时间压力对风险决策中框架效应的影响

时间压力是决策的重要因素.研究引入时间压力变量(高时间压力、非时间压力),探索了时间压力对风险决策的框架效应的影响.结果显示:(1)时间压力弱化了风险决策的框架效应;(2)时间压力情境下的框架效应是一个精细加工的过程.     

决策者角色及相关因素对风险偏好的影响

两个实验考察了金钱和时间决策中决策者角色及相关因素对风险偏好的影响。结果发现:(1)两种决策中不同决策者角色都会引起风险偏好反转,人们在为他人决策时更偏向于风险寻求;(2)两种决策中风险偏好的反转都会受到任务框架、风险概率的影响,金钱决策中风险偏好的变化还受金钱数额高低的影响。金钱决策中存在决策者角色×任务框架×风险概率之间的交互作用,时间决策中没有发现这种交互作用。     

决策者角色及相关变量对风险偏好的影响

采用IAT技术测查被试的内隐自尊, 并引入收益和损失两种任务框架, 综合探讨了内隐自尊水平、任务得失框架对自我决策和为他人决策时风险偏好的影响。结果发现：(1)在收益框架下, 被试为他人决策时更冒险, 而在损失框架下, 为自我和他人决策的风险偏好无显著差异; (2)与为自我决策相比, 低内隐自尊者为他人决策时更冒险, 而高内隐自尊者为自我和他人决策的风险偏好无显著差异; (3)内隐自尊水平与任务框架的交互作用及内隐自尊水平、任务框架和决策者角色之间的三级交互作用均不显著。依据相关的理论和发现对这种结果进行了分析和讨论。     

成就动机和任务框架对职业生涯决策风险偏好的影响

利用信息板技术研究了成就动机对职业生涯决策过程中风险偏好的影响.结果表明:1)成就动机的各维度对职业决策风险偏好有不同的作用,避免失败动机比追求成功动机对职业风险偏好的预测更加敏感.2)淘汰框架比录用框架表现出更强的风险偏好,但差异均未达到显著性水平.3)成就动机和任务框架的交互作用对职业决策风险偏好有显著影响.     

权力、任务框架对自我和为他人决策时风险偏好的影响

采用情境回忆任务启动被试的权力,并引入收益和损失两种任务框架,综合考察权力高低、任务框架对自我决策和为他人决策时风险偏好的影响。结果表明:(1)在为他人决策中,启动高权力被试有更强的风险偏好,而自我决策中,高、低权力启动组被试风险偏好上无显著差异;(2)在为他人决策中,被试在收益框架和损失框架下的风险偏好差异不显著,而在自我决策中,损失框架下的风险偏好显著高于收益框架;(3)低权力启动的被试,在损失框架下,为他人决策的风险偏好要小于自我决策,而在收益框架下差异不显著;高权力启动的被试无论在收益框架还是损失框架,自我-他人风险决策都不存在显著差异。     

心理距离对风险决策框架效应的影响

解释水平理论是一种解释心理距离怎样影响个体的思维决策的社会认知理论。研究基于解释水平理论,探查了心理距离对风险决策框架效应的影响。实验从心理距离的四个维度入手,每个维度均采用2（解释水平高、低）×2（正框架、负框架）的被试间设计,用于检验解释水平是否调节框架对被试决策任务的选择。结果表明,当心理距离越远,解释水平越高时,被试产生明显的框架效应;而当心理距离越近,解释水平越低时,框架效应明显减弱。除了大概率情况下的框架效应削弱至不显著,其余维度的高、低解释水平下的框架效应均显著。     

心理距离与决策者角色对风险决策的影响

采用改编的I0S量表测量自我与他人的心理距离,在收益和损失情境下,综合探讨了为他人和预测他人决策时心理距离对个体风险偏好的影响.结果发现:(1)与他人心理距离越远,个体决策时越偏好风险,且反应时越短;(2)个体预测他人决策时比为他人决策时更偏好风险,但两者反应时没有显著差异;(3)心理距离与决策者角色存在交互作用,即预测时个体认为远心理距离他人比近心理距离他人更冒险,而为他人决策时两者差异消失;(4)决策角色与决策框架、心理距离与决策框架存在交互作用:在收益框架下,自我他人心理距离较远时个体更偏好风险,且个体预测比为他人决策时更冒险,损失条件下无差异.依据相关理论对这些结果进行了分析讨论.     

