal junction, whereas chess-specific pattern recognition was related to bilateral activations in the middle part of the collateral sulci. Using the expertise approach together with carefully chosen controls and multiple dependent measures, we identified object and pattern recognition as two essential cognitive processes in expert visual cognition, which may also help to explain the mechanisms of everyday perception.     

Intuitions without concepts lose the game: mindedness in the art of chess

To gain insight into human nature philosophers often discuss the inferior performance that results from deficits such as blindsight or amnesia. Less often do they look at superior abilities. A notable exception is Herbert Dreyfus who has developed a theory of expertise according to which expert action generally proceeds automatically and unreflectively. We address one of Dreyfus’s primary examples of expertise: chess. At first glance, chess would seem an obvious counterexample to Dreyfus’s view since, clearly, chess experts are engaged in deep strategic thought. However, Dreyfus’s argument is subtle. He accepts that analysis and deliberation play a role in chess, yet he thinks that all such thought is predicated on intuitive, arational expert perception, and action. We argue that even the so-called “intuitive” aspect of chess is rational through and through.     

Revising superior planning performance in chess players: the impact of time restriction and motivation aspects

In a previous study (Unterrainer, Kaller, Halsband, & Rahm, 2006), chess players outperformed non-chess players in the Tower of London planning task but exhibited disproportionately longer processing times. This pattern of results raises the question of whether chess players' planning capabilities are superior or whether the results reflect differences in the speed-accuracy trade-off between the groups, possibly attributable to sports motivation. The present study was designed to disambiguate these alternative suggestions by implementing various constraints on planning time and by assessing self-reported motivation. In contrast to the previous study, chess players' performance was not superior, independently of whether problems had to be solved with (Experiment 1) or without (Experiment 2) time limits. As expected, chess players reported higher overall trait and state motivation scores across both experiments. These findings revise the notion of superior planning performance in chess players. In consequence, they do not conform with the assumption of a general transfer of chess-related planning expertise to other cognitive domains, instead suggesting that superior performance may be possible only under specific circumstances such as receiving competitive instructions.     

Chess expertise in children

This paper reports several studies of chess expertise in children who play competitive chess. The first study examines (1) the relationship between experience and skill among 113 school-age children (grades 1 through 12); and (2) the relationship between chess skill and scores on various spatial and logical abilities tests among the top 15 players. Improvement in skill is related to experience, and chess players score higher than average on the Raven's Progressive Matrices. Also, scores on a chess-specific test, the Knight's Tour, correlate with scores on the Raven's. The second study reports three experiments with 59 Ss involving chess-specific tasks in memory, perception, and similarity judgements. The first two experiments replicated and extended Chase and Simon (1973). The third experiment, which asked Ss to judge similarities of chess positions, demonstrated that similarity judgements become more global and abstract with increased skill. The final section describes qualitatively how children's chess expertise compares to that of adults. Drawing upon Anderson (1985), we focus on some distinctive features of children's chess play and on some successful techniques in coaching young players.     

Selecting the Better Model by Using Data,Occam's Razor,and a Little Common Sense: Reply to Ericsson

The issue is which model, practice‐alone or innate talent affecting learning speed and limiting asymptotic performance level, better accounts for expertise development in international chess. The innate talent model does much better by the usual criteria. A study to determine what innate talent for chess might consist is now needed. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Concepts without intuition lose the game: commentary on Montero and Evans (2011)

In several papers, Hubert Dreyfus has used chess as a paradigmatic example of how experts act intuitively, rarely using deliberation when selecting actions, while individuals that are only competent rely on analytic and deliberative thought. By contrast, Montero and Evans (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10:175?C194, 2011) argue that intuitive aspects of chess are actually rational, in the sense that actions can be justified. In this paper, I show that both Dreyfus??s and Montero and Evans??s views are too extreme, and that expertise in chess, and presumably in other domains, depends on a combination of intuitive thinking and deliberative search, both mediated by perceptual processes. There is more to expertise than just rational thought. I further contend that both sides ignore emotions, which are important in acquiring and maintaining expertise. Finally, I argue that experimental data and first-person data, which are sometimes presented as irreconcilable in the phenomenology literature, actually lead to similar conclusions.     

