Democratic pluralism and majority rule

Abstract

I argue that Metz’s undertaking, in seeking a ‘comprehensive basic norm’ to underpin African ethics, is similar to Hans Kelsen’s postulation of the Grundnorm in his Pure Theory of Law. But African ethics does not need to be underpinned by an approach such as Kelsen’s. In my view, Metz’s preference for seeking to develop a Grundnorm rests upon a failure to attend carefully to the distinctness of African ethical thinking from Western ethical thinking. This failure is manifest in a spurious distinction (on which Metz relies) between ‘moral anthropology’ / ‘cultural studies’ and ‘normative theory’. It is also manifest in Metz’s failure to attend carefully to the work of Wiredu and Bujo, both of whom present systematic, critical analyses of African ethical thinking while implicitly rejecting the quest for a Grund norm as being unAfrican.     

Truthfulness,risk, and trust in the late lectures of Michel Foucault

This paper argues that Foucault's late, unpublished lectures present a model for evaluating those ethical authorities who claim to speak truthfully. In response to those who argue that claims to truth are but claims to power, I argue that Foucault finds in ancient practices of parrhesia (fearless speech) a resource by which to assess modern authorities' claims in the absence of certain truth. My preliminary analytic framework for this model draws exclusively on my research of his unpublished lectures given at the Collège de France between 1982–84. I argue that this model proceeds in three stages: the truth‐teller is first established as independently authoritative, he is subsequently tested under conditions of risk, and the encounter concludes by generating trust and a relation of ‘care’ with the audience. Foucault's model results in an ‘aesthetics of existence’ organized around a set of ethical practices, and thus offers an alternative to other forms of ethical subjectivity. In so doing, this model also critiques the place for risk in liberal political institutions.     

On Hannah Arendt: The Worldly In-Between of Human Beings and its Ethical Consequences

Abstract

In this paper, I show how a concept of ethics can be derived from Hannah Arendt’s theory of action in The Human Condition, which contains from her call for action. When she looks at the ‘political actor’, as well as at the concept of ‘political situation’, her ethical claim is first of all the need to take initiative, to act. Hence, ‘political situations’ as she defines them are discussed as common responsibilities. But common responsibility is rooted in the in-between of human beings, rather than in individual human nature and is determined by Arendt’s principle of humanity. Therefore, at the centre of an implicit Arendtian ethics stands the world and the in-between of human beings.     

Irony,Embodiment, and the ‘critical Attitude’: Engaging Saba Mahmood's Critique of Secular Morality

At the intersection of feminism, postcolonial studies, and religious studies, this essay engages Saba Mahmood's critique of universalistic ethics and post-structural feminism. It contrasts Mahmood's ‘ethical embodiment’ with a concept of ‘ethical irony’, offering examples of the latter from literature (Brecht, Baudelaire) and cultural theory (Carolyn Steedman, Judith Butler, Michel Foucault). Its thesis is that ethical irony signifies modes of critical engagement that are not premised on notions of metaphysical subjectivity or abstract rules, but may nonetheless be cross-culturally translatable. One specific formulation of ethical irony considered concerns the figure of injurable bodies. At once material (bodily) and transcendental (unknown injuries from unknown sources, or the possibility of injury), injurable bodies the irreducibility of ethics to the purely abstract and the purely empirical. Finally, the defence of ethical irony speaks to the viability of upholding what Foucault called the ‘critical attitude’ as a cross-cultural norm.     

Was Schopenhauer a Kantian Ethicist?

ABSTRACT

Commentators have generally seen the compassionate person as a second-rate character vis-à-vis the ascetic ‘saint’ who denies the will-to-life and resigns from willing altogether in Schopenhauer's ethical thought. In this paper I offer another way to interpret Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion, which is textually grounded and genuinely Schopenhauerian, but which draws out similarities to Kant’s ethics that, I shall argue, have not been hitherto appreciated. Once these Kantian similarities are appreciated one sees that the compassionate person is no longer a runner up ethically and epistemically to the saint, rather, the compassionate person and the saint are at odds with each other, and really represent – unbeknownst to Schopenhauer himself–two distinct and incompatible ethical ideals.

