Religious Organizations and Homosexuality: The Acceptance of Gays and Lesbians in American Congregations

The participation of gays and lesbians in all aspects of society is continually disputed in the United States. Religion is one of the key battlegrounds. The extent to which religious congregations include lesbians and gays in congregational life is vital to the wider debate over homosexuality because congregations consistently influence more Americans than any other voluntary social institution reported by Putnam (Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2000). Using nationally representative data from the 2006–2007 National Congregations Study this analysis investigates the level of acceptance of gays and lesbians within congregations as well as which congregations are most likely to allow lesbians and gays to become involved. I find that religious tradition, theological and political ideology, location, and demographic composition of congregations all influence the degree to which gays and lesbians are included into congregational life.     

Predicting electoral activism among gays and lesbians in the United States

Although battles over gay and lesbian rights have appeared prominently in political arenas, scholars have created few empirical studies on gay and lesbian activism. To address this absence, this quantitative study identified factors that inspired greater electoral engagement among gays and lesbians in the United States (n = 285). After integrating “resource,” “mobilizing,” and “framing” variables into regressions, this study found that electoral activism was inspired by many sorts of motivators. In sum, activist tendencies were swayed by educational levels, perceptions of political potency, a desire to conceal sexual orientations, surviving hate crimes, and joining certain political groups. Interestingly, this study supported “new social movement” theories that downplay economic factors as predictors of involvement in gay and lesbian rights campaigns.     

The Rhetoric of Homosexual Practice

Many Protestant denominations have or recently had policies that prohibit “self‐avowed practicing homosexuals” from being ordained. By only prohibiting “practicing” homosexuals, proponents of these policies claim that they do not discriminate against homosexuals as a group since, technically, a homosexual can still be ordained as long as she is “non‐practicing.” In other words, a condemnation of homosexual practice is not the same as a condemnation of homosexual persons. I argue that this is not the case; the rhetoric of homosexual practice does, in fact, amount to a condemnation of gays and lesbians. It does so by conflating the two things it claims to keep separate—homosexual conduct and homosexual identity. I demonstrate this conflation by analyzing the history of this rhetoric and how it has been adjudicated in church court decisions from the United Methodist Church and the Presbyterian Church (USA).     

Criminal law,multicultural jurisdictions and cultural evidence

This article investigates whether providing minority groups with power over criminal law can create injustices that target lesbians, gays and bisexuals within those groups. In order to carry out the task of evaluating to what extent providing power over criminal law to minority groups can result in negative consequences for lesbian, gay and bisexual individuals, this paper assesses the work of Ayelet Shachar. I contend that her model leaves lesbians, gays and bisexuals within minorities vulnerable because her division of jurisdictions collapses when put into practice; additionally, her principles do not provide normative guidance for avoiding jurisdictions that criminalise homosexuality, and that protect lesbian, gay and bisexual individuals from violence. This rejection of transformative accommodation, however, does not mean that cultural evidence is irrelevant for criminal procedures. Rather, I assert that cultural evidence is relevant for trials and including it does not jeopardise the interests of lesbian, gay and bisexual individuals.     

Religiousness,Religious Orientation,and Attitudes Towards Gays and Lesbians1

Two studies are reported that examine the relationships among religiousness, religious orientation, and prejudice toward gays and lesbians. Study 1 reports the results of a survey done for the purposes of scientific jury selection. These results suggest that Baptists, fundamentalists, and “Christians” display more antigay prejudice than do Catholics, Jews, and many Protestant denominations, but even many supporters of gay-tolerant religions show more antigay prejudice than those claiming no religious preference. Among those with a religious preference, frequency of worship is significantly related to antigay prejudice among those belonging to antigay denominations, but not among those belonging to more gay tolerant religious faiths. Study 2 reports the results of a study of college students regarding religiousness, religious orientation, and prejudice toward gays and lesbians. Results showed that self reported religiousness, frequency of worship, and Batson's internal and external scales were all positively correlated with measures of prejudice toward gays and lesbians, whereas scores on the Quest (Interactional) scale were negatively correlated. Results of both studies strongly challenge the view that those with an intrinsic religious orientation are unprejudiced. It is argued that a social influence process can account for the role played by religious practice and beliefs in creating and maintaining negative attitudes toward gays and lesbians.     