The role of domain-specific practice, handedness, and starting age in chess

The respective roles of the environment and innate talent have been a recurrent question for research into expertise. The authors investigated markers of talent, environment, and critical period for the acquisition of expert performance in chess. Argentinian chess players (N = 104), ranging from weak amateurs to grandmasters, completed a questionnaire measuring variables including individual and group practice, starting age, and handedness. The study reaffirms the importance of practice for reaching high levels of performance, but it also indicates a large variability: The slower player needed 8 times as much practice to reach master level than the faster player. Additional results show a correlation between skill and starting age and indicate that players are more likely to be mixed-handed than individuals in the general population; however, there was no correlation between handedness and skill within the sample of chess players. Together, these results suggest that practice is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the acquisition of expertise, that some additional factors may differentiate chessplayers and nonchessplayers, and that starting age of practice is important.     

Effect of expertise acquisition on strategic perception: the example of chess

The two experiments presented here study perceptual processes implemented by chess players in situations related to their domain of expertise. The aim was to determine how patterns are perceived as a function of their strategic value when players acquire expertise. In this study, conducted on novice and more experienced players, it is hypothesized that with acquisition of expertise players would quickly encode familiar patterns and then rapidly focus their attention on patterns with a higher immediate strategic value. In Experiment 1, participants had to carry out a change-detection task that used the "flicker paradigm". The results showed that during the perception of standard chess positions, experienced players--but not novices--quickly focused their attention on the most strategic patterns. In Experiment 2, experienced players and novices carried out a recognition task after having encoded chess positions for 1 or 5 s. The results indicated early encoding of familiar patterns without immediate strategic value, followed by the encoding of more strategic patterns. Taken together, the results of these two experiments are consistent with the results by both de Groot and Gobet (1996) and McGregor and Howes (2002) about the strategic content of Chase and Simon's chunks (Chase & Simon, 1973b).     

Recall of rapidly presented random chess positions is a function of skill

A widely cited result asserts that experts’ superiority over novices in recalling meaningful material from their domain of expertise vanishes when they are confronted with random material. A review of recent chess experiments in which random positions served as control material (presentation time between 3 and 10 sec) shows, however, that strong players generally maintain some superiority over weak players even with random positions, although the relative difference between skill levels is much smaller than with game positions. The implications of this finding for expertise in chess are discussed and the question of the recall of random material in other domains is raised.     

Identification and conceptualization of procedural chunks in chess

When it comes to cognitive architecture and human information processing, chunks are one of the best known and most recognized constructs. Nevertheless, the nature of chunks is still very elusive, especially when it comes to chunks in procedural knowledge. This study deals with basic features of procedural information processing and examines the manifestation of chunks in procedural knowledge. The participants' task was to reconstruct sequences of chess moves. Chess was chosen as an experimental domain, because of its complexity, well-defined rules and standardized measure of chess player strength. From the results we conclude that short-term memory capacity is determined by the combination of the size and amount of procedural chunks recalled to the short-term memory. We have shown that on average, participants with more specialized knowledge operated faster and with larger chunks of procedural information than participants with less specialized knowledge. We have shown that in procedural information processing, the level of expertise and the sorting order of the retrieved information are important factors that influence the amount of procedural chunks retained in the short-term memory. Therefore, the capacity of short-term memory in complex situations cannot be expressed as a simple concept.     

Chess masters show a hallmark of face processing with chess

Face processing has several distinctive hallmarks that researchers have attributed either to face-specific mechanisms or to extensive experience distinguishing faces. Here, we examined the face-processing hallmark of selective attention failure--as indexed by the congruency effect in the composite paradigm--in a domain of extreme expertise: chess. Among 27 experts, we found that the congruency effect was equally strong with chessboards and faces. Further, comparing these experts with recreational players and novices, we observed a trade-off: Chess expertise was positively related to the congruency effect with chess yet negatively related to the congruency effect with faces. These and other findings reveal a case of expertise-dependent, facelike processing of objects of expertise and suggest that face and expert-chess recognition share common processes.     

Planning abilities and chess: A comparison of chess and non‐chess players on the Tower of London task

Playing chess requires problem‐solving capacities in order to search through the chess problem space in an effective manner. Chess should thus require planning abilities for calculating many moves ahead. Therefore, we asked whether chess players are better problem solvers than non‐chess players in a complex planning task. We compared planning performance between chess (N=25) and non‐chess players (N=25) using a standard psychometric planning task, the Tower of London (ToL) test. We also assessed fluid intelligence (Raven Test), as well as verbal and visuospatial working memory. As expected, chess players showed better planning performance than non‐chess players, an effect most strongly expressed in difficult problems. On the other hand, they showed longer planning and movement execution times, especially for incorrectly solved trials. No differences in fluid intelligence and verbal/visuospatial working memory were found between both groups. These findings indicate that better performance in chess players is associated with disproportionally longer solution times, although it remains to be investigated whether motivational or strategic differences account for this result.