To motivate this interpretation, I will first delineate the traditional interpretation of what Schopenhauer means by the compassionate person’s intuitive insight into the way the world really is. Second, I will offer a novel, and to my mind, textually preferable reading of what this intuitive insight consists in. Finally, I’ll suggest in light of recent work in metaethics by Colin Marshall – notably in his 2018 book titled Compassionate Moral Realism–that my interpretation of Schopenhauer’s ethics offers a creditable moral realist option for the contemporary landscape.     

Some aspects of medical ethics from the perspective of bioengineering

The problem of ethics in medical care as seen from the bioengineering results from the almost incredible technological achievements based on scientific research: On the one hand there is inadequate handling of technology and fear on the part of the patient; on the other hand there is admiration on the part of the physicians and the nursing staff. This article will survey the points of criticism concerning ethical behavior and will present and evaluate general problems of mechanization in medical care. General phenomena of human interaction, and especially problems related to medical care, will be discussed. It will be necessary to develop clinical medical technology, aiming primarily at ‘realizing the patient's concern’. After analyzing these concerns, it is necessary for the clinical medical engineer to develop an ‘invisible’ technology. Criteria for such an ‘invisible’ technology (function, design, automatic control, methods of implantation, whether chronic application is necessary) are being demonstrated by particular devices (artifical heart, functional electro-stimulation, diaphragmatic pace-maker).     

Levinasian Reflections on Somaticity and the Ethical Self

In this article, I attempt to bring some conceptual clarity to several key terms and foundational claims that make up Levinas's body‐based conception of ethics. Additionally, I explore ways that Levinas's arguments about the somatic basis of subjectivity and ethical relatedness receive support from recent empirical research. The paper proceeds in this way: First, I clarify Levinas's use of the terms “sensibility”, “subjectivity”, and “proximity” in Otherwise than Being: or Beyond Essence. Next, I argue for an interpretation of Levinas's thought that I suggest is buttressed by recent experimental work in both developmental psychology and neuroscience. I provide examples of research that I suggest opens up Levinas's phenomenological analysis in new and interesting ways. I also urge the importance of Levinas's phenomenological analysis in contextualizing the ethical significance of these empirical findings.     

Narrative identity,practical identity and ethical subjectivity

The narrative approach to identity has developed as a sophisticated philosophical response to the complexities and ambiguities of the human, lived situation, and is not – as has been naively suggested elsewhere – the imposition of a generic form of life or the attempt to imitate a fictional character. I argue that the narrative model of identity provides a more inclusive and exhaustive account of identity than the causal models employed by mainstream theorists of personal identity. Importantly for ethical subjectivity, the narrative model gives a central and irreducible role to the first-person perspective. I will draw the connection between narrative identity and ethical subjectivity by way of an exposition of work by Paul Ricoeur and Marya Schechtman, and a brief consideration of Korsgaard’s work on practical identity and normative ethics. I argue that the first-person perspective – the reflective structure of human consciousness – arises from human embodiment, and therefore the model of identity required of embodied consciousness is more complex and irreducibly first-personal than that provided in a causal account. What is required is a self-constitution model of identity: a narrative model of identity.     

Rethinking technology, revitalizing ethics: Overcoming barriers to ethical design

This paper explores the role of ethics in design. Traditionally, ethical questions have been seen as marginal issues in the design of technology. Part of the reason for this stems from the widely held notion of technology being “out of control.” This notion is a barrier to what I call “ethical design” because it implies that ethics has no role to play in the development of technology. This view, however, is challenged by recent work in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). Looking into the dynamics of technological change, STS scholars argue that human choices are present at every stage of a technology’s development and, furthermore, that human values are reflected in the very design of artifacts. This alternative view suggests that ethics can and should be included in the design process. Drawing on examples from the privacy arena. I point to some of the potential advantages of addressing ethical concerns early on in the design of a technology. I conclude with some general strategies for bringing ethics back into design. A version of this paper was presented at ETHICOMP98, the Fourth International Conference on Ethical Issues of Information Technology, March 25–27, 1998, Erasmus University, the Netherlands. Patrick Feng is a Ph.D. student in the Science and Technology Studies Department at Rensselaer. His research focuses on the development of technical standards that are designed to address social values such as privacy and trust.     