"Lesbians, gay men, and their parents": a critique of LaSala and the prevailing clinical "wisdom"

This article challenges the popular assumption that coming out to family of origin is important for lesbians and gay men's mental health and couple relationships. First, I present theory emphasizing the unique position of lesbians/gays in families of origin and the significance of "families of choice." Second, I review the quantitative research on social support received by lesbians/gays from family of origin, friends, and other social network sources. Third, I demonstrate how the dominant clinical opinion about coming out to family is based on an unwarranted use of theory developed for heterosexuals and on overgeneralization of findings from studies of white, upper-middle-class, North American lesbians/gays. Fourth, I propose five determinants of lesbian/gay persons' decisions to come out to family-of-origin members. Fifth, I argue that such decisions are constrained by "realistic" costs/benefits in various sociocultural niches rather than being a simple function of individuals' levels of differentiation. Lastly, I offer an expanded contextual stance for the family therapist working with lesbian/gay clients.     

Are Lesbians Women?

I argue that Mordque Wittig's view that lesbians are not women neglects the complexities involved in the composition of the category “woman.” I develop an articulation of the concept “woman” in the contemporary United States, with thirteen distinct defining characteristics, none of which are necessary nor sufficient. I argue that Wittig's emphasis on the material production of “woman” through the political regime of heterosexuality, however, is enormously fruitful for feminist and queer strategizing.     

The Primary Maternal Oedipal Situation and Female Homoerotic Desire

In this paper, I closely examine classical psychoanalytic theory on the female oedipal complex in order to shed light on same-sex object choice. Given that the mother is the first love object for the girl as well as for the boy, the girl's object relational constellation centrally involves the experience of homoeroticism as well as heteroeroticism. Yet, it remains a question as to whether a mother can see her daughter as a sexual subject; can mother–daughter homoerotic desire be experienced and validated by the mother? That a girl desires her mother is generally not seen or registered by the mother; it remains an unrecognized desire.

I suggest that the obscuring of female desire has to do centrally with the fate of eroticism in the early mother–daughter relationship. I propose relabeling the “negative oedipal complex” in girls as “the primary maternal oedipal situation.” Issues involving invisibility or stigmatization of one's erotic desire likely pose a significant challenge to the self–esteem of many lesbians. It is important in clinical work with lesbian patients to be open to a complex interweaving of developmental experiences, varying with each individual, some of which may have been damaging to, and others strengthening of, female sexuality.     

Gloria Anzaldúa's Affective Logic of Volverse Una

Although Gloria Anzaldúa's critical categories have steadily entered discussions in the field of philosophy, a lingering skepticism remains about her works’ ability to transcend the particularity of her lived experience. In an effort to respond to this attitude, I make Anzaldúa's corpus the center of philosophical analysis and posit that immanent to this work is a logic that lends it the unity of a critical philosophy that accounts for its concrete, multilayered character and shifting, creative force. I call this an “affective logic of volverse una.” Starting with the understanding of a situated modality of all subjectivity, Anzaldúa's work exhibits a logic of three moments distinguished by states of awareness. Each state of awareness is characterized by the generative degree of the subject's responses to its conditions: critical, individuating, and expansive. Led by her late concepts of conocimiento and nepantlera, I return to her earlier works and trace Anzaldúa's innovative exploration of undoing the oppressive condition of marginal subjectivities from “La Prieta” through Borderlands/La Frontera to her final published essay “now let us shift.” I find a liberatory schema of volverse una/becoming whole that is grounded in an active receptivity of sensibility and facilitated by affective technologies for transformation.     

