“Bad philosophy” and “derivative philosophy”: Labels that keep women out of the canon

Efforts to include women in the canon have long been beset by reactionary gatekeeping, typified by the charge “That's not philosophy.” That charge doesn't apply to early and mid-analytic female philosophers—Welby, Ladd-Franklin, Bryant, Jones, de Laguna, Stebbing, Ambrose, MacDonald—with job titles like lecturer in logic and professor of philosophy and publications in Mind, the Journal of Philosophy, and Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. It's hopeless to dismiss their work as “not philosophy.” But comparable reactionary gatekeeping affects them, this paper argues, typified by the labels “bad philosophy” and “derivative philosophy.” Virtue and vice epistemology help explain why these women have been neglected and why their own approaches are epistemically virtuous. Their contemporaries and historians are deficient in scholarly virtues in labelling these women's work “bad” or derived from male mentors with no or specious justification. Their disparaged qualities—intellectual humility, modesty, critical self-reflection, disclosing biases—are often epistemic virtues.     

Emerging Technologies and the Future of Philosophy

This article examines how a class of emerging technologies—specifically, radical cognitive enhancements and artificial intelligence—has the potential to influence the future of philosophy. The article argues that progress in philosophy has been impeded, in part, by two specific constraints imposed on us by the natural architecture of our cognitive systems. Both of these constraints, though, could in principle be overcome by certain cognitive technologies currently being researched and/or developed. It surveys a number of these technologies, and then looks at a particular metaphilosophical stance (called “inflationism”) that advocates amplifying the abilities of philosophers rather than reducing the ambitions of philosophy, given the apparent “teleological gap” between philosophy's ultimate goal (i.e., “the truth”) and the limited capacities of our evolved mental machinery.     

Progress with Science and Religion Issues: Critical Questions and Suggestions

Progress with the marriage of science and religion is slowed by “sterile” controversies. Ways toward overcoming them are suggested here. These concern the metaphysical foundations of science and religion (science and spirituality, science and theology) with a specific emphasis on epistemology, ontology, anthropology, aims, methodological procedures, limitations of binary logic, and the use of other types of logic (in particular relational and contextual reasoning). Dialogues between science and religion can have positive practical societal relevance, and therefore need to progress faster. An enlargement of humanity's mental horizons and development—especially of epistemic cognition—seems to be called for in order to secure the future of a global intellectual culture. Suggestions for achieving this are included.     

Toward operationalizing a psychoeducational definition of learning disabilities

An operational definition of “learning disabilities” is presented from the standpoint that classificatory psychoeducational definitions must ultimately relate to educational processes. Thus the condition should be described in terms of abilities crucial to educational achievement, and noneducational criteria should not be employed. It is pointed out that the most generally accepted current definition — which identifies children as “learning-disabled” on the basis of behavioral criteria, while excluding others because of etiological and other nonbehavioral factors — overlooks functional similarities among such groups as educable mentally retarded and emotionally disturbed children. These similarities warrant the inclusion under the rubric of “learning-disabled” of some children who may also be grouped within other diagnostic categories. Consequently, the profferred definition is based on a primary concern with day-to-day learning and management issues. Concepts subtended by the definition are operationally defined, and its relationship to programming is discussed.     

On the Importance of Being (Earnestly) Hybrid—Or,Qualms of a Quasi-Postmodernist: Commentary on Paper by Susan Fairfield

Dr. Fairfield makes a strong case that contemporary analytic theorists fail to live up to their apparent aspiration to present a thoroughgoingly postmodern conceptualization of the self. She argues instead in favor of a “hybrid” model—one that includes a dollop of modernism in the postmodernist brew. In this commentary, I critique the theorizing process inherent in psychoanalytic postmodernism, and then comment on and give a clinical example involving the self's “configurality.” I argue that we need to embrace the challenges of postmodernism without so privileging this position that we let it loosen our grasp of the realities of everyday clinical experience that might cause us to question postmodernism's tenets or values. Moreover, we must not assume that we can gauge the full impact of our “model of subjectivity” on the therapeutic process by knowing what we think we think.     

Constructivism about Practical Reasons1

Philosophers commonly wonder what a constructivist theory as applied to practical reasons might look like. For the methods or procedures of reasoning familiar from moral constructivism do not clearly apply generally, to all practical reasons. The paper argues that procedural specification is not necessary, so long as our aims are not first‐order but explanatory. We can seek to explain how there could be facts of the matter about reasons for action without saying what reasons we have. Explanatory constructivism must assume constructive “norms of practical reasoning” which yield particular truths without assuming them. But philosophers often mistakenly assume that only “formal” norms of reasoning could fulfill this role. The paper describes a further possibility: norms of reasoning can be “situation‐specific” and yet retain truth‐independent authority. Though we might doubt whether such norms can be independently defended, we should not doubt the possibility or coherence of constructivism about practical reasons.     