Kierkegaard,Repetition and Ethical Constancy

How can a person forge a stable ethical identity over time? On one view, ethical constancy means reapplying the same moral rules. On a rival view, it means continually adapting to one's ethical context in a way that allows one to be recognized as the same practical agent. Focusing on his thinking about repetition, I show how Kierkegaard offers a critical perspective on both these views. From this perspective, neither view can do justice to our vulnerability to certain kinds of crisis, in which our ethical self‐understanding is radically undermined. I further examine his alternative account of ethical constancy, by clarifying Kierkegaard's idea of a ‘second ethics’, as addressed to those who feel ethically powerless and as requiring an ongoing process of self‐transformation.     

Umwelt,food, and the limits of control

This paper draws on the work of the early 20th century ethologist Jakob von Uexküll to formulate a notion of food as a process of bodies becoming other bodies. I begin by situating my argument in relation to two strands of critical food research – feminist-inspired work on food and embodiment, and posthumanist approaches that focus on non-humans as mediators of food assemblages. I then discuss Uexküll's work, focusing on three key concepts: umwelt, “the island of the senses” that envelops each being; subjectivity as an intra- and intercorporeal phenomenon; and the variation among umwelten available to humans. These ideas, I contend, illustrate the inherently political nature of ‘food,’ which in turn calls for a realignment of food ethics and critical food scholarship. To illustrate this contention, I draw on my research with the Oklahoma Food Cooperative, considering this socio-ecological experiment as an effort to create a food system in better accord with the affective imperatives (or umwelten) of its constituent components. Throughout the paper, I develop the argument that food systems will always present limits to control by even those actors who seem to enjoy hegemonic positions. Uexküll's work helps us understand these limits in a way that allows critical analysis of dominant food systems and the alternatives proliferating in response to them, but does not prematurely foreclose the actual and virtual possibilities contained in the present heterogeneity of foodways.     

Possible competences to be aimed at in ethics education – Ethical competences highlighted in educational research journals

Abstract

The aim of this article is to present varieties of ethical competence that are highlighted in ethics and moral education research articles, and to discuss them in the light of competences stressed in the Swedish curriculum, understood as an example of ethics education in compulsory school. The material consists of 1,940 educational research articles published between 2000 and 2015, and the method of analysis is inductive, focusing on ethical competence. One finding is the similarity between the study’s tentative formulation of identified ethical competences in four categories, and Rest’s understanding of acting morally, captured in the four components: sensitivity, judgement, motivation and implementation. Based on the analysis of the articles, broader understandings of these focuses are developed, and later discussed in relation to Swedish ethics education, characterised as both a conservative and liberal values education. The analyses and comparison show the importance of the components of moral sensitivity and moral implementation and their relative absence in the Swedish curriculum, but also how moral judgement must include a competence to evaluate moral motivations, where empirically testable reasons are also central. Moreover, the risk of neglecting contextual, situational and knowledge-related aspects of ethical competence is highlighted.     

Historical undecidability: The Kantian background to Derrida’s politics1

This paper deals with Derrida’s analysis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment in his essay ‘Economimesis’. I argue that Derrida’s analysis of Kant’s aesthetics can be used to describe the aporia within Kantian politics between rebellion and progressive revolutionary acts. The focus of my argument falls on examining how the recent debate over Derrida’s ethics can be usefully considered from the background of this treatment of Kant. In particular, the analysis Derrida gives of Kant’s aesthetics commits him to a series of conceptual constraints that can be detected in his recent commentaries on ‘forgiveness’ and ‘hospitality’. I suggest that these recent commentaries on political topics also depart from his earlier practice of ethics in ‘Economimesis’ as a ‘witnessing’ of the particular. This departure can be clearly seen once the Kantian background to Derrida’s recent writing is set out.     