Longing for the Feminine: Reflections on Love,Sexual Orientation,Individuation, and the Soul

This article is a collaboration that represents several years of dialogue about our topic, alongside the individual depth work done by each of us to overcome the negativities that often poison collaborations and feeling connections: envy, enmeshment, and passivity. It is the unique expression of two women working together in a co-creative process pulsed by feminine principles. Diane is a Jungian analyst and has spent her life close to the unconscious. Fran is a writer, educator, and lifelong student of mystical paths. The article gives an account of Diane's longing for the divine feminine and the particular meaning it has for her as a lesbian in this time of global upheaval. In particular, her story highlights the psychic suffering that individuals go through when their same-sex attractions and love orientation are judged as psychologically “immature” or religiously “sinful.” Neither Christian-based “conversion therapy” nor Jungian analysis turned Diane into a heterosexual woman. Her story reveals the benefit of Jung's depth psychology even as it underscores the singularity of every person's individuation process. The article's unusual format is a tandem of Diane's first-person sharing of her soul's journey and Fran's witnessing of the journey's profound significance. We found that both voices were needed. Truth requires not only the one who lives a journey with courage but also the one who witnesses it with a loving heart. Ultimately, we see the personal journeys of gays and lesbians as significant to the larger context of the evolution of human consciousness.     

Coping with Sexual Identity Stigma in the U.S. Military: An Examination of Identity Management Practices Prior to and After the Repeal of “Don’t Ask,Don’t Tell”

This study assesses the identity management strategies employed by gays, lesbians, and bisexuals in the U.S. military prior to and after the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” In-depth interviews were conducted with gay, lesbian, and bisexual service members and veterans. Data were analyzed using constant comparative analysis. Findings revealed that these service members made thoughtful and deliberate decisions about whether or not, and to whom, they would reveal their sexual identities. Identity concealment was practiced most often, even after the repeal, which was found to incite feelings of self-reproach, isolation, and stress. However, several new identity management strategies emerged after the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (i.e., strategies of openness) that stimulated positive self-feelings. By engaging in some level of openness, participants in this study were able to overcome some of the adverse effects of their minority stress.     

Philosophy and Feminism: The Case of Susan Bordo

In this paper I lay out what 1 take to be the crucial insights in Susan Bordo's “Feminist Skepticism and the ‘Maleness’ of Philosophy” and point out some additional difficulties with the skeptical position. I call attention to an ambiguity in the nature or content of the “maleness” of philosophy that Bordo identifies. Finally, I point out that, unlike some feminist skeptics, Bordo never loses sight in her work of women's lived experiences.     

“ONCE UPON A TIME THERE WAS AN S.S. OFFICER”: THE HOLOCAUST BETWEEN HISTORY AND FICTION IN ELSA MORANTE'S LA STORIA

The twentieth-century Italian Jewish novelist Elsa Morante's La Storia, published in 1974, is rarely included in the canon of Holocaust literature today, yet contains considerable content regarding the Italian experience of the Holocaust. In this essay I examine how Morante's proclaimed artistic principles, in particular her notion of “verità poetica”, “poetic truth”, and “storia”, “history” or “story”, affect her depiction of the Holocaust. I also trace what I term an “anxiety of absence” in La Storia, which I believe explains not only Morante's use of characters who are unreliable witnesses to the Holocaust as it unfolds in Rome, but also explains her ultimate swerve away from her artistic ideals and her problematic use of historical sources.     

Particularity and Perspective Taking: On Feminism and Habermas's Discourse Theory of Morality

Seyla Benhabib's critique of Jürgen Habermas's moral theory claims that his approach is not adequate for the needs of a feminist moral theory. I argue that her analysis is mistaken. I also show that Habermas's moral theory, properly understood, satisfies many of the conditions identified by feminist moral philosophers as necessary for an adequate moral theory. A discussion of the compatibility between the model of reciprocal perspective taking found in Habermas's moral theory and that found in Maria Lugones's essay “Playfulness,‘World’‐Travelling, and Loving Perception” reinforces the claim that his moral theory holds as yet unrecognized promise for feminist moral philosophy.     

Vitalizing Enactment: A Relational Exploration

Drawing from her extensive work with deeply disturbed children Alvarez (2012) theorized a form of intervention termed “vitalization” in which the analyst actively reaches out to contact and “reclaim” her most inaccessible patients, engaging them in the world of emotions and relationships. In this paper I consider Alvarez’s ideas through the lens of Relational thought, reconceptualizing vitalization as a unique form of enactment that can draw the analytic dyad from deadened impasse into enlivened contact. In vitalizing enactment embryonic affects, hopes, and longings find expression and are potentiated for patient and analyst alike. This is a view of enactment as a progressive and creative lived experience, rather than an unconscious collision to be survived and symbolized. I contextualize vitalizing enactment in relation to Alvarez’s original formulations as well as relevant contemporary theories and present a clinical vignette to illustrate this paper’s themes.     