Two Potential Problems with Philosophical Intuitions: Muddled Intuitions and Biased Intuitions

One critique of experimental philosophy is that the intuitions of the philosophically untutored should be accorded little to no weight; instead, only the intuitions of professional philosophers should matter. In response to this critique, “experimentalists” often claim that the intuitions of professional philosophers are biased. In this paper, we explore this question of whose intuitions should be disqualified and why. Much of the literature on this issue focuses on the question of whether the intuitions of professional philosophers are reliable. In contrast, we instead focus on the idea of “muddled” intuitions—i.e. intuitions that are misdirected and about notions other than the ones under discussion. We argue that the philosophically untutored are likely to have muddled intuitions and that professional philosophers are likely to have unmuddled intuitions. Although being umuddled does not, by itself, establish the reliability of the intuitions of professional philosophers, being muddled is enough to disqualify the intuitions of the philosophically untutored. We then turn to the charge that, despite being unmuddled, professional philosophers still have biased intuitions. To evaluate this charge, we switch focus from the general notion of biased intuition to the more specific notion of theory-laden intuition. We argue that there is prima facie evidence—in the form of the presence of conflicts of intuition—for thinking that at least some of the intuitions of professional philosophers are theory-laden. In summary, we conclude that that there is no clean and easy answer to the question of whose intuitions should matter.     

Phenomenal character, phenomenal concepts, and externalism

A celebrated problem for representationalist theories of phenomenal character is that, given externalism about content, these theories lead to externalism about phenomenal character. While externalism about content is widely accepted, externalism about phenomenal character strikes many philosophers as wildly implausible. Even if internally identical individuals could have different thoughts, it is said, if one of them has a headache, or a tingly sensation, so must the other. In this paper, I argue that recent work on phenomenal concepts reveals that, contrary to appearances, this standard conjunction of externalism about content and internalism about phenomenal character is ultimately untenable on other models of phenomenal character as well, including even “qualia realism.” This would be significant for a number of reasons. The first is patent: it would undermine a primary objection to representationalism. The fact that representationalism is incompatible with the conjunction would be no serious problem for representationalism if no other plausible model of phenomenal character is compatible with it. The second is that the many philosophers who embrace the conjunction would be forced to abandon one of the two views; externalism would be true either of both content and phenomenal character, or of neither. Likewise, those philosophers who have taken a stance on only one of the two internalism/externalism debates would have to be seen as thereby committed to a particular stance on the other. The third reason stems from the fact that qualia realism typically goes hand in hand with internalism about phenomenal character. To the extent that it does, my argument would reveal that qualia realism is itself in tension with externalism about content. This would perhaps be the most surprising result of all.     

Gender and Transference

Despite an early interest, Freud explicitly rejected philosophy, because of its “speculative” character. He struggled with balancing the intellectual appeal of philosophy with the certainty he hoped to find in positivist science. Putting aside the scientific status of Freud's work, the author re-examines Freud's attitude towards philosophy. Failing to recognize the assumptions of his investigations, Freud segregated psychoanalysis from philosophy on the charge that philosophers equated mind with consciousness, putatively propounded unfounded speculations, and assumed false conclusions about comprehensiveness. However, Freud never completely abandoned his initial philosophical proclivities. His own contributions to cultural history, social philosophy, notions of personal identity, and the humanistic thrust of psychoanalysis, demonstrate that he continued to address his earliest interests in philosophical questions. The author elucidates the philosophical complexity of psychoanalysis and concludes that a reconsideration of Freud's self-appraisal of his intellectual commitments is warranted.     

Kant and Kantians on “the Normative Question”

After decades of vigorous debate, many contemporary philosophers in the Kantian tradition continue to believe, or at least hope, that morality can be given a firm grounding by showing that rational agents cannot consistently reject moral requirements. In the present paper, I do not take a stand on the possibility of bringing out the alleged inconsistency. Instead I argue that, even if a successful argument could be given for this inconsistency, this would not provide an adequate answer to “the normative question” (i.e., “why should I be moral?”). My defense of this claim emerges from a defense of a claim about Kant, namely, that he did not attempt to answer the normative question in this way. After carefully articulating Kant’s answer to the normative question, I argue that his answer to this question contains a lesson about why we should not embrace the approach that is popular among many contemporary Kantians.     

The Grounding of Identities

Philosophia - A popular stance amongst philosophers is one according to which, in Lewis’ words, “identity is utterly simple and unproblematic”. Building from Lewis’ famous...     

Feminist directions in medical ethics

I explore some new directions—suggested by feminism—for medical ethics and for philosophical ethics generally. Moral philosophers need to confront two issues. The first is deciding which moral issues merit attention. Questions which incorporate the perspectives of women need to be posed—e. g., about the unequal treatment of women in health care, about the roles of physician and nurse, and about relationship issues other than power struggles. “Crisis issues” currently dominate medical ethics, to the neglect of what I call “housekeeping issues.” The second issue is how philosophical moral debates are conducted, especially how ulterior motives influence our beliefs and arguments. Both what we select—and neglect—to study as well as the “games” we play may be sending a message as loud as the words we do speak on ethics.     