情绪和任务框架对自我和预期他人决策时风险偏好的影响

两个实验考察了情绪和任务框架对自我和预期他人决策时风险偏好的影响。结果表明:(1)获益框架下,悲伤情绪比愉悦情绪诱发更强的风险偏好,自我决策比预期他人决策表现出更强的风险偏好;(2)损失框架下,愉悦情绪比悲伤情绪诱发更强的风险偏好,预期他人决策比自我决策表现出更强的风险偏好;(3)在自我决策时,愉悦情绪在损失框架下比在获益框架下诱发了更强的风险偏好,悲伤情绪在获益框架下比在损失框架下诱发了更强的风险偏好;在预期他人决策时,无论是愉悦情绪还是悲伤情绪,损失框架均比获益框架诱发了更强的风险偏好。     

任务框架、损益值大小对自恋者风险偏好的影响

以234名大学生为被试,探讨了任务框架、损益值大小对显性/隐性自恋者风险偏好的影响。结果表明：(1)框架效应较稳定的出现在中等风险水平情境下,且在大损益值条件下更易出现。(2)在获益框架下,被试为小金额决策更冒险,在损失框架下,则为大金额决策更冒险。(3)在损失框架下,高显性自恋者比低显性自恋者更为冒险,在获益框架下,高隐性自恋者比低隐性自恋者更为保守;高隐性自恋者的风险偏好受到任务框架和损益值大小的共同影响。     

风险决策与博彩行为的眼动特点

为了探索博彩行为与风险决策的特点,采用眼动研究方法对博彩行为中的风险决策任务进行了实验,结果发现:(1)外部框架表征虽影响决策者的内部表征,但决策者的内部表征方式表现出稳定的规律;(2)参与者在博彩中面对损失时,认知加工的决策时间比在面对收益的博彩任务的决策时间长,凝视次数也多比较多,决策者的瞳孔直径比面对收益任务下更大;(3)博彩参与者的内部表征方式,随博彩任务的外部表征的框架,金额、概率、备择项间倍数的改变而发生变化.结论:概率信息是博彩任务中的决策者稳定的决策权重;决策者在面对损失时会更加敏感,导致在决策过程中给予更多的加工负荷;博彩任务的外部表征对参与者内部表征有显著影响.     

情绪和框架效应对个体捐赠决策影响的实验研究

本研究采用双因素被试间实验具体考察了特定即时情绪和框架效应对于捐赠决策的影响,结果发现存在显著的主效应和交互作用。悲伤情绪能够增加捐赠者的捐赠意愿,快乐情绪会降低捐赠者的捐赠意愿;损失框架能够增加捐赠者的捐赠意愿,幸存框架会降低捐赠者的捐赠意愿;快乐情绪的捐赠者的捐赠决策受框架效应的影响要弱于中性情绪和悲伤情绪的捐赠者,捐赠者在幸存框架下的捐赠决策受情绪的影响比在损失框架下受情绪的影响更小。     

Social cues and verbal framing in risky choice

We examined how people use social and verbal cues of differing priorities in making social decisions. In Experiment 1, formally identical life – death choice problems were presented in different hypothetical group contexts and were phrased in either a positive or negative frame. The risk‐seeking choice became more dominant as the number of kin in an endangered group increased. Framing effects occurred only in a heterogeneous group context where the lives at risk were a mixture of kin and strangers. No framing effect was found when the same problem was presented in the context of a homogeneous group consisting of either all kin or all strangers. We viewed the framing effects to be a sign of indecisive risk preference due to the differential effects of a kinship cue and a stranger cue on choice. In Experiment 2, we presented the life – death problem in two artificial group contexts involving either 6 billion human lives or 6 billion extraterrestrial lives. A framing effect was found only in the human context. Two pre‐conditions of framing effects appear to be social unfamiliarity of a decision problem and aspiration level of a decision maker. In Experiment 3, we analyzed the direction of the framing effect by balancing the framing. The direction of the framing effect depended on the baseline level of risk preference determined by a specific decision context. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

