Catharine R. Stimpson:

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Catharine Macaulay on the Paradox of Paternal Authority in Hobbesian Politics

Catharine Macaulay's first political pamphlet, “Loose remarks on certain positions to be found in Mr. Hobbes's philosophical rudiments of government and society with a short sketch for a democratical form of government in a letter to Signor Paoli,” published in London in 1769, has received no significant scholarly attention in over two hundred years. It is of primary interest because of the light it sheds on Macaulay's critique of patriarchal politics, which helps to establish a new line of thinking about the historian as an early feminist writer. It appears she was working from an unauthorized edition of the Thomas Hobbes's De Cive (1647) entitled Philosophicall Rudiments of Government and Society, printed by a royalist bookseller in London 1651. Some errors in this translation may explain Macaulay's skewed understanding of Hobbess argument in support of the premises of monarchy. Her intriguing analysis of paternal authority in “Loose Remarks” anticipates recent feminist explorations of Hobbesian political thought.     

An Odd Coupling: Nietzsche and W.E.B. Du Bois on 21st Century Philosophy of Education

Studies in Philosophy and Education - This essay contrasts Nietzsche’s remarks on elite education with W.E.B. Du Bois’ demand for democratized education. The essay takes their remarks...     

Odd Couplets: CPE, Journaling, and Spiritual Poetry

It is argued that concepts of what is poetryand what is a journalare broader than might be considered and vital to the spirit of I AM in us. It begins with word derivations that shed light on conceptual connections that might otherwise be missed. Through the author's CPE experience, the I AM of what we do, write, and feel manifests: Creation connected to Creator as Co-Creator, explored through a wide variety of word-arts under five (5) themes: I AM, empty/full, birth/death, bridges, and the path of unknowing. Conclusion: We are I AM and I AM is us.     

Multiculturalism and Equal Human Dignity: An Essay on Bhikhu Parekh

Bhikhu Parekh is an internationally renowned political theorist. His work on identity and multiculturalism is unquestionably thoughtful and nuanced, benefiting from a tremendous depth of knowledge of particular cases. Despite his work’s many virtues, however, the normative justification for Parekh’s recommendations is at times vague or ambiguous. In this essay, I argue that a close reading of his work, in particular his magnum opus Rethinking Multiculturalism and the selfproclaimed “sequel” A New Politics of Identity, reveals that his claims frequently rely upon a Kantian account of moral dialogue and indeed moral personhood that he remains unwilling to claim. Recognizing this latent Kantianism is essential to a thorough assessment of Parekh’s work on identity, and his criticisms of other theorists. It is only because of his ambiguity that his multiculturalism is able to avoid the sort of charges that he levels against other responses to diversity, including those of such authors as Rawls, Habermas, Kymlicka, and Raz.     

公正与效率的均衡分析——兼论社会主义基本价值追求

公正与效率是构建社会价值体系的两个最基本要素,二者的均衡发展是人类社会演进的内驱力,也是人类社会进程中的应然状态,理应成为社会主义基本价值追求的目标.     

Equal Opportunity Programs: A Case for Counseling

The Civil Rights Act of 1964, under Title VI, requires that institutions of higher education submit enrollment figures according to ethnic breakdown for federal monies to be allocated. Such requirements are indicative of efforts to diversify student populations. The Higher Education Act of 1965 also incorporates a number of related programs—Supplemental Opportunity Grants, College Work Study, Talent Search, Upward-Bound—which are designed to provide direct or indirect assistance to disadvantaged students. (Gordon, 1975)     

Equal performance but distinct behaviors: sex differences in a novel object recognition task and spatial maze in a highly social cichlid fish

Animal Cognition - Sex differences in behavior and cognition can be driven by differential selection pressures from the environment and in the underlying neuromolecular mechanisms of...     

The Value in Equal Opportunity: Reply to Kershnar

abstract Stephen Kershnar (2004) recently argues that under its most plausible interpretation, equality of opportunity is simply not something worth pursuing; at least, not for itself. In this paper I try to show that even if we accept Kershnar's characterisation of equality of opportunity in terms of weighted aggregate chances, none of his objections succeed. Opportunities, not outcomes, are the appropriate focus of EO advocates; hedonic treadmills are irrelevant to the issue; we do not need to assume general equality in some attribute to ground equality of opportunity; finally, it is possible to show that it is permissible to promote EO at some cost to other independent values.     

尊严平等与关怀:女性主义生命伦理学

女性主义生命伦理学试图从根本上颠覆男尊女卑的传统伦理观念,倡导从制度层面确保女性独立的社会地位,捍卫女性权利与尊严.女性主义生命伦理学还以其特有的关怀主义特征,呼吁性别平等,强调人文关怀,注重社会公平,成为构建和谐社会的重要理论思潮.     

Com-Posting Experimental Futures: Pragmatists Making (Odd)Kin with New Materialists

Studies in Philosophy and Education - Here I craft a case for recognizing the roots and patterns that ground the possibility of contemporary com-posting—as outlined in Donna Haraway’s...     

On Equal Citizenship and Public Reason: Reply to Critics

In writing Equal Citizenship and Public Reason, we aimed to show that political liberalism is a feminist liberalism. To that end, we develop and defend a particular understanding of the commitments of political liberalism. Then, we argue that certain laws and policies are needed to protect and secure the interests of persons as free and equal citizens. We focus on the laws and policies that we think are necessary for gender justice. In particular, we apply our view to the contexts of prostitution law, family and marriage law, state support for caregivers, and religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. In this article, we consider some of the challenges made by the thoughtful critics who are part of this symposium. In particular, we address: why the collective enterprise view of liberal democracy requires shared reasons for the justification of certain laws and policies; how we understand substantive equality and why our understanding of substantive equality does not commit us to a comprehensive doctrine; how we avoid defending a particular political conception of justice in showing that political liberalism is a feminist liberalism; and how it is that, given justice pluralism, public reasons can provide stability for the right reasons.     

Capability as Opportunity: How Amartya Sen Revises Equal Opportunity

Although the concept of equal opportunity has received scant attention from theological ethics, it attracts widespread approval in the U.S. popular culture and has been examined extensively by contemporary moral philosophy. Amartya Sen's conception of capabilities as "freedom" or "real opportunity" corrects deficiencies in both popular and philosophical conceptions of equal opportunity that ignore interpersonal variations in mental, physical, and psychological abilities beyond agents' control. Recent theologically informed conceptions of love and common grace affirm and revise Sen's conception of equal capability as equal opportunity. The resulting understanding of equal opportunity is quite different from some uses of this concept and could be an important criterion for a just society.