On Timothy Findley’s The Wars and Classrooms as Communities of Remembrance

In this paper I explore the connection between narrative ethics and the increasing emphasis on historical consciousness as a way to cultivate moral responsibility in history education. I use Timothy Findley’s World War I novel, The Wars, as an example of how teachers might help students to see history neither simply as a collection of artefacts from the past, nor as an effort to construct an objective view about what went on in those other times and places, but rather as something that makes ethical demands on us here and now. Theoretically, this paper draws on Adam Zachary Newton’s conception of narrative ethics and Roger Simon’s conception of historical consciousness, both of which rest on the Levinasian themes of irreducible difference, the face, and subjectivity as a position of ethical responsibility to and for the other.     

Moderation,morals, and meat

Meat‐eating as a human practice has been under ethical attack from philosophers such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan on both utilitarian and deontological grounds. An organicist ethic, on the other hand, recognizes that all life other than the primary producers, the plants, must feed on life. This essay affirms, with many environmental ethicists, the moralconsiderability of biota other than the human, but denies that this enlargement of the moral community beyond Homo sapiens necessarily precludes our eating of meat. First, absolute deontological arguments against meat‐eating are disputed, then utilitarian‐hedonistic arguments are shown not to be sufficient to require ethical vegetarianism. Both sorts of arguments have strengths, however, that set us on guard against current abuses in the meat‐raising and slaughtering industries. If the principle of ‘due respect’ for beings with different degrees of intrinsic value is honored, then moderate meat‐eating under reformed social practices can be seen as licit. Two final problems then require investigation: the problem of dietary justice for poor humans and the problem of ‘speciesism’. Dealing with the latter requires discussion of cannibalism and the ethics of humans being eaten by still higher ‘aliens’.     

Theological Ethics, Moral Philosophy, and Natural Law

The article deals with the relationship between theological ethics and moral philosophy. The former is seen as a theoretical reflection on Christian ethics, the latter as one on secular ethics. The main questions asked are: (1) Is there one and only one pre-theoretical knowledge about acting rightly? (2) Does philosophy provide us with the theoretical framework for understanding both Christian and secular ethics? Both questions are answered in the negative. In the course of argument, four positions are presented: theological ‘unificationism’, philosophical ‘unificationism’, theological ‘separationism’ and Lutheran ‘dualism’. It is argued that the latter position is most convincing. It is dual in the sense of being both a theory of Christian ethics and of including a recognition of natural law. Hence, it unites a particularistic and a universalistic point of view. In the last section a reformulation of the Lutheran position is attempted in making use of the ethical theory of Knud E. Løgstrup's The Ethical Demand.     

Analogies between al-Māturīdī’s and Duns Scotus’s Ethical Perspectives

Al-Māturīdī and Duns Scotus share an ethical paradigm that represents the middle ground between divine command and natural law theories in ethics. While al-Māturīdī’s theory can generally be located between Ash?arite divine command and Mu?tazilite natural law theories in Islamic ethics, Scotus’s theory can be placed between William of Ockham’s divine command and Thomas Aquinas’s natural law theories in Christian ethics. Although the starting point of their ethical perspectives is fundamentally based on criticism of natural law theory, neither theologian can be labelled as a typical divine command theorist. This moderate theory may therefore be described as the theory of soft divine command. The main purpose of this article is to draw attention to some similarities between al-Māturīdī’s and Duns Scotus’s ethical perspectives: First, both theologians highlight the composite picture of human nature in terms of morality. In other words, they posit that humans have two opposite tendencies: ‘affection for justice’ and ‘affection for advantage’. Second, although both theologians grant reason an ontological authority in determining what is good and bad, this authority is not limitless. Finally, both theologians argue that, unless one takes account of God’s freedom and wisdom, the moral order in the world cannot be fully comprehended.