不同建议来源和关系亲疏下突发事件决策中的框架效应

从建议来源和关系亲疏两个方面对突发事件下的决策框架效应进行探讨。采用2（建议来源：来自普通群众／消防人员）×2（关系亲疏：关系亲密／关系疏远）×2（任务框架：正面框架／负面框架）完全被试间实验设计。实验材料以突发事件为背景,根据Kahneman（1981）研究的经典“亚洲疾病问题”改编。采用集体施测的方法,240名来自济南和重庆的大学生参加了实验。结果发现：①建议来源影响被试的决策反应,尤其是当建议来自专业人士（如消防人员）时,决策者表现出偏好于风险的单向框架效应;②关系亲疏导致不同的框架效应,在拯救包括亲属在内的受灾人群（关系亲密）时,框架效应非常明显;但当拯救陌生人（关系疏远）时,决策者表现出偏好于风险的单向框架效应;③当建议来源和关系亲疏共同作用于被试决策时,凡涉及关系亲密条件时决策者不管建议来源都表现出明显的框架效应;而当关系疏远时不同的建议来源导致决策者的决策框架不同。这说明,不同的建议来源和关系亲疏对突发事件下的决策框架效应产生了影响。     

Framing Effects: Dynamics and Task Domains

The author examines the mechanisms and dynamics of framing effects in risky choices across three distinct task domains (i.e., life–death, public property, and personal money). The choice outcomes of the problems presented in each of the three task domains had a binary structure of a sure thing vs a gamble of equal expected value; the outcomes differed in their framing conditions and the expected values, raging from 6000, 600, 60, to 6, numerically. It was hypothesized that subjects would become more risk seeking, if the sure outcome was below their aspiration level (the minimum requirement). As predicted, more subjects preferred the gamble when facing the life–death choice problems than facing the counterpart problems presented in the other two task domains. Subjects’ risk preference varied categorically along the group size dimension in the life–death domain but changed more linearly over the expected value dimension in the monetary domain. Framing effects were observed in 7 of 13 pairs of problems, showing a positive frame–risk aversion and negative frame–risk seeking relationship. In addition, two types of framing effects were theoretically defined and empirically identified. Abidirectional framing effectinvolves a reversal in risk preference, and occurs when a decision maker's risk preference is ambiguous or weak. Four bidirectional effects were observed; in each case a majority of subjects preferred the sure outcome under a positive frame but the gamble under a negative frame. In contrast, aunidirectional framing effectrefers to a preference shift due to the framing of choice outcomes: A majority of subjects preferred one choice outcome (either the sure thing or the gamble) under both framing conditions, with positive frame augmented the preference for the sure thing and negative frame augmented the preference for the gamble. These findings revealed some dynamic regularities of framing effects and posed implications for developing predictive and testable models of human decision making.     

Framing Effects and Choice Shifts in Group Decision Making

An experiment was conducted to examine the effects of framing on group decision-making. Decisions involving risk were posed in terms of either gains or losses to individual subjects. Subsequently, subjects were divided into groups and the decisions were presented again in either the same frame or the opposite frame. As hypothesized, when the same frame was presented to subjects both individually and in groups, individual-level framing effects became larger in groups; when the opposite frame was presented to groups, initial framing effects were reduced. However, these results were observed on only two of the four decision cases. On the other two cases, significant choice shifts occurred independently of the framing manipulations. Implications of these results for decision making groups in applied settings are discussed.     

Dispositional optimism,self‐framing and medical decision‐making

Self‐framing is an important but underinvestigated area in risk communication and behavioural decision‐making, especially in medical settings. The present study aimed to investigate the relationship among dispositional optimism, self‐frame and decision‐making. Participants (N = 500) responded to the Life Orientation Test‐Revised and self‐framing test of medical decision‐making problem. The participants whose scores were higher than the middle value were regarded as highly optimistic individuals. The rest were regarded as low optimistic individuals. The results showed that compared to the high dispositional optimism group, participants from the low dispositional optimism group showed a greater tendency to use negative vocabulary to construct their self‐frame, and tended to choose the radiation therapy with high treatment survival rate, but low 5‐year survival rate. Based on the current findings, it can be concluded that self‐framing effect still exists in medical situation and individual differences in dispositional optimism can influence the processing of information in a framed decision task, as well as risky decision‐making.