The Trolley’s Last Stop before Consequentialism: Exploring the Terrain

The doctrine of double effect and the many other principles that philosophers have advanced to remedy the doctrine’s defects were meant, in the words of Warren Quinn, "to capture certain kinds of fairly common intuitions about [a set of canonical] pairs of cases." Both cases in each pair “have the same consequential profile,” in that "agents bring about the same good result at the same cost in lives lost or harm suffered." But they exhibit differing deontological characteristics, leading the “common intuitions” to which Quinn refers to deem one but not the other case in each pair permissible. Over time, though, the body of cases has ballooned to embrace ever more complex situations about which intuitions are far less shared, and the principles advanced to explain those intuitions do not necessarily generate the “common” permissible/impermissible distinctions in each canonical pair. My goal is to offer a principle that does so, and to suggest that it reflects a unique deontology.     

Orienting ourselves to the gay penguin

This article analyzes the global proliferation of discourse about gay penguins in zoos. Based on internet-based representations, we identify a directional narrative logic of “gay penguin discourses” in which the ideal gay penguin comes out as gay, falls in love, follows natural desires to parent, and may marry as a reward. This discursive chain is animated by the zoo as institutional space of captivity, which incites human subjects to become agents in its reproduction. In contests over penguin actions and morality, zookeepers, gay activists, and conservative family groups reiterate a homonormative politics of identity through talk of discrimination and rights. To identify what makes this discourse seem real, we draw on Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology to analyze the composition of the zoo as the site of a particular “mode of address” that orients humans to adopt positions of authority, evaluation, and regulation. Three orientations—reason, emotion, and instinct—function as an assemblage whose elements connect and separate, such that when one orientation’s ability to explain penguin behaviors is exceeded, another orientation steps in or connects with the first to supply a logic that confirms the discursive chain for the ideal gay penguin and how humans can meet his needs. Locked into logics of hetero/homo, oriented through reason, instinct, and emotion, and interpellated through emotions, humans can imagine little more than an anthropocentric repetition of our own “progress.” The future, for humans and penguins, is secured.     

Lessons for experimental philosophy from the rise and “fall” of neurophilosophy

Experimental philosophy is a recent development whose broader aims and goals are still being debated. Some prominent experimental philosophers have articulated an attitude toward perennial philosophy that is reminiscent of an early explicitly defended goal of neurophilosophy, a field that predated experimental philosophy by at least one decade. But relative to that early goal, neurophilosophy quickly “fell” within broader philosophy, and came to assume its current status, a technical specialty within the philosophy of science (now more commonly referred to as “the philosophy of neuroscience”). In this paper I document the revolutionary goal of early neurophilosophy, provide a novel explanation of its “fall,” and suggest that analogous goals of some experimental philosophers set that field up for a similar “fall.” I document recent published evidence that experimental philosophy is trending in this direction.     

Behaviors and attitudes of normally developing children toward their intellectually disabled siblings

This study investigated behaviors of children who have normal development toward their siblings with intellectual disabilities. 9- to 17-year-old normally developing siblings (55 girls, 39 boys) of 94, 5- to 15-year-old mentally disabled children (51 girls, 43 boys) who were attending a special education and rehabilitation center were enrolled in the study. Data were gathered by using a general information form and the Schaeffer Sibling Behavior Rating Scale. Age of the disabled child did not have a significant effect on siblings' behaviors, while knowledge of family about the diagnosis and educational status of their child with intellectual disabilities affected sibling behaviors.     

Epistemic Rationality

Many epistemologists and philosophers of science, especially those with “naturalist” inclinations, argue that if there is to be any such thing as normativity or rationality in these domains, it must be instrumental—roughly, a matter of goal satisfaction—rather than something involving normative “oughts” that are independent of the satisfaction of our epistemic, cognitive, or other ends. This paper argues that while such an instrumental conception of epistemic rationality is perfectly respectable, even insofar as it concerns specifically epistemic ends, it cannot be the whole story about such normativity. Rather, it must be accompanied by a “categorical,” goal‐independent sort of normativity that cannot be reduced to instrumental rationality, both because instrumental rationality itself depends on a noninstrumental relationship between a belief/claim/theory and the evidence that renders it rational, and because the epistemic rationality of many beliefs is independent of the goals of their believers.     

Non‐Ideal Theorizing,Social Groups,and Knowledge of Oppression: A Response

In responding to Anderson, Tobin, and Mills, I focus on questions about non‐ideal theory, normative individualism, and standpoint theory. In particular, I ask whether feminist theorizing can be “liberal” and yet not embody the problematic forms of abstraction and individualism described in Challenging Liberalism. Ultimately, I call for methods of theorizing that illuminate and challenge oppressive social hierarchies.     

Systematicity is necessary but not sufficient: on the problem of facsimile science

Paul Hoyningen-Huene argues that what makes scientific knowledge special is its systematic character, and that this can be used to solve the demarcation problem. He labels this STDC: “Systematicity Theory’s Demarcation Criterion.” This paper argues that STDC fails, because there are areas of intellectual activity that are highly systematic, but that the great majority of scientists and historians and philosophers of science do not accept as scientific. These include homepathy, creationism, and climate change denial. I designate these activities “facsimile sciences” because they mimic the appearance of science but are not, by the standards of philosophers and scientists, scientific. This suggests that we need additional criteria to demarcate science from non-science and/ or nonsense.