Evidential Preemption

As a general rule, whenever a hearer is justified in forming the belief that p on the basis of a speaker’s testimony, she will also be justified in assuming that the speaker has formed her belief appropriately in light of a relevantly large and representative sample of the evidence that bears on p. In simpler terms, a justification for taking someone’s testimony entails a justification for trusting her assessment of the evidence. This introduces the possibility of what I will call “evidential preemption.” Evidential preemption occurs when a speaker, in addition to offering testimony that p, also warns the hearer of the likelihood that she will subsequently be confronted with apparently contrary evidence: this is done, however, not so as to encourage the hearer to temper her confidence in p in anticipation of that evidence, but rather to suggest that the (apparently) contrary evidence is in fact misleading evidence or evidence that has already been taken into account. Either way, the speaker is signalling to the hearer that the subsequent disclosure of this evidence will not require her to significantly revise her belief that p. Such preemption can effectively inoculate an audience against future contrary evidence, and thereby creates an opening for a form of exploitative manipulation that I will call “epistemic grooming.” Nonetheless, I argue, not all uses of evidential preemption are nefarious; it can also serve as an important tool for guiding epistemically limited agents though complex evidential scenarios.     

Rawls’s Principle of Justice as Fairness and Its Application to the Issue of Same-Sex Marriage

Abstract

This essay applies the principle of justice as fairness to the issue of same-sex marriage. I will outline Rawls’s theory of justice, including the original position and the veil of ignorance as the means by which choosers craft a just state. In considering whether same-sex marriage should be permissible, I argue that a just society, formulated in the Rawlsian context of justice as fairness, should allow them. I assert that gays and lesbians do count as equal citizens because they possess the minimum requirements of the capacity for a sense of justice, a conception of the good, and the ability to be cooperating members of society. Furthermore, within the original position gays and lesbians will be represented because choosers do not know their sexual orientation because it is one of the individual characteristics that are withheld behind the veil. Since the choosers do not know their sexual orientation, they will be unable to use that information in their construction of what counts as a just state comprised of free and equal citizens. Because the family, and the institution of marriage as a primary manifestation of the family, is one of the major social institutions within the basic structure, limitations must be carefully scrutinized.     

A Procedural,Contextual, Action-Focused Understanding: Response to Renn and Westerman

In this reply to comments by Paul Renn and Michael Westerman, I discuss the nature of relational discourse and the various meanings of multiplicity in the relational literature. In further discussing Mitchell’s (2000) case of Connie, cited also by Renn, I highlight the ways in which Mitchell understood that Connie’s sadness was perpetuated by the ways she communicated her feelings and needs in the present. I discuss Westerman’s participatory perspective in relation to Schafer’s action language, Shapiro’s emphasis on action and responsibility, and Dollard and Miller’s conceptualizations of repression as the active behavior of not-thinking certain thoughts. I examine as well Westerman’s distinction between “self and context” and “self-in-context” formulations in relation both to the cyclical psychodynamic point of view and his own case example.     

“I am NN”: A Reconstruction of Anscombe's “The First Person”

This paper develops a way of understanding G. E. M. Anscombe's essay “The First Person” at the heart of which are the following two ideas: first, that the point of her essay is to show that it is not possible for anyone to understand what they express with “I” as an Art des Gegebenseins—a way of thinking of an object that constitutes identifying knowledge of which object is being thought of; and second, that the argument through which her essay seeks to show this is itself first personal in character. Understanding Anscombe's essay in this light has the merit of showing much of what it says to be correct. But it sets us the task of saying what it is that we understand ourselves to express with “I” if not an Art des Gegebenseins, and in particular what it is that we understand ourselves to express with sentences with “I” as subject that might seem to express identity judgments, such as “I am NN”, and “I am this body”.